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Abstract 
Despite their importance in. France and Europe in the sixteenth century, the Guise have received 
little archival study from historians this century. This thesis overturns the myths that have 
surrounded the family as a result of this neglect, and re-evaluates the political aims of the Guise. 
They were not confined in their interests to eastern France; they possessed lands in provinces as 
diverse as Provence and Brittany. Moreover, they were a family with a truly European strategy with 
concerns in Scotland, Italy and the Empire. The Norman lands of the Guise were the wealthiest 
possessions of the family and provided an important base for Guise intervention in Scotland. 
This thesis traces the development and dynamics of the Guise affinity in Normandy, 
composed of clients, servants and kinsmen. There was a volatile relationship between patron and 
client, and the Guise regularly sought the advice and opinions of their clients in council when 
formulating family strategy. This strategy was one primarily concerned with family interest and not 
blinded by devotion to religious dogma; the Guise protected their Calvinist kinsmen and employed 
Calvinist servants on their estates. The position of the Guise in the popular imagination and the 
relationship between elite politics and the masses was highly complex. The Guise manipulated 
religious passions in factional manoeuvring at court and as early as 1562 established a catholic 
peasant league in Normandy. However, the Guise could only exploit, not control, popular forces. 
The research for this thesis was undertaken in Paris and Rouen over fifteen months. It 
attempts to construct the personnel and relationships that constituted an affinity by harnessing 
quantitative data drawn from gendarmerie musters, household accounts, legal and financial 
transactions to the more conventional sources of letters and memoirs. For example, the 
uncatalogued notarial records of Rouen demonstrate that the correlation between the heavy 
financial investment made by Guise clients in the city elite and the growth of the ultra-catholic 
faction in the city. 
The ambitions of the Guise are still misinterpreted because research has been hindered 
the by the prejudices of monarchical apologists, liberal nationalist and protestant historians. This 
thesis uses new archival material to show that the Guise pursued strategies and defended their 
interests within the context of sixteenth-century noble culture and aspirations, challenging 
assumptions about the role of monarchical power and the rise of the 'state'. 
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A Note on Usage 
As far as possible French words have been left in the original and italicised. The exceptions being 
some familiar and easily recognisable words which have remained either non-italicised (e. g. 
parlement) or rendered in their English form (e. g. admiral). All titles and seigneurial jurisdictions 
have been left in the French and remain non-italicised whereas the names of most offices, 
institutions and royal administrative jurisdictions have been left in the French but italicised. The 
English form has been adopted for the names of French provinces. The punctuation and spelling 
of quotations has been left in the original form and all dates are in the new style. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
11 
Affinity and Ctfentage 
During the last fifteen years historians have begun to re-examine the traditional view of early 
modern France, which emphasised the decline of the power of particularist interests in the face of 
the growing centralisation and bureaucratisation of the state. Political and institutional history has 
now been explored within its contemporary cultural and social context. Consequently a new 
understanding of political culture and structures of power has emerged, stressing the continued 
importance of personal power relationships over bureaucracy as a means of exercising authority. 
The new historiography emphasises the continuing vitality of particularist interests and especially 
the enduring preponderant role played by the nobility in France. ' The power of the greater nobles 
was evident through their monopoly of patronage, and authority was exercised by means of the 
large clientage networks that they constructed. 
In simple terms clientage is "an unequal, vertical alliance between a superior and an inferior 
based on reciprocal exchange. The reciprocity of the exchange was an obiligation. 0 This form of 
social organisation usually involved the exchange of service and loyalty in return for patronage and 
protection. This schema for understanding noble relationships has drawn heavily on the works of 
sociologists and social anthropologists who have studied social structures in developing societies. ` 
The reliance of historians on models has led to the simplification of noble relationships in early 
modern France. Recently, Kristen Neuschel has admirably demonstrated that the strict model of 
clientage, stressing dependency and hierarchy, does not correspond to the actual behaviour 
patterns of sixteenth-century noblemen. 5 Her study of the prince de Conde and the Picard nobility 
emphasises the non-hierarchical and non-exclusive nature of noble relations and the high degree 
of autonomy shown by clients. Noble relationships were not characterised by patron-client relations 
For example, see R. Harding, Anatomy of a Power Elite: the Provincial Governors of Early 
Modern France, New Haven and London, 1978; W. Beik, Absolutism and Society in 
Seventeenth-Century France: State Power and Provincial Aristocracy in Languedoc, 
Cambridge, 1985; S. Kettering, Patrons, Brokers and Clients in Seventeenth-Century 
France, Oxford, 1986; R. Mettam, Power and Faction in Louis XIV's France, London, 1988. 
On the sixteenth-century nobility and especially their continuing economic power, see J. 
Wood, The Nobility of the Election of Bayeux, 1463-1660: Continuity through Change, 
Princeton, 1980; J. Dewald, The Formation of a Provincial Nobility: The Magistrates of the 
Parlement of Rouen, 1499-1610, Princeton, 1980; A. Jouanna, Le devoir de rdvolte: la 
noblesse frangaise et la gestation de l'Etat moderne, 1559-1661, Paris, 1989; J. R. Major, 
"Noble Income, Inflation and the Wars of Religion in France", American Historical Review, 
1981. 
S. Kettering, "Friendship and Clientage in Early Modern France", French History, 1992, pp 
145-6. 
A good example is S. N. Eisenstadt and L. Rodger, "Patron-Client Relationships as a 
Model of Structuring Social Exchange", Comparative Studies in Society and History, 1980. 
K. Neuschel, Word of Honor: Interpreting Noble Culture in Sixteenth-Century France, Ithaca 
and London, 1989, especially chapter one. 
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bonded by material exchanges but were distinguished by the daily exchange of honour, courtesy 
and mutual recognition. All nobles took part in these exchanges and there was no exclusiveness 
about the bonds and ties of personal relationships; there were no rigid, hierarchical and distinct 
clientage networks. It is clear from Neuschel's study that models have been too stringently applied, 
as they fail accurately to explain the behaviour of noblemen. Conversely, the autonomous 
behaviour of the noblemen that Neuschel depicts does not present an accurate picture of all noble 
relationships. Many of the noblemen whom she describes in her study are allies in a common 
cause with Conde rather than clients in his service. Clearly Condd's clientele was part of a faction 
made up of many elements and its composition was constantly shifting .6 
This study argues that noble relationships were complex and that there were a multitude 
of links and bonds among noblemen that varied in strength over time and according to 
circumstance. 7 Relationships were founded on the basis of kinship, paid service, clientage and 
alliances in a faction. From this study it will become clear that it is impossible to categorise simply 
relationships among noblemen. Some links were ephemeral and based on opportunism while it is 
easy to find evidence of one family serving another faithfully over several generations. A new 
schema is needed to encompass the complexity of these relations and this study will employ the 
term affinity 8 Affinities have most accurately been described as forming concentric circles, each 
ring representing a different strength of relationship .9 At the core of an affinity the nobleman was 
surrounded by his most trusted friends, servants and kinsmen, who gave counsel and dominated 
the household. Outside this elite were the paid servants: the judicial and administrative officials who 
administered the patrimony and constituted the military retinue which followed the patron. The wider 
affinity of the patron was dynamic and fluid in its composition, consisting of clients, neighbours, 
vassals, amis and alliEs who were largely autonomous of his control. Affinities varied in size, 
depending on the social status of the lord. He acted like a pole of attraction -a magnet for those 
seeking favours and service. Since there were a multitude of poles of attraction, each of varying 
strengths, loyalties were not constant but fluctuated in strength over time and according to 
circumstance. 
By the fifteenth century in both England and France, feudalism, here meaning the 
organisation of military service based on tenure, had been replaced by a new form of social 
organisation, usually referred to as Bastard Feudalism, founded on payment for service. However, 
s On the fluid nature of factions, see E. W. Ives, Faction in Tudor England, London, 1979. 
C. Carpenter, "The Beauchamp affinity: a study of bastard feudalism at work", English 
Historical Review, 1980, p 518, has argued that this "sea of varying relationships" was a 
more stable phenomenon than hitherto supposed. 
The term affinity has already employed with regard to sixteenth-century France, see M. 
Greengrass, "Noble Affinities in Early Modern France: The Case of Henri I de 
Montmorency, Constable of France", European History Quarterly, 1986. However, the 
author fails to explain the terminology. 
9 G. L. Harriss, in K. B. McFarlane, England in the Fifteenth Century, London, 1981, p xi. 
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traditional loyalties based on tenure and locality remained and were not completely replaced by the 
cash nexus. 1° Long before the rigidly hierarchical model of clientage, as applied to sixteenth- 
century France, had come under attack, K. B. McFarlane had explored the diffuse nature of power 
In fifteenth-century England. He saw affinities as "loose and as yet unhardened by any organisation; 
they could clearly dissolve, not merely because a magnate couldn't find pasture enough for his 
clients, but because they didn't agree with the line he was taking". " It was evident to McFarlane 
that "clients are likely to have influenced the policy of their lords as much as he could influence 
theirs". 12 The local studies of noble affinities which McFarlane called for, in order to understand 
the structure of Bastard Feudalism have flourished and expanded our understanding. Kristen 
Neuschel's work on the prince de Condos and the Picard nobility remains the only substantial 
investigation into the relationship between a magnate and his clients in sixteenth-century France. 
The main flaw in her analysis is to be found on her reliance on letters as the prime source for the 
study of noble relationships. 13 A letter was a forum for the exchange of courtesies and a mutual 
recognition of honour. However, since the language of sixteenth-century letters was stylised and 
the exchange of courtesies was universal, letters alone cannot be accurate examples of the nature 
and strength of noble relationships. What a noble wrote and what he thought and did were often 
entirely different. 14 This study attempts to investigate noble relationships by illustrating the extent 
to which clients followed the wishes of and acted on behalf of their patrons, using letters in 
conjunction with other sources. Legal contracts provide an excellent means of tracing the 
involvement of clients and servants in the financial and administrative affairs of their patron. These 
documents, bereft of the formulas of address found in letters, reveal the nature of service and its 
rewards and the exchange of tangible benefits. Thus in 1555 Jean du Bosc, sieur d'Emendreville, 
presidentof the courdes aides in Rouen and future Huguenot leader of 1562, gave a house to the 
connctable, Anne de Montmorency, "recognoysans des bienffaictz receuz par ledict seigneur 
desmentreville dudit seigneur. '5 Important legal agreements, such as the sale of rentes, contracts 
of marriage and the creation of wardships, involved only the most trusted clients and kinsmen of 
the parties concerned. These documents provide much more trustworthy insights into the dynamics 
10 Regional variations and the absence of studies of affinities in fifteenth-century France 
makes generalisation difficult. For some preliminary considerations, see P. S. Lewis, 
"Decayed and Non-Feudalism in Later Medieval France", Bulletin of the Institute of 
Historical Research, 1964. On England, see K. B. McFarlane, "Bastard Feudalism", in 
England in the Fifteenth Century. 
K. B. McFarlane, The Nobility of Later Medieval England, Oxford, 1973, pp 293-4. 
12 Ibid, p 294. 
13 Neuschel, Word of Honor, especially chapters three and four. 
14 The conventions of exchanges of honour in letters mirror the conventions of life at court 
in which dissimulation and role-playing were parts of everyday life, see S. Greenblatt, 
Renaissance Self-Fashioning from More to Shakespeare, Chicago, 1980, pp 12-15. 
15 ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1,310,8 January 1555. 
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of the patron-client relationship than letters, since they involve more than exchanges of courtesies. 
The analysis of military retinues is vital to establishing the composition of an affinity. In 
fifteenth-century England this is facilitated by the survival of contracts of service called 
indentures. 16 While maintained retinues declined as a feature of the Tudor polity, they remained 
an integral part of French society into the sixteenth century. Indeed, the companies of the 
ordonnance, established in 1445, soon evolved into armed retinues maintained by noblemen for 
royal service at the king's expense. The profession of arms in the companies became increasingly 
important to the furtherance of noble careers. During the sixteenth century French noble culture 
remained a warrior culture, contrasting with the de-militarisation of English society. " The muster 
rolls of the companies of the ordonnance and other units are therefore an important and still vastly 
under used source for a quantitative analysis of a lord's following. 
Finally, this study attempts to portray the importance of collective decision making in family 
strategy. Historians of the early modern French nobility have ignored the importance of councils in 
the administering of family affairs. Councils and not individuals formulated all aspects of family 
strategy, from financial management to political calculation. The concept of giving counsel as a key 
element of noble culture and its importance as a means of binding an affinity has been ignored by 
the majority of historians of sixteenth-century France. "' 
Above all, the Wars of Religion afford an excellent opportunity to study how affinities 
functioned, since it is possible, by building a prosopography of an aff inity and with detailed attention 
to the narrative of political events, to examine the behaviour and activities of clients, servants and 
allies. The existence of a civil war in France enables the historian to study the dynamics of an 
affinity, and study the nature of a nobleman's following and the political support it provided. The 
relationship between the Guise family and their affinity in Normandy provides an excellent 
opportunity to explore the motives, interests and strategies of a great nobleman and his following. 
The Guise and Historians 
Writing a history of the Guise family is complicated by the nature of primary sources which, 
in supporting their own sectional interests, are hostile to the Guise. The problem has been further 
exacerbated by generations of historians, judging the Guise according to the values and prejudices 
of their own times. After the fall of the Catholic League Henri IV tried to promote a policy of 
16 Non-feudal contracts for life service in later medieval France are discussed in Lewis, 
"Decayed and Non-Feudalism in Later Medieval France". 
17 The change of military service from an obligation into a profession is considered in P. 
Contamine, Guerre, etat et sociEte A la fin du moyen age, Paris, 1972, pp 550-1. 
18 For some preliminary work on noble councils in later medieval England, see C. Rawcliffe, 
The Staffords, Earls of Stafford and Dukes of Buckingham, 1394-1521, Cambridge, 1978, 
chapter eight. 
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reconciliation, expunging memories of the bitterness and hatreds of the civil wars. "' The burning 
of League documents and pamphlets was a symbol of this process, but the destruction of evidence 
has hindered the understanding of the Catholic League and reinforced the tendency of 
historiography to represent the perspective and prejudices of the victors. 
The Guise had numerous enemies during the Wars of Religion and it is important to read 
the works of monarchical and protestant propagandists with caution 20 These works are inaccurate 
and tend to identify all their enemies and ultramontane catholics as 'Guisards'. By the mid- 
seventeenth century analogies were being made between contemporary political instability caused 
by aristocratic factionalism, and the history of the Guise family. Mdzeray, writing at the height of 
the Fronde, saw all the present woes of the French polity as originating from the factionalism of the 
late sixteenth century? ' Louis Maimbourg, in his Histoire du Calvinisme and Histoire de la Ligue, 
aimed to demonstrate to Louis XIV that religious militancy was a natural harbinger of rebellion. The 
pernicious nature of religious zeal was juxtaposed to the greatness of Henri IV who had found a 
via media? z The Guise were portrayed as working, with the connivance of Spain and the pope, 
to form a Catholic League from as early as 1563.23 By the eighteenth century the sinister myth 
of the Guise family had gained wide acceptance? ` The hero worship of Henri IV reached new 
proportions with Voltaire who drew heavily on the historical works of Maimbourg and Mezeray. To 
Voltaire, Henri IV represented the triumph of reason over both religious superstition and the self- 
seeking tyranny of aristocratic factionalism. In La Henriade, Voltaire imagined Henri contrasting his 
own magnificent exploits with those of the Guise: 
Ces chefs ambitieux d'un peuple trop creduie, 
Couvrant leurs inter@ts des cieux, 
Ont conduit dans le piege un peuple furieux, 
Ont arme contre moi sa piete cruelle25 
19 M. Greengrass, France in the Age of Henry IV: The Struggle for Stability, London, 1984, 
pp 61-2. 
20 The best examples of history as propaganda are to be found in the works of Louis Regnier, 
sieur de La Planche, who was strongly pro-Montmorency and anti-Guisard, see his Histoire 
de I'Estat de France taut de la republique que de la religion sous le regne de Francois 11, 
1576, and La Legende de Charles, Cardinal de Lorraine et de ses frdres de la maison de 
Guise, descrite par Frangois de lisle, Reims, 1576. 
21 W. H. Evans, M6zeray et la conception de / histoire de France au XVllr, Paris, 1930, pp 
164-5. 
22 L. Maimbourg, Histoire de la Ligue, Paris, 1684, pp 3-5. 
23 Ibid, pp 13-15. 
24 Saint-Simon spoke of "cette ambition et cet esprit qui leur a dtd si terriblement propre", 
see, Memoires, A. de Boislisle (ed), 43 vols, Paris, 1881-1930, vol III, p 61. 
25 Voltaire, Oeuvres completes, W. H. Barber et al (eds), Geneva, 1968-, vol II, pp 392-3. 
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By the time of the Revolution, the Guise were valuable examples of the self-serving aristocrat, 
"toujours les ennemies de la Nation et des Rois" 28 
The notion of a family driven by unbridled ambition is one that had its roots in the anti- 
Guise propaganda of the late sixteenth century. It was also a factor prominent in the writings of 
liberal-nationalist historians of the nineteenth century who admonished the Guise for putting family 
interest before the integrity of the patrie. As one historian put it, "Henri de Guise voulut devenir 
maitre de France en se plagant au dehors dans la dependance du roi d'Espagne. "2' Histories of 
the Guise since the mid-nineteenth century have gone a long way to illuminating their political 
strategy. More recently there has been a reassessment of the political role and religious beliefs of 
the cardinal de Lorraine, which has shown the complexity of family strategy and differences among 
Individual family members 23 However, the orthodox view of the family and the myths that surround 
it have failed to disappear. Every noble family in sixteenth-century France was fighting for survival 
in a harsh and competitive world. The honour of the family came before everything and all families 
strove to maintain their status and prestige. However, N. M. Sutherland reduces the complexity of 
family strategies into the naive portraits of admiral Coligny as a virtuous crusader for his faith, 
comparing him to the villainous cardinal de Lorraine, the "evil genius" of the House of Guise who 
is "cowardly, avaricious and mean and quite unscrupulous in the pursuit of restless ambition" 
2° 
It will be argued here that such stereotypes are invalid as are such terms as 'ambition' used in its 
pejorative sense, since all nobles were primarily preoccupied with and aggressively pursued their 
family interest. Family strategy was formulated with the counsel of kinsmen and clients. Only by 
studying the interaction between the Guise and their clients can the political strategies and motives 
of the family be understood, compensating for the propaganda of its enemies and the prejudices 
of historians. 
Studies of the Guise have usually centred upon their political and religious motives and role 
in court politics 30 These works cover inadequately the relation between the Guise and the 
monarchy and there has been little discussion of their provincial power base, aside from simple lists 
26 Des Crimes Commis par les Princes Lorrains Depuis leur etablissement en France 
jusqu'aujourd'hui, Lausanne, 1789, p 14. 
27 J. de Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe 11,2 vols, Paris, 1866, vol I, p 227. 
26 H. 0. Evennett, The Cardinal of Lorraine and the Council of Trent, Cambridge, 1930; D. 
Nugent, Ecumenism in the Age of the Reformation: The Colloquy of Poissy, Cambridge 
Mass., 1974; S. C. Shannon, "The Political Activity of Francois de Lorraine, duc de Guise 
(1559-1563): From Military Hero to Catholic Leader", unpub. PhD thesis, Univ. Boston, 
1988. 
2D N. M. Sutherland, The French Secretaries of State in the Age of Catherine de Medici, 
London, 1962, p 56. The malicious and overbearing nature of Guise power is a feature of 
all Sutherland's work and is discussed more fully in chapter five below. 
30 R. de Bouille, Histoire des ducs de Guise, 4 vols, Paris, 1849-50; H. Fomeron, Les ducs 
de Guise et leur epoque, 2 vols, Paris, 1877; J. -M. Constant, Les Guises, Paris, 1984; 
Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe ll. 
17 
of the offices and seigneuries they possessed 31 This reflects the preoccupation that historians 
have always had with the fortunes of the monarchy and the development of royal power at the 
expense of the nobility. Politics, as this thesis attempts to show, cannot be studied only with 
reference to the monarchy. Political society cannot be reduced simply to the grand events and great 
figures. In sixteenth-century France politics was a routine preoccupation, concerned with the 
protection and furtherance of family and particularist interests. A feature of early modem France 
was the ability of local conflicts to destabilise monarchical authority and become a focal point 
around which factions might coalesce. During the Wars of Religion inter-communal religious 
violence had a damaging effect on royal power. 32 However, little is known about the relationship 
between elite and popular politics and how factions at court involved themselves with provincial 
disputes. 
Lucien Romier, writing earlier this century, divided France on the eve of the Wars of 
Religion into territorial spheres of influence: the Guise preeminent in the eastern provinces and the 
Montmorency in the Ile-de-France 33 He makes no mention of any Guise presence in Normandy. 
Recent scholarship has overturned such simplification which designated a dominant role to the 
Guise in Champagne, the Montmorency around Paris and the Bourbon-Vendbme in the South- 
West. The Bourbon were, for example, considerable landholders in Picardy. 34 Anne de 
Montmorency was governor of Languedoc and was succeeded by his son, Henri. Nevertheless, 
some confusion remains in modern historiography's When Claude I de Lorraine (1496-1550), 
comte de Guise and d'Aumale, established himself at the French court his landed interest was 
scattered. He installed his family seat quite naturally at Joinville in Champagne, close to the land 
of his birth and where he possessed many seigneuries. By the time of his death in 1550 Claude 
had lands in Picardy, the Ile-de France, the Maine, Provence and Normandy, in addition to those 
in Champagne. ' Claude's importance in Champagne was further enhanced by his position as 
governor from 1524 until 1543. Thereafter he was governor of Burgundy until his death in 1550. 
The small town of Guise from which the family took its patrimonial name and which was raised from 
a comte to a duche-pairie in 1527 in favour of Claude, is situated in Picardy 38 Claude's lands in 
31 Bouilld, I, pp 46,219. 
32 P. Benedict, Rouen during the Wars of Religion, Cambridge, 1980. 
3' L. Romier, Le royaume de Catherine de Medicis: La France h la veille des guerres de 
religion ,2 vols, Paris, 1922, vol I, pp 206-18. 
34 Neuschel, Word of Honor, pp 26-8. 
35 R. Briggs, Early Modern France 1560-1715, Oxford, 1977 p 15, states without any 
reference that the Guise had considerable influence in Brittany. 
36 Bouilld, I, p 219. 
37 Harding, Anatomy of a Power Elite, p 222. 
38 Anselme, III, p 478. In the Thierache to be precise. 
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the Maine - the baronies of Mayenne, L'Abbd, La Ferte Bernard and the chatellenies of Ervde and 
Portmain - were erected into a marquisate in 1514. Thus Claude's landholding concerns were not 
confined to a single province, but were truly those of a northern and eastern French magnate. 
The approach of this study has been to outline in chapters two and three the growth, nature 
and composition of the Guise affinity in Normandy. The subsequent four chapters attempt to explain 
and describe family strategies and those of its clients during the Wars of Religion. A study of 
Normandy has many advantages over one of Champagne, traditionally seen as the power base 
of the Guise. Normandy had its own parlement and provincial Estates whose records permit the 
investigation of Guise clients acting on behalf of their patrons. Normandy was a key province for 
both the protestants and the monarchy. Calvinism was initially strong in the province and the 
existence of a Guise landed power base was to have adverse effects on the consolidation of the 
reformed faith. Normandy provided a disproportionately large share of royal income, and the 
financial importance of the province increased during the Wars of Religion as royal control of other 
provinces decreased. During the wars of the Catholic League the province had immense strategic 
and financial importance, and the strength of the Guise affinity in Normandy was vital to the 
success of the League. As princes etrangers the Guise had a truly European family strategy, and 
Normandy provided a base for the Guise in sustaining their dynastic interests in Scotland. Chapters 
four and six below demonstrate how the Guise affinity in Normandy facilitated the logistical support 
of family strategy in Scotland. 
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Chapter Two 
The Rise of the House of Lorraine in Normandy 
from the Fifteenth to the Mid-Sixteenth Century 
20 
By 1570 the Guise were the largest landholders in upper Normandy. This is attributable to 
favourable marriages and eminence at the court of Henri Il (1547-59). The family was able to create 
and maintain kinship and political alliances with other Norman magnates, thereby augmenting their 
own contacts and credit in the province. However, the Guise were not outsiders or newcomers. 
Well before the accession of Henri II in 1547 they could claim a strong territorial and historical 
interest in Normandy. Indeed, the relationship between the elder branch of the House of Lorraine 
and Normandy dates back to the early fifteenth century. 
The Harcourt Inheritance 
In 1420 Rend I d'Anjou (1409-80), comte de Guise, the second son of Louis II king of Naples, Sicily 
and con-de de Provence married Isabel (d. 1453) duchesse de Lorraine, oldest daughter and heiress 
of Charles I, due de Lorraine. When the due de Lorraine died in 1430 Antoine, comte de 
Vaudemont, a cadet of the House of Lorraine, claimed the ducal title through the male line in 
opposition to the Angevin succession. This inheritance was of immense political importance - the 
Angevin claimant was naturally supported by the French and the Vaudemont had the support of 
the Burgundians. At Bulgneville in 1431 the Angevins were defeated and Rend was captured. He 
was constrained to pay a huge ransom and had to marry Yolande, his daughter, to Ferry, the eldest 
son of the Comte de Vaudemont. In 1473, when the last male descendant of Rend I died, the ducal 
inheritance passed to the comtes de Vaudemont, represented by the celebrated Rend Ii son of 
Ferry de Vauddmont and Yolande d'Anjou. ' 
The connection of the comtes de Vaudemont with Normandy began in 1417 when Marie 
d'Harcourt married Antoine, comte de Vaudemont, the victor of Bulgndville. Marie's father, Jean 
d'Harcourt, represented the last of the direct male line of the greatest of all Norman families. On 
his deathbed in 1452, his lands in Normandy were divided between his two daughters, Marie and 
Jeanne. This was a considerable inheritance, consisting of the comtes of Harcourt and Aumale, 
the chätellenies of Lillebonne and Gravengon, the baronies of Brionne, Elbeuf, Saussaye and 
Routout and the barony of Mayenne in the Maine. Under Norman law Marie enjoyed possession 
of all these lands by droit d'ainesse, pending a partage. Her second son, Jean de Lorraine, took 
the title comte d'Harcourt and was active in Charles VII's reconquest of Normandy, playing a full 
part in Norman politics in the 1450s and 1460s. He supported Charles, due de Berry, against Louis 
Anselme, I, p 231; BouilI6, I, pp 33-7. Rents was finally released from captivity in 1437 and, 
after unsuccessfully pursuing the Neapolitan crown, he retired from public life in 1452, 
leaving his lands to his sons. 
2 C. -M. Bost, Les seigneurs de Lillebonne, Luneray, 1987, p 99. 
Anselme, V, pp 130,134. Harcourt was raised to a comte in 1338 and consisted of the 
chatellenies of Harcourt, Brionne, Boissay-le-Chatel, Elbeut, Lillebonne and Gravengon. In 
the sixteenth century Lillebonne and Brionne are referred to as vicomtes or even comtds 
in their own right. 
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XI in the War of the Public Weal. For a brief time the leaguers were successful against Louis, Berry 
received the duchy of Normandy as an apanage and Jean de Lorraine was well rewarded for his 
support. He was an important member of Berry's ephemeral ducal court and was created marechal 
hereditale of Normandy. Jean's period in authority was shortlived as Berry's regime succumbed to 
a resurgent Louis. Although Jean had died childless and was buried at La Saussaye near Elbeuf 
in 1472, he was nevertheless the first member of the House of Lorraine to hold a position of power 
in Normandy. His inheritance was administered by his mother, who died four years later. 4 This 
prized inheritance now passed back to the ducal house of Lorraine, to Jean's nephew, Rene II, son 
of Ferry and Yolande d'Anjou. Rene II de Lorraine-Vaudemont became duc de Lorraine when the 
last Angevin heir to the duchy died in 1473, and was the means by which the duchy of Lorraine 
was reunited with the dynasty of Lorraine, having been in Angevin possession for fifty years. 5 
However, Rene inherited not only substantial properties in Normandy, but also an inheritance 
complicated by a lawsuit over the partition between between his grandmother, Marie d'Harcourt, 
and her younger sister Jeanne, wife of Jean IV de Rieux. In 1493 the case was finally judged and 
in 1496 an accord was drawn up between the two families in which Rene gained the baronies of 
Elbeuf and Brionne and the comte of Aumale. The Rieux received the comt6 of Harcourt itself as 
well as rentes assigned on the revenues of Ren6's portion. The title of the comte d'Harcourt was 
to remain indivisible and was subsequently used by both families. 
The duc de Lorraine's presence in Normandy had already been reinforced in 1471 when 
Rene married Jeanne d'Harcourt, comtesse de Tancarville. This marriage was designed to reinforce 
his links with France against the overbearing presence of Charles the Bold, Jeanne d'Harcourt 
came from a cadet branch of the family and was daughter of Guillaume and Yolande de Laval. ' 
In 1485 Rene repudiated his wife because she was "petite bossue et incapable d'avoir des enfants" 
- he later remarried Philippe de Gueldres B His abandoned wife died in 1488 and instituted as her 
heir Francois I d'Orleans, comte de Dunois. This added to his extensive Norman lands, which 
included the comt6 (later duchy) of Longueville. From the early sixteenth century, the Guise were 
to form a close kinship alliance with these other great Norman landowners. 
The House of Lorraine was an ally of the Valois monarchy up to the end of the fifteenth 
° GA. da La Roque, Histoire genealogique de la maison d'Harcourt, 4 vols, n. p., 1662, vol 
I, p 461; H. -M. Saint-Denis, Notices historiques sur les communes des environs d'Elbeuf, 
8 vols, Elbeuf, 1885-90, vol II, p 33. I am grateful to Gareth Prosser for additional 
information on Jean de Lorraine. 
R. -L. Moulierac-Lamoureux, Le roi Renes, ou les hasards du destin, (1409-1480), Avignon, 
1980, p 125. The last Angevin duc de Lorraine, Nicholas, grandson of Rene I, died on 27 
July 1473. 
6 The dispute and its resolution can be followed in La Roque, Histoire genealogique de la 
maison d'Harcourt, I, pp 473-9. 
G. Martin, Histoire et gOnOalogie de la maison d Harcourt, St. Etienne, 1971, pp 90-1. 
e Ansetme, VIII, pp 450-1, V, p 138. 
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century and beyond. This relationship was strengthened further when Rend II sent three of his sons 
to the court of Louis XII in 1501. The Valois were particularly committed to this alliance as their 
conflict with the Habsburgs intensified. Rend's fourth surviving son, Frangois, was sent to claim his 
father's lands in Provence, dying in French service at the siege of Pavia in 1524.9 The third son 
Jean (1498-1550) was the founder of the Guise ecclesiastical dynasty, becoming archbishop of 
Reims and cardinal de Lorraine. The eldest brother, Antoine, became duc de Lorraine. However, 
it is the second son of Rend and Philippe de Geuldres, Claude I de Lorraine (1496-1550), who 
received the majority of the family's landed interest in France. 
Claude I was raised at the French court, naturalised French in 1506 and inherited his 
father's French lands, scattered all over northern and eastern France in 1508.10 He established 
his seat at Joinville in easy reach of both Nancy, ancestral seat of the House of Lorraine, and Paris. 
Claude's status grew steadily during the reign of Francois I since the Lorraine alliance was highly 
valued. Although Claude was not one of the king's intimates he was a favourite of the queen 
mother, Louise de Savoie and, following the disastrous defeat at Pavia, in which Francois was 
captured, he became a leading member of the regency council headed by his patron. He was well 
rewarded for his services, receiving the office of grand veneur and obtaining the elevation of the 
comtd of Guise to a duch6-pairie in 1527. The major offices Claude received reflected his ancestral 
links with the East and the desire of the Valois that the House of Lorraine should protect the 
sensitive eastern frontier. Thus he was governor of Champagne from 1524 until 1543 and 
subsequently of Burgundy from 1543 until his death in 1550. " Claude had already significantly 
augmented his own status by marrying in 1513 Antoinette de Bourbon (1494-1583). She was the 
eldest daughter of Francois de Bourbon, comte de Vend6me and de Saint Pol and Marie de 
Luxembourg, and the sister of Charles de Bourbon, duc de Vend6me (1489-1537). '2 By 1540 this 
cadet branch of the House of Lorraine had reached something of a peak, in terms of credit at court. 
Claude had, only two years previously, married his eldest daughter Marie to James V of Scotland. 
As Claude aged and his military capacities declined so his influence at court waned. Moreover, in 
the twilight years of his reign Francois I turned to new set of advisers, consequently Claude's sons 
moved closer to the Dauphin. 13 
The early 1540s is therefore a convenient time, with the Guise at a peak, to examine the 
family landholding interest in Normandy, reflecting its position in the first haft of the sixteenth 
century before the great accumulation of influence on the accession of Henri II. We are able to 
Chenaye-Desbois, XII, p 395. 
10 Bouille, I, p 46; Constant, Les Guises, p 21. 
" Harding, Anatomy of a Power Elite, pp 221-2. 
12 Anselme, I, p 328. Charles duc de Vendome was the father of Antoine de Navarre, Charles 
cardinal de Bourbon and Louis prince de Conde. 
13 Constant, Les Guises, p 22. 
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follow the pattern of Guise landholding through the extant accounts of 1542, which recorded all 
landed and extraordinary income for the year. " 
Seigneury Amount 
livres sous deniers 
comte of Aumale 7,883 2 4 
barony of Elbeuf 4,286 12 8 
seigneury of Quatremares 806 15 
seigneury of Routout 771 15 
seigneury of Groslay 455 
seigneury of Beaumesnil 1,875 17 11 
total 16,079 1 11 
Table 2.1 Income from the Guise lands In Normandy, 1542 
The overall income of the Guise in 1542, including extraordinary revenue like pensions, was 64,9231 
Os 8d. '5 This figure compares very favourably with the level of noble income in the sixteenth 
century. The average income of the major princely houses in the period 1589-1624 has been 
calculated at 73,00006 If one accounts for sixty years of inflation, it is plain to see that Claude I, 
duc de Guise, possessed, not only the lineage, but the income to maintain himself in the highest 
caste of French society. Moreover, nearly 24 per cent of his income came from his lands in 
Normandy, representing 40 per cent of landed income - the comt6 of Aumale being the single most 
important title in terms of revenue. " Thus Normandy constituted an important part of Claude's 
total income, although his preoccupations and certainly his historical roots were in eastern France. 
He resided at Joinville and his governorships were in two eastern border provinces. Furthermore, 
in the same account of 1542 not a single Norman noble was in the household of the of the duke, 
" BN, Ms Fr, 8182, fos 323-7; Bouille, I, pp 536-45. 
15 BN, Ms Fr, 8182, to 345. 
to Neuschel, Word of Honor, p 139. Guise income compared favourably with Bourbon landed 
wealth in Picardy, see D. Potter, "The Luxembourg Inheritance: The House of Bourbon and 
its Lands in Northern France during the Sixteenth Century", French History, 1992. 
17 One must use this account with some caution. For example, the landed receipts do not 
tally to the figure shown in the document and some lands, notably those in Provence, do 
not figure in the account at all. Secondly, the total income includes 8,4561 for the upkeep 
and pension of the duc de Longveville, grandson and ward of the duc de Guise. A break 
down of the landed income by province as a percentage of total income would look like 
this, the figure in brackets represents the value in terms of landed income only: Picardy 4% 
(7%), Normandy 24% (40%), Champagne 13% (21 %), duchy of Bar 12% (20%), the Maine 
14% (23%). 
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nor pensioned by him. 18 
The paucity of evidence prevents a full exploration of the activities of the duc de Guise in 
Normandy during the early sixteenth century. Guise clients in Normandy were more likely to be 
involved in the management of estates and the protection of their patrimony in the law courts than 
to be prominent moyenne noblesse in the military retinues of the family. Claude Le Roux, sieur de 
Tilly, conseiller in the parlement from 1521 until his death in 1536, besides being a magistrate for 
the Guise in the comt6 of Aumale, handled their affairs in the parlement. 19 The best 
recommendation for employment always came from a trusted kinsman, and the Le Roux had a 
history of serving the House of Lorraine. Claude Le Roux's father, Guillaume, had been vicomte 
of Elbeuf, procureur of Rene II de Lorraine and consefller in the 6chiquer of Rouen in 1499. His 
grandfather was titled intendant and secretaire of Marie d'Harcourt and vicomte of Elbeuf, and he 
received a gift of 200 Ecus on her death. 20 Rene II inherited these Norman counsellors. Thus 
Guillaume de Franqueville, who was the beneficiary of 50 Ecus on the death of Marie d'Harcourt, 
was later a signatory of the accord of 1496, which ended the conflict over the Harcourt 
inheritance. 1 Rene himself had little time for Norman affairs and therefore delegated responsibility 
to Jean d'Orglandes (d. 1515), chambellan and governor of his lands In Normandy. 
Continuity of service from father to son was maintained from the fifteenth to the sixteenth 
centuries, reinforcing loyalty and trust. The Le Roux, having served Marie d'Harcourt, provide the 
first of many examples of the Guise inheriting servants and clients from families with whom they 
were linked by marriage. The Le Roux proved faithful servants and were well patronised by the 
Guise. Guillaume Le Roux (d. 1532), elder brother of Claude, was made abbot of Aumale in 1517. 
Another brother Nicholas (d. 1561), also a conseiller in the parlement, was abbot in 1548. The 
type of relationship that existed between this family and the Guise, is revealed by a letter from 
Claude Le Roux to Antoinette de Bourbon in 1524 in which he pleaded for a benefice in Aumale: 
in favour of Master Martin Bretel, a lawyer in the parlement, who has employed 
himself and continues to employ himself in watching over your affairs in this 
province. For a long time he was a servant of the late lord Bourgetheroulde 
[Guillaume Le Roux], underwhose direction he worked hard and diligently pursuing 
'B BN, Ms Fr 8182, fo 353. 
19 Dewald, The Formation of a Provincial Nobility, p 91. For the letters of Claude Le Roux to 
the Guise, see BN, Ms Fr, 20649, fos 166-9. 
20 Frondeville, Presidents, p 294; La Roque, Histoire genealogique de la maison d'Harcourt, 
I, p 458. 
21 La Roque, Histoire genealogique de la maison d'Harcourt, I, pp 459,479. 
22 La Roque, Histoire genealogique de la maison d Harcourt, I, p 479; Chenaye-Desbois, XV, 
p 206. 
23 E. Semichon, Histoire de /a vflle d'Aumale, 2 vols, Paris, 1862, vol II, p 53-4. 
25 
your lawsuits? ` 
The Le Roux were a conduit for Guise patronage in Normandy, and the means by which their 
influence was extended, aided by the Le Roux's local knowledge and contacts. After all, the Le 
Roux were perhaps the most important noblesse de robe family in late fifteenth and early sixteenth 
century Rouen 25 
Control of ecclesiastical patronage was at the heart of Guise power throughout the 
sixteenth century. They enjoyed, like many lords, the right of appointment to church posts within 
their seigneuries. It was under Jean cardinal de Lorraine that the foundations of a formidable 
ecclesiastical empire were laid, which flourished under his nephew Charles de Lorraine (1525-75), 
second son of Claude duc de Guise. In 1550 Jean was in possession of six abbeys and six 
dioceses. ' The most prestigious benefice in France was the archbishopric of Reims, which 
conferred the title premier pair de France and which Jean ascended to in 1533.2' The Guise 
enjoyed the fruits of the two richest abbeys in Normandy. Jean was made abbot of Fecamp in 1523 
and on his death it passed into the possession of his nephew, Charles. Louis (d. 1578), the fourth 
son of Claude and Antoinette de Bourbon, was cardinal de Guise and abbot of Bec in Normandy 
from 1558 until 1572.8 It was during the reign of Henri II that the empire was extended and 
consolidated. After his accession, Charles de Lorraine was raised to the cardinalate, became an 
important member of the conseil du roi and was made chancellor of the order of Saint-Michel. 
Charles's status on the highest royal council, the conseil des Maires, was second only to that of 
Anne de Montmorency' In 1559 the abbey of Bec was valued at 19,5001 of revenue per 
annum 30 There are no figures available for Fecamp, situated on the Channel coast between Le 
Havre and Dieppe, but it was one of the richest foundations in France. In the late seventeenth 
century it was estimated to be worth nearly double the annual revenue of Bec 3' Therefore it 
would be no exaggeration to claim that the annual revenue of these two benefices combined 
touched on 50,0001- a vast sum of money, almost equalling the entire income of the duc de Guise 
in 1542. Thus Bouilie was not exaggerating when he stated that the Guise, in the mid-sixteenth 
24 Quoted in Dewald, The Formation of a Provincial Nobility, p 89. 
25 Their wealth is attested to by the building of the renaissance h6tel de Bourgetheroulde. 
26 J. Bergin, "The Decline and Fall of the House of the Guise as an Ecclesiastical Dynasty", 
Historical Journal, 1982, pp 782-3. 
27 Anselme, II, p 70. 
28 A. A. Por6e, Histoire de I'abbaye de Sec, 2 vols, Evreux, 1901, vol II, p 338. 
29 F. Baumgartner, Henry 11, King of France 1547-1559, Durham and London, 1988, pp 50-2. 
30 Por6e, Histoire de ! 'abbaye de Bec, II, pp 345,354. This rose to 22,0001 in 1568 and 
24,0001 in 1576. 
31 G. Hurpin (ed), L'Intendance de Rouen en 1698, Paris, 1984, p 45. 
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century, were worth collectively 600,0001, Charles cardinal de Lorraine accounting for half this 
figure? Whatever the exact figures, the importance of ecclesiastical wealth to the fortunes of the 
Guise cannot be underestimated. 
Within Normandy the administering of the estates of Bec and Fdcamp and the patronage 
they afforded, provided the Guise with the opportunity to extend their influence. The continuing 
Guise domination of ecclesiastical patronage, established during the reign of Henri 11, was 
maintained by resigning benefices to other family members or to faithful clients. Thus there was a 
continuity which enabled the same patronage structure and clientele to remain. In 1572 Louis, 
cardinal de Guise, resigned Bec in favour of his nephew, Claude de Lorraine (1562-91), chevalier 
d'Aumale, the second son of Claude (1526-73), duc d'Aumale. The chevalier d'Aumale was also 
abbot of Aumale and on the death of his uncle in 1578, received several other lucrative abbeys 3` 
Fdcamp also remained firmly in the grip of the Guise throughout the sixteenth century. It was 
resigned by the cardinal de Lorraine on his death to his nephew Louis II, cardinal de Guise. Guise 
monopoly of these lucrative abbeys only ended with the murder of Louis 11 at Blois by Henri III and 
the death of the chevalier d'Aumale at the battle of Senlis in 1591.35 The patronage available to 
the abbot of Fecamp alone was formidable. The abbey possessed the right to appoint to the 
captaincy of the town and its jurisdiction extended over 12 priories and 29 churches of the diocese 
of Rouen, in addition it was patron of 43 churches in the diocese. The temporal of the abbey 
consisted of nine baronies, all with high justice appealing directly to the parlement of Rouen. Until 
the mid-seventeenth century most monks came from aristocratic families, thus "les families nobles 
du Pays de Caux, empdchees de partager leur bien par coutume de Caux, trouvees lä leurs cadets 
un "debouche" commode" 36 
As de facto heads of the French church the Guise became magnets, attracting offers of 
service from all over France and beyond. Before establishing a core of servants in Normandy, they 
were able to forge close links with the existing Norman ecclesiastical hierarchy. For example, the 
Le Veneur were an established ecclesiastical family well before the Guise reached their ascendant 
position in the church. Gabriel Le Veneur (1517-74), bishop of Evreux, had a close relationship with 
Charles, cardinal de Lorraine. Gabriel's great uncle, Jean IV Le Veneur (d. 1543), became a 
cardinal in 1533, having been bishop of Lisieux and abbot of Bec and Mont Saint-Michel. Another 
uncle, Ambrose Le Veneur, bishop of Evreux from 1511 until 1531, was the last bishop to be 
32 Bouille, I, p 223. 
33 Poree, Histoire de l'abbaye de Bec, I, p 354. 
34 See chapter six below. 
3,5 Bergin, "The Decline and Fall of the House of Guise as an Ecclesiastical Dynasty", pp 786- 
9. 
36 G. Lemarchand, "Le temporel et les revenues de I'abbaye de F6camp pendant le XVII' et 
le XVIII' siecle", Annales de Normandie, 1965, p 525; A. Hellot, F6camp au temps de la 
Ligue: la legende de Boisrozc. Yvetot, 1897, p 5. 
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elected by the chapter. " As these elections decreased and church appointments became the 
preserve of the elite, so local candidates depended increasingly on the favour of the mighty for 
advancement. This process was most evident during the reign of Henri II, when the king used 
episcopal appointments to reward his allies in Italy, undoubtedly with the approval of the Guise. 38 
By 1560 Gabriel Le Veneur was closely associated wth the cardinal de Lorraine, becoming, on the 
resignation of the cardinal, chancellor of the order of Saint-Michel 39 It may have been through the 
good offices of the Guise that Gabriel received the abbey of Jumieges near Rouen in 1549, since 
the man who resigned was the cardinal of Ferrara, brother-in-law of Frangois de Lorraine, duc de 
Guise. 40 At the funeral of Henri II Gabriel assisted the cardinal de Lorraine in the capacity of sous 
diacre and in 1562 he accompanied the cardinal to the council of Trent. At his death in 1574 he 
was the most important churchman in Normandy; bishop of Evreux and abbot of Jumieges, N6tre- 
Dame de Lyre, Saint-Evroult and Saint-Taurin" The fact that Gabriel's elder brother was 
reportedly "fort aimd du duc de Guise" was also a reason for the continued prosperity of the Le 
Veneur. `2 
Despite the prominence of the Le Veneur, the archbishop of Rouen was the most important 
prelate in Normandy. The see was held continuously from 1550 by Charles cardinal de Bourbon, 
until his death in 1590`3 Charles de Bourbon-Vendome was a prince of the blood, the younger 
brother of Antoine, king of Navarre, and some years older than Louis, prince de Conde. The 
alliance that was forged between the Guise and the cardinal de Bourbon was the product of years 
of cooperation and friendship, which later became the pivotal axis of the ultra-catholic faction. The 
role played by the cardinal in this faction cannot be overstated, chiefly because of his status as a 
prince of the blood. He was later hailed by the Catholic League as Charles X, king of France. In 
addition to being archbishop of Rouen, the cardinal possessed a number of other benefices in 
Normandy - he was abbot both of Jumieges (on the death of Le Veneur) and Saint-Ouen de 
Rouen. Thus the choicest abbeys in Normandy were reserved exclusively for himself and the 
Guise. Through this alliance the Guise extended their contacts with Normans and augmented their 
37 G. Bonnenfant, Histoire generale du diocese d'Evreux, 2 vols, Paris, 1933, vol I, p 131; D. 
B. F., II, p 1358. 
38 F. Baumgartner, "Henry II's Italian Bishops: A study of the use and abuse of the Concordat 
of Bologna", Sixteenth Century Journal, 1980, pp 49-58. In 1557,25 per cent of bishops 
were Italian, many of whom were Florentines close to the queen. The Guise had their own 
Italian ambitions, having inherited the Angevin claim to the kingdom of Naples 
39 BM, Collection Leber, 5176, fo 4. 
ao L. Jouen, Jumieges, Rouen, 1925, pp 62-3. 
" Bonnenfant, Histoire general du diocese d'Evreux, Ip 133. 
42 BN, Dossiers Bleus, 661, to 1. 
43 E. Saulnier, Le We politique du Cardinal de Bourbon (Charles X. ) 1523-1590, Paris, 1912, 
p 9. 
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influence In the province. The cardinal de Bourbon had amicable relations with the cardinal de 
Lorraine. In their youth they had attended the College de Navarre together and it was through the 
good offices of Lorraine that Bourbon received his cardinal's hat. Bourbon always remained on 
good terms with the Guise and, unlike his brothers, never wavered in his faith. As the Wars of 
Religion dragged on, he moved further into open alliances with the Guise and by 1574 had severed 
contacts with his nephews Conde and Navarre 4° 
The Breze and Rieux Inheritances 
Following the precedent of the Le Roux family, it is clear that the Guise drew on a pool of proven 
servants who in some cases had been in the service of the House of Lorraine since the fifteenth 
century. These fifteenth century foundations were built upon and strengthened in the mid-sixteenth 
century. Members of the Guise family married into substantial families, whose landholding base and 
power was firmly Norman in character. These marriages greatly enlarged Guise possessions in 
Normandy and subsequently their credit. None of this would have happened without the accession 
of Henri 11 in 1547. Their credit with the new king created the conditions in which the sons of 
Claude duc de Guise would prosper. 
When Henri came to the throne there was a palace revolution. His father's most trusted 
councillors, the cardinal de Tournon and the admiral, Claude d'Annebaut (d. 1552), were banished. 
One royal mistress, the duchesse d'Etampes, was replaced by another, Diane de Poitiers, 
Buchesse de Valentinois. Henri recalled Anne de Montmorency, the connetable and Pvt him 
A. chaýýcý rv4atý'KC ýes.. 'S As an individual, Montmorency had no equal as a confidant and 
intimate of the king. The Guise were also well rewarded. Frangois de Lorraine, the eldest son of 
the duc de Guise, was admitted to the conseil des affaires, along with his younger brother Charles 
and made governor of Dauphine. Before his father's death in 1550 Francois was known as the 
comte d'Aumale and this was raised to a duchd-pairie soon after the new monarch's accession. "' 
The collective influence of the brothers far surpassed that of their father who rarely appeared at 
court any more. Yet they never reached the same level of trust or intimacy that marked 
Montmorency's relationship with Henri. The duchesse de Valentinois also understood this special 
relationship and moved towards the Guise in order to bolster her own position with the king. By 
patronising the Guise she hoped to balance her lover's dependence on Montmorency. " 
The relationship with Diane was to lead to a fundamental shift in the Guise position in 
Normandy. The duchess was the widow of Louis de Breze (1473-1531), grand senechal and 
44 Ibid, p 86. 
45 Baumgartner, Henry 11, pp 43-8. 
46 Francois became duc de Guise on the death of his father in 1550. The third son Claude 
II, formerly marquis de Mayenne, received the duchy of Aumale. 
41 Constant, Les Guises, p 23. 
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governor of Normandy from 1526 until 1531`8 Since the 1450s the Brez6 had been dominant 
figures in Norman society. During his lifetime Louis was the most important Norman nobleman 
reflected by his large affinity and landholding interest, which Diane preserved on his death . 
41' Their 
marriage produced two daughters, Frangoise and Louise. In 1539 the elder, Francoise, married 
Robert IV de La Marck, duc de Bouillon (d. 1556). 50 The La Marck were, like the Guise, proteges 
of the duchess during the reign of Henri II. Included in the dowry was the barony of Bec-Crespin 
and the comt6 of Maulevrier in the pays de Caux. 
In the same year that Henri II succeeded to the throne, Diane cemented her alliance with 
the Guise by marrying her other daughter, Louise, to Claude lI de Lorraine, marquis de Mayenne 
and later duc d'Aumale, third son of Claude duc de Guise. D'Aumale's rapid rise from the third son 
of a princely house, to the establishment of his own branch of the House of Lorraine and elevated 
status at court, was largely due to the patronage of his mother-in-law. The dowry included the 
wealthy barony of Mauny, bordering the Seine just downstream from Rouen 5' In June 1561, after 
the duchess retired from court, the remainder of the Breze inheritance was partitioned amongst the 
daughters. This was achieved definitively after her death in 1566 Louise and Claude received 
the largest share in the partition. This included the major prize of Anet with its magnificent 
renaissance chateau, the normal residence of the duchess. Anet was adjoined by the baronies of 
Ivry, Garennes, Breval and Montchauvet, which lie on the river Eure, separating Normandy from 
the Ile-de-France. Anet was to become the usual residence for the duc d'Aumale. When sold in the 
SýNti 
early seventeenth century these lands fetched the considerable, of 500,0001, equal to an 
annual value of 20,0001 which was nearly a third of the yearly income of a prince in the period 
1589-1624.63 In 1562 Claude II further extended his territories in Normandy when he purchased 
Bec Crespin from his nephew, Henri-Robert de La Marck, duc de Bouillon, son of Robert and 
Frangoise de Breze -5` In 1564 Claude bought two small fiefs in the bailliage of Rouen for 
48 Harding, Anatomy of a Power Elite, p 225. 
49 D. B. F., VII, pp 258-9. 
50 J. de Chestret de Hanneffe, Histoire de la maison de La Marck y compris les ClEves de 
la seconde race, Liege, 1898, pp 175-6. 
s' BN, Na Fr, 21165, to 70. Homage of Alain Bellebarbe to "haut puissant prince Claude duc 
d'Aumale, baron de Mauny ä cause de sa femme Louise de Brezel", 1553. 
52 F: J. Maudit, Histoire d'Ivry-la-Bataille et de l'abbaye de Notre Dame d'lvry, Evreux, 1899, 
p 230. 
53 Maudit, Histoire d'Ivry-la-Bataille, pp 282-3; Neuschel, Word of Honor, p 139. D'Aumale 
also received the comtd of Saint-Vallier in Dauphine. 
54 A. Lechevalier, Notice historique sur les barons et la baronnie du Bec, Paris, 1898, p 12. 
D' Aumale also purchased the comte of Maulevrier from him in the 1550s, although the title 
was used by both families, see ADSM, J, 138, Documents concernant le comtd de 
Maulevrier, 1468-1779. 
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23,0001. Having inherited the duchy of Aumale on the death of his father in 1550 and acquired 
or purchased most of the Brezel inheritance, Claude was by 1566 one of the largest landowners 
in Normandy. Despite the extensive campaigning against the Habsburgs in the 1550s Claude spent 
a lot of time in his adopted province - the first member of the House of Lorraine to do so since Jean 
de Lorraine one hundred years previously. Claude's residence was at Mauny, transferring to Anet 
on the death of Diane de Poitiers. 56 Furthermore, from 1557 until 1559 Claude was bailli of Caen, 
again one hundred years since his predecessor had held office In Normandy. This office was sold 
for 21,7801, either to pay off debts incurred in the wars of the 1550s or to fund his purchase of Bec 
Crespin. " 
Before the Wars of Religion d'Aumale made little effort to build up his power base in 
Normandy. His Norman residences were merely subsidiaries of the Guise family seat at Joinville. 
It was at Joinville that d'Aumale's children were raised by their grandmother, Antoinette de 
Bourbon, in the company of their cousins and Louise de Brezel herself rarely left Joinville 
D'Aumale was a great courtly figure who had little time to spare for affairs in Normandy. Indeed, 
as governor of Burgundy from 1550 until 1573, his preoccupations lay elsewhere, but even these 
affairs were largely looked after by his lieutenant-general, Tavannes "' In the 1550s d'Aumale was 
preoccupied by wars abroad and it was only in the 1560s that he began to make a conscious effort 
to expand his Norman affinity, when the problems of political instability and factionalism required 
magnates to strengthen their provincial power bases B0 Nonetheless, the Brezel inheritance brought 
with it legal and financial officials to administer the lands and counsel the Guise; the family now 
became the focus for former servants of the Breze. Pierre Rdmon, who came from a Parisian 
background, was premier president of the parlement of Rouen from 1543 to 1553. He received 
many favours and offices from the duchesse de Valentinois 61 At the accession of Henri 11 he was 
55 ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1,329,19 February 1564. 
See for example BN, Ms Fr, 3121, to 42, duc d'Aumale to duc de Nemours, Mauny, 25 
March 1555; 4638, to 42, d'Aumale to Saulx-Tavannes, Mauny, 26 November 1558; 4640 
to 39, Claude to Saulx-Tavannes, Mauny, 4 January 1559. 
s' ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1,323,28 July 1561. 
58 G. de Pimodan, La mere des Guises: Antoinette de Bourbon 1494-1583, Paris, 1889, pp 
159,182,373. 
5° H. Drouot, Mayenne et la Bourgogne: Etude sur la Ligue, 1587-1596,2 vols, Paris, 1937, 
vol I, p 76. Gaspard de Saulx-Tavannes, Memoires, Michaud and Poujoulat, 1st ser., VIII, 
p 205, states that "le gouvernement avoit est6 donnde par la faveur de madame de 
Valentinois A M. d'Aumalle". 
80 See chapters three and five below. 
61 For help given by the duchess in seeking offices, see BN, Ms Fr, 20541, to 70, Rdmon to 
Guise, Paris, 24 February, 1551. 
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introduced to the conse<'I p"ve, almost certainly at the instigation of the duchess 62 Rdmon 
soon became closely involved with her proteges, assisting the Guise in the parlement of Rouen 
when the judges blocked alienations of royal domain to the Guise. Remon's son joined the 
household of the duc de Bouillon as gentilhomme ordinaire. 0 Another parlementaire who found 
service with the Guise was conseiller Robert Raoullin (d. 1565), who had been the procureur of 
Diane de Poitiers in 1546.64 Thereafter he moved into the service of the duc dAumale and was 
among the more extreme catholics in the parlement. 65 
The Brevedent were another noblesse de robe family associated with the Brez6. According 
to one seventeenth-century commentator "this family grew wealthy from the protection of Diane de 
Poitiers, duchesse de Valentinois, and in their house... the arms of the Brew are to be seen in 
several places. "6 Jacques de Brevedent (d. 1580) was conseiller at the parlement (1537-60) and 
lieutenant-general of the bailliage of Rouen (1547-67). He was in the confidence of the Guise and 
was known and trusted by the duc d'Aumale for whom Brevedent helped to raise money in the 
1550s. 7 Even after the death of Diane de Poitiers the links with the Brezel remained strong. Louis 
de Brew was the nephew of Diane de Poitiers. Through the patronage of his aunt he became 
bishop of Meaux in 1553 and grand aumönier of France in 1556. Although stripped of the latter 
post by the Guise themselves in 1559 to appease the enemies of Diane de Poitiers (notably 
Catherine de Medicis), Louis later found high office as chancellor of the Catholic League in 
1589. " 
The d'Annebaut were another family which had originally been in the Brezel affinity. Claude 
d'Annebaut had been lieutenant of the ordonnance company of Louis de Breze and had taken over 
the company on Brezd's death in 1531.69 D'Annebaut's rise thereafter was meteroic, at the 
expense of the Montmorency. Although he was banished from the court at the accession of Henri 
II in 1547, he was not completely disgraced. He was made governor of Normandy, probably at the 
instance of Diane de Poitiers because, as an enemy of the Montmorency and a former servant of 
her family, he was a useful ally. D'Annebaut therefore returned to the position of a protege of the 
Brezel and was part of a faction which included the Guise. His son, Jean, fought under the Guise 
62 Baumgartner, Henry 11, p 46. 
6' Frondeville, Presidents, p 48; see also chapter three below. 
64 BN, Na Fr, 21165, to 74. 
65 Histoire ecclesiastique des 6glises reformees au royaume de France, G. Baum and E. 
Caunitz (eds), 3 vols, Nieuwkoop, 1974, vol I, pp 858,861. 
66 Quoted in Dewald, The Formation of a Provincial Nobility, p 88. 
67 They were also part of the ultra-catholic faction in the city, see chapter four below. 
68 D. B. F., VII, p 263; Anselme, VIII, p 269. 
69 Vindry, p 23. 
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in Italy in the 1550s and with the duc d'Aumale in 1562.70 Families who had been in the Brez6- 
d'Annebaut affinity, for example the Cleres, the Vieuxpont and the Le Veneur, became integral 
parts of the Guise affinity in Normandy. " The Le Veneur, for example, owed their importance as 
an ecclesiastical family to the d'Annebaut. Gabriel Le Veneur received the bishopric of Evreux on 
the resignation of Jacques, cardinal d'Annebaut. In turn Jacques owed his benefices (which besides 
the bishopric of Evreux included the abbey of Bec) to the resignation of his uncle Jacques IV Le 
Veneur, who died in 1543. As the fortunes of the d'Annebaut waned so the Le Veneur attached 
themseles to their natural successors, the Guise. 
The growing Guise presence in Normandy during the reign of Henri 11 is no less striking 
when one considers the sixth son of Claude I de Guise, Rene de Lorraine, marquis d'Elbeuf (1536- 
66). When Claude I died in 1550 his Norman possessions were divided up between two of his 
sons. Claude II took the title and duchy of Aumale whilst Rend received the barony of d'Elbeuf and 
the seigneuries of Groslay, Criquebeuf, Quatremares and Beaumesnil. 72 In effect the partition of 
1550 had created two exclusively Norman lords - the remainder of the Guise lands in the Maine, 
Picardy, Champagne and Provence went to the eldest son Frangois. 73 Returning to the account 
of 1542 it is possible to see that, in terms of revenue, Claude and Rend divided up these Norman 
possessions equally. 
Rend, like his elder brothers, was also able to contract a valuable marriage in 1550 to the 
much pursued heiress, Louise de Rieux (1531-66). " The dowry consisted of the large barony of 
Ancenis situated on the Loire in Brittany. In 1548 the last surviving male heir of the Rieux died and 
in 1557 there was a general partition of the Rieux lands. 75 The largest share of the inheritance, 
including the comt6 of Harcourt went to Renee de Rieux (1524-67), a Calvinist. When she died in 
1567 the lands had to be partitioned between the heirs of her two surviving sisters; on the one 
hand Charles de Lorraine (1556-1605), marquis d'Elbeuf, son of Rene and Louise de Rieux, and 
on the other hand Paul de Coligny (d. 1586), son of Claude de Rieux and Francois de Coligny 
(d. 1569). As both these heirs were minors the lands were administered by their guardians until they 
70 D. B. F., pp 1356-9. 
71 These families will be dealt with in detail in succeeding chapters. 
n Bouille, I, p 219. 
73 One exception was the seigneury of Boves near Amiens which went to Claude duc 
d'Au male. 
74 The actual marriage took place in 1554, see E. Maillard, Histoire d'Ancenis et de ses 
barons, Nantes, 1881, p 81. 
75 Anselme, VI, pp 768-9. In 1540 the vicomt6 of Lillebonne, (often referred to as a comtd) 
was detached from the comte of Harcourt for the dowry of Suzanne de Bourbon, mother 
of Louise de Rieux. On the death of Suzanne in 1570 Lillebonne passed to d'Elbeuf 
directly. The inheritance of Harcourt therefore primarily concerned the comtd of Harcourt 
itself and the comt6 of Brionne, see ADSM, E, 3,1 October 1540. 
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reached their majority and a partition arranged. 76 Suzanne de Bourbon and the cardinal de 
Lorraine acted for the young marquis and admiral Coligny was guardian of his nephew Paul. " 
Therefore political considerations impinged on this legal problem since the Huguenots were in 
danger of having their property seized during the religious wars, as happened to Frangois de 
Coligny in 1567. But despite their political and religious differences it seems that the Guise and 
the Coligny were able to administer the lands jointly and effectively until the amicable partition of 
1584. In this accord d'Elbeuf received the comtes of Brionne and Lillebonne, and Coligny the comtd 
of Harcourt itself. 78 As in 1496 the title was to remain indivisible but Coligny was unable enjoy his 
possessions, dying in 1586. D'Elbeuf was made tuteurof his son Guy de Coligny in 1588 and when 
he died in 1605 the entire Rieux inheritance passed definitively to the d'Elbeuf'9 
In 1549, at the youthful age of thirteen, Rend, marquis d'Elbeuf, was soon involved in his 
affairs in Normandy: writing from Rouen to his older brother Francois he hoped to "mis ordre aux 
affaires que jay en ceste ville ei incontinent seray prest de faire ce quil vous pleust me 
commander". 80 Notwithstanding this precociousness, it was his mother, Antoinette, who was made 
his guardian in 1550 and who administered his estates 8' It was she who oversaw the elevation 
of d'Elbeuf from a barony to a marquisate in 1555. The parlement of Paris put up many objections 
to this and the whole process took at least five years 82 Although Antoinette supervised the 
general affairs of Rene, she entrusted much of the upbringing of her son to a small number of long 
standing and trusted Guise domestiques. Rene's first tutor, appointed in 1550, was Etienne de 
Morainville, the former maitre d'hbtel of his father 83 The next tutor was Charles des Boves, sieur 
de Contenant, a young Champenois nobleman with a considerable landholding interest in the Vexin 
76 Coligny and d'Elbeuf collected their revenues and protected their rights together "chacun 
en leur partie comtes d'Harcourt", see ADC, E, 239,5 March 1577 and 5 June 1582. 
77 For the letters establishing the tutelle of the marquis d'Elbeuf in 1567, see BN, Clair, 1204, 
fo 96. Suzanne de Bourbon may have been sympathetic to Calvinism, when Lillebonne was 
her dower a Calvinist chapel was allowed to flourish, see Bost, Les seigneurs de 
Lillebonne, p 111. 
78 ADSM, El, 482,1584. 
79 B. de Broussillon, La maison de Laval, 1020-1605. Etude historique accompagnd du 
cartulaire de Laval et de Vitr6,5 vols, Paris, 1895-1903, vol IV, pp 229-324. 
80 BN, Ms Fr, 20532, to 11, d'Elbeuf to Guise, 11 May 1549. Note that in these letters 'Guise' 
always refers to Francois de Guise in order to avoid confusion. He was entitled duc 
d'Aumale until the death of his father in 1550. 
81 BN, Ms Fr, 20649, to 144, Antoinette to Hauteville, her tresorier-general, Joinville, 15 June 
1552. 
1 BN, Ms Fr, 20468, fo 83, Antoinette to d'Elbeuf, Joinville, 2 March 1551; P. Maille, 
Recherches sur Elbeuf: Esquisses ou silhouettes de ses seigneurs de la maison de 
Lorraine, 3 vols, Elbeuf, 1859-63, vol II, p 71. 
83 ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1 304,9 October 1550. 
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Frangais and belonging to a family with a history of loyal service to the Guise. According to one 
contemporary he governed his charge, "tres bien et sagement" T` He and other members of his 
family remained central figures in the d'Elbeuf household throughout the sixteenth century. Charles 
des Boves was, not only the commander of the legion of Champagne, but ensign in d'Elbeuf's 
company of the ordonnance (1555-60) and its lieutenant (1560-78). Other members of the family 
were also prominent servants. Charles des Boves, sieur de Rance, was ensign (1564-70) and Henri 
des Boves was guidon of the duc d'Elbeuf in 1588 " In 1542 and again between 1552 and 1562 
Frangois des Boves was maitre d'h6tel and conseiller of the duc de Guise, 6 It was Charles des 
Boves under instruction from Antoinette, who saw to the details of Rend's marriage and to the 
erection of Elbeuf into a marquisate - several of his reports from Rouen to Joinville are extant" 
The services of the des Boves were retained over the generations and thus continuity was 
established which engendered reciprocal loyalty. Rend was raised in an atmosphere that could only 
serve to reinforce kinship solidarity. Although he was almost exclusively a Norman lord, the major 
positions in his household and company of the ordonnance were filled by nobles from the traditional 
areas of Guise support in eastern France. This centred him firmly within a long standing 
geographical and historical context based in eastern France and partly explains the renowned 
family solidarity that the Guise achieved throughout the sixteenth century. Rend's lingering 
attachment to this region of France, despite his landed interest in Normandy, allowed patronage 
to be dispensed regions traditionally associated with the loyalty to the Guise. Antoinette therefore 
used the offices at the disposal of her children specifically to reward clients and servants from the 
traditional areas of Guise power - there was no attempt to augment the affinity in Normandy " 
The Relationship between the Guise and other Norman Magnates. 
It was not simply through individual members of their own family that the Guise became steadily 
more influential in Norman society. It was also facilitated by the strong associations that the Guise 
developed with the elite of Norman landholders. Such links furthered influence within the province 
in much the same way that the Brezel inheritance made the duc d'Aumale one of the most powerful 
men in the province. These links, brought about through marriage and amitiO, had the effect of 
inducing Norman nobles to help in the international political strategy of the Guise. The strategic 
84 Brantbme, IV, p 280. 
85 Vindry, pp 294,304; ADSM, Tabellionage, 2b" Heritage, 2E1,2007,27 August 1588. 
116 BN, Ms Fr, 8182, to 353; BN, Ms Fr, 22429, tos 130,136,143,150,155,161. Antoine de 
Boves was also in the household in 1542. 
87 BN, Ms Fr, 20532, to 11, des Boves to Antoinette, 21 May 1549; 20517, to 79, des Boves 
to Guise, 5 January 1554; Pimodan, La mere des Guises, p 385. 
88 For further discussion of Rene's affinity and particularly his company of the ordonnance, 
see chapter three below. 
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importance of Normandy, adjacent to the British Isles, figured ever larger in the dynastic and 
diplomatic plans of the Guise. 
Undoubtedly the largest landholders in upper Normandy at the accession of Henri II were 
the d'Orldans-Longueville who were to figure so prominently in the province in the seventeenth 
century. In the pays de Caux alone they possessed the duchy of Longueville and the comtd of 
Tancarville. They were descendants of Jean, batard d'Orldans, and were consequently cadets of 
the Valois, inhabiting a constitutionally grey area and were only recognised as princes of the blood 
in the seventeenth century. 89 Their lands were situated principally in the Loire valley, the ancestral 
home being at Chäteaudun. They were also large landowners in the Beauce, where they 
possessed the comt6 of Dunois, and Picardy. In 1534 Marie de Lorraine, the eldest daughter of 
Claude I de Guise, married Louis II d'Orleans, duc de Longueville and comte de Dunois 90 As with 
Claude's own marriage, the Guise aimed to marry into princely houses associated with the royal 
family. This was a means of assimilation, legitimising their own claims to be true born French 
princes and not foreigners. In 1536 Louis died, leaving Marie de Lorraine a widow with an infant 
son, Frangois. Marie and her father managed to obtain "le bail garde noble gouvernement et 
administration" of the young duke. "' Control of the young duke's vast landed wealth yielded 
substantial opportunities for patronage and financial rewards; both Marie and Claude took a keen 
interest in the accounts and administration of the duke's household °2 Jacques Girard, tresorier 
et receveur des finances for the duc de Longueville, received a payment of 1,2001 by order of Marie 
de Guise in 1549 93 In 1554 Marie was receiving 13,0001 per annum from her dowry alone. " 
The ramifications of this inter-family relationship became apparent after Marie's second 
marriage in 1538 to James V, king of Scotland. In 1542 the unfortunate Marie was again widowed. 
James left a daughter, Mary Stuart, and a legacy that began fifty years of Guise involvement in 
Scottish and English politics. Marie de Guise remained queen of Scotland, acting as regent from 
1554 until her death in 1560.95 In the person of Marie de Guise the fortunes of the Houses of 
Stuart, Guise and d'Orleans-Longueville became interwoven. The household and followers of the 
Longueville now owed at least a nominal loyalty to the Guise, and the Guise reciprocally had to 
B° AN, M, 458, Longueville, to 2; La Roque, Histoire genealogique de la maison d'Harcourt, 
I, p 763. 
90 Anselme, I, p 218. 
91 BN, PO, 2165, to 1020. 
92 AN, 0', 1374. The account of 1541 for the barony of Manehouville was scrutinised by 
Guise himself. In their own accounts the Guise included money for the upkeep duc de 
Longueville. 
0' ADSM, C, 8182, Compte du duchd de Longueville, 1549-50. 
°` M. Wood (ed), "Foreign Correspondence with Marie de Lorraine, Queen of Scotland, 1548- 
57", Scottish Historical Society, 3rd Ser., vol VII, Edinburgh, 1925, pp xlviii, 1. 
96 G. Donaldson, Scotland: James V-V11, Edinburgh, 1978, pp 70,80-131. 
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defend the interests of their kinsmen. The control of the Longueville household allowed the Guise 
to extend their own clientele into the Loire valley, far from their traditional power base. Moreover, 
the regency in Scotland allowed for considerable patronage with which the Guise could reward men 
from their own retinue and that of the Longueville. As with the Breze inheritance before, the Guise 
increased their following and credit through their ties with another established family. 
We can follow this complex tripartite relationship through the career of one man in 
particular. Jacques de La Brosse (d. 1562) was a middling provincial noble from Touraine, later 
made infamous by his role in the massacre of Vassy in 1562 and whom contemporary called, "une 
des creatures le plus devoudes de la maison de Guise" °B Jacques filled the highest positions in 
the household of the young duc de Longueville. He was tutor of the duke from 1547 until 1551 and 
lieutenant of his company of the ordonnance. °' At the beginning of his career he was not a Guise 
client but appointed by Marie de Guise because his family were trusted and loyal servants of the 
Longueville. He was entrusted with the mission to bring back Mary Stuart from Scotland in 1548.98 
The blossoming career of La Brosse was cut short by the death of Frangois duc de Longueville in 
1551, shattering the dominant relationship established by the Guise over the Longueville. There 
was now no male heir and the inheritance passed to a cadet line of the d'Orldans family, which 
involved tortuous lawsuits between several families, including the Guise. This suit was partially 
settled in 1553, in favour of the new duc de Longueville, Ldonor d'Orleans (1540-73) and his 
mother, Jacqueline de Rohan, marquise de Rothelin. °° Although Guise control of this family was 
brought to an end, Ldonor remained close to the Guise, their amity being a major restraint on iw 
Huguenot influence Normandy and at court. 1°° When the previous duc de Longueville died in 
1551 his household was broken up and La Brosse was forced to look around for alternative forms 
of service. He was important enough to be offered the royal post of maitre des requetes but 
rejected this, hoping to be offered something by the Guise as he informed the dowager queen: 
Madame, apres avoir seu la plus maleureuse nouvelle qui me povet avenir, qui est 
la mort de feu Monseigneur votre filz, pour lequel j'avois abandonne toustes 
auctres esperances, me suis en chemin pout m'an aler ver Messieurs voz Freres 
entendre se que dois devenir. 101 
96 De Thou, III, p 454. 
97 Vindry, p 98. 
°8 A. Teulet, Relations politiques de la France et de I'Espagne avec l'Ecosse au XVP sidcle, 
5 vols, Paris, 1862, vol I, p 159 n 1. See also G. Dickinson (ed), Two missions of Jacques 
de la Brosse", Scottish Historical Society, 3rd Ser., vol XXXVI, Edinburgh, 1942. 
9 La Roque, Histoire gendalogique de la maison d'Harcourt, I, p 735. 
10° See chapter four below. 
101 Foreign Correspondence with Marie de Lorraine, pp 100-101. 
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La Brosse solicited her intervention with irony: 
si vous plest vous escripres effeccionement a Monsieur et Madame et Messieurs 
voz Freres car ion assez de moien, et tout homme qui a Ia barge grise ne puit 
longuement actendre. 102 
La Brosse eventually received a position in the household of the duc de Guise, becoming 
one of its most important members. He was a conseiUergentilhomme and mare d'hßtelfrom 1552 
until 1557 and thereafter lieutenant of the duke's ordonnance company (1556-8). 
103 In 1558, the 
year of Mary Stuart's marriage to the Dauphin, he was appointed governor to the heir to the throne 
and was lieutenant of his ordonnance company in 1559. After the Dauphin was crowned Francois 
II, La Brosse received his own company employing Francois de Lorraine, grand prieur, fi th son of 
Claude I de Guise, as his lieutenant. 104 Throughout he remained closely involved with affairs in 
Scotland and was one of the councillors of the dowager queen sent to Scotland in 1559, to shore 
up the tottering regime. 105 The Guise attracted clients from the Beauce region, where the 
d'Orleans-Longueville were large landholders. Other officers of Frangois, duc de Longueville, 
besides La Brosse went into Guise service. The maitre de logis of the company was Jean de 
Brezolles (d. 1562), who, after the death of the young duke, moved in 1556 to occupy the same 
position in the company of the duc d'Aumale. 106 
Of crucial importance to the Guise interest in Scotland was the need for good sea 
communications, especially for the rapid transportation of troops and provisions. Thus the position 
of Frangois de Lorraine, grand prieur, as capitaine-gene=ral des gale res had added significance; the 
post was no sinecure. Francois, with his younger brother Rend as lieutenant, was heavily involved 
in the seabome support of Guise inspired operations in Italy. As early as 1554, the two young men 
commanded an expedition to Corsica. 107 In 1560 reinforcements were sent to bolster the regime 
of the queen dowager in Scotland, the land forces were commanded by Rend and the fleet by 
Francois. 108 They were reinforcing an expedition similarly full of Guise clients, La Brosse had 
102 Ibid, pp 290-1. 
103 BN, Ms Fr, 22429, tos 130,136-7. 
104 Vindry, p 98. 
105 BN, Clair, 353, fo 156; Dickinson (ed), "Missions of Jacques de la Brosse", p 52. 
106 Vindry, p 284. 
107 BN, Ms Fr, 20467, d'Elbeuf to Guise, Toulon, 30 January 1554. His maritime exploits 
provide the theme for the poetry of Remy Belleau, in Larmes sur le trespas de 
Monseigneur Rene de Lorraine, et de Madame Louyse de Rieux Marquis & Marquise 
d'Elbeuf. Ensemble le tombeau de Monseigneur Francois de Lorraine Duc de Guyse, n. p., 
1566. 
108 See chapter (our below. 
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previously been sent with his son Gaston and was appointed governor of Leith. 109 There were 
plenty of captaincies available for the ambitious. Corbeyran de Cardilliac, sieur de Sarlabous, a 
respected Gascon captain, first served in Scotland in 1549. In the early 1550s he was captain of 
Dumbarton, returning to France to fight under the duc de Guise at the siege of Thionville in 1558. 
He fought again in Scotland in 1560 as captain of Dunbar and maitre de camp of the French forces 
and was later governor of Le Havre from 1563 until his death in 1584.110 
Normandy and its seafaring community were crucial to Guise ambitions in Scotland. To 
maintain a viable presence there the transport of men and materials had to be undertaken by those 
with local expertise and credit. Thus the Guise began to employ Normans to aid them in their 
enterprises, extending to these servants the honour and patronage associated with such schemes. 
During the first Scottish expedition of 1548-9, Charles de Moy (d. 1567), sieur de La Meilleraye, 
governor of Le Havre (1528-60) and vice-admiral of France (1532-60), was responsible for the 
organisation of the fleet sent to support Marie de Guise against the English. "' The post of 
admiral was a collection of rights and jurisdictions; an administrative and judicial post rather than 
a military command. ' 12 It was the local vice-admirals and captains of ports who organised and 
sailed with the fleet; in 1544 Charles de Moy sported the title chef de 1'armee de mer in the 
projected invasion of England. ' 13 
During the Scottish expedition Moy was responsible for hiring vessels, sending out 
commissions and supervising the logistics. " Throughout the preparations and voyage Moy kept 
in close contact with Francois de Guise. There was no communication with the disgraced admiral 
d'Annebaut. In March 1548 Moy wrote from Le Havre informing Guise of the readiness of the fleet 
for the voyage to Scotland. "s In July he wrote again, informing the duke of the imminent 
departure of the fleet from Brest to Scotland, with the commander of the land forces, Pierro Strozzi. 
Two weeks out of port and with 400 leagues still left to go, Moy reported that some of the cardinal's 
ships had been in difficulty. "" This suggests that the Guise put a great deal of their own money 
109 Dickinson (ed), Two Missions of Jacques de la Brosse", p 52. 
10 E. Forestie, Un capitaine gascon au XVP: Corbeyran de Cardaillac-Sarlabous, Paris, 1897, 
pp 26-72. 
R. Rodiere and E. Vallee, La maison de Moy, Le Mans, 1928, pp 75-6; BN, PO, 2078, fos 
30-48. 
112 L. de Voisin, sieur de La Popelini8re, L Amiral de France, Paris, 1584. 
113 Rodiere and Vallee, La maison de Moy, p 75. 
114 See for example, BN, Ms Fr, 3118, to 15, "Estat des vivres qui ont este faict charge par 
Monseigneur de La Meilleraye dans les gallaires et navires pour porter en mer. Cant pour 
la nourriture des soldars en mer que pour descendre en terre", 21 July 1549. 
"s BN, Clair, 341, to 209, Moy to Guise, Le Havre, 24 March 1548. 
1e BN, Ms Fr, 20549, to 141, Moy to Guise, Leith, 11 July 1548. 
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behind this expedition, making it vital to employ trustworthy clients. Whilst Scotland remained 
unstable, there was a serious revolt against the gabelte in Gascony. Having returned from Scotland, 
Moy was sent to help with the suppression of the revolt by blockading Bordeaux in September 
1548. Once more it was to Guise, who along with Montmorency was directing operations, that his 
correspondence was directed. '" While preparing ships at Brest, Moy relayed letters to the duke 
that he had received from the queen dowager and the French ambassador in Scotland. At the 
same time he implored Guise to pay mutinous troops who were awaiting embarkation. 18 Thus 
in affairs that concerned Scotland all enquiries, dispatches and demands for favours were 
channelled through Guise. The links forged at the beginning of the reign of Henri II were apparent 
nearly ten years later, for in March 1557 it was to Francois de Guise again that Charles de Moy 
solicited favour: 
Jay par cy devant une assignation pour une armee de mer estatz a prendre sur 
le louvre laquelle na eu lieu a raison de lordonnance qui depuys a este rompue 
et daultant M. que cest tout le moyen que je puys... faire service au Roy et a vous. 
Que vous plaise commander que lad. assignation soit changee et mise sur la 
Recepte generale de Rouen. Ainsi quit ma este accoustume de faire paiable en 
tel temps quil vous plaira ordonner et encores que je ne Jaye sur ce premier 
quartier. Je ne laisseray pour cela dessayer den tirer quelque chose daucuns des 
mes amis pour subvenir a mesd. enfans lesquelz je desire pour jamais veoir 
employez en lieu ou ils vous puissent faire treshumble et tresagreable seýýice. 1' 
The Moy family was another which entered Guise service through a mutual association with 
the Longueville family. In June 1549 Frangois duc de Longueville rewarded Moy's help in the 
Scottish expedition, as another member of the Moy family testifies in a letter to Guise: 
ayant enendu par la Meilleraye que Monseigneur de longeuville Iuy avoit faict cest 
honneur le retour de sa bande.... il [Moy] sen va le trouver avec tout son equipage 
en esperance de Iuy faire service et a vous. 120 
The fortunes of the Guise were inexorably tied to the axis of the Longueville family and Scotland. 
The Guise relationship with the Moy reflects their growing fortunes during the reign of Henri II. The 
"' BN, Clair, 342, to 43, Moy to Guise, Torigny, 24 September 1548. 
18 BN, Clair, 344, to 226, Moy to Guise, Brest, 16 September, 1548. 
BN, Ms Clair, 348, to 92, Moy to Guise, 27 March 1557. 
t20 BN, Ms Fr, 20534, to 43, unknown to Guise, 4 June 1549. The sender here is either 
Nicholas, baron de Moy (1506-49) the elder brother of Charles, or Nicholas's son, Anthoine 
(d. 1555). 
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Moy possessed many lands in Picardy and they seem to have been originally clients of the 
Bourbon-Venda me. Charles de Moy had been a man-at-arms in the company of Francois de 
Bourbon (1491-1545), comte de Saint-Pol and duc d'Estouteville (situated in upper Normandy), 
brother of Antoinette de Bourbon. '2' Nicholas de Moy (1506-49), elder brother of Charles, was 
a vassal of the comte de Saint-Pol and lieutenant of the ordonnance company of Charles de 
Bourbon, duc de Vend6me. In the marriage contract of Anthoine de Moy, son of Nicholas, to 
Charlotte de Chabannes in 1539, one of the signatories was Marie de Luxembourg, widow of 
Francois de Bourbon, comte de Vendome and mother of Antoinette de Bourbon. '22 Allegiances 
fluctuated and the ascendancy of the Guise under Henri II - their international concerns and 
dominance of ecclesiastical patronage - made them more attractive patrons than the Bourbon- 
Vend6me. 
The d'Este were another family which encompassed both the provincial and international 
aspects of dynastic alliances. In 1549 Frangois de Lorraine, at that time the duc d'Aumale, married 
Anne d'Este, daughter of Ercole d'Este, duke of Ferrara and Renee de France, daughter of Louis 
XII. In November 1528 the royal vicomtes of Caen, Bayeux and Falaise were leased out to Alfonso 
d'Este and his son Ercole, duc de Chartres and comte de Gisors, for the duration of their lifetimes. 
The privileges of the incumbents included the right to farm out the revenues, collect all royal dues 
and nominate to all offices, except those of the bailli and captain of Caen and the governor of 
Falaise. 123 Although this was only a temporary grant it was continued by order of Henri III in 
1577.124 Ercole d'Este was already comte de Gisors in Normandy - part of the dowry given to 
Renee by Francois I at the time of their marriage in 1531.25 Anne d'Este received the comt6 of 
Gisors in turn, as part of her own dowry, retaining it when she remarried to Jacques de Savoie, duc 
de Nemours, in 1566 and was still comtesse on her death in 1607. '26 The influence of the d'Este, 
so far away in northern Italy, could be felt only indirectly in Normandy, since the duke of Ferrara 
had little concern for affairs in provincial France. Their affairs in Normandy and the administration 
of their possessions were left to local officials and more important tasks such as the nomination of 
offices were entrusted to a council headed by the d'Este ambassador at court and the Guise. 
There exists evidence to illuminate the workings of the council. The procureur-general of 
121 Rodiere and Vallee, La maison de May, p 75. Frangois was, along with Chabot and 
d'Annebaut, partof the anti-Montmorency faction, see Brantbme, III, p 205. It was therefore 
quite natural that on his death a client like Moy would find service with the Guise who, after 
1547, were also ranged against the Montmorency. 
122 Rodiere and Vallee, La maison de May, pp 49-58. 
123 BN, Vc Col, 53, to 121. 
124 ADSM, 1 B, Registres Secrets, 92,8 February 1577. 
125 Journal dun bourgeois de Paris, L. Lalanne (ed), Paris, 1854, p 362. 
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the duke of Ferrara In his Norman vicomtes was an Italian named Giulio Ravilio Rosso. 127 He was 
a reviled figure who, during the first religious war, levied contributions on the locally strong and 
influential Huguenot community. The lettres patentes enabling him to raise these special taxes were 
obtained Na la recommendation du duc de Guise". '28 Rosso had committed a variety of sins in 
the eyes of the local population; he was not only a foreigner and a tax collector but also a servant 
of the Guise and their allies. Rosso was finally besieged by a Huguenot force in the chateau of 
Bayeux in February 1563, after capture he was taken to Caen and executed along with his men. 
Other officials of the d'Este also met a bloody end, including the hated contröleur du domain, 
Thomas Noel, a repentant Calvinist. 129 Pierre Rdmon, the premier president of the parlement of 
Rouen, solicited the duc de Guise about one of the viscomital offices in 1551: 
Je vous ai supply me vouloir estre aydant a recouvrir loftice de lieutenant du bailly 
de Caen en son siege de Falaise par le moyen de lambassadeur duc de Ferrara 
pour ung des mes proches alliez. 10 
In effect, Guise acted as a broker of the patronage in the vicomtds -a vital link between those in 
Normandy and the d'Este. 13' Rdmon had already written to the d'Este ambassador at court to 
little effect. The office was venal and Remon wished it to remain in his family. The dispute centred 
around how much relief tax should be paid to the d'Este on the death of the incumbent. Remon 
protested that the office was in the king's gift and that the 400 dcus demanded as payment was 
excessive. In the end however he appealed to Guise's honour: 
le feu pere du gendre de ma femme avoit tendu led. office et que les parens dud. 
deffunct desiroient lung des siens ou filz du gendre en ceste succession Jay mis 
en arrive mond. don pour Ihonneur de vous et de vostres. ' 
He invoked the name of the duchesse de Valentinois to ensure an emotional response: 
127 Charles de Bourgeville, sieur de Bras, Les Recherches et Antiquitez de Neustrie A present 
duch6 de Normandie, Caen, 1588, p 184. 
128 De Thou, IV, p 245. 
120 Histoire ecclesiastique, II, p 416. 
130 BN, Ms Fr, 20541, to 70, Re mon to Guise, Paris, 24 February 1551. See also BN, Ms Fr, 
20533, to 17, Remon to Guise, 11 October 1550. 
131 Guise showed an interest in appointments to offices in the comtd of Gisors handled by the 
council of the duchess of Ferrara, see BN, Ms Fr, 20533, to 83, Fumde to Guise, Paris, 6 
January 1549. 
132 BN, Ms Fr, 20541, to 70, Rdmon to Guise, Paris, 24 February 1551. 
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Je vous supplie treshumblement non par la valloir dud. office mais pour Iesd. 
causes me permectre avec vostre bonne grace poursuyvre la provision du don quil 
a pleu feu dud. Roy me faire a la requeste de madame de Valentinois. 
'33 
R6mon owed much to the duchess and through her he began to establish links with the Guise. This 
example further reveals the way in which provincial affairs were interwoven with wider supranational 
dynastic relationships. 
The three vicomtes assigned to the d'Este were strongholds of Calvinism. In the election 
of Bayeux 40 per cent of the nobility turned to the reformed faith at the height of its popularity in 
the early 1560s. '34 The absence of the d'Este from Normandy and lack of seigneurial authority 
created a vacuum of authority in which protestant vassals and tenants worshipped unmolested. 
Moreover, the identification of the d'Este with the unpopular regime of the Guise during the reign 
of Frangois II (1559-60) and the presence of foreign officials like Rosso represented a source of 
discontent on which protestantism could thrive. Conversely it is clear that kinship relations, 
landholding and service were crucial factors in the transmission of the new faith. '35 The court of 
the d'Este at Ferrara was one of the most brilliant in Italy and they were among the early princely 
protectors of Lutheranism outside Germany. Renee de France (1510-75), the wife of Ercole d'Este, 
attracted reform-minded Frenchmen to her court and one of them, Marot, became her secretary. 
This tolerant policy ended in 1554 - Renee was even imprisoned by her husband for her faith 
during the subsequent backlash. In 1559 she returned to France on the death of her husband and 
continued to work for the reformed faith until her own death. "6 Thus the spread of protestantism 
in the three vicomtcs was aided by the weakness of seigneurial authority and the knowledge that, 
until 1554, the d'Este were favourable to reform. As religious conflict intensified in the early 1560s 
protestants accused rapacious and hated seigneurial officials of being agents of the Guise. Anne 
d'Este was herself a product of the pre-1554 tolerant atmosphere. In the early years of the 
protestant upsurge and religious conflict she had no enmity towards the Huguenots and was 
horrified by the massacre of Vassy. 137 The d'Este did patronise Norman nobles. When the 
ordonnance company of admiral d'Annebaut was broken up on his death in 1552 many of the 
officers found service with the d'Este. Francois de Plainville, the former guidon of d'Annebaut, and 
Gabriel de Longuemare, the former maitre de logis, found service in the company of the duke of 
'3' Ibid. 
'34 Wood, The Nobility of the Election of Bayeux, p 161. 
1-35 Neuschel, Word of Honor, p 32. 
136 Biographie universelle ancienne et moderne, Paris, 1843-, vol XXXV, pp 426-7. 
137 De Thou, IV, pp 167-8. An attitude which faded after the assassination of her husband in 
1563. 
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Ferrara. ' 
The La Marck, princes of the Holy Roman Empire whose lands straddled the border with 
France, were also a part of the configuration of Diane de Poitiers designed to counter 
Montmorency's overwhelming influence on Henri ll. 19 Like the Guise they were princes 6trangers 
and fitted into the same model as the Houses of Lorraine and d'Este, being all anti-Habsburg allies 
of the Valois. In 1539 Robert IV de La Marck, due de Bouillon, married Frangoise de Breze, and 
through the intervention of Diane de Poitiers was given the office of mardchal in 1547 and made 
governor of Normandy in 1552. Awarding this governorship to Bouillon was certainly a shift in royal 
policy since the gouvernement of the province had traditionally been reserved for a member of the 
royal family or a Norman. 10 A royal favourite, whose only link to Normandy was through his wife, 
thus became governor. On his death in 1556 he was followed by his son, Henri-Robert (1540-74). 
Neither was to have much influence in the province, a factor compounded by the sale of much of 
their share of the Brezel inheritance to the due d'Aumale. "' These sales were forced upon the 
family by misfortune. In 1553 Robert IV was captured by the Imperialists and ransomed for 60,000 
ecus. "Z The family was further damaged by the peace of Cäteau-Cambresis in 1559 when, as 
part of the treaty, Bouillon was divested of some of his lands and the promised compensation from 
the French king was never forthcoming. "' It was to his uncle Claude, due d'Aumale, that Henri- 
Robert sold the barony of Bee Crespin in 1562 to offset these debts. 
By 1561 the family relationship has become complicated by Henri-Robert's conversion to 
Calvinism. During his lifetime Jametz and Sedan would become notorious safe havens for his co- 
religionaries. '" His failure to receive compensation after Cateau-Cambresis was symptomatic of 
his loss of favour at court after the disgrace of his patron, Diane, in 1559. In Normandy his credit 
was even lower, because he was an inexperienced youth forced to sell his lands and without 
influence at court. He visited the province only seldom: in 1558 he was sent to reorganise the 
defences of Dieppe, returning in 1561 and ordered to restrict the growth of heresy he seemed only 
8 Vindry, p 25. 
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to tacitly endorse Calvinism. "' Bouillon's power base remained in the Ardennes and he made 
little effort to build up a clientage network in Normandy. For example, not one of the officers in his 
company of the ordonnance was a Norman. 146 Despite the religious divide there was no animosity 
between the Guise and the La Marck families and this friendship and similarly the amity with the 
d'Orleans-Longueville, was to have adverse consequences for the consolidation of protestantism 
in Normandy. 
The La Marck and d'Orleans-Longueville families were great magnate houses, tied by 
amitie and kinship to the Guise but never subservient. The Cossd-Brissac provide another example 
of the ability of the Guise to attach a great noble family to their own interest. This was not facilitated 
by marriage alliances, for the Brissac were not of princely status but nor were they ever lowly 
enough to be mere clients; instead it was a relationship based on mutual benefit. Charles I de 
Coss6 (1506-63), comte de Brissac, was the son of Charlotte Gouffier who came from a family 
usually associated with the Montmorency, indeed Charles was raised in the Montmorency 
household. "' By exploiting their links to the Montmorency the Brissac aimed to accumulate 
offices and raise their status. Charles I followed his father as grand fauconnier and grand pannetier 
he, 
of France. '" The role of the duchesse de Valentinois was also crucial to his career; /- 
became 
a marechal at her recommendation in 1550.19 The relationship with the Brez6 went back even 
further, since the seigneury of Brissac had been purchased from Louis de Breze in 1502.150 
Brissac's landed interest was extended in 1542 when he married Charlotte d'Esquetot, a rich 
Norman heiress. This brought him the baronies of d'Estelan and Norville near the mouth of the 
Seine in the pays de Caux, making him a neighbour of the duc d'Aumale. t51 His brother, Artus 
(1512-82), received the captaincy of Hartleur in 1544 and more significantly was bailli of Caux 
(1540-1554). '52 
It was this service in Italy which was brought the Brissac closer to the Guise, although 
moves had already been made in this direction as Artus de Cosse had been lieutenant of the 
145 ACR, A, 17,14 May 1558; Floquet, II, p 326. 
'" Vindry, p 318. 
147 Simon de Coss6, duc de Brissac, Histoire des ducs de Brissac, Paris, 1952, p 21. 
Anselme, VIII, pp 672-3,756. 
149 Anselme, VII, p 205. 
150 Duc de Brissac, Histoire des ducs de Brissac, p 60. 
15' Ibid, p 69. 
'52 ADSM, 6F, 11, Recueil des capitaines de Normandie; A. Hellot, Essai sur les baillis de 
Caux de 1204 A 1789, Paris, 1895. Artus was a moderate during the Wars of Religion and 
part of the politique faction. 
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company of Frangois duc de Guise (1550-2). '63 As governor of Piedmont in the 1550's Charles de 
Gosse built a reputation as one of the most formidable captains of the day. From the point of view 
of the Guise, it was as important to have a trusted man in Piedmont as it was to have Norman 
nobles capable of preparing expeditions to Scotland to serve dynastic interests. Brissac served 
under the duc de Guise in the Italian campaign of 1556-7. The Guise needed to secure the trust 
and cooperation of Brissac to facilitate their own family strategy. In the same way as possessing 
the post of capitaine-general des galdres, it was another piece of the jigsaw toward their own 
dynastic ambitions. '54 After the end of the Italian Wars in 1559 the relationship began to blossom, 
especially when the Guise recalled Brissac from Piedmont to bolster the regime of Francois li and 
he became a leading figure in the ultra-catholic faction until his death in 1563. '55 Prior to this, in 
1558, Brissac had written to the cardinal de Lorraine requesting a see for his bastard son who 
eventually received the bishopric of Coutances. '56 The Brissac-Guise relationship endured until 
the end of the century, especially because Charles II de Cosse (1550-1621), son of Charles I and 
Charlotte d'Esquetot, maintained the friendship, being greatly "affected to the Duke of Guise". 157 
The Wealth of the Norman Branches of the House of Guise 
Having discussed the outline of Guise territorial ambitions in Normandy in the mid-sixteenth century, 
we can now compare the relative increase in income over our extant account of 1542. Unfortunately 
there exists no comparable document from a later period. Thus the data presented in appendices 
A and B should only be seen as an approximation to be used as a measure or yardstick against 
what is already knowoabout noble income in this period. The average income of a prince at the end 
of the sixteenth century was 70,0001 per annum, lesser court aristocrats such as ducs and comtes 
being worth half this figure and the elite of the provincial nobility averaged 10-15,000! in mid- 
century. 118 Roncherolles are a familiar example of the last category for during this period 
their income exceeded 10,0001 per year. Even by 1600 only a handful of the wealthiest 
parlementaires had achieved this high standard of living. '9 The jurisdiction of the duchy of 
15' Vindry, p 282. 
154 For Guise ambitions in Italy, see L. Romier, Les origines politiques des guerres de religion, 
2 vols, Paris, 1913, especially, vol II, chap 1. 
'55 For a fuller account of the activities of Brissac after 1559, see chapter four below. 
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Etude sur la fin des guerres ditalie et sur la premiere guerre de religion, Paris, 1889, pp 
434-9. Brissac was able to come to an arrangement with the incumbent -a relative of his 
wife. 
157 CSPF, 1579-80, p 150. 
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'59 Dewald, The Formation of a Provincial Nobility, p 124. 
46 
Aumale extended over forty parishes but the appendices demonstrate the dominance of the estates 
grouped around Ivry and Anet and this became the seat of the ducs d'Aumale. The figures also 
underline the importance of marriage to a nobleman's status; the Brew inheritance placed the duc 
d'Aumale in the wealthiest echelon of sixteenth-century French society. The fruits of royal office in 
terms of patronage, bribes and gifts cannot be adequately represented and the wages of offices 
were usually in arrears. 
The fortune of the branch of d'Elbeuf follows a different pattern for, unlike the d'Aumale 
branch of the family, the son succeeded in surpassing the status of the father. Rend de Lorraine 
had an income far surpassing that of the leading provincial nobleman and his rank of marquis was 
easily supported by his income. However, the pension from the cardinal de Lorraine, amounting 
to 2,0001 per annum, was important to his income and he was heavily dependent on the influence 
of his brothers at the court. Like the rest of his brothers he greatly profited from marriage. Yet it 
was his son, Charles, who really reaped the benefits of the Rieux inheritance. The inheritance of 
the comtds of Harcourt and Lillebonne propelled the young marquis up the social ladder. His 
income matched that of his princely status and he made an excellent marriage in 1583 to an 
heiress, Marguerite de Chabot, the daughter of Ldonor, comte de Chamy, senechal hereditaire of 
Burgundy and grand ecuyer de France. 160 Elbeuf was raised to a duchy in 1581, reflecting the 
rising status of this cadet of the House of Guise. 
Both of these cadet branches belonged to a select group of aristocrats at the very top of 
French society and it is therefore fallacious to ignore them when discussing the Guise family. It is 
Important to place their wealth in perspective and remember they were rivalled by the vast 
ecclesiastical fortune of the Guise in the province. Moreover, in 1570 Henri de Lorraine, the third 
duc de Guise, inherited the comte-pairie of Eu when he married Catherine de Cleves. '" Eu was 
one of the oldest titles in Normandy and with a revenue of 28,0001 per annum in the later sixteenth 
century, its wealth was comparable to that of the abbey of Fdcamp. '62 Unlike upper Norman 
duchies such as Longueville, Estouteville, Aumale and Elbeuf whose jurisdiction fell within the 
competence of the parlement of Rouen, the comte of Eu had the right of appeal directly to the 
partement of Paris. '63 The jurisdiction of the comtd covered a vast area between the pays Caux 
and Picardy, consisting of 270 fiefs and arridre fiefs. 164 Thus by 1570 there was a vast increase 
in'the Guise presence in Normandy. By then five members of the family had either a landed interest 
or ecclesiastical benefice in the province - they had become the largest landholders in upper 
160 BN, Cabinet d'Hozier, 216, to 101. 
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'6' R. d'Estaintot, "Recherches sur les Hautes-Justices Feodales existent en 1789 dans les 
limites du departement de la Seine-Interieure", Academie des Sciences, Arts et Belles 
Lettres de Caen, 1892, pp 268-321. 
164 AN, KK, 1088, to 36. 
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Normandy if not the whole province. 
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Chapter Three 
Servants and Clients 
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This chapter attempts to outline the structure and composition of the Guise affinity in Normandy. 
The landed interest of the Guise in Normandy required many trained legal and administrative 
officials and their military retinues and status at the court made them a focus for the services of the 
petite noblesse d'epee and the Norman elites. The first section provides an example of the manner 
in which an affinity was built up and the benefits for the lord and his servants in this relationship. 
The Functioning of an Affinity: Administering 
the Royal Land Grant of 1548 
The relationship between Francois duc de Guise and the parlement of Rouen in the late 1540s and 
1550s provides an excellent example of how clients were employed and why factions formed within 
a particular institution. By the time the Wars of Religion began the duke had a small but politically 
important number of clients within the parlement. 
In December 1548 Francois de Guise received letters patent from Henri II authorising the 
sale of royal domain in Normandy up to a value of 10,0001 of rente. This grant was part of the 
conditions of the marriage contract drawn up between Francois de Guise (at this stage still duc 
d'Aumale) and Anne d'Este, drawn up in the same year. The alienation of royal domain was an 
element of the dowry provision to be paid by the French king to Guise as part repayment of 
150,000/ borrowed from Alfonso d'Este by Frangois I in 1525. ' This royal favour had followed the 
raising of the comtd of Aumale into a duche-pairie in July 1547, not long after Henri's accession. 
The elevation of the comte did not occupy as much time and money as the pursuit of the royal 
grant. However, connected with the former is the beginning of a substantial corpus of manuscripts 
concerning Norman affairs, to be found amongst the Guise letters. Most notable is initial evidence 
of the existence of a council in Rouen conducting Guise affairs in Normandy. Witness the bailli of 
Aumale, Jean de Martimbosc, writing from Rouen concerning the jurisdiction of the haute justice 
of Aumale, "Nous en avons delibere avecq le conseil et advise aprez avoir parle a Monsieur le 
Premier President. "2 
This letter reveals the existence of a Guise council in Rouen and also confirms the close 
relationship that existed between the Guise and the premier president, Pierre Remon 3 In the years 
following this letter another senior magistrate, president A mortier, Louis P6tremol (d. 1561), was 
to become closely involved in the affairs of the Guise. P6tremol, like Rdmon, came to the attention 
of the Guise through their mutual links with the Brez6 family, his father having been receveur of 
Bouille, I, p 204; Catalogue des actes de Henri ll, Paris, 1979-, vol II, p 457. The edict of 
alienation was registered in Paris on 4 March 1549 at "I'expres commandement du roi". 
2 BN, Ms Fr, 20548, to 59, Martimbosc to Guise, Rouen, 23 March 1548. 'Guise' in these 
letters refers to Francois de Lorraine who did not take the title duc de Guise until his 
father's death in 1550 -I have reduced his name and title to Guise for the sake of clarity. 
3 See chapter two above. 
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the comtd of Maulevrier in 1490 It is no surprise to find P6tremol giving the oration at the entry 
of the cardinal de Lorraine into Rouen in September 1550. After the ceremonies and the official 
banquet he was reported to have consulted the cardinal on several matters. " He later formed part 
of the uhra-catholic faction in the parlement and his brother, Antoine (d. 1556), being a maitre des 
comptes in Paris, provided a convenient link with the Guise council in Paris 
It would be misleading to regard the councils in Paris and Rouen as formal institutions with 
defined functions. Rather, they were ad hoc meetings and groupings of advisers and servants 
entrusted with the everyday affairs of the duke or specific tasks such as overseeing the erection 
of the comtd of Aumale. These councils were primarily concerned with legal, administrative and 
fiscal affairs and therefore were comprised of men from the noblesse de robe. They should not be 
confused with the duke's council over which he personally presided. 
The council based in Paris was more important than that in Rouen since it acted as a 
conduit or intermediary for correspondence and information emanating from Normandy. A crucial 
part of the Parisian council were Richet, Basdoulx and Brunet, secretaries of the duke. They 
handled the duke's correspondence and their role had great influence. Letters of 1549 and 1552 
reveal some of the councillors in Paris; de Thou, Boucherat, Chartier, Baudry, du Chastellet, 
Marmagne and de Longeuil, many of whose letters to the duke still survive. 7 Christophe de Thou, 
father of the celebrated historian Jacques-Auguste, was the best known of these. He was conseiller 
de ville in Paris and from 1554 a president in the parlement of Paris and procureur of the Guise 
family in the same court. 8 However, the greatest bulk of correspondence from Paris to the duke, 
who was often away on campaign, in the early 1550s comes from Antoine Le Cirier (d. 1575), dean 
` Frondeville, Presidents, p 176. 
5 ADSM, 1B, Registres Secrets, 91, to 49. 
6 Histoire ecclOsiastique, I, p 859. Again, the crucial importance of the Brezel inheritance in 
the formation of the Guise affinity cannot be overstated. Another family associated with the 
Brezel, the Brevedent, was also playing a role in the legal and administrative affairs of the 
Guise, see BN, Ms Fr, 20534, to 45, Louis Pdtremol to Guise, Rouen, 6 June 1549. 
The "gens de vostre conseil" are mentioned in BN, Ms Fr, 20543, to 43, Richet to Guise, 
Paris, 24 September 1549; BN, Ms Fr, 20513, to 134, Antoine Le Cider to Guise, Paris, 20 
November 1552. A messire Boucherat was avocat at the council of Mary Stuart in 1560, 
see L. Paris (ed), N6gociations, lettres et pieces diverses relatives au regne de Francois 
ll, Paris, 1841, p 747. Mathieu Chartier was a caonseiller at the parlement of Paris in this 
period, see Frondeville, Presidents, p 31. Claude Baudry was a president ds enquetes at 
the parlement, see ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1,304,9 October 1550; Jean de Lallement- 
Marmagne was a procureur at the parlement of Paris and Jean de Longeuil a president. 
8 BN, PO, 1750, fos 207 and 209,17 and 31 January 1578. In 1550 he and Baudry signed 
the papers creating a tutor for Rend de Lorraine, see ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1,304,9 
October 1550. See also R. Filhol, Le premier president Christophe de Thou et la 
reformation des coutumes, Paris 1937, pp 5-30. 
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of the cathedral of N6tre-Dame de Paris and a conseillerat the parlement. 9 Judging by his letters 
he seems to have had a particular responsibility for aff airs in Normandy. Le Cider's entry into Guise 
service may have come through the d'Orleans-Longueville, since he had been a pensioner of the 
cardinal d'Orl6ans and the duc de Longueville. On their demise Le Cider was compensated by 
receiving ecclesiastical benefices from the cardinal de Lorraine. 10 
The ample correspondence of Pdtremol and Le Cider provide excellent examples of clients 
at work. The burden of work was further increased in 1551 with the death of the young duc de 
Longueville and the complicated succession which ensued. Nevertheless, the major issue remained 
the sale of the royal domain, beginning in 1548 and ending in 1556, when the relevant 
correspondence comes to an abrupt halt. 
As early as August 1548 Roland Trexot (d. 1578) was commissioned, at the instance of the 
council in Rouen, to measure and record the lands and rights for sale in the vicomte of Bayeux, 
pertaining to the royal gift to Guise. " Trexot was a conseiller-clerc at the parlement of Rouen and 
his appointment was due to his local knowledge as he possessed lands near Bayeux. By November 
of the same year Louis Pdtremol was receiving documents for the procds-verbal, concerning the 
sale of fiefs in the bailliage of Evreux. 12 It was also about this time, when the royal edict 
sanctioning the alienation of domain had to be sent for registration to the appropriate sovereign 
courts, that problems began to arise, forcing Guise to mobilise all his influence and resources in 
Rouen in order to achieve a satisfactory outcome. On 20 February 1549 Pdtremol informed Guise 
that the chambre des comptes in Paris had refused to register the royal command "jusques a ce 
quelles soient verif ees en ceste court de parlement a Rouen". 13 The objections of the parlement 
of Rouen were outlined in its "Remonstrance touchant le Domaine du Roy bailie a M. d'Aumale 
pour I'argent de son mariage. "" The parlement put itself forward as the protector of the royal 
domain, which was inviolable since: 
le Roy ne peut bailler les terres en son domaine appartenans ä sa Dignite Royale, 
qui sont inalienables... Iadite obligation [the debt towards the d'Este] est personnelle 
et n'a peu abstraindre la Dignite Royale. 15 
9 A. Le Canu, Histoire du diocese de Coutances et Avranches, 2 vols, Coutances, 1877-8, 
vol I, p 439. 
10 BN, Ms Fr, 20470, to 73, A. Le Cider to Guise, Paris, 3 October 1551. 
" BN, Ms Fr, 20542, to 6, Trexot to Guise, Rouen, 26 August 1548. 
12 BN, Ms Fr 20553, to 22, Petremol to Guise, Rouen, 6 November 1548. 
13 BN, Ms Fr, 20538, to 69, Petremol to Guise, 20 February 1549. 
" BN, V° Col, 54, fo 70,8 February 1549. 
15 Ibid. 
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Another factor which troubled the parlementaires was the transfer of so many tenants from the king 
to the Guise and the consequent increased power of seigneurial over royal courts. In Paris 
opposition to the sale of land in the prevöfe of Paris also needed to be overcome, and to achieve 
this secretary Richet, who undoubtedly had his own interests in mind, told the duke that "Il faudra 
faire quelque frais et despenses... je feray ceste advance et tout ce qui sera necessaire pour 
vostredict service ". 16 This suggests that the altruism and the principles of the parlementaires were 
not as uncompromising as their remonstrances to the king at first suggest. 
The extent to which Francois de Guise became embroiled in the factional manoeuvring in 
Rouen is clear from his correspondence. Guise was able to build up support for the sale of the 
royal domain by outright bribery and by patronage involved in the lucrative contracts and 
commissions for the sale of the land. He was kept informed of developments but devolved details 
and appointments to men with local knowledge and contacts. Robert Vauquelin, for example, was 
made "procureur-general sur le faict des fiefs en Normandie". " Agents had to be appointed to 
every bailliage of the province. Vauquelin's kinsman, Antoine Caradas, bourgeois and garde de la 
monnaie of Rouen, was designated "procureur du roy pour le faict des fiefs au bailliage de 
Gisors". 18 In the same ballliage, Nicholas Caillot (d. 1588), an avocat in the parlement and later 
a conseiller, was appointed as a commissioner. He must have been familiar to the Guise and 
trusted since he was involved in the financial affairs of Claude, duc d'Aumale. 19 Montague du 
Vivier supervised land sales in the Perche 20 In Alengon the lieutenant-general of the duchy of 
Alengon was appointed and Trexot was already occupied in lower Normandy. 1 
These were lucrative offices and an important source of patronage. Caillot was advanced 
200 ecus on his appointment and Trexot received 6,000/towards the costs of the proces-verbaux 
in his region 22 The agents forecast that huge sums of money would accrue from the sales, 
exaggerations that were designed to maintain the duke's interest and entice him into spending more 
money with the sweet promise of fantastic returns. Caradas assured Francois in June 1555 that 
the land he was surveying in the viaomtd of Rouen was worth 120,000/. 23 This crock of gold 
16 BN, Ms Fr, 20543, to 43, Richet to Guise, Paris, 24 September 1549. 
17 BN, Clair, 347, to 258, Vauquelin to Guise, Rouen, 2 July 1554. 
18 BN, Clair, 348, to 136, Caradas to Guise, Rouen, 7 June 1555; Frondeville, Conseillers, p 
551. Caradas was married in 1533 to Isabeau Vauquelin. 
19 BN, Clair 347, fo 264, Richet to Guise, Bellesaize?, 15 July 1554; Frondeville, Conseillers, 
p 509. On Caillot's position in helping d'Aumale to raise money see ADSM, Tabellionage, 
2E1,313,7 September 1556; 2E1,318,25 November 1558; 2E1,323,12 August 1561. 
20 BN, Ms Fr, 20554, fo 132, du Vivier to Guise, 24 February 1556. 
21 BN, Clair, 347, to 264, Richet to Guise, Bellesaize?, 15 July 1554. 
22 Ibid. 
23 BN, Clair, 348, to 136, Caradas to Guise, Rouen, 7 June 1555. 
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obscured the problems posed by the many "opposantz" of the sales and the "subterfuges des 
contredisans" as Trexot called them. 24 Claims and counter-claims were made to pieces of land 
and to their rights and privileges, undoubtedly in the hope of being bought off by the duke and 
sharing in his bounty. Trexot found himself "bien empesche" by 120 procds he faced in lower 
Normandy. 25 
By this date the duc de Guise had been pursuing the affair for nearly seven years. The 
whole matter was starting to cause more trouble and expense than it was worth. As the year 1555 
drew to a close the continuing problems were exacerbated by the Longueville inheritance which 
had dragged on for four years. In December of that year a worried secretary Richet wrote to the 
duke: "Monseigneur, jay entendu que luy vows a fere desgoulter de ces deux affaires et questez 
sur le poinct de les quicter. "26 
Little is known about the nature of the lawsuits fought out in the courts of Normandy 
concerning the land sales. The level of chicanery, deals and bribery can only be imagined. In 
protecting the royal patrimony the petty royal officials in the localities may have been more immune 
to Guise influence than senior magistrates. After all they were, in a sense, protecting their own 
livelihood. Jean d'Erneville, lieutenant des Bardes de forets of Evreux, Conches and Breteuil, was 
one of many royal officials who brought cases against the sale. This lawsuit dragged on especially 
after the case was evoked to the chambre des comptes in Paris. Petremol was left in a quandary 
about how to proceed. 7 Occasionally a letter hints at more sinister activities. Secretary Brunet 
was sent from Paris to the aid of Guise agents, including a Norman household officer of the duke, 
Nicholas d'Osmont, who was being held prisoner in the house of a huisser of the parlement of 
Rouen: 
Jay veu le sieur d'osmont prisonnier en la maison d'un huissier. Quil pour le desire 
et affection quil a de vous faire treshumb(e service ma faict communiquer des 
faicts contenu en deux memoires ... 
Et pour ce que ceutx qui les mont baillez 
craignent estre descouvertz de messieurs de la chambre des enquetes de 
Rouen... ils vous prient humblement... que lesdites memoires quits mont baillez 
escripre de leur main ne viennent a la cognoissance de ceutz qui ont donne les 
arretz et jugements derniers ZB 
24 BN, Fr, 20538, to 43, Trexot to Guise, Caen, 10 February 1549. 
25 BN, Clair, 347, to 258, Vauquelin to Guise, Rouen, 2 July 1554. 
26 BN, Ms Fr, 20554, to 43, Richet to Guise, Rouen, 23 December 1555. 
27 BN, Ms Fr, 20519, to 94, Petremol to Guise, Rouen, 18 February 1553. 
28 BN, Clair, 348, to 141. Brunet to Guise, Paris, 9 June 1555. Nicholas d'Osmont was one 
of the genfilhommes servans in the household from 1552 until 1557, sse BN, Ms Fr, 22429, 
fos 130,136,140. Pierre d'Osmont, listed in the arriere-ban of 1552, was also in the 
household of the duke, see E. Travers (ed), R61e du ban of de l arricre-ban du bailliage de 
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Nicholas d'Osmont had been an dcuyer in the household of Jean cardinal de Lorraine in 1547. D 
He then joined the household of the duc de Guise, becoming one of the most important of the 
duke's representatives in Normandy and it was he who, in conjunction with Pdtremol, had originally 
presented the letters patent to the parlement of Rouen in 1549.30 He was released from captivity 
and lost no time in writing to illustrate to the duke the great expense that he had undertaken, telling 
the duke that recently: 
il est vacque ung greffe des esleuz de bemay ou U ne ya que xxv/ de gaiges. Je 
vous supplye treshumblement votre bonte me le faire donner du Roy pour 
rescompense despertes et despences que je ay toutte ma vie faicte en son 
service 31 
Guise had to employ a circle of expert counsellors and a large group of servants due to 
the complexities of the land sales and the multitude of lawsuits. Inevitably, he was the object of a 
host of requests for offices and favours. This was partly a reflection of Guise eminence at court 
after 1547. In addition, his need to employ agents directly in Normandy and the requirement to 
maintain a viable faction in the various law courts meant that he was especially vulnerable to 
appeals for favour. These solicitations came from those who were already in his service from those 
who sought to exchange their goodwill in return for concrete rewards. Louis Pdtremol, Pierre 
Rdmon and Antoine Le Cider took every opportunity to lobby hard for favours. These three men 
were crucial to Guise fortunes in Normandy and the duke could ill afford to lose their good grace. 
In effect, they could use their position as leverage to extract rewards from their patron. 
When premier president Remon died in 1553 the king was eagerly solicited by courtiers 
over the successor. Guise found himself faced with two conflicting candidates from amongst his 
own close contacts. Antoine Petremol wrote in support of his brother, Louis, asking Guise to 
intercede with the king. 32 Antoine Le Cider advanced another candidate, an official at the court 
called Ranconnet 3 In the event neither candidate was successful. The Guise themselves backed 
the candidature of Pdtremol for which they were generously thanked with pledges of future loyalty 
and service. The Guise family did not present a united front on the issue; Antoinette de Bourbon 
and Francois de Guise backed Pdtremol but the cardinal de Lorraine was committed to another 
Caen en 1552, Rouen and Paris, 1901, p 110. 
2' T. Courtaux and marquis de Touchet, Histoire generale de la maison de Touchet, Paris, 
1911, p 45. 
30 BN, Ms Fr, 20649, to 147, d'Osmont to Guise, Rouen, 6 March 1549. 
31 BN, Ms Fr, 20529, to 134, d'Osmont to Guise, 10 January 1558. 
32 BN, Ms Fr, 20544, to 73, A. Petremol to Guise, Paris, 1 June 1553. 
3° BN, Ms Fr, 20544, to 75, Le Cider to Guise, Pads, 1 June 1553. 
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candidate 3` Antoine Le Cider also desired an office in the parlement of Rouen. He put himself 
forward unsuccessfully for the office of conseiller at the parlement of Rouen; having previously 
received the support of Diane de Poitiers he solicited Guise . 
35 
An analysis of the Guise correspondence demonstrates the symbiotic relationship between 
patron and client, evident from the tangible rewards accruing to both in the relationship . 
36 The 
myriad obstructions facing the Guise meant that agents had to be directly employed. 
Thus a large affinity was not simply the reflection of a magnate's power but 
essential for the execution of any task. The power of local decision making and appointment was 
devolved to a small group of robins in Paris and Rouen - counsellors and advisers who sat on ad 
hoc councils. Unfortunately, the correspondence dealing with the sale of land in Normandy ends 
in 1556 and it is not known what became of the royal gift, although after seven years the duke was 
beginning to despair. As late as February 1556 the parlement of Rouen was still blocking royal 
commands sponsored by the Guise, prompting Pdtremol to ask the duke to seek more direct royal 
Intervention. 7 Perhaps the duc de Guise was losing interest in the whole affair. After all, he was 
on the point of crossing the Alps to campaign in Italy (winter 1556-7). However, the status of the 
Guise at court and their close involvement with provincial Norman affairs raised the family's 
influence to new heights in the province. 
Selcneurlal Officials 
The number of procds in which the Guise had an interest, in both the minor and higher courts in 
Normandy, necessitated a close degree of co-operation between their paid household servants and 
the magistrates who pursued their cases. It was, after all, the bailli of Aumale, Jean de Martimbosc, 
who wrote to Francois de Guise mentioning the meeting of a council to discuss the haute justice 
of the duchy in March 1548. The growing territorial influence of the Guise in the 1550s and 1560s 
brought with it an increase in the amount of patronage at their disposal. In the wake of this landed 
power came a greater administrative and legal burden in the higher sovereign courts, meaning that 
the Guise had to extend their influence and employ more lawyers to protect their rights. When the 
legal and administrative tasks had been much lighter the Le Roux family had been able to combine 
their duties as seigneurial officers of the Guise with those of conseillers in the echiquier or the 
34 BN, Ms Fr, 20544, to 117, A. Pdtremol to Guise, Paris, 1 August 1553. Louis Pdtremol 
always professed his loyalty, see BN, Ms Fr, 20554, to 40, Pdtremol to Guise, Rouen 20 
December 1555. He had spent "xxv ans au service du roy du vostre et de la justice. " 
35 BN, Ms Fr, 20551, fo 9, Le Cider to Guise, Paris, 15 June 1553. 
36 Antoine Le Cider also hoped to receive something from the spoils of the Longueville 
inheritance, see, BN, Ms Fr, 20470, to 73, A. Le Cider to Guise, Rouen, 3 October 1551. 
37 BN, Ms Fr, 20554, to 103, Petremol to Guise, Rouen, 10 February 1556. 
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pariement of Rouen'8 By the second half of the sixteenth century few conseillerswere seigneurial 
off dais but the officiers of the landed estates more often than not had a legal background. Those 
employed by the Guise often acted as avocats and procureurs for their patrons in the parlement 
or In the lesser courts of the bailliage or the presidial. For example, Jean de Martimbosc (d. 1561) 
was an avocat in the parlement of Rouen as well as bail/i of Aumale. Like other servants of the 
Guise, Jean found his way into service through the Guise links with the d'Orleans-Longueville, 
having been a pensioner of and acted as avocat for the duc de Longueville. The family was not of 
lowly status since Louis de Martimbosc was abbot of Chartres and Marion (d. 1614) was later abbot 
of Jumieges, grand vicaire of the cardinal de Bourbon in the archbishopic of Rouen (1575) and 
conseiller at the parlement of Rouen (1568-93). 30 It would be wrong to see the seigneurial office 
of bailli as in irrevocable decline in the face of the inevitable triumph of royal offices. A letter from 
Antoinette de Bourbon to her daughter Marie de Guise suggests how appointments took place: 
I have had news with many requests for the [office of] vicomte de Longueville, who 
is dead. I have written as you told me.... to the officers of the place, to inform me 
in your father's absence of the most sufficient and capable [person] to exercise the 
office conscientiously for the good of the duchy and the solace of the people. Many 
offer money for it, but this should not be allowed for a judicial office. The bearer 
said you made some promise to the controller Janot, and I would not hinder him, 
but give it for money I will not, and I think he would not offer it. The procureur of 
Longueville has asked for it, offering his office of procureur "pour faire proufit". A 
good procureur is indeed required, and if he were vicomte all the more. 40 
This letter dates from a time when venality had not yet become the norm or when offices had to 
be sold for financial expediency. It does show that offices were conferred after a collective process 
of consultation. Antoinette, who had a great influence in the administration of family affairs, co- 
operated with her own daughter and with their local servants. 
Seigneurial officials did not just administer estates and oversee the running of local affairs. 
They were also heavily involved in borrowing money on behalf of the Guise. They not only 
defended the rights and jurisdiction of the Guise lordships in the courts but performed military 
functions as captains of chateaux. Above all, they provided the Guise with the local knowledge, 
38 See chapter two above. 
39 Jean de Martimbosc was baillf of Aumale from cl 551 to c1561 see, ADSM, Tabellionage, 
2E1,304,11 and 17 October 1550; 2E1,305,5 August 1551; 2E1,323,7 September 
1556. Rene de Martimbosc was also in the service of the Longueville as procureur-fiscal 
of Gournay and La Fert6 see, 2E1,305,5 August 1551; 2E1,339,22 August 1569. On 
Marion, see Frondeville, Conseillers, p 450. 
40 Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic, of the reign of Henry Vlll, J. S. Brewer et al 
(eds), 21 vols, London, 1864-1932,1538, p 49. Antoinette de Bourbon to the Queen of 
Scotland, 18 August 1538. 
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expertise and contacts which facilitated links with the commercial community in Rouen and the 
political elite of Norman society. 
The most important offices at the disposal of the Guise would often go to a trusted and long 
standing family servant. Charles de La Chaussee was appointed governor of the comte of Eu in 
1579 by Henri de Lorraine duc de Guise, having previously served in the household of the cardinal 
de Lorraine in the capacity of pannetier at the rate of 2001 per annum. " Francois de La 
Chaussee, father of Charles, had served as governor of Joinville and surintendant des maisons 
of Claude duc de Guise `2 Such offices do not seem to be venal and were much coveted. In July 
1552 Rend des Buaz, conseiller at the parlement of Rouen, wrote to Antoinette de Bourbon in 
favour of Jean Lambert, already a servant of the Guise: 
Madame aiant sceu ('indisposition de vostre bailli d'ellebeuf vous aye adverty pour 
vostre service et M. le marquis le personage lequel pour la provision dudict office 
Iuy est necessaire M. Jehan Lambert advocat en ce parlement procureur-general 
de monseigneur le cardinal de Lorraine en ce pays de normandie `3 
Antoinette replied that such a decision would have to be taken in council with "ladvis de mes 
enffans que jattends bien tot icy"" 
The posts of bailli or vicomte required legal knowledge and so those with such a 
background were preferred. Similarly, those with a commercial background were best suited to 
manage the financial affairs of the estates. Only merchants and bourgeois possessed the ready 
cash and expertise to accept the farm of a given revenue. They were also to be found heavily 
involved in the wider financial affairs of the Guise, lending money, constituting rentes and acting 
as proxies and guarantors in financial transactions. Nicholas Rogy, bourgeois marchand and 
receveur of Mauny, performed many other tasks for the duc d'Aumale outside the scope of his 
office, involving himself particularly in the financial transactions that the duke undertook. As a 
merchant Rogy had both the capital and the financial contacts to facilitate these deals. His name 
appears regularly in notarial records as a guarantor and witness for the duke 45 
41 ADSM, E1,486/2, to 83; BN, Clair, 1204, to 84. 
42 Chenaye-Desbois, V, p 527. 
43 BN, Ms Fr, 20515, to 73, des Buaz to Antoinette, Rouen, 16 July 1552. Lambert seems to 
have been successful as he qualified as bailll of Elbeuf in 1559 and 1560, see ADSM, 
Tabellionage, 2E1,319,4 august 1559; 2E1,321,26 May 1560. He was both Willi of 
Aumale and Elbeuf in 1561, see ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1,323,12 August 1561. 
" BN, Ms Fr, 20515, to 74, Antoinette to des Buaz, n. d. The councils of Antoinette and the 
cardinal de Lorraine are also mentioned in connection with the administration of Elbeuf, in 
BN, Ms Fr, 20649, to 157, Le Picart to Antoinette, Paris, 1 May 1551. 
45 Florimond Mallet, receveur of Aumale, also appears frequently, e. g. ADSM, Tabellionage, 
2E1,323,12 August 1561; 2E1,304,11 October, 17 October, 6 November 1551. 
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There were also offices for the petite noblesse d'8pee. Jean de Bellemare, of an ancient 
Norman family, was bailli of the comte of Harcourt for the marquis d'Elbeuf in 1575 Guillaume 
de Franqueville, sieur de Gantrelle, was a verdier in the marquisate at the same time" Jean de 
La Motte 6cuyer, sieur de Vimont, was garde du scel of the vicomtd and duchy of Aumale in 
1558. " His son, Jean, was, like several Guise servants and officials, a Huguenot. 49 Adrien 
Bridou (d. 1580), vicomte and receveur of the duchy of Aurnale in 1567 and vicomte of Neufchatel- 
en-Bray for the king in 1559 and 1560, abjured catholicism in 1559.50 In 1569 Bridou lost his royal 
office in an anti-Calvinist drive and probably also his seigneurial office. His replacement, Nicole 
Cherie, seems to have gained both offices and was titled vicomte of Aumale in 1574.5' However, 
the purging of non-catholic servants was not a policy of the Guise. First, the Cherie family was local 
and well known to the duc d'Aumale, acting as guarantors for the duke in 1564 and 1565 ' They 
received the office as faithful servants of the duke rather than for their religious zeal. Secondly, 
there were other Huguenots happy to serve the Guise. Eustache Trevache, a Rouennais merchant 
and Huguenot, became a financial adviser to the marquis (later duc) d'Elbeuf. He was receveur- 
fermier for the comte of Lillebonne from 1580, for which he paid the duke 2,350 ecus per 
annum. 53 The duke was more concerned with the efficient running of his estates than the apparent 
contradiction between his employment of a Huguenot and his desire for the extermination of heresy, 
as his membership of the Catholic League required. Thus when Trevache had the foresight to flee 
the Catholic League in 1585, the duke's first concern was that Trevache had left without paying the 
money he owed. 54 
The strong catholic faith of the Guise was not always reflected by their servants. Similarly 
" Chenaye-Desbois, II, pp 863-4; ADSM, Tabelfionage, 2E1,351,24 July 1575. 
" The Franqueville had been servants of Marie d'Harcourt in the mid-fifteenth century. 
48 ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1,316,16 March 1558. 
49 The sieur de Vimont was part of the prince de Condd's army in 1562, see Public Record 
Office, London, SP 70/41, "Estat de parties... de lassociasion de Monseigneur le prince de 
Conde... " 
S0 F. Bouquet (ed), Documents concernant l'histoire de Neufchatel-en-Bray, Rouen, 1884, p 
11. 
51 Bouquet (ed), Documents ooncernant l'histoire de Neufchatel-en-Bray, p 21; ADSM, 
Tabellionage, 2E1,348,18 January 1574. 
62 Pierre Cherie, sieur de Fontenil, "demeurant audit lieu daubmalle" acted as a witness for 
the duc d'Aumale in 1564 see, ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1,329,19 February 1564. 
5' G. K. Brunelli, The New World Merchants of Rouen, 1559-1630, Ann Arbor, 1991, pp 155- 
6; ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1,360,13 June 1580; 2E1,365,14 February 1582; 1°' 
meubles, 24 February 1586. Trevache had been receveur-general en la province de 
Normandie. see, ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1,351,9 July 1575. 
54 ADC, E, 353,13 November 1585. Trevache returned to Normandy between 1586 and 1588 
but fled again as the political situation once more deteriorated. 
59 
it would be wrong to designate types of office too systematically Into offices of justice, finance and 
police divided up among the noblesse de robe, merchants and noblesse d6p6e respectively. 
Jacques Blondel, for example, proaureur fiscal of the duc d'Elbeuf, was also captain of Lillebonne 
in 1590. "' Mathieu de Montpellier was verdier of the same estate in 1580, becoming bailli and 
captain of the chateau in 1589. In 1575 Nicholas de Montpellier had been receveur of the comtd 
of Lillebonne in 1575 ' Jean Ameline was receveurof Mauny from 1556 until 1565 and Jean and 
Jacques Ameline pursued military careers as archers in the company of the duc d'Aumale (1572- 
5). 67 One family might receive patronage from different members of the Guise family. Jean Vion 
occupied the important office of tresorier and receuveur-general of the duc de Guise in 1550 and 
again in 1552. Nicaise Vion qualified in the less prestigious position as an archer in the company 
of the ordonnance of Rene marquis d'Elbeuf (1565-9). 58 Even from the few examples provided, 
the close relationship between kinship and service is evident. Bonds of kinship and affection united 
those who served in the same household and shared a common patron. 59 
The Mobilisation of Financial Resources 
All nobles had to raise large sums of cash above and beyond their ordinary revenues, in particular 
for the purposes of marriage, war and the purchase of offices and land. There exists a large 
amount of data in the Rouennais notarial archives showing that land was mortgaged on a large 
scale and substantial amounts of capital quickly raised. The Norman cadet branches of the House 
of Guise raised huge sums on the Rouennais money markets by constituting rentes on their 
Norman lands. 
Appendices C and D outline the borrowing undertaken by both the d'Aumale and the 
d'Elbeuf from the 1550s to the 1 580s. Most noticeable is the division of borrowing patterns into two 
distinct phases. Unlike his son Charles, Claude duc d'Aumale was a heavy borrower in Rouen. 
55 ADSM, EI, 462,28 March 1590. 
56 ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1,362,8 October 1580; 2E1,352,14 February 1576; ADSM, El, 
462,11 April 1589. The widow of Nicholas de Montpellier married Eustache Trevache, 
revealing the complexity of kinship links among servants of the Guise and suggesting that 
the Montpellier were Huguenots too. 
67 ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1,313,7 September 1556; 2E1,318,25 November 1558; 2E1, 
331,16 July 1565; BN, Ms Fr, 21533, to 2077, muster roll of 51 men-at-arms and 75 
archers, Dreux, 6 October 1572; BN, Na Fr, 8630, to 58, muster roll of 21 men-at-arms and 
28 archers, Beaune en Brie, 14 October 1575. 
56 BN, Ms Fr, 24429, fo 130; BN, Clair, 261, fo 1719, muster roll of 40 men-at-arms and 60 
archers, Montereau, 1 June 1565; BN, Ms Fr, 21529, to 1930, muster roll of 33 men-at- 
arms and 39 archers, Chinon, 6 February 1569. 
59 On the importance of fraternity and artifical kinship bonding in service, see J. Davies, 
"Family Service and Family Strategies: The Household of Henri, duc de Montmorency, ca. 
1590-1610". Bu ll&h'w FcSij {"' -a''r(2M4'. - ce 
Steer, '3 .. 
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Conversely, Charles duc d'Elbeuf borrowed heavily in the 1580's whereas his father, Rend, never 
seems to have constituted rentes in Rouen. This financial pattern reflects the political strategy of 
each man. In the case of the ducs d'Aumale, the lather was more concerned with Norman affairs 
and establishing a clientele in Normandy than the son who pursued his political career almost 
exclusively within the confines of Picardy. Rene, marquis d'Elbeuf was never a significant figure in 
the province but his son later became the commander of the Catholic League there in 1585. 
The borrowing of money can be traced to distinct periods of activity (usually military). The 
constitution of rentes by Claude duc d'Aumale in 1550 and 1551 coincides with the preparations 
for the invasion of Metz, Toul and Verdun. The next spate of borrowing comes in 1556, prior to the 
Guise led campaign in Italy. Between 1580 and 1583 Charles d'Elbeuf borrowed heavily in order 
to finance his contingent in the expedition led by the duc d'Anjou into the Low Countries. Troops 
had to be raised and paid for in advance, thereafter recouping money from the royal treasury. If 
indebtedness rose and intervention by the king was not forthcoming land had to be alienated in 
order to meet obligations. Thus in 1559 Claude d'Aumale sold the office of the bailli of Caen in 
order to offset debts built up in the wars against the imperialists 60 The advent of the Wars of 
Religion meant no respite from spiralling military expenditure for both crown and nobility. D'Aumale 
was forced to sell the seigneuries of Estouteville and Plainbosc in 1570 for 30,0001 to a creditor, 
Georges Langlois, and his son was compelled to sell the entire barony of Bec Crespin 1579 in 
order to ease the legacy of debt bequeathed to him 61 
When a large amount of cash needed to be raised a legal document was drawn up 
empowering a chosen servant or client to act as a proxy. Armed with the procuration, which 
detailed the sum required, the servant would set off to Rouen to raise the rentes. In some cases 
the borrower had made preliminary contacts and was aware of whom to approach. In other cases 
the proxy would have used his own personal contacts and knowledge to find those willing to buy. 
Seigneurial officials usually acted as guarantors for the repayments; specific revenues often being 
assigned for this task in the contract. 
A procuration was established by Charles duc d'Elbeuf in May 1588 at his chateau of 
Harcourt stipulating the alienation of 6001 of rente. Jacques Vernier was made proxy for the sale. 
Those pledging caution of all their chattels and goods included Mathieu Dupont receveur of the 
duchy of Elbeuf, Imbert Le Peinteur receveurof the comtd of Harcourt, Pierre Le Danois receveur 
of the comtd of Brionne and Jean Michel adjudicateurof the forests of Elbeuf 62 The details of the 
financial transactions of Claude duc d'Aumale were usually left to his maitre d'hotel and intendant, 
60 ADSM, Tabellionge, 2E1,323,28 July 1561. The original agreement was reached in April 
of 1559 by which the purchaser agreed to meet the debts of the duke totalling 2,1701 of 
rente. The office was probably given by the king to in lieu of money he owed d'Aumale. 
81 ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1,341,11 September 1570; Lechevalier, Notice historique surles 
barons et la baronnie du Bec, p 12. 
ADSM, Tabellionage, 26"" Heritage, 2E1,2003,9 May 1588. 
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Charles de La Menardiere 6' The duke's own residence in the parish of Sainte-Croix in Rouen was 
a place where discussions and legal formalities took place. The duc d'Elbeuf made use of this 
residence In 1582 when conducting his own financial transactions. ` Present at discussions and 
witnesses to contracts would usually be three or four seigneurial officers, who had legal and 
financial expertise. Sometimes a trusted client might figure among the signatures. In 1556 Jean de 
Brevedent, lieutenant-general of the baifliage of Rouen -a man associated to d'Aumale through 
their mutual links with the Brez6 - acted as a witness for the duc d'Aumale. He was joined by 
Nicholas Caillot, a lawyer in the parlement of Rouen who had already been involved in land sales 
for the duc de Guise. Throughout the 1550s, Robert Raouliin, sieur de Longpaon, the procureur 
of d'Aumale in the parlement, was entrusted with the task of finding buyers of rentes and in 1561 
he paid off arrears and outstanding debts 65 
There were political as well as obvious financial implications of the constituting of rentes 
on landed estates. Visualising these transactions as purely financial and legal documents 
underestimates the personal bond of the contract. Rentes were either constituted by parties who 
were familiars or through the good offices of a mutually recognised third party. These personal links 
provided a greater degree of insurance and trust between both parties. The buying of rentes was 
not a purely individual decision or commitment. It was a family investment to provide an income for 
a wife and children in case of the husband's death. 
Those who bought rentes from the Guise often had some personal contact with them, 
however tenuous. A large majority of those outlined in appendices C and D were also supporters 
of the ultra-catholic faction during the Wars of Religion. However buying rentes from the Guise did 
not automatically entail political support for the family and the elite of Rouennais society were quite 
capable of pursuing their own independent family strategies. Among the purchasers were 
Huguenots and others who opposed the Catholic League. Nevertheless, the established contacts 
between several of the biggest purchasers and the Guise were reinforced by mutual financial links - 
financial dependency contributed to the cohesion of an aff inity66 
The personal and family ties involved in the constitution of rentes are revealed in the 
procuration created by Charles d'Elbeuf in July 1581 in favour of Louis Le Mercier, sieur de La 
Bretesque, vicomte of Evreux and a maitre des requetes of the duc d'Anjou, younger brother of 
Henri 111.67 This was to facilitate the raising of money for d'Elbeuf's forces serving with the duc 
63 ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1,305,4 September 1551; 2E1,313,7 September 1556; 2E1, 
314, last of September 1556; 2E1,323,12 August 1561; 2E1,341,11 September 1570. 
64 ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1,365,19 May 1582. 
ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1,304,11 and 17 October 1550; 2E1,305,4 September 1551; 
2E1,313 7 September 1556; 2E1 314, last September 1556; 2E1,323,12 August 1561. 
Thus Guillaume Auber purchased rentes from both d'Aumale and d'Elbeuf and fought for 
the Catholic League. 
67 ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1,363,12 July 1581. 
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d'Anjou in the Low Countries. Le Mercier sold the rentes among his own family and friends. Bartle 
and Anne Le Mercier bought 8001 between them. Pierre Le Cornier, son of Barbe Le Mercier and 
a conseiller in the parfement of Rouen, acquired 1600/. A quartenier of the town of Rouen and 
future conseillerin the parlement, Andre Bonnissent, who was married to Louise Le Mercier, bought 
1501. There was only a financial link between this kin grouping and the Guise; they were of the 
periphery of the Guise affinity and both the conseillers remained on the royalist side during the 
Catholic League " Other religious moderates, such as conseiller Pierre du Quesne, and even 
some Huguenots such as Alonce de Quintadoines, Frangois de Civille and Catherine Le Gras 
bought rentes from the the duc d'Elbeuf 69 Again this demonstrates that d'Elbeuf was less 
interested in the complexities of faith than in raising cash. He was aided in his search for money 
in the Huguenot community because heLpreparing to join the duc d'Anjou who was head of the 
politique faction and identified with religious compromise. * 
There is a more significant group of families which consistently procured rentes from the 
Guise over a number of decades, seemingly not for some isolated enterprise or purpose. The most 
important family in this group, in terms of status, was the great parlementaire family, the 
Bauquemare, and its kinsmen the Le Febvre d'Escalles. Another family, the Puchot, were also an 
important source of money for the Guise. This family was split by religious divisions and it was the 
catholic branch which became the largest creditor of the Guise in Rouen. 
Between 1556 and 1582 the Bauquernare bought 1,2401 of rentes from the d'Aumale and 
d'Elbeuf branches of the House of Guise. Jean Le Febvre d'Escalles (d. 1571), a conseillerat the 
parlement of Rouen (1544-71) and brother-in-law of Jacques de Bauquemare (1518-84), premier 
president (1565-84), was the buyer of a further 6301. " Jacques de Bauquemare was a towering 
figure in Rouen during the Wars of Religion. A confirmed catholic but at the same time a moderate 
concerned with keeping order in the city, he was personally known to the Guise as early as 1551 
when he solicited the duke for a favour! In the years that followed he bought rentes off the Guise 
but also acted as witness, intermediary and guarantor in transactions between the Guise and other 
members of his family, suggesting close contact with the Guise'3 Again, it would be misleading 
" Frondeville, Conseillers, pp 561,598-9. 
On the Quintadoines family, see Brunelle, The New World Merchants of Rouen, p 150, who 
demonstrates that confessional differences did little to hinder commercial relationships 
between families. 
70 See chapter six below. 
71 Frondeville, Conseillers, p 360; Presidents, p 54. Charles Le Febvre d'Escalles was a 
product of the marriage between Jean and Anne de Bauquemare, and maintained the 
family alliance by marrying Marguerite de Bauquemare, see Frondeville, Consefllers, p 528. 
n Frondeville, Presidents, pp 54-5; D. B. F., V, pp 942-3; BN, Ms Fr, 20533, fo 108, 
Bauquemare to Guise, Rouen, 15 January 1551. 
" See for example, ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1,334,13 January 1567. 
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to suggest that this kin group were dependent clients of the Guise. There was, however, a 
relationship with the Guise built upon financial dealings over the decades. Such personal contacts 
were to be useful during times of political crisis. During the hegemony of the Catholic League in 
Rouen the sons of Jacques de Bauquemare, Jean-Pierre (d. 1619) a maitre des requetes and 
Jacques (d. 1616), a conseiller at the parlement of Rouen, sat on the local provincial council of the 
League. " They were joined in the League by their close cousin Charles Le Febvre d'Escalles 75 
A long standing relationship with the Guise should not be seen as synonymous with joining the 
Catholic League. Nevertheless there were further connections through mutual links with the 
Croismare Family. Jacques de Bauquemare the elder was married to Catherine de Croismare 
whose cousin, Charles de Croismare, sieur de Saint-Just, was "attache A la maison de Claude de 
Lorraine, duc d'Aumale". 76 lt is possible to come full circle since Charles de Croismare was 
married in 1550 to Anne Jubert, the younger sister of Jean Jubert grand vicaire of the cardinal 
de Lorraine for the abbey of Bec and also sister of Jacques, a conseiller in the parlement and a 
major creditor of the Guise. " 
The other significant buyers of rentes from the Guise were members of the catholic branch 
of the Puchot family, which was a large and wealthy Rouennais bourgeois family. Vincent Puchot 
(d. pre-1 575), adjudicateur du tabellionage de !a ville et de la vicomtd de Rouen, together with his 
wife, Marie de La Haye, and their sixth son, Charles, a lawyer in the parlement of Rouen, bought 
5,200! of rentes from the ducs d'Aumale and d'Elbeuf. 78 This huge sum made them the most 
important creditors of the Guise in Rouen. This financial involvement with the Guise has two 
interesting facets. First, Pierre Puchot conseillerat the Parlement of Rouen from 1573 to 1619 and 
the second son of Vincent was yet another member of the League parlement of Rouen who had 
financial dealings with the Guise over many years. Secondly, the elder branch of the Puchot family 
were Calvinists and there was internecine feuding between the cousins. This feud may have been 
exacerbated by the catholic side of the family being linked closely to the financial affairs of the 
74 Frondevilfe, Presidents, p 65-6. For their involvement in the League, see chapter seven 
below. 
75 Frondeville, Conselllers, p 528. 
76 Frondeville, Presidents, p 206. It was due to Bauquemare's influence that Jean de 
Croismare was received as a president in the parlement in 1567. For Charles de Croismare 
as an agent of the Guise, see below chapter six. 
77 Frondeville, Conseillers, p 136. Jacques de Bauquemare married his nephew Jean du 
Bosc, sieur de Coquereaumont, to Anne Jubert in 1581 at which a large gathering of both 
families was present, see ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1 364,25 October 1581. 
78 Frondeville, Conseillers, p 532. Interestingly, it was his son and nephew, Jean and 
Nicholas, both catholics who were elected as bourgeois captains of Rouen after the fall of 
the city to royalist forces in 1562 see, ACR, A, 18,18 November 1562. 
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Guise' 
The correlation between personal contact, kinship and politics was complex but crucial to 
the understanding of how nobles mobilised financial resources and political support. In fact, political 
loyalty and financial dependence were closely interlinked - financial interdependence might create 
a political loyalty or reinforce an existing one. Although rentes were constituted on property or 
revenues the buyer was reliant on the creditworthiness of the seller to receive prompt payments. 
During a time of political and fiscal instability the buyer was relying on the future financial solvency 
and social success of the constitutor. Thus both parties preferred to deal with someone they could 
trust. Financial difficulties were common in forcing the ducs d'Aumale, d'Elbeuf and de Guise to sell 
land in the 1570s and 1580s. 90 Only bonds of trust could allow the debtor to re-schedule arrears 
of payment and be granted time to repay debts without recourse to the courts. 
When property had to be sold to meet obligations a buyer was found who was trustworthy. 
Thus when the duc d'Elbeuf was forced to sell the seigneury of Quatremares in 1584 for 80,0001 
to meet debts incurred in the Netherlands campaign, he did so to a noble client, Jean de La Haye, 
in whom he had faith 8' 
Household Domestigues and Military Retinues 
The core of an affinity consisted of those physically closest to the patron; those who served at his 
table, gave counsel and were prepared to sacrifice their lives for their lord on the battlefield or in 
a duel. The two key institutions which supported these noble servants were the household and the 
military retinue, notwithstanding the fact that both were complementary and should not be seen as 
distinct entities. The major difference was that the household was supported by the lord and the 
military retinue, whether company of the ordonnance, light cavalry bodyguard or company of foot 
was funded primarily from royal coffers. In 1556 the formal paid household of the duc de Guise 
totalled some 159 persons, rising to 164 in 1561. During wartime his company of ordonnance 
would have numbered 100 lances or some 250 men. Such a retinue would have been further 
swelled by those who had never appeared on any payment roll: hangers-on and the host of 
professions from pages to prostitutes which serviced the lord's retinue. 
At the top of the hierarchy in the court of a magnate or prince were his closest advisers and 
79 BN, Na Fr, 23576, to 101. In 1567 the conseil du roi demanded the family live in "une 
bonne et parfaict paix... finir et asoupir tous le proces et differends". 
80 See chapter six below for these financial problems. 
81 ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1,367,28 October 1586. On Jean de La Haye, see chapter six 
below. 
82 Harding, Anatomy of a Power Elite, p 27. In 1561 there were 129 members of the 
household of the cardinal de Lorraine at a cost of 16,510/ to keep, see BN, Clair, 1204, fos 
83-6. "Estat des Evesques abbez et protenotaires de la maison de Monseigneur Ilf"° 
Cardinal de Lorraine et des gaiges des gentilshommes off iciers et domestiques". 
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confidants. In the household accounts of the duc de Guise in the 1550s these men are referred to 
as conseillers gentilshommes and chambellans. "Among the closest counsellors should also be 
included the principal officers of the duke's company of the ordonnance. Little is known about the 
cultural concepts which determined the giving of counsel as well as the organisation and 
competence of noble councils. The emphasis political historians place on the individual is a legacy 
of the nineteenth century. There is a tendency to overlook the conciliar and collective in the political 
decision-making process and the search for consensus in sixteenth century politics" The Guise 
governed their household and created institutions to manage their affairs on a pattern, smaller than, 
but similar to that of the crown. It has already been possible to demonstrate how the Guise councils 
oversaw business in Paris and Rouen. Another major upper Norman landowner, the duc de 
Longueville, also had a council in Rouen " Councils were not bureaucratic institutions and, 
although there were often formal council meetings anyone who had the ear of a particular lord was 
in a position to give counsel - physical proximity was therefore of crucial importance. It is also 
possible to envisage conflicting counsel being given and the existence of a variety of opinions and 
factions within the council and household of a nobleman, just as in_ the court of the king. The 
household of the cardinal de Bourbon was certainly fragmented in this manner in the 1570s. 86 
Councils not only tied clients closer to their patron by involving them in the decision-making 
process, but also allowed the lord to hear a variety of opinions and experiences - so crucial in an 
age of poor communications. Moreover, because ties of loyalty were notoriously prone to 
breakdown, a conciliar decision was a means of reaching a broad consensus on strategy and so 
facilitating the maintenance of loyalties. Councils provided a vital link in the uncoordinated and 
disparate web of contacts and information upon which the Guise family relied. In order to 
understand the remarkable solidarity of the Guise family we must appreciate the council as the 
means by which all family members shared in the formulation of family strategy. Family unity could 
be maintained only through consensus and not through the domination of the duc de Guise as an 
individual over the rest of his family and his servants. 
Joinville was the seat of the ducs de Guise. Here resided, almost continuously until her 
death in 1583, the matriarch of the Guise family, Antoinette de Bourbon. It was here that the largest 
03 BN, Ms Fr, 22429, fos 130-8. 
64 This concentration on individuals and their personalities is a feature of the historiography. 
Even the most recent book on the Guise, J. -M. Constant, Les Guises, is not really about 
the Guise as a family but concentrates on Henri duc de Guise. The nobility as portrayed 
by Kristen Neuschel is highly individualistic - each noble intent on following his own 
individual strategy. 
85 Jacques Girard was paid 1115s in 1550 for four journeys made from Longueville to Rouen 
"suivant le commandement des gens de conseil de monseigneur": ADSM, C, 8182, 
Comptes du duchd de Longueville. The same document also reveals that the duke had his 
own chambre des comptes of which Jean de Rouvray, vicomte of Longueville, was 
president. 
" Saulnier, Le role politique du cardinal de Bourbon, p 95. 
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and most important family conferences were held as well as more routine meetings. Given the 
secrecy and risks which surrounded family councils it is little wonder that there is insufficient 
documentation on the proceedings. The partisans of the Catholic League (most of the leaders of 
which were members of the Guise family) met at Joinville to discuss strategy in December of 1584 
and again at Nancy early in 1588.87 Both these meetings were succeeded by periods of heated 
political activity, culminating in open revolt against the crown. In January 1564 the entire family left 
court amid great tension for a conference at Joinville to discuss its future strategy in the pursuance 
of admiral Coligny for the murder of Francois duc de Guise . 
ea The double marriage of Charles 
duc d'Aumale to his cousin, Marie de Lorraine, (daughter of the marquis d'Elbeuf) and of his sister, 
Diane, to Frangois de Luxembourg, comte de Roucy, at Joinville in November 1576 would have 
provided an excellent opportunity to discuss the political crisis engendered by the Catholic League 
in Picardy and the impending convocation of the Estates-General at Blois 8° Councils also decided 
on more mundane matters. The document which created Etienne de Morainville tutor of Rene 
d'Elbeuf in 1550 was made at Joinville in front of Christophe de Thou, Claude Baudry and the bail! i 
Jean Roseuse. Morainville was nominated by Antoinette de Bourbon and the cardinal de Lorraine. 
The document was signed by the comte de Vauds rnont and his wife, the duc and duchesse de 
Guise, the duc d'Aumale and the grand prieur, Francois de Lorraine 90 This process therefore 
involved the whole family, legitimising the act and creating a consensus which lessened the 
opportunity for future dispute. 
Due to the secrecy surrounding these occasions little is known about the councils and what 
transpired while they were in session. However, it is possible to reconstruct a picture of those who 
sat on them using the extant household records of the duc de Guise and the cardinal de Lorraine. 
Jacques de La Brosse was lieutenant (1556-8), conseiller-gentilhomme and maitre d'h6tel of 
Francois de Guise (1552-7) on a pension of 4001 per annum. Even after he disappeared from the 
official pay roll he remained high in the esteem of the duke and in his council. 9t Unsurprisingly, 
Champenois families like the des Boves and the Choiseul appear regularly in the household 
accounts of the duke in the 1550s. 92 The des Boves family served the Guise over three 
generations. Francois des Boves served as the ensign of Claude duc de Guise (1547-50), Henri 
des Boves was guidon of the duc d'Elbeuf and Charles "capitain de cinquante hommes d'armes 
87 Constant, Les Guises, pp 128,162. 
88 Pimodan, La mere des Guises, p 220. 
89 Ibid, p 261. 
90 ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1,304,9 October 1550. 
91 On La Brosse see chapter two above. 
g2 On the des Boves see chapter two above. Jean de Choiseul, baron de Lanques, and Rend 
de Choiseul sieur de Benaprd were gentilhommes servans from 1552 until 1560, see BN, 
ms Fr, 22429, fos 130-161. Pierre de Choiseul, sieur d'Ischd, had previously been guidon 
of Claude de Guise in 1544, see Vindry, p 282. 
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soubz la charge de mondict seigneur duc d'Elbeuf" in 1588. " Marriage and service were closely 
interwoven. The des Essars family, which provided several gentilhommes servans for the duc de 
Guise in the 1550s, was allied to the des Boves by the marriage of Antoine des Boves, sieur de 
Mazibres, to Madeleine des Essars in 1546. °` The des Essars also continued in the service of the 
Guise Into the 1560s. Francois des Essars being first guidon of the company of Henri duc de Guise 
and then ensign from 1564 until 1569.95 
The household of the young Rend marquis d'Elbeuf was a focus for many long standing 
Guise servants. The socialisation of the young prince took place in an environment dominated by 
the loyal familiars of his parents and elder brothers. Charles des Boves was his tutor and Rend de 
Choiseul, baron de Lanques (d. 1564), progressed from the household of the duc de Guise in the 
1550s to become the lieutenant of the company of the ordonnance of the marquis (1559-60). m 
Martin de Romencourt was maitre de logis of the same company from 1559 until 1569, having been 
a maitre d'h6tel of Antoinette de Bourbon. 7 D'Elbeuf's household thus supported and extended 
the traditional interest in eastern France. Indeed, his household and company of the ordonnance 
provided patronage opportunities for his mother and elder brothers. 
Rend's son, Charles (1556-1605), was more independent and established his own council 
and household with Norman servants. A council was established in Rouen to pursue d'Elbeuf's 
rights in his lands and its workings can be seen in the prosecution of errant vassals from 1577 
onwards °B Most of the councillors were lawyers at the parlement of Rouen, headed by Jacques 
des Boulletz ecuyer "ayant la conduite des affaires de Monseigneur le duc d'Elbeuf" °8 He was 
assisted by Jean and Baptiste du Vivier and by d'Elbeuf's procureur in the parlement, Guillaume 
Valdory. 100 From the early 1580s Charles de Sarcilly, sleur d'Ernes, premier maitre d'hdtel and 
intendant of the duc d'Elbeuf was the most important ducal representative in Normandy. 10' The 
93 BN, PO, 485, to 64; Vindry, p 295; ADSM, Tabellionage, 2"r"* Heritage, 2007,27 August 
1588. 
" BN, PO, 485, to 19. 
95 Vindry, p 296. 
Ibid, p 294. 
97 lbid, p 304. 
°B Particularly the prosecutions of the sieur de Saint-Bosmer and later Eustache Trevache, 
see ADC, E, 237,238,353. 
go ADC, E, 237,18 December 1584. 
100 The du Vivier were specifically referred to as conseillers of d'Elbeuf, see ADSM, G, 2176, 
9 March 1588. 
101 ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1,365,14 February 1582. He was especially important during the 
Catholic League and the reconstruction of the duke's estates after the Wars of Religion, 
see chapter seven below. He was supported by Jean de Bohier, sieur de Chandely, maitre 
d'h6tel of the duke, see ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1,367,28 October 1586. 
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Sarcilly were a Norman family closely tied to the House of Lorraine. Charles was himself a relation 
of the Guise since he was the son of Jean and Catherine, batarde de Lorraine. 102 The whole 
family was patronised by the House of Lorraine. The younger sister of Charles, Marguerite, was 
fille dhonneur and dame d'atours of Louise de Lorraine, daughter of the duc de Lorraine, and on 
her marriage at Nancy in 1573, she received 6,000 florins from the duc de Lorraine and a total of 
10,000 florins from the cardinals de Guise and de Lorraine. 103 
Claude duc d'Aumale established an independent household in the 1550s, reflecting his 
position as a major landholder in Normandy. In 1571 he mentioned that, having received a memoir 
from Dauphine, "jay incontinent envoyez a mon Conseil pour y avoir advis. w104 One of his most 
senior Norman councillors was Charles de La Menardiere, sieur de Montaigu, his maitre d'h6tel 
from 1551 until 1568 and intendant in 1568.105 The family were important landowners in lower 
Normandy and Charles' father, Bertrand (1459-1550), had been bailli and captain of Caen. 108 
Other members of the La Menardiere family appear in the musters rolls of the duke's company - 
Louis de la Menardiere qualified as an archer in 1565 - and they continued to be important in the 
military retinues of the duc d'Aumale into the 1590s. 107 D'Aumale's residence in Rouen was a 
focus for financial discussions and in February 1565 he lodged in the house of his procureur, 
Robert Raoullin, whilst he completed the buying of some land. 10e The duke even had a treasury 
in Rouen overseen by Etienne Houdry "recepveur des deniers de mondict seigneur en la ville de 
Rouen", to whom tax fanners and the fiscal officers of the duke paid the seigneurial revenues. 106 
Charles de Lorraine, duc d'Aumale, on the death of his father Claude in 1573, was a minor 
and like Rend d'Elbeuf before him had his household run by Guise servants. His guardian was the 
cardinal de Lorraine who made the bailliof the bishopric of Metz (of which the cardinal was bishop) 
gouverneur et surintendant of the household of the young duke. In 1574 the household was small, 
comprising 32 persons which included two gentilhommes de la chambre and one maitre d'hötel - 
the total cost being 15,000 francs. The size of the retinue was perhaps small because the young 
duke was at the University of Pont A Mousson in 1575. Undoubtedly, the most important member 
of the household was his valet de chambre Charles de Lorraine, second son of the duc de 
102 ADC, 2E, 882, "Genealogie de la Maison de Sarcilly". 
103 Ibid. 
104 BN, Ms Fr, 3188, to 60, d'Aumale to Gaspard de La Chatre, 16 October 1571. 
'05 ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1,313,7 September 1556; 2E1,323,12 August 1561; 2E1,341 
11 September 1570, November 1570. 
106 Chenaye-Desbois, X, 609-10. 
107 BN, Clair, 261, to 1729, muster roll of 50 men-at-amis and 74 archers, Chalons-sur-Saone, 
5 June 1565. See also chapter seven below. 
106 A. Heron (ed), Deux Chroniques de Rouen, Rouen and Paris, 1900, p 315. 
109 ADSM, J, 138,1576, "Ferme du comte de Maulevrier". 
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Mercoeur. 1° This relationship had been cemented when Mercoeur took Catherine de Lorraine, 
daughter of Claude duc d'Aumale, as his third wife in 1569.11' 
Immediately associated with the core of senior counsellors and household servants and at 
the heart of the affinity was the military retinue. Companies of the ordonnance were recruited by 
a captain and paid for by the crown. Philippe Contamine, In his classic study of late medieval 
society and warfare, grasped the fundamental importance of the companies of the ordonnance in 
augmenting royal patronage and differentiating the medieval from the Renaissance monarchy. 112 
The pivotal role of the companies in the patronage system of the French monarchy in the late 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries has attracted much attention and controversy. Robert Harding saw 
the gendarmerie as the key institution of the French Renaissance state, maintaining the equilibrium 
between the crown and the magnates through patronage in return for loyalty. The breakdown of 
this harmonious relationship, especially the decadence of the gendarmerie was, according to 
Harding, a major factor in fuelling noble discontent during the Wars of Religion. "3 Harding's 
theory, exemplified by the section entitled "The demise of the gendarmerie", aims to demonstrate 
the failure of the clientage system upon which society was founded and which had, until the Wars 
of Religion, maintained some sort of equilibrium by acting as a hierarchical conduit for patronage 
and favour in return for service. "` 
Harding reaches his conclusions by making a study of the changing size and composition 
of the gendarmerie throughout the Wars of Religion. He states that the number of ordonnance 
companies declined to a meagre 12 in 1573, having reached the large number of 100 in 1569. 
More damaging to the ethos of the permanent nature of these companies was the edict of 1579 
which provided for the adoption of a rota system, in which each company was operative for one 
third of a year only. Moreover, at the same time the traditional unit of the companies, the lance, 
(composed of three archers for every two men-at- arms) had become meaningless and now simply 
corresponded to the number of men in a company. By March 1585 there were a mere 12 
companies of 400 lances. Thus he was able to conclude that "as an institution for the maintenance 
of noblemen, it was dead in 1579, when it ceased to provide them with permanent careers". "' 
The decline of patronage available to the nobility has also been echoed by Manfred Orlea 
10 BN, Ms Fr, 22441, fos 82-107, "Estat faict par nous Charles cardinal de Lorraine de nostre 
trescher et honnore nepveu Charles de Lorraine". 
Anselme, III, p 794. 
112 Contamine, Guerre, Ctat et societe, p 411. 
113 Harding, Anatomy of a Power Elite, pp 71-80. 
114 Ibid. 
15 Ibid, p 74. 
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in his work on the nobility and the Estates-General of 1576 and 1588.16 The title of his particular 
chapter on the subject, "Une elite hereditaire en crise", explains Orlea's thesis. Paradoxically the 
excellent list of figures on the gendarmerie's strengths during the Wars of Religion provided by 
Orlea plainly contradicts both his own case and the piecemeal evidence offered by Harding. '" 
These figures were used in conjunction with archival research based on 26 muster rolls held 
between 1559 and 1585 involving some 2,400 men. The conclusions of this research furnish a 
rather different picture than the one presented by Harding. 1e 
Far from being in decline the gendarmerie maintained its strength, since the embattled 
monarchy, despite its edicts and good intentions, could not check the spiralling increase of military 
expenditure and the proliferation of units, including the maintenance of the number of ordonnance 
companies at high levels. A chronically weak crown could not afford to cut off the supply of 
patronage at will simply to ease its financial difficulties. Indeed, in order to maintain political stability 
it had to buy support with patronage. It is not possible that the widespread violence and indiscipline 
which characterise the gendarmerie companies in the reign of Henri III, and which Harding is right 
to emphasis, can have been the work of so few units. In reality there was a huge expansion of 
military patronage and offices during the Wars of Religion. The crown and the provinces were 
burdened with increasing military expenditure for which they simply could not pay. Honours and 
off ices failed to bring financial reward and their very abundance devalued all honorific and virtuous 
worth. 
This thesis can be supported by manuscript data. According to evidence from twenty 
muster rolls held from the 1560s to the 1580s, the lance maintained its numerical strength of three 
archers to every two men-at-arms. "9 During the same period many of the companies actually 
increased in size in terms of absolute numbers. 120 Rather than relying on estimates given by 
contemporaries or troop strengths contained in royal edicts, Orlea produced an impressive list of 
16 M. Orlea, La Noblesse aux Etats generaux de 1576 et de 1588: etude politique et sociale, 
Paris, 1980, pp 50-67. 
117 Ibid, p 57. 
"8 For a list of muster rolls consulted, see appendix E. 
19 The lance was usually slightly under strength (on average 2 men at arms: 2.88 archers, 
according to my figures) but there is no significant change in the proportion of archers to 
men at arms over the decades. Care has to be taken when counting the number of men 
in a unit. Men who are paid and still in the company but not actually present on the day of 
the muster are included but, as not everyone was present at the muster, it is easy to 
underestimate real numbers. 
120 See appendix E. From 1560 to 1576 the company of the ducs de Longueville increased 
from 73 to 146 men. In 1579 the marquis d'Elbeuf had more men in his company than ever 
before. In 1581 the duc d'Aumale had only six fewer than in 1572. More surprisingly the 
two lieutenant-generals of in Normandy, Jean de Moy and Tanneguy Le Veneur increased 
the size of their companies consistently throughout the 1570s until their numbers rivalled 
the units commanded by the magnates. 
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figures, including manuscript data unused by Harding. 12' These figures give a different picture 
of troop strengths and concur with the archival research presented here. In 1567 there were 69 
companies and 2,300 lances, in 1573,81 companies and 3,220 lances and in 1578,170 
companies and 6,290 lances. Clearly there was a substantial increase in the size of the 
gendarmerie in the 1570s. Naturally, Harding's evidence would still have some credence if these 
same companies were being employed on a rota basis after 1579. But the poltical anarchy of the 
1580s and the frequency of campaigns suggests that this policy was of temporary duration. 
Harding's assertion that there were a mere 12 companies in royal service in March 1585 fails to 
mention the nature of the civil war, involving three factions each of which could muster their 
complement of ordonnance companies. The gendarmerie was not dead but the control of patronage 
was out of the hands of the king because of political and fiscal decentralisation. Companies 
continued to exist without royal pay - employed by the Catholic League, the duc d'Anjou and the 
Huguenots and living off the land and expropriating royal revenues. It was the widespread extent 
of this anarchy caused the outcry which Harding describes. 
The expansion of military units is evident in other arms. Light cavalry and infantry 
commands proliferated in each locality and every small bourg had to have its garrison. From the 
late 1560s onwards important noblemen began to receive, in addition to the ordonnance, units of 
light cavalry paid for by the crown as a bodyguard and officered from among their own retinue . 
122 
The continuing tactical value placed on cavalry over infantry even in the 1590s was perhaps one 
reason why the gendarmerie survived into the wars of the Catholic League. 123 The effects of the 
expansion and devaluation of patronage were to have widespread political and fiscal implications. 
An early casualty was the chivalric order of Saint-Michel which became a virtually worthless dignity 
because it was awarded with reckless prodigality. '24 The expansion of office caused similar 
dissatisfaction and discontent within the ranks of a large proportion of the noblesse de robe. '25 
The stigma attached by nobles to serving in the army either as archers, infantry officers or 
light cavalrymen declined throughout the sixteenth century. Social prejudice should never be 
confused with social reality. Most archers in the muster rolls were classed as sieurs, some as 
6cuyers and even occasionally chevaliers. In 1579 Jean V, baron de Vieuxpont (d. 1617), from an 
12' Orlea, La Noblesse aux Etats generaux de 1576 et de 1588, p 57; BN, Ms Fr, 3209, 
21543. 
122 For example BN, Ms Fr, 21536, to 2193, "Role de trente arquebusiers a cheval ordonne 
par le roy a M. la Meilleraye", 1 June 1576; BN, Ms Fr, 25809, to 273, "Monstre a Rouen 
de trente arquesbusiers a cheval soubs Berthrand de la Braize estant pres de M. de 
Carrouges", 1577. 
123 C. Oman, A History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, London, 1937, p 464. 
124 Orlea, La Noblesse aux Etats gOneraux de 1576 et de 1588, p 61. 
'n Benedict, Rouen during the Wars of Religion, pp 184-6, "The long-time members of the 
courts particularly resented the multiplication of their once select numbers and were thus 
more prone to oppose the king. " 
72 
ancient Norman family, was an archer in the company of the marquis d'Elbeuf. 126 Thus it is not 
"raisonnable de prdsumer que tous les archers dtaient roturiers", as Manuel Orlea does. '' The 
patronage opportunities for noblemen in the infantry and light cavalry units during the Wars of 
Religion increased, as is recognised by Harding. '28 Two of the most important upper Norman 
noblemen, Adrien de Brdaute and Jean de Cleres, had such commands in the 1550s before 
progressing on to command their own ordonnance companies in the 1560s, perhaps a reward for 
their loyalty to the crown. 120 One of the largest and most celebrated infantry regiments in France 
was that commanded by the comtes de Brissac. In time of war this regiment would have numbered 
in the thousands and provided many commands for the Brissac to fill. 10 
The continuing vitality of the ordonnance companies into the seventeenth century confirms 
their central role in the formation of affinities during the Wars of Religion. The military retinue of a 
nobleman was further strengthened by the proliferation of infantry, light cavalry and garrison offices. 
Political and fiscal decentralisation meant that local notables did not depend so heavily on the 
crown for the upkeep of their retinues. The Huguenots and the Catholic League, as well as a host 
of provincial potentates, were able to plunder localities or take over entirely the local royal fiscal 
machinery. If there was a failure of clientage it came not as a result of royal edicts but because the 
bonds of clientage were more complex and unstable than has hitherto been assumed. Moreover, 
local notables faced the same problems as the crown in terms of decentralised political authority 
and financial constraints when trying to control a province or even their own affinity or military 
retinue. 
A company of the ordonnance reflected the regional base of a patron in terms of the 
offices he held and the estates he possessed. A patron thus made a clear choice as to where to 
recruit his military retinue, which would enhance his local status. Personal contacts were important 
in recruiting and men who enjoyed the physical proximity and the trust of their captain as 
neighbours, vassals or childhood companions were especially favoured. Closest and most important 
to a captain were his officers. The higher up the social scale a nobleman the more administrative 
responsibility was devolved to his officers. Captains shunned the more mundane tasks of military 
126 BN, Clair, 278, to 5145, muster roll of 35 men-at-arms and 42 archers, Pontoise, 26 
February 1579. 
127 Orlea, La Noblesse aux Etats gdneraux de 1576 et de 1588, p 58. 
128 Harding, Anatomy of a Power Elite, pp 76-7. 
12° C16 res was captain of 560 foot see, ADSM, 7J, 3,23 June 1553 and 12 June 1554. 
Brdautd was captain of 300 foot in 1557, see BN, Ms Fr, 32369, fo 225. 
130 This regiment grew out of the Piedmont regiment commanded by the mardchal de Brissac 
in the 1550s. For a list of his lieutenants see in Piedmont see Francois de Boyvin, sieur 
de Villars, Memoires, Michaud and Poujoulat, Ist ser., X, pp 389-90. In 1567 Pierre du 
Bosc sieur de Preaux was "enseigne-colonel de M. le comte de Brissac", see ADSM, 
Tabellionage, 2E1,335,21 August 1567. 
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life like musters and garrison duty. 13' It would be wrong to see a company as a monolithic entity 
or simply as a source of patronage for the captain alone. Companies were agglomerations of 
subgroups with their own complex relationships bonded by service, status and kinship. '32 
By analysing these subgroups and following the changes within a company a clearer 
picture of the changing composition of a clientOle emerges. A quantitative analysis of the 
geographic distribution of a company shows that the company of the d'Elbeuf was dominated by 
men from the Vexin Frangais and Champagne in the 1560s. This was because Rend's officers were 
from these regions. The des Boves family, elevated by Rend's mother, dominated his household 
and these two regions were precisely where their landholding base lay. In 1565, just before Rend's 
death, 45 per cent of those men identifiable came from Champagne, 32 per cent from the Vexin 
Frangais but a mere 13 per cent from Normandy, where all of Rend's lands were situated. ' 33 The 
lieutenant and ensign of the company, both from the des Boves family, seemed to have as much 
influence over the composition of the unit as the captain. In fact, they would have recruited men 
from among their own clients, servants and contacts. 
Rend's brother, Claude duc d'Aumale, was older and certainly more independent than his 
sibling. In 1565 Claude could boast a company of the ordonnance which was composed of 
noblemen from all over northern and eastern France. There were men in his company from 
Picardy, Normandy, Champagne, the Beauce, Burgundy and the Bourbonnais. ' 34 By 1572 the 
diversity of d'Aumale's company was somewhat reduced. The contingent from Normandy had 
swelled, making up 40 per cent of the company, while only 5 per cent were now coming from 
d'Aumale's gouvernement of Burgundy. '35 The changing geographical composition was not 
without reason or political consequence. In the case of the company of the duc d'Aumale the 
changes were due to the elevation of a new lieutenant. Frangois de Chabot, sieur de Brion, a 
Burgundian, was replaced in 1569 by Claude Vipart, baron de Becthomas, a Norman, who had 
previously been ensign. ' One man would have taken his followers with him and they would 
have been replaced from among the kin and servants of his successor. 
'3' Contamine, Guerre, etat et societe, p 481 
'32 For subgroups in the fifteenth century see Contamine, Guerre, Etat of societe, pp 481-7. 
133 BN, Clair 261, fo 1719, muster roll of 40 men-at-arms and 60 archers, Montereau, 1 June 
1565. 
134 BN, Clair, 261, fo 1729, muster roll of 50 men-at-arms and 74 archers, Chalons-sur-Saone, 
5 June 1565. 
'35 BN, Ms Fr, 21533, fo 2077, muster roll of 51 men-at-arms and 75 archers, Dreux, 6 
October 1572. This contradicts Harding's assertion that 90% of the men in a company 
originated in the gouvernement of the captain if he were a lieutenant-general or governor, 
see Anatomy of a Power Elite, p 23, n 15. Lower down the social scale (i. e. lieutenant- 
generals) captains had a more parochial interest and composition of companies reflects 
this. 
136 Vindry, p 285. 
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Subgroups were able to move easily between one company and another, between one 
patron and another. This happened within the affinity of the Guise family itself revealing another 
factor in the versatility of the Guise clientele. In March 1573 Claude duc d'Aumate died at the siege 
of La Rochelle. Since his children were minors, his company was left in the hands of its officers. 
These men were comparatively fresh-faced, a new lieutenant, ensign and guidon having made their 
appearance only a few months earlier at a muster in October 1572.137 Most important among 
these was a new lieutenant, Jacques de Tiercelin, sieur de Posse, from a family with a strong 
power base in Picardy. " During the next few years an influx of Picards began to replace the 
Normans and Burgundians. The Burgundians were likely to find favour with the new governor of 
the province, Charles de Lorraine duc de Mayenne, nephew of d'Aumale. 
A muster of another nephew, the seventeen-year-old Charles, marquis d'Elbeuf, 
demonstrates that he also absorbed men formerly with his uncle's company. Charles was a more 
forceful character than his father and was anxious to establish a more independent household, 
reflecting his landholding base. Fifty per cent of his company in a muster taken in October of 1573 
had, only one year previously, been serving under the banner of his uncle. 139 Although the des 
Boves family continued to monopolise the officer's posts there were changes in the geographic 
composition of the company. The same muster shows that 24 per cent of the company now came 
from Normandy and 18 per cent from the Bourbonnais. Companies were thus not created or 
changed by recruiting individuals but by the exchanges and movements of different subgroups 
between companies. The contingent from the Bourbonnais appears to be one such entity. It was 
headed by several members of the des Gouttes family, who may have elicited more loyalty from 
their followers than was due to the captain. However, the ability of subgroups to move to different 
patrons but within the umbrella of the Guise as an extended kin network reveals one of their major 
strengths as a family. 
The bonds among the noblemen in a company were complex and multifarious. The 
Norman, Pierre d'Aigrefeuille, was a long serving man-at-arms in the company of the marquis 
d'Elbeuf (1565-79) and a neighbour of the marquis. He was the brother-in-law of Louis de Silly, 
sieur de La Potenay, (man-at-arms of the marquis, 1573-9). Furthermore, both men were kinsmen 
of the Morainville family which had a long history of service with the Guise. 10 The continued 
importance of vassalage, not in terms of dues and services to be rendered but as a point of 
physical contact and mutual recognition, cannot be underestimated as a means of entry into service 
137 Ibid. 
138 On the Tiercelin family, see Orlea, La Noblesse aux Etats gdneraux de 1576 et de 1588, 
pp 131-7. 
139 BN, Na Fr, 8630, fo 27, muster roll of 21 men-at-arms and 34 archers, Mery-sur-Seine, 11 
October 1573. 
140 ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1,304,9 October 1550; 2E1 350,19 February 1575. Etienne de 
Morainville had been the maitre d'h6tel of the duc de Guise in 1550 and briefly tutor of 
Rene marquis d'Elbeuf. 
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or a reason for fidelity. "' Olivier de Cartula 6cuyer, man-at-arms of the duc d'Aumale (1572-5) 
and maitre d'h6tel of the duchesse d'Aumale in 1590, held the fief of Amaulry de Serez valued at 
201 of rente per annum from the duke's barony of Ivry. Jacques Sabrevois was man-at-arms in 
1565 whilst Marguerite Sabrevois some years later held the fief of Sabrevois from the same 
barony. "2 
Charles de Fouilleuse (1546-1612), sieur de Flavacourt, was the descendant of an 
important Vexin family which could claim a former bailli of Rouen among its number. His elevation 
into the company of the marquis d'Elbeuf as guidon (1573-5) and then ensign (1576-9) coincided 
exactly with the influx of Normans into the unit. Thus, although Charles d'Elbeuf was inclined to 
focus his household on Normandy, he was still a minor who had spent most of his life at Joinville. 
He therefore relied heavily on Fouilleuse for his Norman connections with which to begin the 
restructuring of his company. 
L' "remained 
a faithful companion of d'Elbeuf, being present at his 
wedding in 1583 in the capacity of "capitain de cent hommes darmes soubz le command du duc 
d'EIbeur". 143 
Fouilleuse established his position in the company by arranging marriages into the families 
of his fellow soldiers. One of these was the de L'Isle family from Etampes which contributed several 
men to the household of the marquis d'Elbeuf. Toussaint de L'Isle was a man-at-arms in the 
company of the marquis d'Elbeuf (1565-9), ensign (1573-5) and one of his gentilshommes 
ordinaires in 1581. Guillaume de L'Isle was a man-at-arms in the same company (1573-9) and 
captain of d'Elbeuf's chfiteau of Harcourt in 1588. Philippe de L'Isle had been a man-at-arms for 
the marquis d'Elbeuf in 1565 but he was able to serve another member of the Guise, becoming a 
man-at-arms (1572-6) and gentilhomme ordinaire of the duc d'Aumale. "` Charles de Fouilleuse 
was related to this family through the marriage of his younger brother, Louis, to Jeanne de 
L'Isle. "s 
Furthermore, Fouilleuse carefully arranged the marriage of his two step-daughters. In 1579 
the elder was married to Jean V, baron de Vieuxpont, a companion in arms in the same company 
of the ordonnance. The younger was matched in 1585 with a cousin of Vieuxpont, Jean de Courtils 
(d. 1592). "6 In addition, Fouilleuse also claimed other links with the Guise as brother-in-law of 
Francois Buigny, sieur de Comehotte, a leaguer lieutenant of the duc dAumale in Picardy. Families 
141 Neuschel, Word of Honor, pp 132-85. 
"2 Maudit, Ivry-! a-Bataille, p 499. 
' Vindry, p 304; BN, Cabinet d'Hozier, 216, fo 101. 
'" Vindry, p 304; ADSM, 6F, 11, Recueil des capitaines de Normandie, 12 September, 1588; 
ADSM, J, 138, Documents concemant le comtd de Maulevrier, 1468-1779,1576. 
145 E. Morel, Houdencourt: seigneurie et paroisse, 2 vols, Compiegne, 1878-82, vol I, p 299. 
146 Ibid, I, p 100. 
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such as these, all inter-married, were to form the martial vanguard of the Catholic League. "' 
The Guise and the Norman Elites 
Apart from the household officers and the men of their direct military retinue there were others 
whom the Guise considered as within their affinity. Loyalties fluctuated but there always existed 
noblemen who would support the Guise politically and militarily. The strength and dependability of 
this support was not constant and varied with time and circumstance. The study of clientage is 
fraught with methodological problems, Kristen Neuschel shows that the patron-client relationship 
was not a symbiotic bond based on mutual interest. Clients were largely autonomous, self- 
interested and even disobedient. '" No relationship between patron and client was ever in a state 
of harmonious equilibrium, being stronger or weaker according to the situation. The clients only 
formed one part of the affinity, which embraced a variety of relationships from dedicated household 
servants to opportunistic factional allies at court. Affinities were formed from a multiplicity of 
relationships and patrons acted as poles of attraction rather than masters of a rigid and hierarchial 
following. 
In the 1550s the Guise family in Normandy was beginning to attract the Norman elites, a 
process which, as the Guise were forced to strengthen their local power base to counter their 
waning influence at court, became more noticeable during the Wars of Religion. This section is not 
a definitive exploration of this phenomenon or of Guise involvement in Norman political 149 
Instead, the aim has been to outline the important Guise clients in Normandy and show how the 
Guise were able to expand their affinity at a provincial level through their rise at court and rivalry 
with the Montmorency. 
The Guise had already augmented their influence in Normandy by taking most of the Brezel 
inheritance and by forging stronger links with the financial and legal sections of Rouennais society. 
Trusts and contacts built up over many years would one day lay the basis for political influence in 
the province; at the very least they provided local information and knowledge. 
Physical contact with the Guise family may have come directly from its landholding interest. 
The Moy family, for example, held the seigneury of Pierrecourt from the duchy of Aumale. 150 
Close ties were established between Francois de Guise and Charles de Moy, sieur de la 
Meilleraye, during the Scottish expedition of 1548-9. Moy would have solicited many patrons at 
court but, interestingly, only letters written to Guise survive. In 1554 it was to Guise that Moy asks 
for a position to be found for his cousin Jacques de Moy, sieur de Vereins: 
"' For the importance of these marriage alliances, see chapter seven below. 
1" Neuschel, Word of Honor, chapter one. 
19 These developments can be followed in chapters four to seven below. 
150 Semichon, Histoire de !a vilfe d'Aumale, I, p 25. 
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Monsieur le sieur de Vereins present porteur que vous cognoissez avoir este 
lieutenant de ma compagnie [since 1548] a tres bien obey de remectre ceste 
charge entre les mains de mon filz suivant le commandement du Roy et daultant 
Monseigneur que led. Vereins a deslibere de la parte que sera led. seigneur pour 
luy faire service a vous. Je vous supplye treshumblement Monseigneur quit vous 
plaise lavoir pour recommande en estre moyen quil sen employe en lestat auquel 
led. seigneur la pourveu en vostre faveur vous assurant Monseigneur quit est 
homme de bien. 15 
x 
It is no surprise that when the cardinal de Lorraine and the duc de Guise came to Rouen to take 
part in the entrance of the queen of Scotland, they stayed at two residences. One was at Mauny 
(at that time belonging to their brother the duc d'Aumale) and the other was Moy's residence at La 
Meilleraye. '52 The son of Charles de Moy, Jean (1528-91), maintained the influence of the family 
in Normandy as both vice-admiral, like his father, and lieutenant-general of Normandy (1563- 
91). ' He became onelhe most important Guise clients in Normandy and a bulwark of the ultra- 
catholic faction in Normandy. His position at the top of the local hierarchy was reinforced by other, 
more minor, offices. Unlike the magnates he drew recruits to his company of the ordonnance 
almost exclusively from his native province. 
The geographic base of the clientele of the provincial elites was much narrower than that 
of a great lord, being drawn largely from a single pays or bailliage. Thus nearly half the company 
of Tanneguy Le Veneur, bailli of Rouen, was drawn from the bailliage of Evreux. '54 Similarly, 20 
per cent of the company of Pierre de Roncherolles in 1585 were natives of the baflliage of Gisors. 
In both cases these numbers were a reflection of their respective landholding strengths. 
Furthermore, 33 per cent of the Roncherolles company were identified as Picards since Pierre's 
major office was the governorship of Abbeville. 
The parochial nature of these gendarmerie companies can be established more fully by 
analysing the composition of the Moy company between 1559 and 1581. On average nearly 50 per 
cent of this company came from the bailliage of Caux. More specifically they were concentrated in 
the west, in the area between Le Havre and Rouen, because Moy's lands at La Meilleraye were 
situated on the Seine in this region and most of his officers were both neighbours and kinsmen. 
The 45 men in his company who came from the Caux represented 11 per cent of the 398 nobles 
found to be holding fiefs in this region in 1575.155 Of course this percentage would have been 
15' BN, Ms Fr, 20545, to 3, Moy to Guise, La Meilleraye, 5 July 1554. 
152 Floquet, II, p 194. 
153 He was also one of the three governors of the province from 1575 until 1583. 
154 See appendix E. 
156 Orlea, La Noblesse aux Etats generaux de 1576 et de 1588, p 54. 
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much greater In the west, especially in the vicomtes of Caudebec and Montivilliers which bordered 
Moy's lands. The local nobility benefited both from his position as vice-admiral and as lieutenant- 
general. Men from his own retinue were granted minor local offices. Gaspard de Coullarville, was 
a neighbour and ensign in Moy's company (1570-1) and made by Moy a commissaire 
extraordinaire des guerres (1568-78) and lieutenant of Harfleur. 'e Pierre Le Doyen, a man at 
arms in 1570 and malre de Jogis in 1574, went onto become the lieutenant of Honileur from 1581 
until 1590.157 Charles d'Ercambourg was a man-at-arms In the Moy company (1569-81) and his 
brother Francois was captain of the small town of Pont-Audemer. 110 The offices of captain of the 
gendarmerie and vice-admiral also appear to have been complementary: Pierre Sdcard was firstly 
a man-at-arms in the Moy company (1580-5) and then commissaire ordinaire en la marine du 
ponant in 1588. His brother Michel occupied the office of lieutenant of the admiralty (1581-3). 150 
Adrien de Filieres, a man-at-arms form 1570 until 1581, occupied a position in the armee navale 
in 1588.180 Likewise, Jean d'Osterel, sieur d'Antigues, who was also a gendarme during the same 
period, was appointed capitaine ordinaire en la marine. 161 These men were neighbours of Jean 
de Moy, highlighting the importance of community and physical and geographical proximity in 
establishing an affinity. 
The Le Veneur were another family which played a prominent role in Normandy during the 
turbulent years of the civil wars and, like the Moy, were associated with the Guise from the 
beginning of the reign of Henri Il, especially after the disgrace of their patron admiral 
d'Mnebaut. '62 It was through the association of Gabriel Le Veneur, bishop of Evreux, with the 
156 Vindry, p 364; BN, Ms Fr, 25802, fo 219,6 January 1568; BN, Ms Fr, 25808, fo 186,22 
October 1575; ADSM, 6F, 11, Recueil des capitaines de Normandie; ADSM, Fonds 
Danquin, carton 16, no 1,5 April 1578; Esperit de Couillarville was a man at arms in the 
Moy company (1570-4). 
157 Vindry, p 364. Louis Le Doyen was a man-at-arms from 1570 to 1574. Jean de Moy's 
younger brother, Jacques, was captain of Honfleur from 1565 to 1589, see C. Brdard, 
Archives de la ville de Honlleur, notes historiques et analyses de documents, Paris, 1885, 
p xix. 
'58 ADSM, 6F, 11, Recueil des capitaines de Normandie, 4 April 1573. 
'59 H. de Frondeville, Les conseillers du parlement de Normandie sous Henri IV et sous Louis 
Xlll (1594-1640), Rouen and Paris, 1964, p 297; ADSM, C, 1239,3 August 1588. Pierre 
also acted as proxy for Moy in financial matters see, ADSM, Tabellionage, 2' Heritage, 
2E1,2013,23 May 1590; 2E1,2015,24 November 1590. 
160 ADSM, C, 1116,11 May 1588. Filieres was related to the Goutimesnil family who provided 
a number of officers to the Moy company over the years. Charles de Goutimesnil, ensign 
(1567-70) and lieutenant (1571), another neighbour of Jean de Moy had married Madeleine 
de Filibres in 1560, see Vindry, p 364; ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1,320,12 January 1560. 
161 D'Osterel had acted as a proxy for Moy in 1574 and, although bailli of Ardres and the 
comt6 of Guines, he was a resident of Moy's household at La Meilleraye see, ADSM, 
Tabellionage, 2E1,348,18 February 1574; 2E1,360,21 December 1580. 
'62 See chapter two above. 
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cardinal de Lorraine that his younger brother, Tanneguy, became a familiar of the Guise and 
entered their service around 1560. He remained in relative obscurity in the 1550s, qualifying as 
captain of Vire and Avranches in lower Normandy - both towns, if they can be so called, of little 
significance. 16' The last surviving member of the d'Annebaut family, Jean (d. 1562), also like the 
Le Veneur, found servic tithe Guise family during the 1550s. An ardent catholic and somewhat 
unsavoury character, his relationship with the Guise was his only possible means of reaching the 
king's attention given the enmity existing between his family and the Montmorency. '` He followed 
the Guise into Italy in 1557 and was wounded at the battle of Fossano the same year. Such is the 
negative side but also a common feature of affinity: your enemy's foe is your friend. This is not an 
isolated example of the Norman clients of Montmorency's former enemies, offended by the 
overbearing connOtable, seeking alliance with another group of his adversaries. Lucien Romier, 
discussing Normandy on the eve of the Wars of Religion, alluded to this: 
La noblesse normande, si active du temps de Frangois 1' paraissait disgracide et 
meme suspecte en raison des liens qui I'unissaient A la famille d'Estouteville, 
ancienne rivale des Montmorency. Le conndtable, devenu maitre du gouvernment 
sous Henri II, n'avait pas pardonne non plus aux d'Annebaut, aux Matignon et 
d'autres maisons leurs relations avec son ennemi, I'amiral Chabot. Son triomphe 
fut complet lorsqu'il eut obtenu pour son propre neveu Coligny, le charge d'Amiral, 
charge qui conferait au titulaire des pouvoirs effectifs sur les forces du Roi en 
Normandie. '65 
The fact that the Guise were able to attract the services of the enemies of the 
Montmorency is further illustrated by the relationship between the Guise and the Chabot. Philippe 
de Chabot (d. 1543) was created admiral by Frangois I in 1526 and was only equalled by the 
conndtable in the affections of the king until his disgrace in 1538. Chabot was stripped of his 
offices, imprisoned in 1541 and ordered to pay a fine of 400,000/. He was rehabilitated soon 
thereafter by the favour of the new royal mistress, the duchesse d'Etampes. '6 Symbolically, 
Chabot was reinstated at the same time that Montmorency was banished, despised as he was by 
163 BN, PO, 2958, to 47, April 1559. The captaincy of Avranches paid him 1001 p. a. He was 
exempted from service in the ban in 1552 as captain of Vire and Avranches, see Travers 
(ed), R6le du ban at l'arridre-ban du bailliage de Caen, p 117. 
164 On the career of Jean d'Annebaut, see D. B. F., II, p 1359. 
'65 Romier, Le royaume de Catherine de Medicis, I, p 215. The d'Estouteville refers to the 
duke not the family. Until 1545 the duke was Francois de Bourbon, Comte de Saint-Pol, 
patron of the Moy family. This point is further reinforced by the example of Jacques de 
Matignon who became very closely attached to Catherine de Medicis, herself never a great 
friend of the conn6table. 
'66 D. B. F., VIII, p 134. 
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the duchess. The offspring of the admiral found favour with the Guise. Francois de Chabot, marquis 
i.. tine 
de Mirabeau and comte de Charny, second son of the admiral, became guidonLcompany of the 
ordonnance of Claude d'Aumale (1558-62) and was later lieutenant (1562-70). 167 In 1583 Charles 
duc d'Elbeuf married Marguerite de Chabot dame de Pagny, granddaughter of the admiral. '" 
Another of his many children, Anne, was a dame in the household of Mary Stuart. '° 
Another man who experienced the wrath of the Montmorency was Odart du Biez, captain 
and sdndchal of the Boulonnais. In 1549 du Biez and Jacques de Coucy, his son-in law and 
lieutenant, were arrested for treason for their failure to prevent the fall of Boulogne to the English 
in 1544. In June of 1549 Coucy was condemned and beheaded. Du Biez was ordered to receive 
the same punishment in August 1551 but was saved by a timely pardon and lived out his remaining 
years in disgrace. 1° The early career of du Biez was closely connected with that of Montmorency 
rme, A tie. but had blossomed during the latter's brief disgrace, replaced. Montmorency's brother as governor 
L 
of Picardy in 1541. "' Increasingly tied to the men who had displaced Montmorency in the early 
1540s, he soon found himself out of favour when Montmorency returned to prominence in 1547. He 
began to lose his offices to the kinsmen of Montmorency, losing first his governorship and then 
command of troops in the Boulonnais to Coligny in 1548. When du Biez was stripped of all land 
and possessions, half of his confiscated company of the ordonnance was allocated to Adrien 
d'Humieres, a protege of the connetable. 'n 
It was the Guise who made a conscious effort to resurrect the fortunes of the du Biez and 
Coucy families. It was they who solicited for the lettres d'abolition of 1575 and 1576, restoring the 
honour of the two families. ' Long before this, however, Antoinette de Bourbon had made efforts 
to help the Coucy family to whom she was related. She donated the fief of Chemery-sur-Bar in 
1550 to Jacques II de Coucy, the surviving son of the victim of the scaffold and grandson of du 
Biez. Antoinette also gave the seigneuries of Parvin, Voupaix and Lersis to damoiselle Claude de 
Coucy in same year. "` Guise protection of du Biez had its repercussions in Normandy where one 
of their most faithful clients in Normandy on the eve of the civil wars in 1562 was Jean de Cleres 
167 Vindry, p 285. 
' Anselme, III, p 493. 
(bid, IV, p 572. 
10 D. Potter, "A Treason Trial in Sixteenth Century France: the Fall of Marshal du Biez, 1549- 
1551", English Historical Review, 1990, pp 595-623. 
"' Ibid, p 598. 
172 Frangois de Scepeaux, sieur de Vieilleville, Memoires, Michaud and Poujoulat, 1st ser., IX, 
pp 66-7. 
'7' Potter, "The Fall of Marshal du Biez", p 622. 
174 ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1,304,4 October 1550. 
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(1520-63), a grandson by marriage and beneficiary of Odart du Biez In his wiII. 16 
Prelates and Churchmen 
A large proportion of the conseil/ers of the parlements of Rouen and Paris identified within the 
broad affinity of the Guise were conseil/er-cleres with an ecclesiastical background. The position 
of the Guise family at the pinnacle of the French church attracted many of these men to Guise 
service because of the potential for the pickings of ecclesiastical patronage. Among those already 
discussed Louis Pdtremol and Roland Trexot were both conseiller-c/eres. Jean Jubert (1523-70), 
elder brother of conseiflerJean who was also a considerable buyer of rentes from the duc d'Elbeut, 
was dean of the cathedral of Notre-Dame de Rouen (1561-7), prior of Mont-aux-Malades (near 
Rouen) and more significantly protenofaire and grand vicaire of the cardinal de Guise for his abbey 
at Bec (1558-70). 16 Two other families associated with Guise service also had close links to the 
church hierarchy in Rouen. Rend des Buaz was a conseiller-clercat the parlement of Rouen, curate 
and prior of Cleville, a canon of the cathedral of Rouen in 1550 and vicar-general of the cardinal 
de Bourbon in 1557. "' Denis Brevedent (d. 1573) was abbot of La Trappe and also a canon of 
the cathedral. 178 Unsurprisingly, it was families like these that formed the small ultra-catholic 
faction in Rouen in the late 1550s and early 1560s. Later Charles de Bornes, procureur of the 
cardinal de Guise for his abbey of Fecamp, became one of the bourgeois members of the provincial 
council of the Catholic League in Rouen. 19 
The elevated position of the Guise within the French church afforded them a bounty of 
patronage. The Le Cirier, prominent counsellors of the Guise, were well rewarded with 
ecclesiastical benefices. Antoine Le Cider, in addition to being a conseiller at the parlement of 
Paris, was dean of Notre-Dame de Paris. In 1561 he received the bishopric of Avranches, visiting 
his diocese briefly before heading off to the council of Trent with the cardinal de Lorraine. 180 On 
his death in 1573 he resigned the see to his nephew Augustin. 
Even after the Le Cider tenure of Avranches ended, the bishopric remained firmly in the 
hands of fideles of the Guise. From 1583 until 1617 Avranches was occupied by successive 
175 ADSM, 7J, 2,28 May 1553, "Testament d'Odart du Biez". 
176 ADSM, Tabellioange, 2E1,316,14 March 1558; 2E1,364,25 October 1581; Frondeville, 
Conseillers, p 137. 
177 ADSM, G, 2162,2 June 1557; ADSM, 6F, 4, Recueil de I'archevequd de Rouen, 9 October 
1550; Frondeville, Conseillers, p 268. 
"a Frondeville, Conseillers, p 244. 
179 ADSM, Tabellionage, 2 meubles, 25 July 1586. 
1B0 Le Canu, Histoire du diocese de Coutances et Avranches, I, p 458. 
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members of the Pdricard family -a minor ecclesiastical dynasty faithful to and created by the 
Guise. "' There were four Pdricard brothers, the offspring of Jean Pericard procureur-gdndral 
of the parlement of Rouen from 1558 to 1570. '82 Jean Pericard had already served the Guise, 
although we know not in what capacity, for Henri duc de Guise granted him three seigneuries, In 
consideration of the services which the said Pericard had rendered him and the late lord duc de 
Guise, his father". '8' His sons prospered due to Guise patronage, the key to this being the 
position of the eldest brother Nicholas, trained as a lawyer, as a secretary of Henri duc de Guise. 
This resulted in the elevation of his younger brothers. Guillaume, canon of the cathedral of Rouen, 
was a conseiller-cferc in the parlement of Rouen from 1571 to 1609 and was to play a leading role 
in the leadership of the Catholic League in Normandy. Georges also briefly held office in the 
parlement (1579-82) but resigned in order to become bishop of Avranches in 1583. The youngest 
brother, Francois, dean of the cathedral of Rouen, also resigned his office of conseiller-clerc to fill 
the see vacated by his brother's death in 1587. Frangois is best known for his interest in reform 
of the catholic church and his valiant defence of Avranches against the royalists in 1591. 
Ecclesiastical patronage might also be conferred on a family who provided military service 
to the Guise. Thus, Artus Damerval, from the Picard nobility, was grand prior of the abbey of 
Fdcamp (1559-92) for the cardinals de Lorraine and de Guise, but his family was more associated 
with service at the side of the duc d'Aumale. Charles, Jean and Pierre Damerval all saw service 
as archers in the company of the ordonnance of Charles duc d'Aumale between 1576 and 
1581. '` Another Picard family, although originally from Touraine, and associated strongly with 
the duc d'Aumale and the Catholic League were the Tiercelin. Jacques de Tiercelin, sieur de 
Posse, as we have already discussed, was the lieutenant of the duc d'Aumale. His elder brothers 
Charles (d. 1589) and Nicholas acquired an impressive list of benefices which can only have been 
achieved with the collusion of the Guise. 185 Minor posts could easily be found for families in Guise 
service. Louis de La Menardiere, cousin of the servant of the duc d'Aumale, Charles, was a monk 
at the abbey of Bec, held by the cardinal de Guise and two of the younger sisters of Charles de 
Sarcilly, intendant of the duc d'Elbeuf, were provided with support as nuns in the convent of Renee 
de Guise at Reims. Thus service with the Guise offered the advantage of providing for younger 
sons and daughters; crucial to the maintenance of the family inheritance in the case of large 
families. 
However the best known prelate of Norman descent who had a strong affiliation with the 
1at (bid, I, pp 458-75. 
182 For this and following see Frondeville, Conseillers, pp 501,565,583. 
183 Dewald, The Formation of a Provincial Nobility, p 89. 
'" See appendix F. 
'85 Charles was abbot of Nbtre-Dame des Fontaines-les-Blanches (Brittany), prior of Saint-LG 
de Rouen, prior of Sainte-Marie Magdelaine des Deux-Amants (near Rouen) and 
archdeacon of the Vexin Frangais, see ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1,356,14 February 1578. 
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Guise was the cardinal de Pelleve, a man who was powerful enough in his own right to be seen 
as a counsellor and equal of the cardinal de Lorraine and not a subordinate or creature. During the 
time of the League he even received the archbishopric of Reims which he occupied until his death 
in 1594. '86 Pelleve came from an ancient and important Norman noblesse d'epee house but 
began his early years in the parlement of Paris. In 1553 he was made bishop of Amiens and served 
on the council sent by the Guise to Scotland in 1559 to bolster the regime of Marie de Guise. 187 
He was rewarded for his service to the family by being chosen as archbishop of Sens in 1563 on 
the resignation of the cardinal de Guise. Pelleve's status was clear to contemporaries, being an "un 
nomme fort verse aux affaires et creature de ce grand cardinal de Lorraine". '" According to one 
% contemporary 
ce prdlat ne parvint aux dignites dcclesiastiques que par un ddvouement servile 
A la maison de Guise, & surtout au cardinal de Lorraine qui lui ouvrit le chemin de 
la fortune, en le nommant son intendant. '" 
Little is known about Pellevd's role in the counselling and affairs of the cardinal de Lorraine. He 
was no lackey as his enemies claimed since he came from one of the oldest Norman families and 
consequently enjoyed a high status. Nor was he the only member of the family to have served the 
Guise. His eldest brother, Jean (1510-58), had married Renee Bouvery, a close relative of 
chancellor Poyet, in 1540. Poyet was yet another of the ministers of Francois I who attracted the 
hatred of Montmorency. Thus it is not surprising that we find another Pellevd, a nephew of the 
cardinal, serving in Scotland and dying at the siege Leith, in 1559. Another nephew laid down his 
life thirty years later defending Paris against Henri de Navarre. Several of the cardinal's sisters and 
nieces married into families which were also associated with Guise service. His sister Roberte 
married Robert Vipart the cousin of the lieutenant of Claude duc d'Aumale. Their son Guillaume 
was captain of Pont-Audemer for the League in 1589. The wardship of Guillaume, established in 
1566, was signed in the presence of the cardinal de Lorraine himself and the young nobleman soon 
found a place in the household of Henri duc de Guise as gentilhomme page. Frangoise and 
Roberte de Pelleve married two leaguer captains - Michel d'Estourmel governor of Peronne and 
Nicholas de Moy, sieur de Vereins. 190 
This complex example of marriage patterns underlines the web of kinship links which were 
Anselme, II, p 74 
187 BrantOme, VI, p 38. 
Ibid. 
189 Michel de Castelnau, Memoires, Collection Universelle des memoires particuliers relatifs 
a I'histoire de France, Paris, 1786-91,67 vols, vol XLI, p 299. 
190 Anselme, II, pp 77-8; BN, PO, 3029, to 46; BN, Dossiers Bleus, 674, fos 20-1. 
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crucial to the resilience of an affinity; Guise defence of catholicism was the defence of their 
patrimony and power. Their position at the top of the church hierarchy meant that they became 
magnets for those seeking ecclesiastical patronage. Moreover, their preponderant influence in the 
church meant that they were able to satisfy their clients and servants in myriad ways; from efforts 
to provide a bishopric for Pelleve to finding places in nunneries and abbeys for the younger children 
of the moyenne and petite noblesse. The defence of catholicism, which forms the essence of the 
a following chapters, was not only a conflict of faith and ideology but also struggle to maintain the 
Guise family at the pinnacle of society. 
85 
Chapter Four 
Defending the Family Interest: Court Faction, Religion 
and International Dynastic Strategy, 1558-62 
86 
On the night of 15 April 1562 fighting erupted on the streets of Rouen between protestants and 
catholics. This was a response to tension within the city, inflamed by the massacre of Vassy and 
the dramatic political events which were unfolding in and around Paris. The Huguenots in Rouen 
were well prepared and the authorities taken completely by surprise. The strategically important 
convent of the Celestines was seized, shortly followed by the hotel de ville itself. The following day 
the keys of the town were secured and the beleaguered bailli, Jean d'Estouteville, sieur de Villebon, 
forced to hand over the chateau. His lieutenant in the vieux palais, Louis de Bigars, sieur de La 
x 
Londe, was compelled to do likewise. On the morning of April 17 the Huguenots found themselves 
in effective control of the third city of the kingdom. ' 
The motives of the Huguenots behind this successful coup de main are inextricably linked 
to their fears of an impending repression of their faith. Immediately following the massacre of 
Vassy, the Huguenots in Rouen mounted an armed guard to protect their assemblies. Vassy was 
seen, not as a horrendous misjudgment by the duc de Guise, but as the beginning of a pre- 
meditated plot to eradicate protestantism. The subsequent march of the Triumvirs on Paris and the 
virtual imprisonment of the defenceless Charles IX and his mother only lent further credence to this 
conspiracy theory. On the 19 April the duc de Bouillon, governor of Normandy, arrived in Rouen 
on a mission from court to pacify the rebels. The Huguenot leaders justified their actions in a 
remonstrance to Bouillon. 2 The events of 15 April were represented as a defensive measure to 
ensure the safety of The people' against the machinations of malevolent factions and more 
specifically to defend royal edicts protecting protestant worship. The remonstrance directly accuses 
the duc de Guise, not only because of Vassy and his seizure of the king's person, but also because 
of his attempts to mobilise catholic forces in Normandy. 
The remonstrance and the fears it expresses were the product of local circumstances as 
much as a direct response to the massacre of Vassy and the events taking place in Paris. The 
apologia had nothing to say in favour of the prince de Conde but conversely voiced great anxiety 
about the Guise and suspicion about the local threat posed by a man like Villebon. This chapter 
identifies and discusses those Catholics who constituted that local 'menace', the relationship they 
had to the Guise and consequently to factional politics at court. 
P. Benedict, Rouen during the Wars of Religion, pp 96-7; Histoire ecclesiastique, II, p 715; 
Relation de troubles excites par les calvinistes dans la ville de Rouen depuis I'an 1537 
jusqu'en l'an 1582, publication of La Revue de Rouen et de la Normandie, Rouen, 1837, 
p 14; "Discours abbreg6 et memoires d'aulcunes choses advenues tant en Normandye que 
en France depuis de commencement de I'an 1559, et principalement en Ia ville de Rouen", 
in A. Heron (ed), Deux Chroniques de Rouen, Rouen, 1900, pp 194-5. The Huguenot 
insurgents reportedly numbered 500 compared to the handful of men at the disposal of 
Villebon. 
2 Histoire ecclesiastique, II, pp 716-18. 
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Court Faction and Family Strategy, 1558-9 
The unforeseen death of Henri II on 10 July 1559 is a convenient yet artificial and misleading 
historical watershed. The date separates the glories of the Renaissance monarchy from the 
ignominy of the introverted and chaotic civil wars. The sense of dramatic change is heightened 
because it ushered in the weak rule of Frangois II and because "the ultra-catholic Guise took 
control of the government". 3 It will be argued that, in terms of policy, there was little difference 
between the two reigns. Furthermore, the Guise, like other families, was more concerned with 
pursuing and defending its own family interests than adhering to a single religious ideology with 
blind devotion. 
When the Guise came to power in the summer of 1559 there were significant changes of 
personnel at court because they now held the reins of patronage. The need to dominate the 
patronage network was essential because the virtual bankruptcy of the monarchy dictated that there 
were not sufficient offices to satisfy everyone. When considering this period of history it is important 
not to give uncritical credence to the memoirs and histories of protestant commentators. The 
constant mistreatment of the princes of the blood by the Guise in these accounts is often mere 
justification and an apologia for the later actions of the prince de Conde. The Guise were shrewd 
enough to realise the dangerous consequences of alienating too many important families. Thus 
there was no series of wholesale disgraces, with the calculated exception of Diane de Poitiers, such 
as happened on the accession of Henri II in 1547. Montmorency was deprived of the office of grand 
maitre but this took place only after his eldest son Frangois received the office of mardchal as 
compensation. The Montmorency were too powerful to be ignored and, moreover, the Guise had 
to take into account and acc modate the ambition of their new ally the queen mother and her 
antipathy to the connetable. 
Far from altering the designs of the dead king the Guise showed themselves to be highly 
conservative in carrying out his wishes. Their policies did not herald the dawn of a new era. Indeed 
they implemented the policies of Henri and his most trusted and faithful friend Anne de 
Montmorency. This future strategy consisted of maintaining a viable peace with Spain while at the 
same time pursuing French dynastic claims in Scotland. ` At home religious persecution was to be 
intensified. 
In the weeks before Henri's accident and death, the Guise were present at council 
meetings but it was Montmorency who was the major power broker at court. The origins of his 
ascendancy began two years previously. In the 1550s the Montmorency-Guise rivalry increased as 
Francois, duc de Guise, sought to capitalise on his growing military reputation first gained at the 
defence of Metz in 1552. Montmorency, with one eye on the royal finances and the other on his 
J. H. M. Salmon, Society in Crisis: France in the Sixteenth Century, New York, 1975, p 
118. 
CSPF, 1558-9, p 305. There was a council meeting to formulate a Scottish policy on 7 
June 1559. 
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rival, increasingly represented a more pacific faction at court. The clear difference between the two 
men intensified with the humiliation of the connetable at the battle of Saint-Quentin in August 1557. 
While Montmorency languished in Spanish captivity, Francois de Guise embarked on a glorious 
campaign which resulted in the capture of Calais in January 1558.5 Henri himself was becoming 
increasingly suspicious of the reputation of Guise, and Montmorency's return to France in October 
1558 only stiffened his resolve to seek peace . 
r' Henri's freedom for manoeuvre was hampered by 
the parlous state of the royal finances and the growing confidence and assurance of the 
protestants. In January 1558 an assembly of notables agreed to loans totalling 3 million ecus, a 
figure which was still not forthcoming at the return of the connetable. In May of the same year 
Montmorency's own nephew, Francois de Coligny, sieur d'Andelot, was imprisoned on suspicion 
of heresy at the behest of the Guise. Factional political advantage rather than religious zeal was 
the motive of the Guise for this demarche. Their influence was at its peak at court and they were 
determined to capitalise on their ascendancy. The pinnacle of Guise influence came in April when 
Mary Stuart, niece of the duc de Guise, married the dauphin -a reward for the capture of Calais. 
Success breeds jealousy and thus Diane de Poitiers, the former mentor of the Guise, realigned 
herself with her old protagonist Montmorency by arranging a marriage between her granddaughter 
and Henri de Montmorency-Damville. 
The winter of 1558-9, with Montmorency safely back at court, witnessed a more vigorous 
pursuit of peace and a colder royal attitude to the Guise. The request of the duke for further 
rewards for his victory at Calais, especially the office of grand maitre, was refused and, realising 
his increased isolation, he left court on December 1 1558. The Guise family could therefore only 
rely on Catherine de Medicis at court who hated Montmorency and balked at seeing the French 
abandoning their Italian allies. Peace negotiations began in earnest in February 1559, six miles 
from Cambrai. 7 
At the same time another event of significance was unfolding. Mary Tudor died in 
November 1558 and immediately Mary Stuart sought to have the arms and titles of the sovereigns 
of England added to those of Scotland and emblazoned on her possessions and domiciles .8 Thus, 
although peace was concluded with Philip II by the treaty of Cäteau-Cambrdsis in April 1559, it 
would be wrong to see this as a comprehensive renunciation of war. Montmorency and the treasury 
This victory was due to the cooperation between the duke and the cardinal de Lorraine at 
court, see D. Potter, "The duc de Guise and the fall of Calais, 1557-8", English Historical 
Review, 1983. 
6 For this and following, see Baumgartner, Henry Il, pp 197-230. 
De Thou, III, p 350. 
8 CSPF, 1558-9, pp 314,324,346. The English ambassador Throckmorton became 
obsessed with this affront. 
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gained peace while the king, the Guise and thousands of other noblemen would be able to continue 
their martial feats on another front. 9 
The traditional depiction of Guise strategy by their opponents and subsequently by 
historians is that of the family using all its resources in the destruction of protestantism. 1° This is 
an inaccurate reading of the events of the period 1559-60. We should not see the 1560s through 
the perspective of the Catholic League of the 1580s. Guise family strategy became inextricably 
linked to the defence of catholicism in the intervening years but in 1559 there was nothing 
inevitable about this. The cardinal de Lorraine was the most powerful ecclesiastic in the French 
church and had a great stake in its future. However this was not the only determinant of family 
strategy, and Lorraine was certainly not a pro-papal ideologue created in the same mould as the 
hawkish cardinal de Tournon. 
Ultra-catholicism itself was never the sole preserve of the Guise, even when the family 
became synonymous with the defence of catholicism in the 1570s and 1580s. The inquisition 
tribunal established by the edict of Compiegne in July 1557 was largely the work of the king himself 
when the Guise family were away campaigning in Italy. Henri needed to hold a lit de justice to 
enforce the publication of the edict. The inquisition was to be run by representatives from the three 
leading families In France: the cardinals de Bourbon, de Chatillon (nephew of Montmorency) and 
de Lorraine. " Diane de Poitiers and the mardchal Saint-Andre also had a significant influence 
on the king's hardline policy. The edict which reinforced measures against heresy after CAteau- 
Cambresis was drawn up and signed at Montmorency's chateau of Ecouen when the connetable 
was once again ascendant at court. 
The dominant themes of the reign of Frangois II - religion, finance and Scotland - were 
similarly the preoccupying issues for his father who had, to a large extent, set the agenda for his 
son's reign. 12 After Henri's death the Guise continued these policies. The real problem was that 
their dominance at court and of patronage made this seem like the policy of a single faction rather 
than the result of a consensus reached during the previous reign. The battle for supremacy at court 
between the princes of the blood and the Guise was to destabilise France. It was only natural for 
the princes of the blood to seek a constituency among those opposed to the policies of Henri, 
among them protestants and unpaid soldiers. The determination to pursue dynastic interests in 
Scotland would not go unhindered either. A major expedition to Scotland would require the 
expertise and co-operation of Normandy's seafaring community and her provincial notables. This 
9 De Thou, III, p 254, lamented this continuation of hostilities when France was exhausted. 
10 Injudicious reading of the "historical" works of Regnier de La Planche would certainly give 
this impression, see H. Hauser, Les sources de l'histoire de France: Le XVP sidcle (1494- 
1610), 4 vols, Paris, 1912, pp 66,82. 
Histoire ecclesiastique, I, pp 136,163. 
12 CSPF, 1558-9, p 307. The council sat "very hard on matters of finance, whereof they have 
much lack, notwithstanding the great sums they have borrowed". 
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would have to be undertaken in a war weary province whose commercial wealth had already 
suffered from piracy, trading restrictions and taxation. 
Before analysing Guise attempts to mobilise the war effort in Normandy, it is important to 
understand the major details of the reign of Francois II. From the summer of 1559 until the drama 
of the Conjuration of Amboise (March 1560), which severely shook the regime, the Guise managed 
to maintain a firm grip on the flow of royal patronage. 13 Montmorency was not in favour and had 
no means of access to the king's ear. He retired to his estates with all but the office of grand maitre 
intact. This gave Guise control of the royal household; an office he had coveted for a number of 
years. In addition, Guise acquired the office of grand chambellan, wrested from his young kinsman 
Ldonor d'Orldans, duc de Longueville. " These offices at the centre of the royal patronage 
structure complemented the preponderant role already played by the cardinal de Lorraine in the 
church. In the royal council Guise conducted military affairs while Lorraine looked after finance. 
Changes in the personnel of the royal office hierarchy soon resulted. Frangois de Coligny, sieur 
d'Andelot, was ousted as colonel-general of the infantry and replaced by Sebastian de Luxembourg, 
vicomte de Martigues, a distant kinsman of Antoinette de Bourbon. '5 Obviously any invasion of 
Scotland would require the full co-operation of the officers involved. D'Andelot was suspect because 
of his religion and family ties. 
Diane de Poitiers and her closest relatives also suffered at the hands of the Guise. Despite 
the protests of her son-in-law, Claude duc d'Aumale, she was sacrificed and forced to retire to her 
lands in an effort to appease the queen mother. Her nephew, Louis de Breze, bishop of Meaux, 
was similarly disgraced and compelled to vacate his office of grand aumonier. te The daughter of 
Diane, Frangoise de La Marck, was also banished from court and her husband the duc de Bouillon 
came close to losing his governorship of Normandy. Diane, a mistress without a king, had become 
a political liability. Guise relations with Bouillon soon thawed, but clearly he was dependent on them 
to maintain his governorship. 
The problem of the Bourbon claim, as princes of the blood, for a leading role on the royal 
council made Catherine a very useful ally, and great efforts were made to accommodate her. 
Nevertheless the Guise attitude to both Montmorency and Antoine d Bourbon was one of 
deference and caution. The two Bourbon brothers, Antoine de NavarreLLouis prince de Conde 
heir C. ovsw'. 
andLCharles prince de La Roche-sur-Yon, were all offered seats in council. In addition, Conde, who 
had not been thought of as worthy of a governorship before, was offered that of Picardy in place 
13 Harding, Anatomy of a Power Elite, pp 34-5. 
14 La Roque, Histoire de la maison d'Harcourt, I, p 735; La Planche, La legende de Charles 
Cardinal de Lorraine, p 34. 
15 L. Romier, La Conjuration d'Amboise, Paris, 1923, p 4. 
16 CSPF, 1558-9, p 338. 
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of Gaspard de Coligny. " However, the Bourbons believed they had to uphold what they saw as 
the rights and honours due to them as princes of the blood. Navarre was under pressure from 
those discontented with the present regime. He was in contact with the English ambassador, 
Calvinist ministers and Montmorency who all counselled Navarre to press his rights which, of 
course, would benefit them. Young hot heads in the retinue of Conde, such as the vidame de 
Chartres, were eager to make their own reputation through action. However, on his return to the 
South from a family conference at Vend6me, Navarre reaffirmed his loyalty to the king and 
adherence to catholicism. te He was accused by Calvinists and has been by subsequent historians 
of indecision, and for being seduced by both the Guise and Philip I1 with the mirage of 
compensation for the loss of Spanish Navarre from his kingdom. This is an unfair accusation 
against a man whose family interests did not necessarily coincide with the aspirations of French 
protestants. Indeed, Navarre occupied an excellent bargaining position from which to extract 
favours from the Guise. 1° Poitou was thus added to his already large gouvernement of Guyenne. 
On 25 November 1559 Navarre, La Roche-sur-Yon and the cardinal de Bourbon began their 
mission to accompany Elisabeth de Valois to Madrid, there to wed Phillip II in accordance with the 
Franco-Spanish peace. Conde, furious at the inactivity of his brothers, began to plot against the 
Guise. 
There was certainly sufficient scope and enough disaffection on which to base a 
conspiracy. Patronage emanating from court was sharply curtailed in desperate economy 
measures. Pensions were cut back or left unpaid and thousands of disbanded soldiers were added 
to the swelling ranks of the discontented 2° The huge alienations made by Henri II were revoked 
by the Guise, "chose qui despleut grandement A beaucoup de Princes, grandes seigneurs & 
personnes notables qui se voyoyent frustrez de leurs bienfaitz" 2' Religious tensions and violence 
now affected the stability of every province of France. In Paris the burning of parlementaire Anne 
du Bourg (a prosecution begun in the reign of Henri II) made the cardinal de Lorraine even more 
unpopular with the greater part of moderate opinion 22 
17 Romier, La Conjuration d'Amboise, p 20. 
1e Ibid, pp 20-3. 
19 For a traditional evaluation of Navarre's role see N. M. Sutherland, Princes, Politics and 
Religion, London, 1984, pp 55-72. 
20 Romier, La Conjuration d Amboise, pp 6-8; La Planche, L'Histoire de l'Estat de 
France-sous le regne de Francois ii, p 5. 
21 La Planche, Histoire de l'Estat de France.. . sous le regne de 
Francois ll, p 39. 
22 De Thou, IV, pp 400-1. 
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A Province In European Politics: Normandy and the Scottish campaign, July 1559 - July 1560 
Normandy was no different from the rest of the kingdom with regard to the problems it faced in 
1559. A forced loan of 800,0001 levied on the province in the previous year still remained unpaid. 
Charles de Bourgeville, a royal officier in Caen writing twenty years after the event, recalled vividly 
the hardships that this particular tax caused ,3 In the region surrounding Rouen, peasants fled 
their villages in order to escape the exactions 24 It is thus against a background of religious, 
political and economic uncertainty that the preparations of the Guise for the Scottish expedition 
must be considered. 
The Guise had been responsible for organising the previous expedition in 1548-9, primarily 
because of their dynastic interests in Scotland. However by 1551 peace had been concluded with 
England and Marie de Guise became regent in April 1554. She was an able politician, like her 
mother Antoinette de Bourbon. She reconciled disaffected noblemen by pursuing a lenient policy 
towards protestantism. The strategy of reconciliation was hampered only by the presence of 
Frenchmen in her household and French troops on Scottish soil. The precarious position of Marie 
was such that she was never able to implement a policy of repression as favoured by Henri 11 -25 
The twin fears of repression and the loss of independence, following the marriage of Mary Stuart 
to the Dauphin, provoked open revolt against the regency government in Scotland. By August 1559 
Marie de Guise was clinging to the strongholds of Dunbar and Leith, awaiting assistance from her 
brothers. 
It is possible to reconstruct accurately the way in which the relief expedition was organised 
because there are surviving reports from the many English spies active in Normandy at this time. 
In the beginning the campaign had been perceived as beneficial and not as solely in the sectional 
interests of the Guise. When Henri II was still alive he had seen Scotland as a crown for his eldest 
son. As early as 29 June 1559 Throckmorton, the English ambassador, reported the imminent 
dispatch of Jacques de La Brosse, "accounted one of the best men of war in France", and Nicholas 
de Pelleve bishop of Amiens. Both men were among the most trusted servants of the Guise family. 
La Brosse had already served in Scotland in 1548-9 and held a position as one of the closest 
advisers to Frangois duc de Guise. Pelleve was held in similar regard by the cardinal de Lorraine. 
La Brosse was to provide the military expertise and Pelleve, who was accompanied by three 
theologians from the Sorbonne, was clearly entrusted with the task of combatting heresy. The 
expedition force, numbering approximately 2,000 men landed in August 1559 26 
2' Bourgeville, Les Recherches et Antiquitez de la province de Neustrie, p 162. 
24 Floquet, II, p 277. 
25 Donaldson, Scotland: James V-Vll, pp 80-99. 
26 CSPF, 1558-9, p 346; De Thou, III, p 454. 
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The Estates of Edinburgh demanded that Marie relinquish affairs of state and surrender 
Leith where she was sheltering. The arrival of the French reinforcements strengthened her hand 
against the Confederates. The subsequent campaign of the rebels was a fiasco and they were 
eventually compelled to evacuate Edinburgh on 6 November 1559. The Scottish rebel leaders were 
now forced to turn to the English for aid under the Treaty of Berwick (27 February 1560). The war 
now escalated for English troops crossed the border in March and laid siege to Leith. Peace was 
finally concluded in July 1560 due to the death of the regent, the failure of the siege of Leith and 
increasing turmoil in France v' 
Interest lies less in the political narrative than in the effects of the logistics and preparations 
for the campaign and their specific relation to the Guise position in Normandy. The problem of 
supplying an army over such long distances, even one as small as 3-4,000 men, was a major 
problem for the early modem polity28 The logistical problem was enhanced by the hostility of the 
English who presented a threat to French shipping even before the Treaty of Berwick. The 
continuous difficulties of traversing the North Sea can be illustrated by the frustrated attempts to 
send Rend de Lorraine, marquis d'Elbeuf, and Frangois de Lorraine, grand prieur, to Scotland with 
reinforcements. This expedition was first mooted in July 1559 but not realised until spring 1560. 
Indeed, the grand prieur, who was entrusted with the task of leading the Levant galley fleet from 
Marseille, was still in transit along the western seaboard of France when peace was eventually 
concluded. 
The operation, of which the Guise had full control after the death of Henri II, not only had 
to deal with the perennial problems of distance, bad weather and corsairs but also the political 
instability in France, shortage of money and war weariness. Nowhere were these factors more 
evident than in upper Normandy where the major preparations for the Scottish campaign were 
sited. The previous expedition had largely been organised by the Guise through the good offices 
of the vice-admiral, Charles de May, sieur de La Meilleraye. The local credit of a man like Moy was 
vital for getting orders and plans speedily translated into action. His expertise was to be sadly 
missing in 1559 when, at around sixty years of age, he was incapacitated by infirmity. 
Gaspard de Coligny, as admiral, had a role to play in these preparations. It is important to 
remember that Coligny was not yet the implacable foe of the Guise that he was later to become. 
Coligny was not stripped of his governorship of Picardy until early 1560. Thereafter he began to 
use the office of admiral to build up support in Normandy. He spent more time than ever before in 
the province, cultivating links with the reformed community. He was sent to Normandy by the queen 
mother to enquire into the state of religious feeling. This culminated in the celebrated petition 
signed by 50,000 Norman Huguenots, presented to the king at Fontainebleau in August 156029 
27 Donaldson, Scotland: James V-Vll, pp 96-9; De Thou, III, pp 456-66. 
28 These troop figures include those men already based in Scotland before the arrival of 
reinforcements. 
29 Romier, Le royaume de Catherine de Medicis, I, p 215; De Thou, III, p 526. 
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Coligny, on the other hand, conducted himself in a seemingly diligent manner throughout the 
campaign and liaised with the Guise servant La Brasse 30 Coligny may have seen the expedition 
as an opportunity to expand his credit and reputation in the province and increase his authority at 
the expense of the vice-admirals who were usually responsible for naval logistical organisation. In 
July 1560 Charles de Moy retired from public life but was unable to resign his offices to his eldest 
son Jean. The office of vice-admiral fell into temporary abeyance and the captaincy of Le Havre 
passed to Jean de Cros, a Languedocian client of Coligny. " 
After the first expedition had departed in August 1559 the Channel ports were occupied 
with the victualling of ships and the constant arrival of fresh troops awaiting transport. In Normandy 
the main towns affected were Honfleur, Le Havre, Dieppe and Fdcamp. The disruptions of war 
signified continuing hardship to these communities, dependent on fishing and commerce. These 
problems were exacerbated by the very nature of the Scottish campaign itself. The Guise had much 
to gain dynastically from victory in Scotland and the campaign could be seen as being solely in 
their factional interest. Moreover, the expanding Calvinist community in Normandy could only look 
on apprehensively at the attempts to suppress their religion in Scotland. The Huguenot communities 
in Le Havre and Dieppe would have been especially aware of this. A chapel was established at 
Havre as early as 1557. Dieppe became home to one of the largest Calvinist congregations in 
France. The first pastors had arrived in January 1558 and the town had strong trading links with 
Scotland. John Knox visited the town in February and March 1559, baptising several important 
noblemen. These included Jean de Senarpont, bailli of Amiens, and Charles de Martel, sieur de 
Bacqueville, a leading upper Norman nobleman. The expansion of the reform was facilitated by the 
Poitevin captain of Dieppe, Charles de Ponsard, sieur de Fors, yet another Coligny appointee. 32 
The Guise were able to call on their own clients with local credit and in whom they could 
have complete confidence. In September 1559 the English ambassador was "informed that M. de 
Carrouge, brother of the bishop of Evreux, a gentleman of the king's chamber and of the faction 
of the Guise, will be sent to England"" Tanneguy Le Veneur, sieur de Carrouges, would be 
entrusted with many sensitive missions by the Guise but he held no significant office in Normandy. 
He was a servant at court beside the duc de Guise rather than a provincially based contact. Thus 
there was no nobleman in Normandy, who had the requisite local credit and the complete trust of 
the Guise family, able to organise the expedition and maintain smooth relations between court and 
locality. The expedition was to be directed largely by the family itself. On 2 December 1559 Rend 
30 CSPF, 1558-9, pp 432-3,454-5. 
31 H. Amphoux, Essai sur 1 iistoire du protestantisme au Havre et dans ses environs, Le 
Havre, 1894, p 44; A. Borely, Histoire de la ville du Havre et de son ancien gouvernement, 
3 vols, Le Havre, 1880-1, vol II, p 24. 
32 Bor41y, II, p 18; G. and J. Daval, Histoire de la ROformation a Dieppe, 2 vols, Rouen, 1878, 
vol I, pp 7-17; ADSM, 6F, 11, Recueil de capitaines de Normandie; CSPF, 1559-60, pp 
142-4. 
33 CSPF, 1558-9, pp 541,570,586. 
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marquis d'Elbeut was created lieutenant-general of Scotland by the king. This was an appointment 
which protected the family interests of the Guise. As a Norman landowner Rend could expect to 
have some leverage in Norman society. It this was the rationale behind his appointment it was 
severely flawed. Rend himself was inexperienced and, as we have seen, his clientele base was 
drawn largely from the traditional Guise strongholds in eastern France. Moreover, the commission 
was granted against a background of rising discontent among the townsfolk of Rouen and Dieppe: 
They are not in good quietness; they grudge and murmur at the Cardinal of 
Lorraine's proceedings and his government of their King. They fear not so much 
the war, and think the Cardinal of Lorraine has cause to fear the people, who (as 
the voice is) does not lie far from the King, and has a guard for his more 
assurance. ` 
Reports like this from English spies are subjective and anecdotal. However they do provide unique 
eye-witness accounts of the preparations for the Scottish campaign. The contacts of the English 
agent probably included many Huguenots. They were obviously concerned more about the 
continuing policy of repression than the war at this time. This report is contemporaneous with the 
controversial trial of protestant magistrate Anne du Bourg in Paris. Indifference to the war in 
Scotland might have continued in Normandy, had d'Elbeuf's relief expedition been able to leave 
port. Instead the marquis was driven back by storms and only two vessels, one of which contained 
the vicomte de Martigues, completed the hazardous voyage. ' 
The misgivings of the Huguenot minority about the Guise were expressed by a wider 
section of the community for different reasons. Normandy now had to suffer an influx of idle soldiers 
and the re-fitting of storm damaged ships. Supplying and equipping the relief expedition in 
Normandy cost 166,4541.36 The burden on the local population was great since billets and 
sustenance had to be found for the army in the depths of winter. On the 5 January 1560 the 
marquis d'Elbeuf established his residence in Dieppe, thus adding to the chagrin of the indigenous 
protestant community who found the public exercise of their religion proscribed for the next two 
months" On March 13 Francis Edwards, an English agent, informed London about the 
sentiments of the Dieppois: 
Arrived at this town of the 7th [March], and received a letter from a friend at 
Rouen, who wrote that he had seen a letter from Dieppe, mentioning that d'Elbouef 
34 CSPF, 1559-60, p 184. 
35 C. de La Ronciere, Histoire de la marine francaise, 6 vols, Paris, 1899-1932, vol, IV, p 26. 
36 Ibid, p 28 n 1. 
" Daval, Histoire de la Reformation A Dieppe, 1, p 13. 
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had departed into the country. The merchants are glad of the same, for he was 
right noisome unto them; few men can say well by him or the Cardinal of Lorraine, 
and think there will be some stir before they bring their matters to pass. All men 
draw back and get themselves out of the way, in order not to go with him on this 
voyage [to Scotland]; some say they are sick and other(s) they lack money. There 
is much talk of the Queen. The poor merchants would be sorry to have war of her 
making; they say it is too great a price for them, they will not be able to wear it out; 
they will be content with peace, they have no money for war at present; "whishing 
the Cardinal of Lorraine were bound to a stake and all the dogs of the Pallis 
Garden were upon his back. ' 
Merchants were concerned about the continued effect of the war on trade. Amongst the Huguenot 
community hatred of the Guise was even more acute, especially in Dieppe where a member of the 
family was physically present in the town with troops. Soldiers like these antagonised the townsfolk 
of Le Havre: 'they would have meat and drink without money, wherefore the townsmen and they 
can scant agree. "" The tension inside Dieppe was only relieved when d'Elbeuf departed: 
On the 26th [March] M. de Foesse [Fors], Captain of Dieppe, came to the castle 
of Dieppe and proclaimed that noone should call the people there Lutherans on 
pain of death. The people of Dieppe every night in the market-place and 
afterwards, going through the streets, sing the Psalms of David, and some days 
have sermons preached to them in the fields. 40 
This example demonstrates exactly the extent to which royal edicts could not be carried out when 
the local royal officers had no interest in the enforcement. Religious repression was thus largely 
a failure as the cardinal de Lorraine was beginning to realise. It was counter-productive because, 
far from ensuring religious uniformity and peace, it only served to de-stabilise the body politic. 
Moreover, the Scottish campaign was draining the royal treasury and further antagonising the 
seafaring communities of the northern coast. By April 1560 a policy was evolved which foresaw the 
dispatch of a large relief force in July, including the Levant galley fleet. Furthermore peace 
negotiations were instituted under the auspices of the queen mother. The Guise had no altruistic 
motive for this and thus it was simply a tactical political move. 41 
38 CSPF. 1559-60, p 446. 
'° [bid, p 493. 
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In accordance with this plan a much larger force of noblemen gathered at Dieppe in early 
May to hasten preparations. This time the Guise called on men of local influence to make the 
preparations more efficacious. D'Elbeuf was now accompanied by the rehabilitated governor of 
Normandy, the duc de Bouillon, who, as a Calvinist himself, offered the hope of improved 
relationships with the Huguenots. Accompanying them were Jean d'Estouteville, sieur de Villebon, 
bailli of Rouen, and Claude de Lorraine, duc d'Aumale `2 This 'organising committee' therefore 
comprised the two most important royal office holders in the province and two members of the 
Guise family who were also large landowners in upper Normandy. It was hoped these men would 
have the necessary influence, as the Venetian ambassador reported "M. d'Aumale has been 
dispatched to Normandy that his presence and authority may hasten the outfit of ships, and the 
supplies of ammunition and victuals. "43 
The peace negotiations dragged on, however, and the limit of Guise power in Normandy 
was evident as the fleet was still unable to sail. The problems with the relief expedition were not 
simply due to hostility in the ports. Frangois d'Andelot, no friend to the Guise, refused to embark 
with troops under his command in Marseille, whereupon many other captains and soldiers followed 
his example" He and his brother, Gaspard de Coligny, had little to gain from going to 
Scotland in person. Nevertheless, the admiral was party to the preparations taking place in 
Normandy in the spring and early summer of 1560, although, as has been discussed, these were 
not the only reasons for his presence. In June 1560 he was at Le Havre supervising the transport 
for the troops who were arriving daily. Five vessels were readied for the embarkation of 800 men, 
and stores were laid in at Caudebec, Hartleur and Le Havre itself for a long campaign. 45 
Preparations continued on into July. All prospective voyages to Guinea, Brazil, Biscay and Canada 
were halted and the captains ordered to prepare for royal service. On 20 June Coligny held a 
council of war at Le Havre with all the sea captains `6 These measures belied the continuing 
problems of the expedition. Even as they celebrated the peace treaty in Edinburgh it was clear to 
the English that the Guise had been forced into peace by internal circumstances: 
The ten hulks stayed for the French king have been discharged, because the 
mariners would not serve.... The Admiral having consulted all the captains for the 
sea at Newhaven, received answer that the ships were not meet for any enterprise 
and the men were not willing to serve .... 
It is thought that [in Marseilles], as about 
42 CSPF, 1560.1, p 39. 
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Dieppe the people and mariners are so evil satisfied that they dare not trust 
them" 
The Scottish campaign foundered on the inability of the Guise to mobilise the ports of 
Normandy into a sustained relief operation. There were a number of factors which contributed to 
this: primarily lack of money and the internal instability and unpopularity of the regime, which meant 
that Scotland was never the major interest of the Guise. The problems may well have been 
insurmountable but they also say something about Guise authority in Normandy. Despite their 
dominance at court and the help of the admiral, their influence was minimal. They needed provincial 
contacts and clients to get things done. This had been most successful in the campaign of 1548-9 
when the Guise had liaised with La Meilleraye, the vice-admiral. Coligny's role in 1560 was 
ambivalent. He was more concerned with strengthening his own power base in the province, 
especially among members of the reformed community who were by no means partisans of the 
catholic government in Scotland. The governor of Normandy, Bouillon, had little credit in the 
province that could be of use to the Guise. More importantly, despite their landholding base in 
Normandy, Rend and Claude de Lorraine lacked a major office and thus the extensive affinity and 
power of patronage which would facilitate the speedy departure of the relief force, as their presence 
was expected to do. 
In accordance with their upbringing and tradition, Claude and Rend maintained links with 
eastern France through clients drawn from the region. There were Norman parlementaires, nobles 
and merchants in the Guise affinity but this was based purely on the landed interest of the Guise 
in Normandy and had nothing to do with building up influence in the province. The Scottish 
campaign demonstrated the limits of Guise power even when maintaining control of the patronage 
resources of the monarchy. 
The Guise and the Response to Protestantism In Normandy, 1559-60 
After the death of Francois II in December 1560 there was a consequent decline in Guise influence 
at court. The Guise remedied this by cultivating their provincial links and by increasingly identifying 
themselves with ultra-catholic opinion. In Rouen there was already an ultra-catholic faction in the 
city which represented a wider constituency for the Guise in which to expand their credit. 
The small coterie of men who represented the ultra-catholics among the Rouennais city 
elites had maintained definite and traceable links to the Guise going back many years, a number 
were indeed paid servants. Nevertheless it would be wrong to see these men as the pawns of 
some higher authority. The Guise were more ambivalent towards ultra-catholicism than has been 
assumed hitherto and the people who moved into their affinity did so because of their own beliefs 
47 Ibid, p 182. 
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and strategies. Alliance and empathy with the Guise interest was one way of furthering an 
individual's own political and career ambitions. 
Normandy had a long tradition of proteslantism and its repression dates from 1528 when 
Pierre Bar was the first man to be put to death for heresy`" In 1531 an inquisiteur de la foi was 
established in the province. 49 This tribunal was installed in the convent of the Jacobins in Evreux 
in the diocese of Gabriel Le Veneur -a close fidele of the cardinal de Lorraine. However, it 
functioned for only a short time, its prosecution record uneven and its efficacy questionable 50 
Philip Benedict, citing Paris and Toulouse as examples, argued that, despite the inadequacies of 
judicial repression, it did have an effect on the spread of heresy. 5' Evreux was to remain largely 
untouched by the growth of Calvinism in the 1550s. In Rouen, on the other hand, protestant cells 
became more deeply established and the institutionalisation of the reformed church began with the 
arrival of a Calvinist minister in 1557. It was lower Normandy that led the way in the 
establishment of churches. The congregations of Saint-L6, Vire and Bayeux had churches by 1557 
and Caen followed suit in 1558.53 Lower Normandy was far enough away from the surveillance 
of the parlement of Rouen and too jealous of its own autonomy to permit the efficient prosecution 
of royal edicts. In upper Normandy Dieppe had a church since August 1557 and the village of 
Luneray in the pays de Caux provided a centre of worship for Huguenots from the neighbouring 
bourgs and villages. 
The most striking and politically dangerous aspect of the growth of Calvinism was its 
success in attracting the nobility. The rate of conversions was particularly noticeable in lower 
Normandy. Gabriel de Lorges (d. 1574). comte de Montgommery, a man infamous for his accidental 
killing of Henri 11, was the most important of these. Ostracised by society after his misfortune, 
Montgommery fled France and converted while staying in England in 1560. ` His renunciation of 
catholicism was preceded by that of his equally important neighbour Frangois de Briqueville (1535- 
74), baron de Colombieres. The conversion of the elite of the local noblesse ddpce encouraged 
and influenced those of lesser status. 55 At its peak in the late 1560s Calvinism could claim to be 
" Floquet, II, p 223. 
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the religion of 40 percent of the nobility of the dlection of Bayeux 56 The links of many of these 
Normans to the Calvinist leadership demonstrate the importance of marriage and clientage in the 
transmission of the reformed faith. For example, Colombieres was related to Eldonor de Roye, the 
wife of the prince de Condd. s' 
In upper Normandy the strength of Calvinism within the nobility seems to have been 
modest in terms of numbers and status compared with lower Normandy. The paucity of work on 
this topic does not enable us to draw concrete conclusions. It is noticeable that more compact and 
larger temporal territories were to be found in upper Normandy than in lower Normandy. It was in 
the region on the right bank of the Seine that the lands of magnates were situated. The inability 
of noblemen such as these to support Calvinism openly and protect it in their jurisdiction must have 
inhibited its growth. 
One of the largest landowners in Normandy, the majority of whose territories were situated 
in upper Normandy, was Ldonor d'Orleans (1540-73), duc de Longueville. His mother, Jacqueline 
de Rohan, won a legal action against the Guise in 1554 which gave her sole wardship of the young 
duke when he succeeded his cousin, Francois d'OrlOans, in 1551. The Guise were uncles and 
guardians of the late duke and despite the legal wrangles maintained an close interest in the affairs 
of his successor. 68 Thus in 1560 the cardinal de Lorraine was named as curateur for the 
administration of the young duke's estates until he attained his legal majority. S° At the same time 
preparations were under way for the marriage of Longueville to the eldest daughter of Francois duc 
de Guise. However, the relationship between the duke and Jacqueline de Rohan was soured in the 
same year when Guise took the office of grand chambellan from his prospective son-in-law. 
Relations between the two families continued to deteriorate, as the English ambassador reported 
in May 1561: 
The King [Charles IXJ was sacred at Rheims on 15th.... The Prince of Conde, the 
Admiral, the Duke of Longueville, the Mareschal of Montmorency and his brother 
Damville, were not at the sacre, because they would not assist at the Mass. The 
said Duke is clean fallen from the other side and from his marriage that was in 
hand with the Duke of Guise's daughter; he is now altogether on this side, which 
56 Wood, The Nobility of the Election of Bayeux, p 161. 
67 Laheudrie, op cit. Connections between Conde and these lower Normans were forged and 
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has greatly increased the Protestants, he being one of the greatest of this 
realm 60 
This rupture with Guise over religion was not as obvious as it seemed. At this particular juncture 
the major influence over Longueville was his mother, who was a correspondent of Calvin. 
Nevertheless, Longueville's conversion was a major boost to the protestant cause, especially in 
upper Normandy where he had many tenants and because the chapel at Luneray was surrounded 
by his lands. Longueville's chateau at Tancarville on the Seine acted as a haven for Huguenots 
escaping persecution 61 The captain of the chateau was Jean d'Ach6, sieur de Serquigny. It is not 
certain whether Serquigny adopted Calvinism in the wake of his master. He was, however, related 
to other Norman Calvinists, like the badli of Evreux, Jean d'Orbec (d. 1565). ß 
Among the moyenne noblesse of upper Normandy the most important Calvinist was 
Charles de Martel (d. 1566), sieur de Bacqueville. As early as 1534 Bacqueville was suspected of 
harbouring heretics. He held many of his lands from the duc de Longueville and like his lord his 
attitude to protestantism was equally ambivalent. He signed Condd's association for the defence 
of the Gospel in 1562 but never took up arms. He was a moderate, and his seven children were 
a mix of both protestarns and catholics. His links to the catholic hierarchy were strong. One of his 
relations Etienne, perhaps a brother, was bishop of Coutances between 1552 and 1560 and a sieur 
de Baoqueville was a pensioner of the cardinal de Lorraine in 1561. ' 
Bacqueville's faith was therefore not necessarily the prime determinant of his political 
affiliations. The ducs de Longueville and de Bouillon, governor of Normandy, were also Calvinists 
but both followed highly individual strategies. Both men were kinsmen of the Guise and this, as 
much as their religion, coloured their strategy. Neither had much in common with the Calvinist 
faction except religion. Indeed in November 1561, when Coligny was ascendant at court, Bouillon 
was in danger of losing his office because he was 'well affected to the house of Guise"" Bouillon 
did not find this relationship incompatible with his religious beliefs and during a sojourn in 
Normandy in July 1561 gave great heart to the reformed community with his sympathetic attitude 
to their plight rA The failure of magnates like Bouillon and Longueville to support the reformed 
faith, either politically or militarily, would prove a severe handicap to Norman protestantism. 
Normandy was a protestant stronghold in terms of numbers but it never had a leader of sufficient 
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status to defend its early gains. The essentially egocentric mentality of both Bouillon and 
Longueville should not simply be seen as the lost opportunity of Norman protestantism. Rather, 
their strategies were perfectly logical within the context of noble culture; collaborating with the Guise 
to further their respective houses. Indeed, Bouillon was probably dependent on Guise support to 
retain his office as he lacked other means of support at court after the death of Diane de Poitiers. 
Until 1559 Calvinism was the concern of a small, if growing, minority of the French elites. 
Likewise the repression of heresy and attempts to foster catholic piety was the domain of a few 
zealots. The catholic hierarchy made no concerted attempt to revive popular devotion to catholicism 
in the 1550s and 1560s. 6" Etienne de Bacqueville-Martel, bishop of Coutances since 1552, did 
not make any effort to visit his see until 1558, despite the growth of heresy. Seven months after 
arriving he tied because of the threat that the Calvinists posed to his person. 6' The response of 
the ecclesiastical authorities in the diocese of Rouen to the reform movement was languid and 
ineffectual 60 The secular arm of repression was represented by the parlementaires in Rouen who 
were, by and large, catholic moderates with a distaste for harsh measures. 
Not every magistrate in Rouen was so indifferent and it is this small group of men which 
is of most interest. It is also possible to trace the links between the Guise family and this clique. 
Nonetheless, it must be stressed that the Guise were not the sole family which was identified with 
ultra-catholicism, and that the relationship between the Guise and their Rouennais contacts was 
a complex alliance of ties rather than that of direct control implied by the traditional patron-client 
model. Moreover, the Guise association with ultra-catholicism has perhaps blinded historians to the 
fact that the family was primarily interested in protecting its own interests. It was not until the 
summer of 1561, when Guise influence at court was waning, that there are the first indications that 
Francois de Guise was becoming associated with the defence of catholicism in the Parisian popular 
imagination. At the same time the cardinal de Lorraine was as unpopular as ever and remained 
committed to seeking doctrinal reconciliation with the Calvinists 60 
The most zealous inquisitors in Rouen in the 1550s included Robert Raoullin, sieur de 
Longpaon and conseiller in the parlement, and Rene des Buaz, canon of the cathedral of NBtre- 
Dame de Rouen and grand vicaire of the diocese of Rouen. In the absence of the cardinal de 
Bourbon, the office of grand vicaire was regarded as the principal ecclesiastical office in the 
archbishopric of Rouen. In 1554 Longpaon accused conseiller Antoine de Croismare of heresy 
" Benedict, Rouen during the Wars of Religion, p 192. 
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during a full session of the parlement 70 Longpaon is a more Interesting figure than des Buaz 
because of his long standing links with the Guise. His career in the service of Diane de Poitiers and 
then as the procureur of the duc d'Aumale has already been traced. " Longpaon was no mere 
puppet of the Guise; his zeal was genuine, and furthermore it is likely that the Guise had little 
interest in the detailed proceedings against heretics when they were at war in the 1550s. 
Longpaon's motives may have been altruistic, factional or designed to attract plaudits from his 
patrons. In November 1556 five conseillers were purged because their faith was dubious: Jean de 
Quievremont, J6r6me Maynet, Antoine de Civille (who later repented), Charles Le Verrier and 
Robert Le Roux . 
72 Tensions in the city increased after this date especially with the establishment 
of the protestant church in 1557. The catholics made some moves to increase devotional activities 
and preaching. Chief among these was Claude S6card curb of Saint-Maclou" By the 1560s the 
S6card family were increasingly important in the church hierarchy and would play a longrunning 
but unrecognised role in the defence of catholicism throughout the Wars of Religion in Rouen. 
During the period 1560-1 there were no fewer than nine serious disturbances of public 
order in the city. " The bailli of Rouen Jean d'Estouteville, sieur de Villebon (c1492-1565), was 
an ultra-catholic who became notorious for his harshness towards the Huguenots. In 1560 he drew 
up a list of all those who did not openly take part in catholic rituals and processions. 75 Although 
Villebon was a catholic, that did not necessarily make him a Guisard. Despite service under the duc 
de Guise in 1558 in Picardy there is nothing to suggest that he was a partisan of the family. )6 
Rather, Villebon consistently neglected the wishes of the Guise. In June 1560 the inhabitants of 
Dieppe, Le Havre and Rouen presented a confession of faith to the parlement of Rouen. This was 
publicly burnt in front of the cathedral on the 12th. The following day the religious procession of the 
fete-dieu turned into religious riot. Following this episode some 2,000 Huguenots marched on the 
parlement to demand justice. Not to be outdone by this show of strength Villebon rode through the 
streets of Rouen 'en grande compagnie" demanding that all citizens celebrate the festival for the 
full eight days on pain of death. " 
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Royal policy at this time, formulated largely by the cardinal de Lorraine, was designed to 
defuse religious tension as much as possible in order to stabilise the tottering Guise regime. The 
impending assembly of notables at Fontainebleau (21-26 August 1560) was the beginning of the 
search for some solution to instability. Lorraine had realised well before the unsettling and 
disruptive Conspiracy of Amboise that religious repression would only exacerbate dangerous 
factionalism. " Villebon was more concerned about his own authority than that of the Guise. 
Indeed, the activities of Villebon and other provincial zealots like him threatened Lorraine's attempts 
to secure the monarchy: 
'I am also told that the cardinal greatly complains of Villebon accusing him of too 
much zeal and inquisitiveness in having caused such great turmoil, and that he 
ought rather to have dissembled and pretended not to see what did not please 
him, than to proceed to such extremities for the discovery of what was kept hidden, 
whereby he has done nothing but place all his Majesty's Ministers in danger and 
anxiety. 79 
Far from being a Guise placeman. Villebon had risen in the service of Anne de 
Montmorency. It was Montmorency who protected him from royal disfavour after a humiliating 
defeat in a skirmish with Imperial troops in 1558. Villebon donated several pieces of territory to the 
conndtable "pour la bonne amitid qu'il aA Monsieur Anne duc de Montmorency". ' The ultra- 
catholics, in the 1560s especially, were at no time a monolithic faction. On July 7 1560 a general 
pardon was published at the parlement of Rouen and prisoners involved in the recent disturbances 
were released B1 This was in line with Guise strategy at the time and could not have been 
instituted without their consent. Court directives had little effect on the tensions in the provinces. 
In August Rouen was again the scene of further violence. The lieutenant-general of the bailliage, 
Jacques de Brevedent (d. 1580), found it increasingly difficult to pursue the functions of his office, 
since he "n'osait sortir de sa maison; craignoit tout de la haine de certains malveillants qui voulaient 
faire le contraindre ä mettre en liberte un de leurs, ddtenu prisonnier. ""2 Brevedent was an 
obvious target of anger because of his position of authority. His reputation was further tarnished, 
in the eyes of the reformed community, by his close connections with Diane de Poitiers and then 
the Guise. Along with Longpaon he was closely involved with the efforts of the Guise to sell rentes 
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in Rouen. Significantly, it was Brevedent who was deputed by the town council of Rouen to go to 
Paris and lobby the cardinal de Lorraine for a reduction of the town's tax contribution in 1555. The 
cardinal managed to get him an audience in front of the king and the Conseil prive. Brevedent 
had close ties to the local catholic hierarchy. His uncle had been a priest, and his son Denis 
(d. 1573) was abbot of La Trappe and a canon of the cathedral of Rouen. " Denis, as a canon, 
would have been an associate of Rene des Buaz, canon and grand vicaire. Another priest singled 
out for his zeal, Claude S6card, was to see his relative, Adam, appointed to the office of dean In 
the cathedral chapter in October 1560 " The cathedral chapter was thus home to a small number 
of the most zealous catholics. These were some of the men trying to defend catholicism in 1560. 
However, there was as yet no organisation and little that this handful of priests and lawyers could 
do. Moreover, there was little support at court for a policy of repression, in fact, more the opposite. 
However, the nucleus of ultra-catholics in Rouen would grow in the following year and the Guise, 
increasingly displaced at court, sought to activate and strengthen their aff inity in Rouen and to 
reaff irm their commitment to catholicism. 
The Guise and the Defence of Catholicism, December 1560-April 1562 
Since the summer of 1560the Guise had tried to bolster their regime by defusing the religious 
problem and pursuing the perceived threat of the prince de Conde. Two of the most prominent 
Norman clients of the Guise were involved in the last case. Tanneguy Le Veneur, sieur de 
Carrouges, would play a key role in Normandy in the next thirty years. He came to prominence at 
court with his kinsman and neighbour, Jean de Bailleul, sieur de Renouard, on the accession of 
Francois II. Both men had originally been close to the admiral Claude d'Annebaut until his death 
in 1552. Bailleul had served in Italy under the Guise as the lieutenant of the ordonnance company 
of Jean d'Annebaut. In 1560 they were jointly charged with the arrest of Madeleine de Mailly, 
Cond6's mother-in-law and a stalwart of the reformed cause. 86 
Conde was himself finally arrested and tried following a summons from the king. The 
judgement was suspended on the death of Francois II on 5 December 1560, only eight days before 
the Estates-General was due to open at Orleans. The accession of a minor strengthened the hand 
of Catherine de Medicis and the princes of the blood at the expense of the Guise. A reaction of the 
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Estates against the previous regime might have been expected, with the perennial problem of 
taxation and the religious question high on the agenda. "" Delegates were concerned about these 
problems but the Guise were not used as scapegoats. Some enemies of the Guise accused them 
of a concerted effort to prevent the election of Calvinist deputies; £A is unlikely and hard 
to verify. The Guise did have many of their own men as representatives. The deputies of Burgundy 
and Dauphine, provinces governed respectively by the ducs de Guise and d'Aumale, demanded 
that the princes of the House of Lorraine enjoy the same rank as the princes of the blood at the 
Estates. " Although this request was rejected and despite widespread dissatisfaction with the reign 
of Francois and distrust of the cardinal of Lorraine, condemnation of the Guise was muted. The 
family showed it could still call on the voices of two provinces to speak up for it in the Estates B° 
Other Guise clients were elected, particularly in Champagne. Jean de Choiseul, sieur de 
Lanques, lieutenant of the company of the marquis d'Elbeuf, was chosen to represent the Second 
Estate of the baflllage of Clermont. In Normandy Jean de Bailleul, sieur de Renouard, represented 
the nobility of the bailllage of Alencon °0 The Estates-General of Orleans thus presaged the 
election of many Guise clients to the Estates of 1576 and 1588. There was therefore a caucus 
sympathetic to the Guise at Orleans. To what extent there was liaison and organisation it is 
impossible to gauge. 
The problems for the Guise were not in the Estates but at court. The Guise and their 
kinsmen now found themselves out of favour. The ducs d'Aumale, de Longueville and de Nemours 
all took leave of the court in January 1561 and the cardinal de Lorraine departed on 1 February. '" 
On 24 March 1561 Antoine de Navarre was made lieutenant-general of the kingdom, although 
Catherine was the real influence at court as regent. Catherine's attempt to manage court affairs on 
a Bourbon-Montmorency axis was doomed to failure. The ageing Anne de Montmorency was irked 
by the influence of the Calvinists at court and the behaviour of his own nephew, admiral Coligny. 
During Easter 1561 the formation of the Triumvirate for the defence of catholicism set the seal on 
the Guise-Montmorency rapprochement. Strictly speaking the Triumvirate was an association led 
by Guise, Montmorency and marechal Saint-Andre. It resulted from their weakness and loss of 
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influence at court but its strength resulted from the range of opinions it embraced. The pro-papal 
cardinal de Toumon was no friend to the Guise. The Triumvirate encompassed important nobles 
in their own right like the duc de Montpensier and the comte de Brissac. 92 The Triumvirate was 
a proto-catholic League without ideology or popular elements. It had as much to do with court 
faction as religious loyalty. 
Francois de Guise left court in April, not wishing to be seen to condone tolerant attitudes 
to worship. Guise also broke off the engagement of his daughter to the duc de Longueville following 
his refusal to attend mass at the sacre of Charles IX. The cardinal of Lorraine however pursued 
a more tolerant line in the summer, culminating in the colloquy of Poissy in September. Whether 
i this was part of the process of mere political manoeuvring or a sincere desire for doctrinal 
reconciliation is not at issue here. The fact is however that the Guise family was not presenting a 
monolithic ultra-catholic front bent on the destruction of protestantism °3 In defence of family 
interests the Guise were politically flexible and in regard to the religious question they were not 
united in their search for a solution. The duc de Guise stood firm against any concessions that 
would undermine the position of the catholic church but did not interfere with his brother's plans. 
Guise perhaps had more to lose. His image as a popular military and catholic hero had begun to 
take root in the imagination of the Parisian menu peuple. This is illustrated by the rapturous 
reception he received during the procession of the fete-dieu in Paris (5 June 1561)Y ` 
The queen mother sought to defuse religious and factional tensions, thus stabilising the 
regency. The edict of 30 July 1561 was the result °5 This edict endeavoured to stop the escalating 
violence in the provinces in order to lay the groundwork for an accommodation at Poissy. Most 
significantly it proscribed all leagues and associations. On the surface the edict only recognised 
catholicism but it ended the death penalty for heresy, and governors, like the duc de Bouillon in 
Normandy, were told privately to show leniency in its application. 96 The new mood of conciliation 
was crowned when, at the reopening of the Estates-General at Pontoise in August, a formal public 
reconciliation was staged between Guise and Conde. On 9 September 1561 the first debates of 
the colloquy of Poissy began 97 
02 Romier, Caftot, ý es ei- filvii ck,, pp 104-5. 
9' For a discussion of the religious question in 1561 see, Shannon, "The Political Activity of 
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The colloquy failed but this did not prevent Catherine searching for a solution, and she 
summoned an assembly of notables to convene at Saint-Germain in the coming winter. °B The 
failure of Poissy undoubtedly damaged the credit of the cardinal de Lorraine and probably 
convinced his brothers that moderation was a failure. Moreover, the Huguenots were beginning to 
dominate the conseil du roi. Cond6's rising star was crowned with the acquisition of the 
governorship of Picardy in place of the Triumvir and Guise nominee, the Comte de Brissac. The duc 
d'Aumale was the first to leave court on the 9 October rapidly followed by the cardinal de Lorraine 
and his companion Gabriel Le Veneur, bishop of Evreux. Ten days later the duc and cardinal de 
Guise, accompanied by the ducs de Longueville, Nemours and "other great personages" in a train 
including 700 men, departed 9° Longueville's presence in this cort6ge suggests that religion was 
not the sole motive for this exodus. Rumours of plots circulated and both Catherine and Antoine 
pleaded for Guise to return to the court where they could be watched more closely. When 
Montmorency left court two days after Guise, the conseil du rot assumed the character of being in 
the control of one faction. The council was dominated by Catherine, chancellor Michel de I'H6pital, 
Navarre, Conde and Coligny. The former favourites of Henri II were away from the centre of royal 
patronage but all the more dangerous for it. The projected assembly of notables would have little 
authority as it would be bereft of the most powerful men in the kingdom. 
The Guise family remained in eastern France from October 1561 until March 1562; 
Catherine's persistent appeals to return to court were ignored. Unfortunately we know little about 
their movements. The Guise were plotting to frighten Catherine into acceding to their wishes or by 
taking more direct action to seize power. Consequently, a good opportunity to hold counsel was 
during Christmas which was spent at Joinville. Thence the duc de Guise and the cardinal de 
Lorraine moved on to Nancy where they were entertained by their cousin the duc de Lorraine. From 
here the two brothers, accompanied by the duc d'Aumale, travelled to Saverne to discuss doctrinal 
reconciliation with the duke of Württemberg and his Lutheran theologians. Apprehension at court 
was understandable as an English commentator wrily noted "the Court fears the Guise more than 
the Guise fear the Court". 10° From Saverne, where the Guise hoped to neutralise Lutheran 
opinion or even create an anti-Huguenot alliance, they returned to the family seat at Joinville. 
D'Aumale returned to court by 6 March, perhaps as a means of facilitating the gathering 
of information. 101 It impossible to know if either he or d'Elbeuf spent any time at their Norman 
residences that winter or whether there was any Guise contact with the growing ultra-catholic 
faction in Rouen. Attempts at reform and reconciliation at court were in stark contrast to the 
escalating violence in the provinces; here catholics and Huguenots dispensed their own justice. In 
98 De Thou. IV, p 128. 
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Normandy in August the great equine fair at Guibray was the scene of further disorders. 102 In the 
same way that the Triumvirate was formed as a reaction to the growing influence of the Huguenots 
at court, steps were being taken in the same direction in the provinces. In Rouen the Confrdrie du 
Saint-Sacrement was founded in 1561 and quickly gained a large membership. "* Growing 
catholic activism was forming out of the kernel of the minority of zealots of the 1550s. The plotting 
of the Guise in the winter of 1561-2 and the renewed vigour of ultra-catholics in Normandy, 
culminating in the raising of catholic forces in March 1562 by Guise clients, shows a remarkable 
correlation. 
On 19 September 1561 Pierre Quitard of Bourges was executed in Rouen for possessing 
papers listing the names and detailing the wealth of the four hundred leading Rouennais 
Huguenots. "" The activities of this man give credence to the not unbiased claims of the Histoire 
eccldsiastique that there was an anti-protestant plot being hatched in Rouen. The Histoire also 
states that the Guise were implicated because Quitard was a servant of the sieur de Fizes, 
secrdtaire d'etat, who owed his position to Guise patronage. This assertion is not without 
foundation, for Fizes was in the service of the cardinal de Lorraine between 1559 and 1563, only 
attaching himself to Catherine de Medicis thereafter. t°5 
Quitard's links to the Guise are a possibility. On his arrest he was reported to be in 
possession of correspondence from the cardinal de Lorraine and Catherine. This does not prove 
their complicity in a plot and Catherine denied any knowledge of the man. The duc de Bouillon was 
sent with a special commission to try Quitard in the presidial courts and justice was quickly 
dispensed. The Histoire ecclesiastique implicated a number of local men who seem far more likely 
candidates for a projected demarche in Rouen. These included Richard Papillon, conseillerat the 
hötel de ville, Robert Raoullin, one of the stalwarts of ultra-catholicism, Nicholas Damours, avocat 
du roi, Louis Pdtremol, president ä mortier in the parlement of Rouen, Claude Sdcard, by now 
grand vicaire of the diocese of Rouen, Jean Pdriicard, procureur du roi, and Raoul Yon, avocat. 106 
The author of the Histoire may have been expressing his prejudices in compiling this list of 
miscreants. Nevertheless, these names contain men at the forefront of repression in the 1550s and 
men whose service to the Guise goes back further still. 
Jean Pericard was a faithful servant of the Guise and both he and his three sons did not 
go unrewarded, attaining major offices in the legal and ecclesiastical hierarchy through Guise 
patronage. 1°7 By autumn 1561 Pdricard was identified with ultra-catholicism but as early as 1559 
102 Benedict, Rouen during the Wars of Religion, pp 56-7. 
103 Ibid. 68-9. 
104 Ibid, p 67. 
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he had served as a commissioner to supervise the repression of Calvinism in the Cotentin. 1° 
Nicholas Damours (d. 1585) had been avocat-general in the parlement since 1558 and was sent 
on a similar commission to Caen in January 1560. Both he and Pericard have no identifiable link 
to the Guise before 1561. They seem to have gravitated towards the Guise affinity because of 
common religious beliefs. Damours also remained closely identified with the Guise interest during 
the Wars of Religion. He counselled the duc d'Aumale on campaign Normandy in 1562, and his 
house was destroyed by the Huguenots in retaliation. His elder brother Pierre would join the 
Catholic League in 1589.10° 
It is important to stress the sincere catholic faith these men shared. Richard Papillon was 
later arrested for his part in the murder of a Huguenot oficier. 1° Their motivation was not loyalty 
to the Guise but a common interest in the defence of catholicism. Naturally the furnishing of favours 
and services was also part of involvement in the Guise affinity. Each noble served his own interest 
in working towards a common ýý` ng goal. The growth of those men involved in the Guise affinity was 
aided by the existence of Guise servants in Rouen, such as Longpaon, who had ready access to 
the Guise family. Similarly, Louis Petremol (d. 1563) had been in Guise service, enjoying their 
patronage since at least 1549. "' Petremol was a senior magistrate and a figure of authority who 
symbolised everything the Huguenots feared. The Guise lands were to become easy targets for the 
Huguenot troops in 1562 and ultra-catholic magistrates had their property ransacked. As early as 
July 1561 P6tremol, perhaps identified in the popular imagination with the Guise family, was the 
subject of threats and attacks and suffered "des injures et voyes de faict commises contre luy et 
ses domestiques en sa maison situee au faubourg Cauchoise". 12 
The names provided by the Histoire ecclesiastique fail to mention Jean de Lallement, sieur 
de Marmaigne, who served on the Guise council in Paris. In August 1553 he resigned his office 
of conseiller in the parlement of Paris to another Guise client, Antoine Le Cider, in order to take 
a similar post in Rouen. He later went on to become president d mortier in the parlement where 
he was recognised as being particularly "tort severe et exacte ä faire la recherche et punition de 
ceux de la R. P. R. ""3 More importantly it was he who would rally the demoralised parlement in 
May 1562 after the Huguenot coup. Saint-Anthot, the moderate premier president, fled to his home 
in Burgundy, leaving Lallement to preside over the radicalisation of the parlement in relation to the 
problem of heresy. 
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Potential Guise support in the winter of 1561-2 was not only confined to a small coterie of 
robin servants and sympathisers among the elite of Rouennais society. In the remonstrance 
presented to the duc de Bouillon in April 1562 the Huguenots explained their rebellion as a 
defensive measure against an all-encompassing catholic attack. They specifically referred to the 
raising of troops for Guise: 
Est aussi notoire, que ledit sieur de Guyse, par les commissions qu'il a fait 
expedier sous le nom du Roy, a fait lever gens en plusieurs & en divers lieux, afin 
d'estre le plus fort a executer son entreprinse & de saccager ceux de la religion, 
voire jusques A envoyer ä ceste fin capitaines en ceste ville de Rouen. 
Davantage on fait de certain que le sieur de Clere & le sieur d'Ozebost & 
autres gentilhommes de ce pais levent & font amas de gens de guerre, pour aller 
trouver ledit sieur de Guyse & ceux de sa Iigue. "` 
Unfortunately this passage only reveals two names: Jean baron de Cleres (1520-63) and 
his nephew Frangois de Bricqueville, sieur d'Auzebosc (d. 1563). 15 The baron de Cleres was an 
experienced captain, having commanded an infantry company in 1554 and then progressing to 
become captain of 100 chevaux-legers in 1557.116 Cleres was the grandson of the mardchal du 
Biez. As was outlined in the previous chapter, it was the Guise who protected the du Biez family 
from the wrath of the king and the vindictiveness of Montmorency after the betrayal of Boulogne 
to the English in 1544. It may be that Cleres became part of the Guise affinity as a result of these 
links. He was an important local nobleman and played an active role in Norman affairs, 
representing the second estate of the bailliage of Rouen in 1549 and 1556. ' 17 Well before the 
spring of 1562 he was a familiar of the ducs d'Aumale and de Guise. D'Aumale was in the process 
of buying horses from Cleres in January 1558 while recuperating from illness at his residence 
of Mauny near Rouen. 18 
The Bricqueville were one of the oldest and most famous Norman families, although there 
were many different branches. Francois de Bricqueville, sieur d'Auzebosc, qualified as captain of 
114 Histoire ecclesiastique, II, p 717. 
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confused with his namesake, protestant captain Francois de Bricqueville, sieur de 
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Saint-L6 In 1553.10 D'Auzebosc had, along with his uncle, links with the Guise that went back 
a number of years. It seems that both men, like so many others, came to the attention of the Guise 
through their acquisition of the Brezel inheritance and all the many historical and traditional mutual 
ties that it entailed. Georges de Breze (d. 1539), baron de Cleres, was the father of Jean. He had 
married Anne de Brezb, daughter of the comte de Maulevrier, and had been lieutenant of the 
company of Louis de Breze (husband of Diane de Poitiers) In 1525.120 It is likely therefore that 
both men would have been familiars of Diane de Poitiers and the duc d'Aumale. Indeed, 
d'Auzebosc was held in the highest regard by Diane, of whom it was said that, "ladict dame a teile 
affection". 121 In 1557 she wrote to the chapter of Rouen cathedral in order to plead for the 
privilege of Saint-Romain which empowered the chapter to pardon a single convicted murderer 
each year. Diane petitioned in favour of one of d'Auzebosc's companions "pour le dOsir que j'ay 
de faire plaisir en ce que me sera possible, ä mon nepveu d'Ozebosc". 122 This supplication was 
successful and d'Auzebosc thanked the canons personally. Clearly these ties of kinship, however 
tenuous to modern eyes, could be activated at any time as part of a reciprocal relationship. When 
the duc d'Aumale married Louise de Brezel he became part of this complex Norman kinship 
network, which could be exploited when need arose. 
Clbres and d'Auzebosc were more likely to aid the Guise in 1562 because of their historical 
kinship links rather than their religious zeal. Both men also possessed strong affiliations to the 
Norman Huguenot nobility. D'Auzebosc was a first cousin to the leading Huguenot captain, Frangois 
de Bricqueville, sieur de Colombieres. These ties were not ruptured by the civil war. D'Auzebosc 
and Cleres were both murdered in the aftermath of the first war of religion in 1563. This had 
nothing to do with religion and was the result of a long running feud. The records pertaining to the 
wardship of their children strongly suggest that both men were married to women, either protestant 
themselves or from families strongly identified with the reformed faith. Adrien de Breaute, tutor to 
the young Jacques de Cleres (1548-1616), petitioned the king in 1565: 
d'ordonner jusques a... Iedit sieur de Clere ait attaint son age portd par la loy, il ne 
sera mis presche selon la Religion pretendue retormde es terres et seigneuries 
dud. sieur de Clere... eu esgard que ses predecesseurs ont tousjours vescu suivant 
les statutes de I'eglise Romaine Catholique. '2' 
1° ADSM, 1 B, 547,3 March 1553. 
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The seventeen-year-old baron's adherence to catholicism was obviously perceived as being 
tenuous, although he fought on the catholic side in the ensuing years. Brdautt was most concerned 
about the influence of the other tutors on the impressionable young man. These included 
Huguenots like his uncle, Guy de Bricqueville, sieur de Sainte-Croix, and his step-mother, 
Marguerite de Louvigny. 124 D'Auzebosc and his wife, Frangoise de Cheveulles, had a son 
christened Isaac, an Old Testament name popularised by Calvinists. 125 
Having established the close ties of both men to the Huguenot community, it seems highly 
unlikely, as the Histoire eccldsiastique and the Rouennais Huguenots claimed, that d'Auzebosc and 
Cleres saw their mission as a part of a premeditated offensive against the reformed church. It is 
clear that the two nobles were dispatched into Normandy in order to elicit support from their friends 
and kin and others in the Guise affinity for the Guise family in the expected military confrontation 
with the prince de Conde. The rigid division of parties into protestant and catholic obscures the 
reality of loosely constructed factions built around kinship, affinity and religion. The ultra-catholics, 
like all factions, were a broad church built on the constantly shifting foundations of individual and 
family interests. Appeals to religious belief and attempts to control the royal patronage network 
were different ways of strengthening and broadening support. Religious and political ideology, 
especially in the short term, gave identity to what were volatile and dynamic entities. The very 
diversity of interest within a faction or affinity meant that control from above, in a hierarchical 
manner, was extremely difficult. The support that the Guise family received in March and April 1562 
was that based on common interest born of the bonds of service and patronage, religion and 
kinship. 
On 7 April 1562 two catholic recruiting captains of Norman origin, Nicholas Le Gras and 
a man called Maze, marched through the streets of Rouen drumming up recruits. This was 
provocation to the Huguenot community and the recruiters were promptly set upon; Maze was 
wounded and Le Gras slain. '26 These captains had a similar mission to that of the baron de 
Cleres to raise forces for the Triumvirs in Paris. Maze may well have been commissioned by Cleres 
himself. A Nicholas de Maze was lieutenant of the two companies of foot raised by the baron for 
service against the Imperialists in September 1554.127 Thus in 1562 even the mobilisation of 
catholic troops in the provinces was executed through contacts, who could be trusted to be reliable. 
However, the Guise affinity in Normandy was small; there existed no populist element in the 
catholic forces as would be the case in the 1580s. The affinity consisted of a handful of nobles, 
robins and bourgeois, linked to the Guise personally through kinship and service. 
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The motivation behind the subterfuges of the Guise in the winter of 1561-2 was the political 
domination of the court by the Huguenots and their allies. The imbalance in royal counsel was soon 
manifested in the liberal interpretation of royal commands, originally designed to prevent large 
assemblies. The new interpretation effectively sanctioned public worship of Calvinism in provinces 
like Normandy and Guyenne. 128 By November 1561 the Huguenots of Rouen were sufficiently 
confident of immunity from the authorities to be holding services publicly in the Halles. 120 On 3 
January 1562 the assembly of notables convened at Saint-Germain to discuss solutions to the 
religious question. Considering the absence of the greatest catholic magnates, the atmosphere was 
more favourable to the Huguenots. The result was the edict of Toleration (17 January 1562). 
Theodore de Bi ze could even contemplate the conversion of the royal family. 13° However, the 
lack of urgency that the parlements showed in registering the edict revealed the widespread 
catholic despair at such a measure. The crown had little chance of enforcing the edict without the 
support of the parlements. Paris was the most recalcitrant of all the law courts, waiting until 6 
March and a royal lettre de jussion before complying with the wishes of the royal council. 
Conversely the parlement of Rouen was the most amenable of all the sovereign courts, being the 
first to register the edict. In Rouen the ultra-catholic faction only consisted of a few magistrates, 
often personally linked to the Guise. The vast majority remained, until the outbreak of the civil wars, 
part of a moderate catholic and essentially Erasmian elite. "' 
As the duc de Guise approached the village of Vassy on 1 March 1562, on his way from 
Joinville to Nanteuil, he had no premeditated notion of perpetrating a massacre. Guise had been 
summoned to Paris by Antoine de Navarre who was leading the vocal opposition against the edict 
of Toleration. Tension in Paris was running high and as a consequence the Chatillon brothers had 
already considered it wise to retire from the capital. "2 Catholic anxiety in Paris was something 
the Triumvirs could exploit politically. Guise himself would have been well informed of all 
developments because the duc d'Aumale had been in attendance at court at Saint-Germain and 
was still there on 6 March. 13Guise would have been fully aware, when he joined his Triumvirs 
at his residence of Nanteuil on 13 March, of the ecstatic greeting he could expect to receive upon 
entering Paris. The triumphal procession was nonetheless impressive: 
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the duke de Guise, accompanied by his brothers, (except the cardinal de Lorraine 
and the marquis d'Elbeuf) came to Paris on the 16th inst., conducted by the 
Constable, his sons, the four Marshals of France, and twenty-one knights of the 
Order, which train amounted to 3,000 horse.... Having arrived at his house the 
Provost of the merchants of Paris, accompanied by many of the principal 
merchants here, there made an oration testifying to his joyful welcome, with an 
offer of two million of gold to serve him in defence of the Catholic religion and the 
quietness of Paris, where they desire him to reside. '34 
Guise had come as a saviour and the queen mother was denuded of support. Conde 
remained in Paris with about 1,000 men but he rejected her calls for assistance and left the capital 
on 23 March 1562. "5 The way was now open for the Triumvirs to take control of the king. Condo 
eventually raised his standard at Orleans and called on all of France to sign his Treaty of 
Association (11 April 1562) in defence of the edict of Toleration and against the unjust 
imprisonment of the king. Four days later Rouen was seized by the Huguenots. This was a coup 
mounted by local residents who were profoundly disturbed by the events that had taken place in 
Paris. However these conflicts were not their immediate concern. Not without some justification they 
were anxious about the intrigues and plans of the ultra-catholics in Normandy guided by the hand 
of the duc de Guise himself. 
'34 Ibid, p 558. The Guise had some support and clients among the catholic hierarchy in Paris 
but the extent to which they had truly popular support in Paris is questionable, see chapters 
five and seven below. 
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Chapter Five 
Civil War and Blood Feud, 1562-74 
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The Guise were not the only magnate House to represent themselves as champions of catholicism. 
However, unlike their counterparts the Montmorency, the Gonzague-Nevers and the Montpensier, 
they possessed a unique position of influence in the French church. The Montmorency, for 
example, were divided in their religious loyalties hindering family solidarity. The Guise brothers, on 
the other hand, were remarkably harmonious in their religious convictions and acted in a more 
unified manner regarding factional politics. ' They were thus in the unique position of being able 
to take advantage of the resurgence of catholicism in the 1560s. In Normandy this process was 
aided by the contacts made and patronage dispensed in the previous two decades. The martyrdom 
of Francois de Guise for the catholic cause in 1563 only served to strengthen the popular image 
of the Guise as saviours of the faith; most significantly it hardened the attitude of the cardinal de 
Lorraine who bitterly abandoned the ecumenism of 1561. 
Civil War In Nonnandy 1562-3 
The task of establishing the composition of the respective catholic and Huguenot adherents in 
Normandy during the first war of religion is complicated by several factors. First, a consideration 
of the ease with which lesser nobles acted independently of any higher authority or overall strategy 
is required. Allegiance was often ephemeral and military activity carried out for no other purpose 
than pillage and plunder. The fluidity of noble relationships was a product of noble culture; 
noblemen changed sides or remained neutral in accordance with individual strategies. It did not 
mean however that there were not distinct factions in Normandy, based on religious faith and 
around identifiable aff inities. Secondly, the Calvinist governor of Normandy, the duc de Bouillon, 
endeavoured to assemble a third party in the province. It has been suggested that this was an early 
attempt to form a party composed of both religions, thus reconciling them in the political sphere 
along the same lines as the politiques were to attempt later. 2 In fact Bouillon had no concern other 
than to bolster his own flagging authority. 
It is not necessary to give a detailed account of the military campaign in Normandy in 1562- 
3. The narrative of events can however be divided easily into a number of distinct phases. 
From the fall of Dieppe on 22 March until late August 1562 the Huguenots took control of the major 
urban centres in the province. Claude de Lorraine, duc d'Aumale, was dispatched thither with a 
special commission as lieutenant-general of Normandy to rectify the breakdown in royal authority. 
He was supported by Jacques de Matignon as his lieutenant in lower Normandy. Bouillon, furious 
that his own position was being undermined, established his own base at Caen. He co-operated 
This is not to say that having members of a family on different sides in wars or identifying 
with opposing factions was neither beneficial nor indeed a part of family strategy. This was 
a common occurence in the Wars of Religion and the reasons for fluidity of family loyalties 
and vindications for 'betraying' the family are little studied by historians. 
2 De Thou, IV, p 240. 
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with the local Huguenot forces and succeeded in effectively besieging Matignon in Cherbourg. The 
catholic nobility was surprised, unorganised and often indifferent to the tide of protestant success. 
The next major development witnessed the arrival of a large royal army in Normandy and 
the subsequent seizure and sacking of Rouen on 26 October 1562. A few weeks earlier Breton 
troops had entered lower Normandy and the short-lived Huguenot hegemony began to crumble. 
The final phase of the war took place in February and March 1563. Admiral de Coligny marched 
from Orleans to Le Havre in order to secure English subsidies for his mutinous reiters. During this 
brief campaign he was able to retake several key strongholds, including Caen .3 
The Norman nobles who flocked to join the standard of Conde at Orleans in spring 1562 - 
or who alternatively assembled for his cause in Normandy - had neither unity of motive nor 
unhesitating allegiance. The most militant Calvinists among their number possessed a solidarity and 
zeal formed by faith and a fear of repression. The audacious exploits of the robins Jean du Bosc, 
sieur d'Emendreville, president of the sour des aides, and Noel Coton, sieur de Berthonville, 
leaders of the Rouennais insurgents, contrasted sharply with the caution of the protestant captain 
of Le Havre, Jean de Cros, who was keen to prevent a repetition of events in the provincial 
capital. ` A surviving manuscript detailing those who joined Conde in Orleans in May of 1562 shows 
that only five out of the seventy-one noblemen listed therein were Normans ., 
5 An English document, 
dated September 1562, gives a more detailed illustration of the Huguenot party in Normandy-6 
These noblemen fall into a number of different categories. There was a strong contingent 
from lower Normandy, led by the comte de Montgommery and the baron de Colombibres, both of 
whom had ties of marriage with the Huguenot leaders. A smaller group was particularly identified 
with Coligny - like Ponsani, the captain of Dieppe, and Antoine d'Alegre (1523-77), sieur de 
Meilhaud, ensign of the company of Coligny and captain of Boulogne through the nomination of the 
admiral. 7 
The Huguenot cause in upper Normandy was less well served by men who had links to the 
Calvinist hierarchy. In the list of CondO's followers drawn up in September 1562 the sieur de 
Rouville joined Conde "avec cens gentilshommes Normans". This refers to one of the many 
3 The best accounts of the first civil war in Normandy are: Histoire ecclesiastique, II, pp 712- 
884: Michel de Castelnau, Memoires, Michaud and Poujoulat, IX, pp 462-8; "Discours 
abbreg6", pp 712-884; Daval, Histoire de la Reformation A Dieppe, I, pp 22-46. 
` Borely, Histoire de la ville du Havre, II, p 28. 
Correspondence de Theodore de Bdze, H. Meylan et al (eds), 5 vols, Geneva, 1960-, vol 
IV, appendix VII. 
6 Public Record Office, State Papers, Elizabeth, SP 70/41 no 436; "Estat des parties .... qui 
ont resolu de vivre et mourir ensemble pour mantenir IEvangille en France". 
P. de Vaissiöre, R6cits du "temps de troubles", XVP siecle. Une Familie: les d Alegre, 
Paris, 1914, pp 32-9. Antoine's landed interest was in the Auvergne but the family 
possessed considerable lands in Normandy through his mother, Marie d'Estouteville. His 
father had been bailli of Caen until his death in 1539. 
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members of the Rouville family, although it is not certain which one .8 The Rouville and d'Alegre 
families represented the elite of Norman society and had great credit in the province. Nevertheless, 
both the d'Alegre and Rouville families remained predominantly catholic; individual noblemen had 
less impact than a united family. " 
From the remaining names on the muster rolls the outstanding figures, all from the 
moyenne noblesse are: Jean de Moy (1528-91), sieur de La Meilleraye, Charles de Martel (d. 1566), 
sieur de Bacqueville, and his two sons Nicholas sieur de La Vaupaliere and Francois sieur de 
Lindboeuf; and finally there are some unidentified members of the Fouilleuse-Flavacourt family. The 
fate of the protestant cause in upper Normandy and the reason why it failed to consolidate in one 
its original heartlands is complex. An understanding of the strategies of these families provides 
some clues. The Moy and the Martel were rivals for power in the pays de Caux. Moy had changed 
sides and joined the catholics as early as July 1562. The Martel were moderate and, despite 
appearing on the register of Huguenot captains, remained loyal to the crown. Charles de Martel 
was instituted as the new royalist governor of Dieppe after its composition. He was ousted after 
another Huguenot plot and later imprisoned by the comte de Montgommery. 'O The Fouilleuse, an 
important family in the Vexin, never distinguished itself in the Huguenot struggle. Charles II de 
Fouilleuse became an officer in the company of Charles marquis d'Elbeuf in 1573 and one of the 
marquis' most trusted servants thereafter. " 
There was no leadership in upper Normandy for the large numbers of Calvinists. The 
Bacqueville-Martel family were vassals of the duc de Longueville. They shared his faith and 
benefited from the protection he could provide for exercising their religion. It is perhaps not 
surprising that they were circumspect about joining Conde when the leading Calvinist magnate in 
Normandy was a close companion of the duc de Guise. The lieutenant of Longueville for the 
chateau of Tancarville declared for the Calvinists. This was contrary to the wishes of the duke and, 
after some months of resistance to the royalists, he ordered his servant and his men to 
surrender. 12 
Outsiders without local credit were thus forced to play a key role in the protestant cause 
in upper Normandy. It was the vidame de Chartres who secured Le Havre and a Picard, Jean de 
Morvillier, who was appointed by Conde as captain of Rouen. Morvillier did not remain at his post 
° Anselme, VIII, p 709; Chenaye-Desbois, XVII, p 828. 
The Rouville were related to the ultra-catholic Le Roy family and Philippe de Rouville 
served in the company of the comte de Randan, a close friend of the duc de Guise, see 
ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1,320,19 October 1559. 
10 Hellot, Essal sur les Martels de Basqueville, p 166. 
" It possible that the followers of Conde were the father and an uncle of the figure mentioned 
here, for in 1562 Charles 11 de Fouilleuse was only sixteen years old, see Morel, 
Houdencourt: seigneurie et paroisse, I, pp 100-1,299. 
12 Deville, Histoire du chateau et des sires de Tancarville, pp 263-4. 
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long and was replaced by Montgommery. The failure to hold Rouen after a short siege, even with 
English support, further revealed the qualitative and quantitative weakness of protestant support 
among the upper Norman nobility. In 1592 the Catholic League was able to call on a more 
substantial section of the local nobility in its successful defence of Rouen against Henri de Navarre. 
The upper Norman Huguenots thus lacked the effective leadership which could have 
overcome some of the difficulties posed by families dedicated to pursuing their own interest. Noble 
strategy might marry religious faith to financial gain. On 5 May 1562 Louis baron d'Orbec, bailli of 
Evreux, and his kinsman Jean d'Ach6, captain of Tancarville for the duc de Longueville, seized and 
pillaged the cathedral town of Lisieux. 13 This sort of localised violence and iconoclasm had very 
little to do with the plans and aims of the prince de Conde. 
The Wars of Religion were more the product of these local acts of violence and the virtually 
autonomous depredations of bands of soldiery than of grand campaigns. Moderates like 
Charles de Bacqueville-Martel and the duc de Bouillon had little success in tempering their more 
zealous co-religionaries. Bouillon arrived at Rouen on 19 April 1562 to treat with the rebels but, 
realising his own impotence, was forced to retire leaving Martel there as his lieutenant. Martel was 
himself forced to withdraw early on 14 May in response to the increasing level of iconoclasm which 
he was powerless to prevent. " Superseded by the duc d'Aumale as the principal royal officer, and 
with few links to the Calvinist leadership, Bouillon tried to establish his own power base in Caen 
which he entered in June 1562. He co-operated with the Huguenots who were strong in the locality 
and tried to prevent the outbreak of religious violence which would further destabilise his position. 
The seizure of church plate was useful for supporting a small army but not enough to offset the loss 
of financial support from the crown, which Bouillon estimated at 35,0001. '5 An officer in Bouillon's 
army, like Guillaume de Hautemer, sieur de Fervacques, had a large degree of autonomy, 
facilitated by the general breakdown of authority. On 31 May he was sent to curb the activities of 
the Huguenots in Lisieux. In the following month he took the opportunity to suspend all catholic 
services and expel all priests. In early July he went on to sack the nearby bourg of Montfort and 
made an unsuccessful assault on the monastery of Saint-Philibert-sur-Risle. Subsequently, 
Fervacques changed sides on the eve of the battle of Dreux, thus beginning a career which, after 
serving the Catholic League, was crowned by the bestowal of the office of mare chat by Henri 1V. 1' 
On 5 May 1562 Claude de Lorraine, duc d'Aumale, was created lieutenant-general of 
Normandy, giving him widespread powers of authority. This followed the inability of the duc de 
13 M. Sauvage, "Les troubles de 1562", Etudes Lexoviennes, 1915, pp 53-4. 
14 Hellot, Essai historique sur les Mantels de Basqueville, pp 166-72. 
15 BN, Ms Fr, 15876, fo 245,14 July 1562; Le Hardy, Histoire du Protestantisme en 
Normandie, pp 91-131. 
16 Sauvage, "Les troubles de 1562", pp 55-62; D. B. F., XIII, pp 1190-1; "Histoire contenant 
le vain effort des Huguenots assiegens le prieurd de Sainct-Philibert en Normandie", 
Cimber and Danjou, VI, p 35. The defender of Saint-Philibert was the younger brother of 
Jean du Bosc, leader of the Rouennais Huguenots. 
121 
Bouillon to reason with the rebels in Rouen and the deterioration in the political situation In 
Normandy. D'Aumale was an obvious choice. He was an experienced soldier and, as a large 
landowner in the province, could be expected to possess more local political and financial influence 
than Bouillon. Moreover he was Bouillon's uncle and was thus less likely to offend his nephew's 
honour and drive him openly into the arms of his fellow Calvinists. 
The problem faced by d'Aumale was the need to contain an increasingly successful revolt 
In Normandy with limited resources. The main catholic-royalist army, gathering in and around Paris, 
took priority in resources and the local elites were completely unprepared to deal with the Huguenot 
threat. In May, Saint-L6, Bayeux, Falaise, Vire, Lisieux, Carentan, Pont de I'Arche and Le Havre 
all followed Rouen and Dieppe in falling under the control of the Huguenots. The captain of Caen, 
Philippe de Roncherolles, found himself isolated and surrounded in the town's chateau. " Jacques 
de Matignon was dispatched from court to lower Normandy in order to rectify the situation. He was 
a locally important man but also a fidele of Catherine de Medicis, and was expected to act as a 
counter-balance to d'Aumale's extensive powers in Normandy. 18 
It was immediately apparent that neither man had the resources to conduct a vigorous 
offensive campaign. Local credit and the ability to raise money in Normandy were at a premium. 
Matignon, like his protestant counterparts, relied heavily on church plate and contributions from 
local churches to maintain his troops. 1° Nevertheless he remained on the defensive, strengthening 
Cherbourg and awaiting the arrival of reinforcements. D'Aumale complained strongly about his lack 
of money and his weakness was revealed by an abortive attack on Rouen. He summoned the city 
on 28 May 1562 but, after a few days of ineffectual bombardment, he was compelled to break 
camp and withdraw when the garrison inside Rouen was reinforced by the sieur de Morvillier. 
D'Aumale's army numbered no more than 3,000 men and he possessed no siege guns. 0 To 
combat the strong protestant forces in Normandy the duke mobilised the local catholic nobility using 
the patronage he had at his disposal, and by summoning his own clients and amis to serve him. 
At the same time he employed the unconventional tactic of attempting to utilise the catholic 
peasantry as an armed militia against Huguenot troops. 
When d'Aumale entered Normandy he was able to give leadership to a small band of 
disorganised catholic noblemen, already in arms. Most notable of these was the displaced bailli of 
Rouen, Jean d'Estouteville, sieur de Villebon. D'Estouteville was accompanied by the two Guise 
agents in Normandy, Clbres and d'Auzebosc, who had been actively recruiting in Normandy for 
17 Histoire eccldsiastique, II, p 219; Borely, Histoire de la ville du Havre, II, p 28; De Thou, 
IV, p 192. 
1e J. de Caillieres, Histoire du mareschal de Matignon, Paris, 1666. 
19 BM, Y, 102, to 32, Charles IX to Matignon, 27 May 1562. 
20 Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, H. de La Fernere and Comte Baguenault de Puchesse 
(eds), 9 vols, Paris, 1880-99, vol I, p 317; Journal de ce qul est passe en France durant 
! 'annee 1562, M. Francois (ed), Paris, 1950, pp 25-50. 
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some time. These men were supported by Yves d'Alegre (1523-77), baron de Blainville, Louis Le 
Pellerin (d. 1594), sieur de Gauville, Adrien sieur de Brdaut6 (d. 1595) and Antoine de Vieuxpont, 
sieur de Saussay. From July 1562 Jean de Moy, sieur de La Meilleraye, was also part of this army. 
In order to galvanise these forces, and provide the offices these men expected for their 
service, commissions were quickly dispatched by d'Aumale. Adrien de Breautd, captain of Gisors, 
was invited to raise 100 mounted arquebusiers and 200 foot 21 Jean de Moy, who had originally 
joined Conde in May 1562, was made captain of Honfleur, Lisieux and Pontaudemer by the duke 
on 22 July 22 Moy's movement between opposing camps was opportunist and brought high 
rewards. His subsequent shift to ultra-catholicism in the mid-1560s indicates that Moy was not 
primarily motivated by religious faith. When his father retired from public lif e in in July 1560, he was 
divested of his offices of vice-admiral of France and captain of Le Havre, which had placed the 
family among the elite of Norman society 23 Jean de Moy found himself disinherited from these 
offices, which he expected to receive on his father's resignation. The fluid political situation of 1562 
was an ideal time to offer his services to the highest bidder. There is no evidence to suggest that 
Moy was ever a protestant. He had little reason to admire admiral Coligny who took over the 
captaincy of Le Havre from his father and who was, in addition, increasingly preoccupied with 
Norman maritime affairs once the office of vice-admiral had lapsed? ` Nevertheless, he profited 
from Condt 's shortlived ascendancy at court, becoming knight of the order of Saint-Michel in 
December 156125 Open revolt the following May immediately raised his bargaining position. His 
rapid return to the catholic party was a reflection of the satisfactory accommodation of his wishes. 
It is significant that, when d'Aumale handed out the captaincies to Moy, the original core of catholic 
nobles were passed over in preference for their former opponent. He did not have to wait much 
longer to regain the family patrimony: he was given the office of vice-admiral on 1 September 1562 
and was further rewarded with the post of lieutenant-general of Normandy in July 1563. He was 
not a half-hearted turncoat and in early September 1562 attacked the advancing comte de 
Montgommery near Dives. Satisfied for the time being with the honours of royal service, Moy 
remained loyal to the monarchy and began to cement a relationship with the Guise and the ultra- 
catholic faction, in order to consolidate and build on his recently accumulated offices 26 
21 BN, Ms Fr, 32369, to 227. 
22 Sauvage, "Les troubles de 1562", p 64. 
23 BN, PO, 2078, fos 47-8; Catalogue analytique des chartes, documents historiques 
composant les archives du college heraldrique, 2 vols, Paris, 1866, vol II, p 191. 
24 Borely, Histoire de la ville du Havre, II, p 24. 
25 CSPF, 1561-2, p 430. 
26 BN, PO, 2078, fo 50; De Thou, IV, p 245. On the Moy family, see Rodiere and Vallee, La 
maison de Moy. 
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Moy was not the only man to benefit from the patronage of the duc d'Aumale. After the 
duke's appointment Louis Le Pellerin was made captain of 200 foot, governor of Harfleur and 
captain of the arriere-ban of the bailliage of Evreux 27 Antoine de Vieuxpont, sleur de Saussay, 
was made captain of 300 toot, In turn filling the company with his own clients and servants. The 
ensign of the company, Guillaume Bernard, was wealthy enough to lend his captain 5001, 
presumably towards the upkeep and pay of the company. 21 Le Pellerin and Vieuxpont, along with 
others like Martin du Bosc, the defender of the monastery of Saint-Philibert against Fervacques, 
had a common history of service with the comte de Brissac and the Guise in the 1550s. Le Pellerin 
and du Bosc had served as men-at-arms in the ordonnance company of Brissac, while Antoine de 
Vieuxpont and his elder brother Jean had both commanded infantry units in Piedmont under the 
comte 2D Brissac's lands and clientele in Normandy were extensive and his connections to the 
Guise and the ultra-catholic faction are well documented. 
Many of Brissac's old comrades turned out to support the duc d'Aumale in 1562 and the 
Vieuxpont family was one of the first to take any open action against the Huguenots. On 21 April 
1562 Jean IV, baron de Vieuxpont (d. c1563), and Antoine, sieur de Saussay, gathered at the house 
of their sister Nicole, dame d'Ouville-la-Riviere, in the pays de Caux, and proceeded to organise 
an abortive attack on the nearby Huguenot chapel and stronghold at Luneray 30 This seems to 
have been an autonomous action by the family and an early demonstration of the activity which 
made the Vieuxpont one of the staunchest catholic families in Normandy. The baron had originally 
been a man-at-arms of admiral d'Annebaut and in the 1550s he had entered the service of the 
comte de Brissac 3' The Vieuxpont had their own esoteric motives for supporting the catholic 
party. In 1553, on the death of d'Annebaut, the baron de Vieuxpont had been stripped of the 
governorship of Dieppe by the new admiral, Coligny 32 The new incumbent, Charles de Ponsard, 
was a Huguenot and it is therefore not surprising that the Vieuxpont had an antipathy to the reform 
and were eager to aid the Guise against a mutual enemy. This laid the foundation for the Vieuxpont 
to become one of the most faithful followers of both Brissac and the Guise throughout the entire 
Wars of Religion. ' 
Sauvage, "Les troubles de 1562", p 63; Vindry, p 501. 
ACR, A, 19,26 July 1562; ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1,327 bis, 31 May 1564. This 
document was witnessed by Jean Lambert, avocat-general of the cardinal de Lorraine. 
29 Francois de Boyvin, baron du Villars, Memoires, Michaud and Poujoulat, 1st ser., X, p 389. 
30 Histoire ecclesiiastique, I, p 796. 
31 Travers (ed), Rble du ban of de I arridre ban du bailliage de Caen, p 120. 
32 D. Asseline, Les Antiquitez et Chroniques de la ville de Dieppe, 2 vols, Dieppe, 1874, vol 
I, p 250. 
3 The eldest son of Jean IV became a major servant of the duc d'Elbeuf, see chapters three 
and seven. 
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Similarly, the Moy family could boast strong links to the Guise going back to the 1540s. 
Moreover Jean de Moy was closely related to Breaut6 who figured as the ensign of Moy's company 
of the ordonnance in October 1561. Breaut6 was also a servant of the duke of Ferrara, father-in- 
law of the duc de Guise. Ferrara, in his capacity as comte de Gisors, had made Brdaute captain 
of the town in 1557.34 
D'Aumale could rely on a measure of support from the local catholic nobility but he was 
severely short of the money to conduct a campaign. The Huguenots held the urban centres and 
they did not hesitate to expropriate local revenue or extort money from the inhabitants. In August 
1562 Montgommery received a commission from the prince de Conde to pay his gendarmerie 
companies out of the faille collected in the elections of Carentan and Saint-L6 35 Montgommery 
had no reservations about levying large sums upon his co-religionaries. His troops committed acts 
of indiscipline and violence against the friendly population of Dieppe and imposed a forced loan of 
15,0001 on the inhabitants. As a lower Norman Montgommery was an outsider; townsfolk 
complained to Coligny and clamoured for the reinstatement of a moderate local man, Charles de 
Bacqueville-Martel 36 
D'Aumale also had considerable powers to expropriate local sources of revenue. The 
decime from the diocese of Rouen was used for the payment of troops. D'Aumale would have been 
able to raise loans on the strength of the anticipated revenue of these taxes and the administration 
of finance would have given him further opportunities to dispense patronage. Thus Jean de La 
Vache, procureur of the bailliage of Gisors, and Jacques Bellier, Clu of Rouen, received 
commissions for the collection of the decimes from three deaneries in upper Normandy to pay the 
gendarmerie of the duc d'Aumale 37 In a financial transaction such as this the commissioners 
would have advanced cash to d'Aumale and his subordinates in return for his farming out of such 
a potentially lucrative contract. For example, in July 1562 d'Aumale directed these men to forward 
1,2001 to the sieur d'Albgre., m 
Temporal revenues were also assigned for the upkeep of specific units. After the end of 
the first war of religion the troops of Adrien de Broautd were maintained from the grenier ä sel of 
Saint-Valdry-en-Caux 39 During the second religious war the same captain was "charge de prendre 
les deniers du Roy qui se severoient a larriere-ban pour payer les troupes quil avoit levees. "40 
31 Rodibre and Vallee, La maison de Moy, p 59; BN, Ms Fr, 32369, to 255; BN, PO, 496, to 
17. It is difficult to ascertain what precise kinship tie united Moy and Breautd. 
35 BN, V° Col, 24, to 4. 
36 Daval, Histoire de la Reformation A Dieppe, I, pp 41-6. 
37 ADSM, G, 5670, Chambre du clerg6,27 May 1562. 
"8 ADSM, G, 5668, Chambre du clergd, 13 July 1562. 
39 BN, Ms Fr, 32369, to 227, May 1564. 
40 BN, Ms Fr, 32369, to 229,7 October 1567. 
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D'Aumale made the baron de Cteres, already the captain of 100 mounted arquebusiers, not only 
colonel du ban et arridre-ban but also receveur du ban. As a result he was involved in the 
collection and distribution of royal revenues. He received a wage for his office as well as handling 
cash that came from the aides of the arridre-ban. Between 25 October and 14 November he 
received 14501 from his subordinate receveur responsible for the bailliage of Caux. " The 
alienation of royal revenue at source in the localities in order to finance troops in the provinces was 
a feature of the Wars of Religion. The interdependence between provincial elites and the local royal 
fiscal administration became ever stronger and was the cause of an increasing decentralisation of 
power. Local elites were able to circumvent the royal will effortlessly and act independently of 
authority because they were able to use provincial patronage and revenues to reinforce their own 
power bases. 
Wartime expediency determined that the duc d'Aumale was able to employ more 
unorthodox methods to raise cash. He seized cloth belonging to Rouennais merchants which was 
at Brionne waiting to be fulled: 
Aumale, auquel la Royne avoit refuse argent pour mal execute sa commission, 
cottisoit les villes au plus haut qu'il pouvoit, n'oubliant son proufit particulier, 
deliberant de faire transporter par charroy ä Amyens les tolles susdites des 
marchans de Rouen, pour les vendre si les marchands ne vouloient racheter ä 
haut prix, pour ä quoy les attirer, il leur promettoit pardon & sauveguarde, dort 
Pericard, Procureur du Roy, faisoit les despeches moyennant un escu pour sa 
signature. 42 
It is not clear if Jean P6ricard was in the Guise affinity before the civil wars, although he can 
certainly be identified as an ultra-catholic. The Pdricard family was loyal to the Guise throughout 
the Wars of Religion and was well recompensed for its services. In the summer of 1562 Pdricard, 
who was procureur-general in the parlement of Rouen, accompanied by the avocat du roi, Laurent 
Bigot (1497-1570), liaised closely with the duke. They seemed to have counselled the duke and 
functioned as his main link with the parlement of Rouen, which had reconvened at Louviers on 22 
July 1562 03 One major consequence of the Huguenot coup d'6tat in Rouen and the unleashing 
of iconoclasm in May was the subsequent radicalisation of the attitudes of the parlementaire 
community towards protestantism. The flight of leading moderates in the parlement, such as 
premierpresidentSaint-Anthot, who spent the duration of the troubles at his residence in Burgundy, 
41 BN, PO, 781, fos 66-70. Another Guise client to enjoy a command was Francois de La 
Menardiere, elder brother of the maitre d'h6tel of the duc d'Aumale, who was given a 
commission to muster the ban of Alencon, Caen and the Cotentin, see BN, Dossiers Bleus, 
442, fo 3,22 May 1562. 
42 Histoire ecclesiastique, II, 738. 
43 Histoire ecci6siastique, II, pp 724-5,733 n 3; Floquet, II, pp 410,415. 
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and the trauma of the flight of the parlement from Rouen, only served to raise the profile and credit 
of the minority ultra-catholic faction. Leadership of the parlement now passed to men like Jean de 
Lallement, an old servant of the Guise, and Nicholas Damours who had been long associated with 
the defence of catholicism. " It was no surprise that the residence of Damours in Rouen was 
ransacked by the Huguenots. These attacks on vacant property were targeted at the most hardline 
conseillers In the parlement. Other victims included Jean Le Febvre d'Escalles (d. 1571), a buyer 
of rentes from the Guise, and conseillers Claude Auvray (d. 1566), Jacques de Centsols (d. 1566) 
and Pierre du Four (1506-1569). The house of Raoullin de Longpaon was demolished and the 
destruction was sufficient to ruin du Four financially. 45 In this atmosphere of bitterness it was 
hardly surprising that attitudes would harden and the arrdts of the parlement became more severe 
towards heretics. A number of laws sanctioned the detention of all Huguenots and their summary 
execution should they resist. In August there occurred a spate of hangings of ordinary and 
harmless Huguenots. Michel de Castelnau had to be despatched by the royal council in order to 
mollify the new found zeal of the parlement of Rouen `s 
D'Aumale thus utilised his contacts both among the noblesse de robe and the noblesse 
epee in his campaign. He also called on assistance from a more surprising quarter: the Norman 
peasantry. He urged local peasants to defend themselves against attack and where possible to 
harass and hinder Huguenot troops and worshippers. The evidence available to us on this subject 
has to be carefully examined; to accuse an opponent of appealing to the peasantry to take up arms 
was a common literary device for denigrating opponents. Nevertheless, reports from English spies 
verity the claims made in the Histoire ecclesiastique. Moreover, the large bands of peasants who 
assembled to confront admiral Coligny at Bemay in February 1563 came from exactly the same 
region where peasant insurrection was strongest in the 1570s and 1580s: the pays d'Ouche. 47 The 
organisation of the peasantry, which later facilitated open armed revolt, began during the violent 
summer of 1562: 
Ces assemblees de paysans avoient continuee depuis le siege mis devant Rouen 
par Aumale, tellement que chaque paroisse avoit son capitaine, qui contraignoit 
Iespaysans d'acheter des armes, lesquels se voyans ainsi enbastonnes, traittoient 
ceux de la religion fort inhumainement, jusques ä piller les maisons de leurs 
propres seigneurs. " 
Histoire ecclesiastique, I, p 858. 
45 Floquet, II, p 397; Frondeville, Conselllers, p 327. 
46 Michel de Castelnau, Memoires, Michaud and Poujoulat, 1st ser., IX, pp 462-5. 
47 The correlation between the peasant leagues of 1562-3 and the those of the 1570s and 
1580s is strong. The Catholic League summoned the peasantry to its aid in 1589 in much 
the same way as did the duc d'Aumale in 1562, see chapter seven below. 
48 Histoire ecclesiastique, II, p 334; De Thou, IV, p 509. 
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The author of the Histoire ecclesiastique undoubtedly exaggerates the degree of control 
exercised by the duke over the rural population. D'Aumale was only encouraging what the 
peasantry had done for centuries: protecting itself against rapacious soldiery. Inter-communal 
religious violence was not exclusively confined to the larger urban centres. Thus in June 1560 
priests from neighbouring parishes, leading a confraternity from the pays de Caux, launched an 
unsuccessful attack against the Huguenot community of Luneray. This centre of protestant worship 
faced similar threats in 1562.49 The Huguenots of Dieppe invaded the hinterland to protect their 
more isolated co-religionaries. They attacked the settlements of Cany, Veules and Saint-Valdry-en- 
Caux, on hearing that 2,000 armed catholic peasants had gathered in the region. -50 The similar 
convocation of peasants at Bernay in February 1563 was easily scattered by the veteran troops of 
admiral Coligny. The prejudices of the author of the Histoire ecclcsiastique are evident: he wanted 
to represent the Huguenots as the party of social order and high social status. Despite this bias and 
impartiality, there is good reason to believe that there is much truth behind the polemic. In June 
1562 an English agent writing from Dieppe noted, not only the arrears of pay owed to the troops 
of d'Aumale, but also the number of peasants in the train of his army. 51 Another English informant 
reported to London the following month: 
Last Thursday arrived at Dieppe and spake with M. De Force [de Fors], the captain 
here, concerning his coming and going to the Prince [de Conde], who doubted the 
same, considering the dangers abroad from men of war, and the peasants, whose 
disorders are increased. This proceeds from the Duke D'Aumale, who has 
promised them not only the sack of their Lords, but also to enfranchise them from 
all tasks and taillages for ever. 52 
No evidence exists to suggest that the duc d'Aumale was intending to establish a catholic league 
organised at parish level. It is important to realise that the reports of English spies were a mixture 
of truth, rumour and speculation. It is also unlikely that d'Aumale made specific promises to abolish 
taxation and he did not have complete control over the movements of the Norman peasantry. 
Nevertheless, d'Aumale was in a position to sanction and encourage the resistance of the 
peasantry to their heretical lords. Moreover, the duke, like his elder brother Francois de Guise and 
his nephew Henri de Guise, realised the political and military possibilities of popular movements. 
The duc d'Aumale was no different from other members of his family in attempting to harness the 
potential of popular discontents to the service of his own strategy. The unique position of the Guise 
49 (bid, I, p 355; II, p 830-2. 
50 Ibid, II, p 801. 
51 CSPF, 1562, pp 91-2. 
5, Ibid, p 178. 
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family as catholic military heroes in the popular imagination, crowned with the martyrdom of 
Francois duc de Guise in 1563, afforded the family a unique opportunity to exploit the increased 
catholic militancy and fervour of the 1570s and 1580s ' 
Pursuing a Blood Feud: 1563-74 
The edict of Amboise brought the first religious war to an end on 19 March 1563. The swift 
campaign of admiral Coligny in lower Normandy retrieved the Huguenot losses sustained there the 
previous autumn. The assassination of Francois duc de Guise on 24 February suspended 
indefinitely the coup de grace about to be delivered to the beleaguered Huguenot forces in Orleans. 
The removal of Guise, the deaths of Saint-Andre and Antoine de Navarre and the capture of both 
Montmorency and Cond6 left Catherine ascendant at court. Furthermore the cardinal de Lorraine 
was absent at the council of Trent. Consequently, the Guise suffered a relative decline in their 
influence at court which was to last, with some exceptions, until the accession of Henri III in 1574. 
It is important to stress that the Guise were far from being politically impotent, but they 
could not wield the same authority or enjoy the favour they had experienced under Henri II, under 
Frangois li and more recently during the first religious war. One reason for this was the trauma that 
affected the family in the aftermath of the first war of religion. The death of the duc de Guise was 
rapidly followed in the same year by that of Francois de Lorraine, the grand prieur, and that of 
Rend marquis d'Elbeuf in 1566. The next generation of the Guise family, whose hopes were chiefly 
represented by Henri, the new duc de Guise, were mere youths who possessed only the potential 
of high birth, combined with the residual credit and honour that radiated from the late duke's 
glorious reputation. These young men were not in a position to make an impact at court, and thus 
leadership of the family devolved to the cardinal de Lorraine and the duc d'Aumale, both of whom 
possessed ability but lacked the charisma of their illustrious brother. 
The political strategy of the Guise family between the death of the duke and the Saint 
Bartholomew's Day Massacre was dictated, less by an all encompassing desire for the eradication 
of heresy, than by a quest for justice against admiral Coligny, accused by the Guise of ordering the 
assassination. The murder of the duke had a significant impact on the psyche of the family. It had 
the profoundest effect on the cardinal of Lorraine who completely abandoned his moderation over 
religion and began to display the ulramontanism previously associated with men like the cardinal 
de Toumon 5` However, the Guise did not compromise their own family interests for the catholic 
53 B. Diefendorf, Beneath the Cross: Catholics and Huguenots in Sixteenth Century Paris, 
Oxford, 1991,70,179-80, rightly questions the extent of Guise influence in Paris and 
shows how autonomous popular attitudes were from elite politics - the Guise became a 
symbol for popular passions and the family were able to exploit this. 
54 E. Lavisse, Histoire de France, vol VI, pt 1, La Reforme et /a Ligue, by J. H. Mariejol, Paris, 
1904, VI, pt 1, p 82. 
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cause; religion and family strategy had a complex interdependent relationship and were not always 
reconcilable. 
Francois de Guise was praised throughout Europe for his martial abilities and chivalric 
deeds. After the prince de Conde was captured at the battle of Dreux, Guise had offered his own 
apartments and bed to his prisoner. His penitential behaviour after the massacre of V. assy and the 
death bed pardoning of his assassin had lent further mystique to his legend, contrasting sharply 
with the public delight expressed by Coligny on hearing news of the assassination. ' This could 
have done little to assuage the seething hatred of the Guise family for the admiral. 
Attempts to entreat the king for redress over the murder were hampered by the presence 
of the cardinal de Lorraine at Trent. 56 It was not until 26 September that the king was formally 
petitioned for justice. 7 The petition itself would have been drawn up after considerable counsel 
had been taken and support solicited from allies and kinsmen. The signatures attached to the 
petition give a good indication of Guise supporters at court. The document was signed by all of the 
surviving members of the family except the cardinal de Lorraine. In addition to these signatures 
were those of Louis II de Bourbon (1513-82), duc de Montpensier, and his eldest son Frangois 
(d. 1582). Louis was well recognised for his hardline, even cruel, stance towards protestantism, 
despite the fact that his daughter had converted from catholicism and was married to the duc de 
Bouillon. Montpensier strengthened his connections with the Guise family in 1570 when he married 
the eldest daughter of Frangois de Guise-58 The cardinal de Bourbon was another sponsor of the 
petition, once again signalling his long standing affection for the Guise. Finally came two kinsmen: 
Jacques de Savoie, duc de Nemours, who married the widowed Anne d'Este in 1566, and Leonor 
d'Orleans, duc de Longueville. 
Longueville had abjured Calvinism before July 1563 for in that month he married the 
catholic heiress, Marie de Bourbon, duchesse d'Estouteville. This marriage greatly increased 
Longueville's landed interest in Normandy. It was a match engineered by the Guise as a reward 
for Longueville's loyalty to the catholic cause and as a means of building a rapprochement with the 
prince de Conde. Marie was the niece of Antoinette de Bourbon and a first cousin of the Guise 
56 Ibid, p 72. 
56 Ibid, p 82. Lorraine was a reformer, advocating the primacy of the council and sceptical of 
the pope's sincerity about reforming abuses. However, by the summer of 1563 he forged 
a more conciliatory line with the pope in order to ensure that a reform programme was 
decided upon, see L. von Pastor, The History of the Popes from the close of the Middle 
Ages, 40 vols, London, 1891-, vol XV, pp 303-35. 
57 Memoires joumaux de Francois de Lorraine duc d'Aumale et de Guise, 1547 a 1563, 
Michaud and Poujoulat, 1st ser., VI, pp 538-9. 
58 Anselme, I, p 355-6. 
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brothers; surviving correspondence shows the two families to have been in regular contact 59 
Originally, Frangois de Lorraine, the grand prieur, had been offered by the Guise as a suitable 
husband until his untimely death. The Longueville-Bourbon alliance was part of a wider Guise plan 
to attract Conde's support and isolate admiral Coligny. Thus Conde, the prince de La Roche-sur- 
Yon, the cardinal de Bourbon, the duc de Montpensier and the duc de Nemours were all witnesses 
to the marriage contract and they were entitled counsellors of the betrothed 60 
Charles IX's reply to the petition of the Guise and their supporters was to evoke the lawsuit 
under way in the parlement of Paris to the jurisdiction of the royal council and furthermore to 
suspend any judgement for three years. This was an attempt to defuse the heated political situation. 
Shortly afterwards the king in council rejected the demand of the cardinal de Lorraine, who had 
recently returned to court, that the Tridentine decrees be implemented in Frances' And yet, the 
main interest of the Guise family lay not in the reforms promulgated at Trent but in their pursuit of 
Coligny. The cardinal was interested in catholic religious renewal; he encouraged the Jesuits, 
strengthened ecclesiastical discipline in his diocese of Reims and founded a University at Pont A 
Mousson in 1571. However, it was the 1580s which saw the dawn of a catholic religious revival. 
Implementation of the decrees of Trent was not seriously on the political agenda in the 1560s and 
Lorraine was surely well aware that the many catholics, especially the sovereign courts, were as 
suspicious of the council of Trent as they were of the Jesuits 62 
The Guise had a greater desire to pursue admiral Coligny and this is what most occupied 
their interest. Of course, the fact that Coligny was one of the leaders of French protestantism 
served only to reinforce the religious convictions of the Guise. Moreover, the feud threatened to de- 
stabilise the uneasy peace that Catherine de Medicis had brokered. The main enemy of peace at 
court was not religion but the feud. This can be seen by the fact that Coligny was a member of the 
Montmorency clan and the feud rekindled the enmity between the Guise and the Montmorency. At 
the end of the first civil war Anne de Montmorency saw his opportunity to regain some of his former 
influence. Navarre and Guise were dead and Catherine's antipathy to her former rival had abated 
since she was desperately in need of support. Not surprisingly the whole Montmorency family 
rallied to the defence of their kinsman: 
59 For example, see BN, Clair, 346, to 303, Marie de Bourbon to Francois de Guise, 10 
October 1553; BN, Clair, 351, fo 119, Adrienne d'Estouteville to Francois de Guise, Gaillon, 
13 October 1557. 
60 G. de La Morandiere, Histoire de la maison d'Estouteville, Paris, 1903, pp 623-31; BN, 
Clair, 726, fo 67. The marriage hugely increased the wealth of Longueville and, after his 
minority ended, he became more independent and was able to distance himself politically 
from the Guise as their influence waned at court. 
61 CSPF, 1564-5, pp 39-40; Lavisse, Histoire de France, IV, pt 1, p 84. 
62 For the religious beliefs and political manoeuvres of the cardinal see, Evennett, The 
Cardinal of Lorraine and the Council of Trent. 
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Here is no bruit so great as the demanding of the death of M. de Guise, which M. 
D'Aumale purchases against the Admiral. The Constable is a friend to the Admiral, 
who has great propos with M. d'Aumale 63 
Catherine's attempts to alleviate the Guise-Montmorency dispute, with a series of 
magnificent entertainments at Fontainebleau in the winter of 1563-4, failed against a background 
of rising tension in Paris. In November 1563 Coligny had journeyed to court in order to defend 
himself against the charges levelled against him. His arrival, accompanied by 5-600 men, was a 
demonstration of his strength. Many catholics, like the comte de Brissac, were infuriated by the 
reinstatement of Coligny's brother, d'Andelot, as colonel-general of the infantry. One of the more 
troublesome catholic infantry captains, Charry, was simply murdered by some of Coligny's 
retainers . 
6` The rehabilitation and influence of the Montmorency-Chätillon was plain for all to see. 
In contrast the Guise failed utterly in their quest to obtain satisfaction over the death of the late 
duke or the implementation of the Tridentine decrees. The outcome was the public reconciliation 
of Henri duc de Guise and Coligny on 5 January 1564. More significant than this sham was the 
retirement of the Guise family to Joinville soon afterwards. Louis cardinal de Guise was the only 
member of the family to remain in regular attendance at court on its celebrated tour through the 
Midi. Henri de Guise was in attendance briefly in June 1565 for the festivities with the Spanish 
plenipotentiaries at Bayonne, thereafter departing to fight against the Turks in Hungary. The 
cardinal de Lorraine spent most of 1564 at Reims overseeing the enforcement of diocesan reform, 
culminating in a provincial synod in November 65 Guise political impotence at court and indeed 
their absence from the heart of patronage and influence does not equate with the preponderant role 
in politics assigned to the cardinal de Lorraine. " Between 1563 and 1567 the attendance of the 
Guise on the conseil du roi declined dramatically. Councils were dominated by the resurgent 
Montmorency-Chatillon and especially the chancellor, Michel de L'H6pital67 It was the duc 
d'Aumale who took the leading role in aggressive action. He personally quarrelled with the 
63 CSPF, 1563, pp 552. 
Bouille, II, p 318; Lavisse, Histoire de France, VI, pt 1, pp 79-80,87; Memoires du prince 
de Conde, Michaud and Poujoulat, 1st ser., VI, p 705. 
65 Bouille, II, pp 318-9,339-40; CSPF, 1564-5, pp 35-6; V. Graham and W. McAllister 
Johnson (eds), The Royal Tour of France by Charles IX and Catherine de' Medici: Festivals 
and Entries 1564-6, Toronto, 1979, pp 35,77. 
"6 Sutherland, The Massacre of Saint Bartholomew and the European Conflict, 1559-72, p 32. 
Sutherland's misunderstanding stems from her reliance on and uncritical reading of 
protestant texts and her failure to understand noble aspirations within their cultural context. 
67 N. Valois, Le conseil du roi au XIV, XV°, et XVP siecles. Nouvelles recherches suivies 
d'arrets et de proces-verbaux du conseil, Paris, 1888, p 192. During these years the 
cardinal de Guise appeared 90 times on different councils and the cardinal de Lorraine a 
mere 24. He was surpassed by L'H6pital (196), Anne de Montmorency (128) and admiral 
Coligny (41). 
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connetable towards the end of 1563 and left court well before his siblings. When the royal cortege 
reached Champagne (of which d'Aumale was temporarily governor in place of his late brother) at 
the beginning of its tour, he quarrelled with the prince de Porcien, a leading Huguenot. " 
Retirement from court did not mean an end to political intrigue: loss of favour at court could 
be offset by the cultivation of allies, safe from the malicious gossip and public glare of court life. 
The death of the princesse de Conde in August 1564 provided the cardinal de Lorraine with the 
opportunity to offer a marriage alliance with the prince. Conde was jealous of the status now 
enjoyed by the admiral and was eager to expand his political and social contacts. Consequently, 
Lorraine travelled to meet Conde at Soissons at the end of 1564 69 Such a marriage alliance 
would bind those unfavoured at court against the Montmorency. Lorraine suggested a number of 
candidates: his nieces, Mary Stuart and Catherine de Guise, and Anne d'Este, widow of the late 
duke. Despite the many obstacles to such a union the preliminary talks were enough to alarm the 
marechal de Montmorency. 70 Nothing came of these plans but amity between Conde and the 
Guise continued for some time because this unholy alliance was in the interests of both families. 
In September 1565 the English ambassador noted the amicable relations that existed between the 
prince, the cardinal de Guise and the marquis d'Elbeuf. " Moreover, the marriage of Conde to 
Frangoise d'Orleans-Longueville, the sister of Ldonor, only served to improve this amity. Family 
networks thus easily traversed the religious divide. At a time of civil war these networks could 
permit a Calvinist like Jacqueline de Rohan, mother of Frangoise and Ldonor d'Orleans, to appeal 
directly to the Guise for help. In 1569 she appealed as "vostre tante" to Anne d'Este to exert her 
influence in obtaining a mainlevee on the dower lands of her daughter, presumably confiscated 
along with all other lands belonging to those outlawed by the crown. 72 
In terms of blood relations Conde was much closer to the Guise family than to the 
Montmorency; Antoinette de Bourbon was his aunt and Francois de Guise had been his first cousin. 
Cond6's departure from court in July 1567, which precipitated the Huguenot attempt to seize the 
king at Meaux and the outbreak of the second civil war, was the result of the perceived threat to 
Huguenots from French catholics and from the arrival of the duke of Alva in the Low Countries. 
However, Conde was also under pressure at court from ultra-catholics. This had nothing to do with 
the Guise but revolved around the rivalry between Conde and the great hope of ultramontane 
catholics, the sixteen-year-old Henri duc d'Anjou. In response to the turmoil in the Low Countries 
France needed to prepare an army. Conde and d'Anjou, both coveting the title of lieutenant-general 
of the kingdom, traded insults and threats. Catherine had been willing to accommodate the 
sa CSPF, 1564-5, p 121. 
69 Ibid, p 248: Lavisse, Histoire de France, VI, pt 1, pp 89-90. 
70 BrantBme, III, 356-7; De Thou, V, p 12. 
71 CSPF, 1564-5, p 465. 
72 BN, Ms Fr, 3237, to 37, Jacqueline de Rohan to Anne d'Este, 27 July 1569. 
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Huguenots in 1563 but there was no doubt that she would support her favourite son in this 
dispute. 73 The antipathy between the two princes would not abate and it is likely that d'Anjou 
ordered the murder of Conde after his capture at the battle of Jarnac in 1569. Significantly, it would 
be the duc de Longueville who reclaimed possession of the mutilated corpse which had been put 
on public display by the victorious d'Anjou. " 
Having established cordial relationships with Conde in the winter of 1564-5, the cardinal 
de Lorraine returned to Paris. He travelled with a very large retinue of armed men, having been 
dispensed from the royal prohibition on carrying arms. However, this was a highly provocative move 
because Francois, the mardchal de Montmorency, was governor of Paris and the Ile-de-France. 
He hated the Guise even more than his father and was in charge of a volatile capital city. In the 
light of subsequent events it seems that the interview between Lorraine and Cond6 was designed 
to ensure the neutrality of the latter in any potential Guise-Montmorency conflict. 75 
The cardinal's purpose in entering Paris with a large armed retinue was to show his 
strength and influence in Montmorency's gouvernement. 76 To this end he summoned his amis and 
called on the duc d'Aumale, nearby at his residence at Anet in Normandy, to join him. The two 
brothers joined forces at Nanteuil, a Guise estate situated between Paris and Soissons. Henri de 
Guise was at Nanteuil but played only a minor role in the affair. We know very little about the 
composition of this retinue. Undoubtedly, there was a substantial number of Champenois moyenne 
noblesse. " These included Nicholas Durand, sieur de Villegagnon, the famous explorer and 
reformed Huguenot; brother of the bailli of Provins and himself the commandeur de ! 'ordre du 
Temple de Paris and a chevalier de Saint-Jean de Jerusalem, wounded at the siege of Rouen in 
1562, he was captain of Sens in 1567.78 Gautier de Foissy, sieur de Crenay (1513-69), was the 
premier maitre d'h6tel of the duc de Guise from 1550 to 1562 and renowned in Champagne for his 
militant Catholicism. He was the maitre des eaux et f6rets of Chenoise and Sourdun and in 1568 
became captain of a regiment of twelve ensigns of foot. 79 The other identifiable member of the 
73 D. B. F., IX, pp 444-6; Lavisse, Histoire de France, VI, pt 1, p 95; P. Erlanger, Henri Ill, 
Paris, 1948, p 58; P. Chevallier, Henri lll: roi shakespearien, Paris, 1985, p 143. 
74 Brant6me, IV, 348. 
75 De Thou, V, p 19. 
76 For the narrative of events, see De Thou, V, 12-19; Michel de Castelnau, Memoires, 
Michaud and Poujoulat, 1st ser., IX, pp 512-3; Agrippa d'Aubign6, Histoire Universelle, A. 
de Ruble (ed), 9 vols, Paris, 1886-97, vol II, pp 214-7. 
77 "Lettre de M. le mareschal de Montmorency A M. le duc de Montpensier, prince de sang 
au sujet de la querelle avec le cardinal de Lorraine", Cimber and Danjou. VI, pp 256-7. 
This source also mentions de La Vallee, Fosse "et autres". 
78 Claude Haton, Memoires 1568-82, F. Bourquelot (ed), 2 vols, Paris, 1857, vol I, pp 33,36, 
170,448,622-4. 
79 ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1 304,4 October 1550; Bouille, II, p 584; Claude Haton, 
Memoires, I, pp 35,507,534,547,560. 
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retinue is Antoine des Essars, sieur de Lignieres, a vassal of the duc d'Aumale. A number of the 
des Essars family, who originated from Normandy and Picardy, had been servants of the Guise 
family over several generations. Antoine's father, Jacques, had been a pensioner of Claude duc 
de Guise in 1542 and their relative, Francois des Essars, was an officer in the company of Henri 
de Guise from 1564 until 1569.80 
Montmorency went to the parlement of Paris on 8 January 1565 to declare that he could 
not ignore the cardinal's flouting of royal edicts banning the carrying of arms (he later claimed to 
have no knowledge of the cardinal's dispensation) and he forbade the Guise to enter Paris. 
Lorraine ignored this order and proceeded to enter Paris through the porte Saint-Denis. D'Aumale 
was separated from his brother because he took a different entrance. Consequently, the cardinal 
faced Montmorency, and the Calvinist prince de Porcien, alone. In the ensuing skirmish one or two 
of Lorraine's men were killed and the cardinal and his nephew forced to take refuge ignominiously 
in a nearby house. Eventually, they reached the safety of the h6tel de Cluny near the Sorbonne, 
where the duc d'Aumale awaited them. Lorraine thought himself safe in this strongly catholic 
quarter, some distance from the governor's residence. "' Instead, Montmorency surrounded and 
menaced the cardinal in his refuge; tension spread throughout Paris and the parlement was 
desperately anxious to prevent an escalation of the violence. On the parlement's intercession the 
Guise and their men withdrew from Paris. This retreat contrasted with the rapturous reception 
received by the Guise in 1562. If the cardinal had expected to receive popular acclaim when he 
entered, he was sorely misguided. Both sides did try and appeal to a popular audience. The 
incident in Paris sparked off a furious pamphlet war. In one Guisard tract the Montmorency were 
blamed for the episode and, furthermore, identified as enemies of catholicism and secret supporters 
of the Huguenots (not without credence given the mar6chal de Montmorency's links to the Calvinist 
hierarchy). Clearly, Guise propaganda was aimed at a catholic constituency, identifying the family 
as the one true defender of the faith 82 By the 1570s, with Anne de Montmorency dead and the 
marechal imprisoned for his role in politique plots, Guise propaganda had even greater claims to 
authenticity. 
The appeal to a wider public was only part of the continuing Guise-Montmorency feud. Both 
families began to petition the court for a redress of their grievances. The cardinal retired to his 
chateau at Meudon outside Paris and thence to Champagne. D'Aumale did not consider a 
dishonourable retreat and remained on the outskirts of Paris with a large force of men. 
Montmorency felt threatened enough to call on the support of his cousin, admiral Coligny, who 
arrived in Paris on 22 January accompanied by 70 gentlemen. With the court hundreds of miles 
80 BN, Ms Fr, 8182, to 353; Anselme, VIII, pp 559-60. For the importance of the des Essars 
to the Guise household, see chapter three above. 
81 De Thou, V, p 16. 
82 De Thou, V, p 19. For a list of these pamphlets, see Hauser, Les sources de I'histoire de 
France: Le XVr siecle, III, pp 207-11. 
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away in Guyenne because of the royal tour, civil war threatened to break out in Paris over an issue 
that had nothing to do with religion. 
Claude d'Aumale was openly preparing for action by attempting to form a league 83 
Leagues and associations were not new phenomena in 1565. Royal troops were used to disperse 
a catholic defence association in Guyenne the previous year. ` The duke had already tried to 
establish a local peasant militia in Normandy in 1562. A letter from d'Aumale to Rene marquis 
d'Elbeuf, intercepted and printed for propaganda purposes by the Huguenots, demonstrates the 
extent and purpose of the league: 
J'en ay par plusieurs fois cydevant escript ä Messieurs de Montpensier, 
d'Estampes, Cehavigny: par oü ils avoyent peu juger la volonte que j'ay tousjours 
de nous venger, et combien je desirerois I'association que vous dites prevoyant 
assez combien eile estoit necessaire non seulement pous nous, mais aussi pour 
tous les Bens de bien ä qui I'on en veult plus que jamais. 
Et pour ceste cause, mon frere, je trouverois merveilleusement bon que les dicts 
Sieurs y voulsissent entendre, laissant les villes, d'autant qu'il n'y a nulle 
asseurance en peuple, comme je I'ay dernierement encore cogneut. Mais avec la 
Noblesse, de ma part je suis tout resolu et prest 85 
The absence of an original signed letter could mean that this document is a Huguenot concoction. 
Nevertheless, the letter makes no specific mention of Calvinists or religion at all and it is known that 
d'Aumale did try to establish a league. The reference to the people seems to suggest that the 
Guise were expecting some show of popular support when they entered Paris. Thus it is too easy 
to exaggerate the extent of Guise penetration into the popular consciousness, or indeed their claim 
to be the sole upholders of catholicism, in the 1560s. It is more likely that the popular image of the 
Guise family was only really strongly developed after the Saint Bartholomew's Day Massacre and 
indeed during the religious and economic crisis of the 1580s. The Guise did not begin to exploit 
populism until this later date. In the 1560s d'Aumale placed his faith entirely in the nobility. 
Many other nobles were canvassed besides those mentioned in the letter. One of these 
was Blaise de Montluc who, although an ultra-catholic, firmly rejected the overtures and 
immediately informed Catherine de Medicis. He counselled the crown to take counter-measures, 
having no motive for becoming entangled in the Guise-Montmorency feud " The duc de 
113 De Thou, V, p 32. 
8' Agrippa d'Aubigne, Histoire Universelle, II, p 213. 
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Montpensier was an obvious candidate for an anti-Montmorency alliance, having been a party to 
the attempts to have Coligny indicted. Frangois Le Roy (1519-1606), sieur de Chavigny, was his 
lieutenant-general in the gouvernement of Anjou, Touraine and the Maine. Contemporaries 
identified him as a Guise client, and this seems likely because it was he who arrested the prince 
de Conde in 1560 and was captain of the archers de la garde during the reign of Francois 11 . 
87 
The inclusion of Jean de Brosse, duc d'Etampes, governor of Brittany, is slightly more surprising. 
He was a catholic but not essentially a Guisard. However, he was the husband of Anne de 
Pisseleu, mistress of Francois I and bitter enemy of Montmorency. Moreover his nephew and 
lieutenant-general in Brittany, Sebastian de Luxembourg, vicomte de Martigues, was also a party 
to the negotiations, and his services to the Guise and his ultra-catholic connections are apparent 
from at least 1560 when he was briefly colonel-general of the infantry and a captain in the Scottish 
expedition. ' De Thou, in his history, also adds the name of Charles d'Angennes, bishop of Le 
Mans. D'Angennes was introduced to the royal council by the Guise in 1559 and received the office 
of aunadnier du roi. D'Angennes accompanied the cardinal de Lorraine to Trent in 1563 and was 
rewarded with the abbey of Savigny by Charles IX for his services B° 
The geographical spread of the offices of these men is too concentrated in the North-West - 
the Maine, Anjou, Touraine and Brittany - to be a coincidence. A regional component of a larger 
structure was thus being discussed in the correspondence. This would explain d'Aumale's presence 
in the Ile-de-France (by 17 February he was in Rouen), Lorraine's withdrawal to Champagne and 
d'Elbeuf's presence in the provinces, all of them concerned with organising support in a specific 
locality. The existence of a royal list of noblemen expressly forbidden by the king from entering 
Paris, aimed at preventing further disorder, permits speculation about the other members of the 
league. The Guise family, Coligny and his followers all appear on the list. The duc de d'Orldans- 
Longueville and the ultra-catholic, although not essentially pro-Guise, Louis de Gonzague, duc de 
Nevers, who also featured, were both suitable candidates for the anti-Montmorency league °0 The 
king also proscribed all leagues and associations. In January 1566 a reconciliation between Coligny 
and the cardinal de Lorraine was staged at the assembly of notables at Moulins. "' Coligny was 
also formally exonerated from any complicity in the assassination of the duc de Guise. The real 
sentiments of both parties were unmistakable; d'Aumale refused to acknowledge the admiral and 
87 Harding, Anatomy of a Power Elite, p 43; BrantOme, IV, p 341, VI, p 40. However, he was 
more loyal to the Montpensier and like them was a royalist in the 1580s and 1590s. 
88 D. B. F., XIII, pp 170-1; De Thou, V, p 32. D'Etampes died soon after these events took 
place and Martigues was the chief beneficiary of his estate. 'D'Etampes' in the letter may 
be a mistake and refer to the vicomte de Martigues. 
89 D. B. F., II, 1087-8; De Thou, V, p 32. 
°0 Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, II, p 288. 
91 De Thou, V, p 184. 
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Henri de Guise was not even present at the ceremony. When he eventually arrived at court the 
admiral symbolically departed 92 
Sutherland insists that the cardinal de Lorraine was gaining influence at court in 1566, but 
fails to explain why the designs of the Guise were so easily thwarted. She further unravels the 
conspiracy which began by ensnaring the duc d'Anjou into the ultra-catholic faction, of which 
Lorraine was the master and which culminated in an attempt to assassinate all the Huguenot 
leaders in the summer of 1568. D'Anjou was ultramontane but he was not the tool of the cardinal. 
Lorraine was not the Machiavellian puppet master that ill-informed protestant observers, both 
English and French, believed. It was a natural and a common literary device to portray the heir to 
the throne as misled by evil counsel rather than to openly attack a royal prince. It is unlikely that 
an individual in early modern society could have been "able to mount a nationwide campaign of 
harassment and violence against the Protestants". 93 In fact, the Guise were only part of a larger 
ultra-catholic faction, composed of families that had widely differing strategies and the main feature 
of the later 1560s was, not the return to power of Lorraine, but the rise at court of new personalities 
patronised by Catherine, many of whom gathered around the heir to the throne -a catholic prince 
of better health and more potential than the other sons of Henri II. 
The rise of this faction at court took place against the breakdown of Spanish authority in 
the Low Countries and the bloody repression instituted by Alva. Lorraine may have empathised with 
Alva and supported the decline of Huguenot magnate influence at court but he was neither 
dominant in council nor did he have a European strategy. Indeed when Tavannes arrived at court 
in early 1567, the Guise family was conspicuous by its absence. Lorraine's impotence was most 
obvious in Scotland where he failed to persuade his niece to choose the husband of his choice or 
to aid her during her difficulties in the period 1564-8.95 
The Guise had no monopoly as champions of catholicism and in the provinces the religious 
parties needed no prompting from the cardinal to engage in violence; royal authority was ineffective 
in preventing plots, assassinations and massacres. In this atmosphere it was not only the protestant 
leaders who feared for their safety; the Guise too feared assassination. 96 
The dominance of the religious moderates on the royal councils between 1564 and 1567 
forced provincial catholics to defend themselves and a number of local catholic defence leagues 
came into existence. The most celebrated of these was the ConfrOrie du Saint-Sacrament 
organised by Tavannes in Burgundy. Leagues were especially strong in Guyenne, Languedoc and 
12 Bouille, II, p 373-4; Salmon, Society in Crisis, p 151. 
93 Sutherland, The Massacre of Saint Bartholomew and the European Conflict, p 76. 
94 Gaspard de Saulx, sieur de Tavannes, Memoires, Michaud and Poujoulat, 1st ser., VIII, p 
291. 
9S Donaldson, Scotland: James V-VII, p 117-59. 
96 Bouilld, II, p 385-6. 
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Provence, where protestantism was most entrenched D7 The leagues were alliances of bourgeois, 
ecclesiastics and nobles and thus seem far removed from the purely noble association envisaged 
by the duc d'Aumale -a league aimed more against the Montmorency than the protestants. The 
cardinal de Lorraine favoured these associations and, as Tavannes claimed, may have dreamed 
of something grander, along the lines of the Schmalkaldic League. However, these leagues were 
highly localised, autonomous and certainly not bent to the will of the cardinal. 
The Guise were not the leaders of a vast catholic conspiracy and furthermore it is difficult 
to gauge their influence at court in the mid-1560s and effect on royal policy. The events which led 
to the third civil war in September 1568 are confusing. The conspiracy theory put forward by 
Sutherland, in which civil war was the consequence of the failed attempt by the cardinal de Lorraine 
to eliminate the protestant leadership, places too much stress on protestant sources and 
uncorroborated English reports, eager to defend their resumption of the conflict. " If there was an 
attempt to eliminate the Huguenot leaders in 1568 both Catherine and her acolyte Birague had as 
much responsibility as Lorraine 99 
The complexity and lack of knowledge about factional politics in the mid-1560s is 
compounded by the nature of the evidence. The paucity of the data means it is very hard to follow 
the movements of the Guise. Protestant propaganda has to be treated with caution as it was much 
easier to attack and accuse the Guise than the crown directly. This propaganda was for the ears 
of the English especially and Conde had to justify his resort to arms by showing that he was 
protecting the crown against evil counsel. 
The protestant demarche at Meaux in 1567 and the third civil war which began in 1568 
discredited the moderate catholics represented by the chancellor, L'Hbpital. Catherine was furious 
with her protege and he was forced to leave court in May 1568. The influence of the cardinal de 
Lorraine at court was resurgent and the duc d'Aumale received important military commands. 
However, the young duc de Guise achieved a seat on the Conseil prive only after his stirring 
defence of Poitiers between July and September 1569.100 Attempts to portray the politics of the 
1560s simply in terms of the struggle of catholic, Huguenot and politique parties confounds reality. 
The politique faction would be a natural progression from the pro-Coligny, anti-Guisard feelings of 
Frangois de Montmorency. It is too simplistic to see the Guise as "chefs du catholicisme 
97 Gaspard de Saulx, sieur de Tavannes, Memoires, Michaud and Poujoulat, 1st ser., VIII, pp 
289-94; J. de Serres, Recueil des choses memorables avenues en France sous /es regnes 
de Henri 11, Francois 11, Charles IX, Henri Ill et Henri IV, contenant infinies merveilles de 
nostre sidcle, n. p., 1599, p 297; Lancelot du Voisin, sieur de La Popeliniere, L'Histoire de 
France... depuis 1'an 1550 iusques i ces temps, 2 vols, n. p., 1581, vol II, pp 10-15. 
98 Sutherland, The Massacre of Saint Bartholomew and the European Conflict, pp 75-105. For 
a critical evaluation of her sources, see G. Griffiths, "Saint Bartholomew Reappraised", 
Journal of Modern History, 1976, pp 499-500. 
90 Memoires de Gaspard de Saulx, sieur de Tavannes, Michaud and Poujoulat, VIII, p 303. 
10° Bouille, II, p 445. 
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intransigant' °'. By discrediting moderation they did not ensure their ascendancy at court. Henri 
d'Anjou was already aiming to establish himself as the leading defender of catholicism, witnessed 
by his great antipathy to and rivalry with Conde, which precipitated Conde's departure from court 
in July 1567. D'Anjou was made lieutenant-general of the kingdom in November 1567 following the 
death of Montmorency. His fame was spread as the new hero of the catholic cause after his two 
crushing victories over the Huguenots at Montcontour and Jamac. The discrediting of the politics 
of moderation did not see the victory of the Guise but the elevation of a new group of Catherine's 
proteges. Protestant propaganda saw as much evil in these 'Italians' as in the ambitions of the 
Guise. 102 Catherine was careful to check the aspirations of the Guise, and the war council 
established to guide d'Anjou consisted of friends of the Guise like Nemours and Montpensier but 
also politiques like the marechal de Cosse. 103 A wider group of counsellors appointed by 
Catherine included only one Guise kinsman, the duc de Longueville, along with members of the 
Montmorency family and a number of men from d'Anjou's own household. 1°' The duc d'Aumale, 
who coveted command of the vanguard of the main royal army, was overlooked and, refusing to 
accept a subordinate position, took an independent command in Champagne. 'o5 
The 'new men' at court were united by their Italian ancestry, mistrust of the Huguenots and 
loyalty to Catherine. Rene de Birague (1506-83) was only naturalised in 1565. He entered the royal 
council in 1568, was made garde des sceaux in 1570 and became chancellor the following 
year. 106 The Florentine, Albert de Gondi, comte de Retz, was a longstanding servant of Catherine 
and had been in her entourage since it left Italy. His star waxed with his patron and he was named 
a governor of the king in 1566.107 Louis de Gonzague (1535-95), duc de Nevers, also began to 
receive an increasing amount of favour in the mid-1560s. This was evident from his marriage to 
the heiress Henriette de Cleves, duchesse de Nevers, in 1566. A special royal dispensation allowed 
the title of the duch6-pairie of Nevers to pass through the female line and he was made governor 
of the marquisate of Saluces, followed by Piedmont in 1567 and the Nivernais in 1569.108 
101 Lavisse, Histoire de France, VI, pt 1, p 133. 
102 Salmon, Society in Crisis, p 172-3; Erlanger, Henri Ill, p 67; Constant, Les Guise, p 63; 
Thompson, Wars of Religion in France, p 367; De Thou, V, p 521. 
103 Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, III, p 79. 
104 Chevallier, Henri l/l, p 97. 
, os Michel de Castelnau, Memoires, Collection Universelle des memoires particuliers relatifs 
ä I'histoire de France, XLV, p 60. 
106 D. B. F., VI, pp 509-10. 
107 Ibid, XVI, pp 549-54. Sutherland is wrong to suggest that the Gondi were especially pro- 
Guise, see The Massacre of Saint Bartholomew and the European Conflict, p 70. 
108 Ibid, pp 606-7. Allowing the duchd-pairie to pass through the female line was vital to the 
status of Nevers and was also highly contentious. There ensued a spate of disputes over 
precedence at court stemming from this royal decision, see Anselme, Ill, pp 667-711. 
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The influence of the Guise on the royal council which had increased after 1567 was soon 
dissipated. In June 1570, Charles IX discovered the amorous attentions displayed by Henri de 
Guise towards his younger sister, Marguerite de Valois. Charles became so furious at the thought 
of such a union that the life of Guise was in danger. D'Anjou's relations with the Guise became 
frosty. The family was in disgrace and hurriedly left court. The departure of the Guise facilitated the 
conclusion of peace between Catherine and admiral Coligny. A new edict of pacification was signed 
at Saint-Germain (8 August 1570) and the talks begun on the marriage between Marguerite de 
Valois and the heir to the Huguenot leadership, Henri de Navarre. Even the duc de Montpensier, 
a staunch catholic and recently married to the sister of the duc de Guise, found it expedient to be 
"pas plus ami des Guises". 109 
The impending return of Coligny to court and the policy of conciliation threatened to push 
the Guise further into the political wilderness»° Indeed, one of the preconditions of peace may 
have been the removal of the Guise. This alone did not ensure the safety of the admiral and he 
was forced to leave court, a mere one month after his return in 1571. The agitated condition of 
Paris was undoubtedly the cause; the catholic population was furious at the pacification. "' The 
cardinal de Lorraine made no attempt to return to court and in May 1572 he departed for Rome to 
attend the election of a new Pope. He was thus absent during the dramatic summer of 1572. On 
31 January 1572 Henri de Guise unsuccessfully tried to petition the king to rescind the arret of 
1566 declaring Coligny's innocence. The alternatives now consisted of open revolt or reconciliation 
with Coligny. The Guise shrewdly chose the latter path. In May 1572 Guise, Mayenne and 
d'Aumale formally recognised Coligny's innocence. This was a part of Catherine's wider policy of 
reconciliation and the admiral was able to return to court on 6 June. It was a humiliating climbdown 
after nine years of bitterness, and Henri de Guise, still only 22, received little in the way of influence 
at court as compensation. The indignity of his position increased as Coligny reached the zenith of 
his power in the summer of 1572. The admiral encouraged Charles IX's fantasies of military glory 
against the Spanish in the Low Countries. D'Anjou was also horrified by the influence of the 
Huguenot leader with his brother, and his friendship with the Guise healed rapidly. Those who had 
most influence on the royal council were the appointees of Catherine: Gaspard de Saulx-Tavannes, 
the duc de Nevers, Jean de Morvillier, bishop of Orleans, the comte de Retz and the chancellor, 
109 De Thou, VI, pp 62-3; Lavisse, Histoire de France, VI, pt 1, p 113; Erlanger, Henri 11, p 90; 
Chevallier, Henri 111, p 143-5. 
10 CSPF, 1569-71, pp 263,291. 
Tensions were running high in Paris well before the massacre, see Diefendorf, Beneath the 
Cross, pp 84,88-92. 
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Birague. Coligny's plans for French involvement In the Low Countries met with unanimous 
disapproval. 1' 
On 17 July 1572 French protestant troops, acting on their own initiative in the Low 
Countries, were crushed by Spanish forces near Mons. Coligny was prepared to leave Paris and 
march north with or without royal consent. The royal council had a clear choice between eliminating 
Coligny, thus precipitating civil war, or allowing the admiral to depart, inviting war with Spain. This 
is the origin of the Massacre of Saint Bartholomew. 
On 23 August 1572 there was an unsuccessful attempt on Coligny's frfe. 13 The Guise 
were probably responsible because the assassin was in the service of the duc d'Aumale. The Guise 
had received royal sanction to carry out the murder of the admiral. To the Guise family this was 
the justice that they had been in search of for so long. This attack was motivated by revenge and 
had little to do with religious passion. Indeed, a successful murder would have negated the need 
for a more general armed attack and thus massacre. The massacre destroyed the trustworthy 
reputation of Catherine de Medicis and, despite royal attempts to blame the Guise for the 
massacre, the family only found their reputation heightened in the eyes of the masses. Ironically, 
the Guise became heroes to a large proportion of the catholic population when their only intention 
had been to pursue their political enemies. 
The Guise would find it expedient in the future to exploit their image as champions of 
catholicism, but this image was different from the reality. After the initial attempt on Coligny's life 
there was a howl of protest from the Huguenots, who demanded an inquiry. This could only have 
led to the complicity of Catherine in the plot. On the evening of the 23 August a secret royal council 
was summoned, where it was decided that Coligny had to be killed. However this would entail the 
deployment of larger forces as the wounded admiral was heavily guarded. It is not clear who was 
present at this midnight council - certainly it was dominated by men close to Catherine and d'Anjou: 
Nevers, Retz, Tavannes and Birague. The dues d'Aumale and de Guise were either party to the 
deliberations or called in by the council to be personally informed of the plan. "` 
The following morning three members of the Guise family set out with retainers to kill 
Coligny. They included Guise, d'Aumale and the young Charles marquis d'Elbeuf. "s They were 
accompanied by the duc de Nevers and the duc d'Angouldme, bastard son of Henri ll. Having 
completed the deed, the duc de Guise rode to Saint-Germain where he hoped to apprehend the 
vidame de Chartres and the comte de Montgommery. In Paris, the ducs de Montpensier, de Nevers 
and the sieur de Tavannes, all known for their hatred of protestants, rode through the narrow 
112 Sutherland, The Massacre of Saint Bartholomew and the European Conflict, pp 251-9; 
Bouille, 11, p 488. 
113 De Thou, VI, pp 384-5. 
114 Constant, Les Guises, pp 317-38. 
15 The marquis de Mayenne had left France to join the Holy League against the Turks. 
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streets of Paris exhorting the populace to butcher the Huguenots. ", Guise returned from his 
unsuccessful mission to Saint-Germain to find a scene of horrific carnage. He immediately headed 
for the h6tel de Guise (in the Marais) which "servit de refuge ä un trbs grand nombre de huguenots, 
qui, sans cette resource, auroient ete assassines comme les autres. "' An English report, a 
source hardly biased in the Guise favour, clearly identified the main culprits of the massacre as 
Catherine, d'Anjou, Nevers and Tavannes: 
The Duke of Guise himself is not so bloody, neither did he kill himself, but saved 
divers; he spake openly that for the Admiral's death he was glad for he knew him 
to be his enemy, but for the rest the King had put to death such as might have 
done him very good service. 118 
Thus Guise proved himself to be no catholic fanatic and indeed was careful to differentiate 
between his duty to his father's memory and the aftermath of the murder of Coligny which was not 
his responsibility. While many protestant amis of the Guise were saved, their catholic enemies in 
the Montmorency clan, like Montmorency-Thore and the marechal de Cosse, went in fear of their 
lives. 19 It was the crown rather than the Guise which suffered the full fury of protestant 
propaganda. The tract Alarm Bell or Reveille shows no hostility to the Guise, perhaps 
demonstrating that some protestants believed the Guise to have justified grievances, for the text 
suggests that the Guise would be better rulers than the Valoisl120 The situation was to be 
Interpreted differently by protestants, catholics and generations of historians. The Guise were 
perfect scapegoats for the beleaguered monarchy, incarnations of the anti-Christ to protestants or 
defenders of the faith to catholics. 12' Henri de Guise would later exploit the last of these myths 
to strengthen his position of power in relation to the crown. The Guise, even though they had little 
to do with the popular fury, were able to capitalise on the increased militancy and fervour of the 
16 De Thou, VI, p 400. 
117 Bouiltd, II, p 508; De Thou, VI, pp 411-12. See also Diefendorf, Beneath the Cross, pp 104- 
5. 
18 CSPF, 1572-4, p 185. 
19 De Thou, VI, p 411. 
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121 On the Guise as scapegoats, see "Lettres du Roy au gouverneur de Bourgogne, par 
lesquelles il charge ceux de Guise du meurtre commis en la personne de monsieur I'amiral 
et de la sedition advenue ä Paris, et mande qu'ii veut que I'edict de pacification soil 
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catholic populace from the 1570s. '22 However, the Guise were never the prisoners of religious 
principle and conviction. Family solidarity came above religion. For example, the constant 
aggravation caused by the duc de Bouillon and Calvinists from his territory of Jametz was a cause 
of great concern to the bishop of Verdun and his tenants. This affair was serious enough to reach 
the royal council in December 1572. The case was evoked through the good offices of the duc de 
Guise in favour of his kinsman, Bouillon, despite the protestations of the bishop who argued that 
he was defending the catholic religion. '23 
Henri de Guise may have boosted his popularity in Paris but he was hated more than ever 
by Charles IX. The extent of Guise popularity with the masses (and thus the increased danger to 
the monarchy) is hard to assess. Francois de Guise was the object of admiration during 
processions in Paris. If contemporaries are to be believed, the cardinal was never loved. A 
juxtaposition is usually made between the glorious and honourable military hero and a scheming 
and greedy prelate -a stereotype which requires the historian to read the sources circumspectly. 
However, it is noticeable that at the height of Guise popularity in 1559 it was residences of the 
cardinal at Meudon and Marchais which were the object of the anger of rioters and not the h6tel 
de Guise itself. 124 When Lorraine entered Paris in 1565 there was no ecstatic welcome and 
seemingly no popular support against the marechal de Montmorency. The Guise could also claim 
popularity for negative reasons. With the exception of the cardinal de Lorraine their influence on 
the royal council was minimal. They represented neither the distastefulness of compromise with the 
Calvinists nor did they belong to the circle of Italian courtiers, increasingly blamed for the woes of 
the kingdom. The Guise were perceived as being outside government and therefore remained 
irreproachable in the face of political and economic disintegration in the 1570s and 1580s. The 
Guise could on the other hand always provide reminders of their ability to achieve victories for 
catholicism, as Henri de Guise had done in 1569. The contrast of military vigour h court 
corruption would be an even more powerful image during the reign of Henri Ill. Nonetheless, it 
would be a mistake to see the Guise family as the ducal house supported by insignificant cadets. 
The strength of the Guise lay in their remarkable solidarity. Claude duc d'Aumale was a major 
political figure in his own right. In March 1573 he became the second member of the family to be 
killed by the Calvinists, this time in action at the siege of La Rochelle. Charles IX, in a letter to the 
hotel de ville in Paris, revealed his own suspicion of the Guise and their popularity in Paris: 
122 Recent scolarship has emphasised the difference between the elimination of the Huguenot 
leaders and the general massacre which was unforseen and uncontrollable act of popular 
violence, see Diefendorf, Beneath the Cross, pp 159-71; D. Crouzet, Les guerriers de Dieu: 
la violence au temps des troubles de religion (vers 1525 - vers 1610), 2 vols, Paris, 1990, 
vol II, pp 15,80-106. 
123 Buvignier, Jametz et ses seigneurs, p 32. This is even more striking when it is considered 
that Guise's father had been "the protector" of the bishopric of Verdun, see Evennett, The 
Cardinal of Lorraine and the Council of Trent, p 414. 
gy, see CSPF, 1559-60, p 534. 124 In April 1560 the cardinal was hanged and burnt in effi 
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considerans que sur la nouvelle de la mort de feu nostre cousin le Duc d'Aumalle, 
le peuple pourra prendre occasion de se esmouvoir... a ceste cause, nous avons 
advise vous faire ceste Iettre pour vous dire et mander que vous regardiez et tenir 
la main de vostre part qu'il ne se face aulcun esmotion populaire en nostre ditte 
ville. 125 
The Guise remained out of favour at court until the death of Charles IX in May 1574 and 
were not fully restored to the centre of power until the return of Henri III from Poland in September 
1574. The Guise-Montmorency feud remained unabated. When Francois de Montmorency had 
arrived at court in December 1573, the duc de Guise promptly retired. The influence of the cardinal 
de Lorraine on Catherine reached a low point as the authority of the comte de Retz increased. 126 
As the king's health declined, both the cardinal and the duke left court fearing the complete 
ascendancy of the queen mother and her favourites. 127 She was delighted to hear of the death 
of the cardinal in December 1574. This date marks the end of the first generation of the Guise. 
Only the cardinal de Guise remained of the mate offspring of the first duke. The fortunes of the 
family now rested in the hands of a new generation watched over as ever by Antoinette de 
Bourbon. The despondency which had been cast over the family by the death of Frangois de Guise 
had faded by the time of the cardinal's death. His nephew, Louis II de Guise (1555-88), was an 
ideal successor to the Guise ecclesiastical empire. Moreover, the arrival of the new king at Lyon 
in September 1574 gave the family great cause to hope that they would once again be the most 
important of royal councillors. Henri III had a military reputation, was considered an indomitable foe 
of heresy and had been close friends with the duc de Guise for many years. All members of the 
Guise family were present at the council meetings that took place in Lyon and were held in high 
regard by the king. The Montmorency were in disgrace. Damville was in open alliance with the 
Huguenots and the marechal Montmorency had been imprisoned for his part in plots hatched by 
the polifique faction. When Henri decided to prosecute the war against the rebellious Damville and 
his Huguenot allies it seemed that the Guise would have an opportunity to press home their 
advantage against their old enemy. 128 
The Foundations of a Local Power Base: Normandy 1563-74 
The landowning presence of the House of Lorraine in Normandy, created by marriages from the 
mid-fifteenth century onwards, was sharply increased in the 1560s, largely by dynastic accident. 
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The good fortune of the family in the province was also reinforced by the definitive establishment 
of the branches of d'Elbeuf and d'Aumale in the province. As Guise influence at court was in 
relative decline after 1563, recompense was found in the strengthened position of power in two 
strategically important provinces: Champagne, where the Guise were major landowners and held 
the governorship from 1563, and Normandy. 
On the death of Diane de Poitiers in 1566 the duc d'Aumale collected the last of the Breze 
inheritance, estabilishing his residence at Anet and he increasingly began recruit Normans for his 
company of the ordonnance. 12° The best evidence there is to show that d'Aumale now considered 
himself a Norman was his burial at Aumale, becoming the first member of the House of Lorraine 
to be buried in Normandy since Jean de Lorraine, comte d'Harcourt, in 1472.130 
When Rend marquis d'Elbeuf died in 1566 he had reached the pinnacle of his status, 
possessing the offices of capitaine-general des galdres and grand prieur of France. The proximity 
of his lands at Elbeuf to Rouen must have been a source of great anxiety to the reformed 
community. In the same way that the property of leading ultra-Catholics was attacked during the 
Huguenot interregnum in Rouen, d'Elbeuf's lands were subjected to pillage in May 1562. "' He 
was clearlyless important figure than his elder brothers but soon after his death his son obtained 
the Rieux inheritance. Charles, marquis d'Elbeuf, inherited the comtes of Brionne and of Harcourt 
at the age of eleven in 1567, followed by the comt6 of Lillebonne in 1570.132 There is no doubt 
that Charles was now one of the greatest lords. Moreover, it is significant that these Iandsformerly 
held by Calvinists (Brionne and Harcourt had belonged to Renee de Rieux and Lillebonne had 
possessed a Calvinist congregation since 1561) now passed to the Guise - another blow to the 
reformed faith in Normandy. This was neither the most important nor significant shift of land from 
a protestant to a catholic. In August 1570 Henri duc de Guise married Catherine de Cleves, 
comtesse d'Eu. This was an immensely important, wealthy and compact territory in upper 
Normandy, located between the bail Tage of Caux and the provincial boundary with Picardy. It was 
one of the oldest and largest seigneuries in Normandy, comprising some 270 fiefs and arridre fiefs 
and had in the 1580s an annual revenue equal to that of the duchies of Elbeuf and Aumale 
combined. 133 By 1570 only Francois duc d'Alencon and the duc de Longueville could rival the 
Guise as landowners in Normandy. 
The acquisition of the comte of Eu by the duc de Guise also had ramifications for 
protestantism in upper Normandy. Guise married a repentant Calvinist who had turned her back 
129 See chapters two and three above. 
130 N. Potin de La Mairie, Recherches historiques et biographiques sur les possessions des 
Sires Normands de Gournay, Le Bray Normand et Le Bray Picard. 2 vols, Gournay, 1852, 
I, p307. 
131 Saint-Denis, Notices historiques sur les communes et environs d'Elbeuf, IV, p 52. 
132 See chapter two above. 
133 See chapter two above. 
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on catholicism for at least ten years. The male issue of the Cleves family had died out in 1564 but 
had until then been sympathetic to protestantism. Her first husband had been Antoine de Croy, 
prince de Porcien, one of the most celebrated Calvinist captains. Porcien vigorously pursued the 
rights granted to him by the edict of Amboise in 1563 to establish a chapel on his lands. He 
founded a preche at Roumare, a seigneury held from the comtd of Eu but situated near Rouen. 
This caused great bitterness because the chapter of the cathedral of Rouen had bought Roumare, 
save for the high justice which remained with the comte. Porcien was legally within his right 
according to the pacification but it was provocative and revealed the difficulties of enforcing the 
peace. Stalwarts of the ultra-catholic faction in Rouen like Pericard, Bigot and Damours complained 
strongly to the king. 134 Porcien's death in 1565 ended the controversy and in 1570 the comt6 
came into Guise possession, laying the foundations of Guise ascendancy in upper Normandy. 
Opportunities to dispense patronage came with these lands. Andres de Bourbon-Rubempr6 
(d. 1579), a cadet of the House of Bourbon had briefly fought for Conde in 1562 but had, by the 
later 1560s, acquired the status of counsellorto the cardinal de Bourbon. In 1572 Guise trusted him 
enough to sell him land to the value of 18,0001 in the comt6 d'Eu, "pour les urgens aff aires", and 
make him governor of the comte at the same time. 135 Rubempr6 was a natural choice because 
of his credit in the region. He was closely linked to the Roncherolles family and they moved into 
Guise service in the 1570s. Rubempr6's position of influence on the council of the cardinal de 
Bourbon provided the Guise with an ally in their attempts to maintain their friendship with the 
prelate, despite the opposition of other counsellors. On Rubempr6's death in 1579 Charles de La 
Chaussee, a longstanding Guise servant, was promoted to be governor of Eu, becoming one of 
the leaders of the Catholic League in the pays de Vimeu and the comt6 de Ponthieu in Picardy, 
bordering the comtd d'Eu. '36 
The growth of the Guise aff inity in Normandy in the 1560s was also a product of the growth 
of catholic militancy. The shift of the parlement and city council away from moderation after the 
Huguenot coup was of most benefit to the Guise. 137 When the moderate catholic premier 
president, Saint-Anthot, returned to Normandy after the first civil war he found himself under attack 
from his more radical co-religionaries for supporting the return of refugee Huguenots to the town. 
He was threatened by a large mob on 18 January 1563 which went on to kill three Huguenots 
unlucky enough to be in the vicinity, including the avocat du roi au bai hiage, Mustel de 
134 Floquet, III, pp 23-5. 
1-15 BN, Ms Fr, 8182, to 277. 
'36 E. Prarond, La Ligue a Abbeville, 1576-1594,2 vols, Paris, 1873, vol II, p 184-5. On the 
La Chaussee, see chapter three above. 
137 This did not mean however the domination of the ultra-catholics. In April 1570 the 
parlement turned down requests to expel Huguenots who failed to observe Easter, see BN, 
Ms Fr, 15551, to 176, Bauquemare to the sieur de Morvillier, Rouen, 9 April 1570. 
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Boscroger. '38 The mob, as the author of the Histoire ecclcsiastique claimed, was not the pawn 
of the parlement. However it is true that the bailli, Jean d'Estouteville, did nothing to prevent the 
killings and the mob may have been encouraged by the attitude of ultra-catholic magistrates like 
the president a mortier Lallement, and magistrates Raoullin de Longpaon, Pdricard and Bigot, to 
the reformed faith. Longpaon addressed the agitated crowd which was baying for revenge, 
remarking "qu'il souffriroit point que les letres de pardon fussent interinees". 139 The marechal de 
Vieilleville, who was sympathetic to the protestants, was infuriated by this killing. He accused 
Villebon d'Estouteville of complicity and in the ensuing duel severed the hand of his adversary. The 
omnipresent Raoullin de Longpaon was also the object of the wrath of Vieilleville. 140 The duc 
d'Aumale still kept in close contact with Longpaon, who acted as his procureur in the parlement. 
On 16 February 1565 d'Aumale visited Longpaon at his residence in Rouen in order to help his 
client, who was in financial difficulty. It is unlikely that this was the only reason for the visit, at a time 
when d'Aumale was organising his noble association for the furtherance of his dispute with the 
Montmorency. His lodgings were busy with the comings and goings of local dignitaries: "se 
presentent par devers luy plusieurs de la ville pour luy faire la reverence et le saluer de la part tant 
de I'eglise que de I'hostel de ville et aultres particuliersi141 
These salutations would have been accorded to any visiting prince. Yet, with so many good 
contacts among the Rouennais elites and at such a sensitive time it is unlikely that this intercourse 
was purely honorific. At the very least this was an opportunity to take counsel and solicit support. 
The reason for his visit was still ostensibly to help his bankrupt procureur, Raoullin Longpaon. 
Consequently d'Aumale paid off the huge debts that Longpaon had incurred and provided him with 
an annual pension in return for inheriting Longpaon's lands when he died. '42 This financial 
transaction was undertaken with the help of others in the ultra-catholic hierarchy in Rouen. 
D'Aumale raised 6,000lduring the same visit from a bourgeois (later ennobled), Georges Langlois, 
sieur de Canteleu, in order to acquit the debts. Langlois had been part of the delegation, headed 
by Nicholas Damours the avocat-general, which was sent to court to request legal sanctions against 
Rouennais Huguenots and the maintenance of an armed force in Rouen. '43 
The Norman provincial Estates also became an arena for protest against royal religious 
policy. The Estates were not, as has been claimed, institutions in which the elite of Norman society 
138 Benedict, Rouen during the Wars of Religion, p 113. 
139 Histoire ecclesiastique, II, pp 789-92. 
"o Francois de Scepeaux, sieur de Vieilleville, M6moires, Collection Universelle des memoires 
particuliers relatifs ä I'histoire de France, XXXII, p 112. 
141 "Discours abbregd", p 315. 
142 ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1,329,19 February 1565. 
143 "Discours abbreg6", p 297; Frondeville, Presidents, p 450. 
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had little interest. '" The Estates vigorously defended Norman privileges, most notably in 1578-9 
when the Norman charter was invoked to show that the relationship between crown and province 
was contractual. Consequently the taille could not be raised without the consent of the Estates. 
During the deliberations of November 1578, deputies were accompanied by a "grand nombre de 
barons at gentilshommes signalez" "s This year might have been exceptional in the interest it 
aroused but every meeting of the Estates was an important social event in the calendar of the 
Norman nobility. Before the first civil war representatives to the Estates, In common with the 
parlementaires, showed little interest in the persecution of heretics. By 1567, at the beginning of 
the second civil war, a more radical outlook is discern i ble. In this year the cahiers of the three 
upper Norman bailliages, as well as that of the Cotentin, called for a profession of faith for all royal 
officiers. ' In 1570 there were objections to many of the clauses contained in the peace of Saint- 
Germain (in comparison to the decision of the parlement which ratified the edict swiftly). The Guise 
would have known directly about the concerns and opinions of deputies because many of their own 
clients and servants were present as representatives. After his acquisition of the comte of Eu in 
1570, the duc de Guise took a much closer interest in the deliberations of the Estates, for it was 
this body which voted on the level of the faille and the proportion that each bailliage was liable to 
contribute. However, Eu was outside the jurisdiction of the Estates and Guise fought a continual 
battle to maintain the status quo. Taxes levied - on Eu were better apportioned from the court, 
where Guise could expect to have more bargaining power and spend less money in bribes, than 
by a large elected body like the Estates which would have been difficult and more expensive to 
influence. 147 
Thus it was not uncommon to see Guise servants and their relatives participating at the 
Estates. "" Extant documents pertaining to the deliberations and election process for the ballllage 
of Rouen reveal that in the First and Second Estates, whose members are more easily identif iable 
than the deputies of the Third, there were an increasingly large number of electors and deputies 
linked either directly to the Guise or connected by the same involvement with the ultra-catholic 
faction. In this way the Estates were, like the parlement, taking a more active role in politics. Adam 
Sdcard (d. 1577), dean and later grand chantre of the cathedral, was deputy for the First Estate of 
the bailliage of Rouen between 1562 and 1565 and again in 1571. '49 Adam was from a family 
144 H. Prentout, "Les Etats Provinciaux de Normandie", Memoires de 1 Academie Nationale des 
Arts et Belles-Leitres de Caen, 3 vols, Caen, 1925-7, vol II, 59-62. 
145 Cahiers des Etats de Normandie sous le regne de Henri Ill, C. de Robillard de Beaurepaire 
(ed), 2 vols, Rouen, 1887-8, vol I, p 310. 
146 Prentout, "Les Etats Provinciaux", I, pp 291-8. 
"' Ibid, II, pp 38-41. 
'" See chapter six below. 
149 For a list of deputies to the provincial Estates, see F. Farin, Histoire de la ville de Rouen, 
6 vols, Rouen, 1738, vol III, p 381. 
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in the forefront of the battle against heresy, his relative Claude having been involved in persecution 
since at least 1557. Antoine de Vieuxpont sieur de Saussay, who had served as a captain under 
the duc d'Aumale during the first civil war, was returned for the Second Estate in 1562 and again 
in 1568. Nicholas de Vipart, the younger brother and heir of Claude, the lieutenant of the duc 
d'Aumale's gendarmerie company (1565-70), appeared for the Second Estate in 1573,1578,1586 
and 1588. Unsurprisingly, the families of these men were staunch supporters of the Catholic 
League in 1589. The Guise would thus have been party to the information, opinions and gossip that 
circulated both during the sessions of the Estates and the social engagements and meetings that 
accompanied them. 
The seeds of mistrust of royal religious and fiscal policy were sown in the 1560s, discontent 
only reaching its apogee In the 1580s. During this decade the conditions existed for the Guise to 
attract other malcontents of the regime, in order to join them in their bid for power. The Catholic 
League in Normandy cannot be understood without reference to the existence of the Guise affinity 
in the 1560s. During the first religious war the men who fought on the catholic side under the duc 
d'Aumale were well rewarded. Men who had been employed by the Guise received their due 
reward from the crown. For example, in 1563 Jean baron de Cleres was made captain of fifty 
lances of the ordonnance and Francois, sieur d'Auzebosc, became the colonel de legionnaires de 
Normandie. 150 The rewards of royal office and the relative decline of the influence of the Guise 
at court made the benefits of loyalty to the crown more attractive. This was obviously the theory 
behind the Inflation of royal honours during the Wars of Religion. In the 1570s and 1580s the 
dissatisfaction of local elites with the devaluation in the value of office, both financially and 
honorifically, was a crucial factor in the crumbling authority of the monarchy. Moreover the control 
of patronage devolved, more than ever, into the hands of the local elites. This decentralisation of 
power, allied to existing discontent with the crown, undermined monarchical authority and 
contributed to political instability. "' 
In Normandy the increased importance of the office of lieutenant-general was symbolic of 
this decentralisation. Moreover, the relationship between the lieutenants-general in Normandy and 
the Guise go a long way to making the concept of affinity comprehensible. Two of these men, Jean 
de Moy, sieur de La Meilleraye and Tanneguy Le Veneur, sieur de Carrouges, owed their rise 
during the first civil war to Guise patronage, thereafter becoming loyal servants of the crown before 
each took a different path during the hegemony of the Catholic League. They were loyal to more 
than one patron but the strength of loyalty depended on specific circumstances - it was never 
constant. For example, their relationship to the Guise is complex and reveals that the links of 
affinity remained latent, awaiting potential activation at any time. 
Like many clients of the Guise, Carrouges also found service with the comte de Brissac. 
It was in the capacity of lieutenant of the comte that Carrouges was sent to Rouen to quell 
150 ADSM, 7J, 8, Chartrier de la famille Martel, 26 July 1564 
151 This is more fully discussed in chapter three above. 
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disturbances in February 1563. He remained there and, on the death of Villebon d'Estouteville in 
1565, fulfilled the functions of bailli with the support of the city council. From 1563 he was a 
lieutenant-general in Normandy, responsible for the bailliages of Rouen and Evreux. '52 On his 
appointment Carrouges was in possession of the best ultramontane credentials which, allied to his 
ability to keep order in the city, endeared him to all shades of catholic opinion. Over the next 
twenty-nine years he played a shrewd and ultimately dangerous game of remaining loyal to the 
crown but maintaining and reinforcing his historic links to the Guise. 153 In a time of peace and 
stability having more than one patron was highly beneficial, but during a time of crisis it became 
perilous when a particular side had to be chosen or it was decided to remain neutral. 
Carrouges did not immediately have complete authority in his new jurisdictions. In June 
1564 the duc de Bouillon was reinstated as governor of Normandy. '64 Bouillon's Calvinism, and 
his dubious record in the war, made this decision controversial at a time when anti- 
protestant feeling was so high. However, the appointment was not made at the insistence of the 
Huguenots, but rather at the behest of the ultra-catholic ducs d'Aumale and de Montpensier. 
Kinship was again the motive behind their lobbying: d'Aumale was the uncle and Montpensier the 
father-in-law of Bouillon. His reinstatement did not pass without complaint from catholics. Tension 
in Rouen was further increased during Bouillon's sojourn in the city from 18 June to 12 July 1564. 
Huguenot residents flocked to the duke to demand redress for the tribulations that they had 
suffered since the fall of the city to catholic forces. Bouillon was accompanied by a retinue almost 
exclusively consisting of protestants and he was accused of favouring them in the city. Furthermore 
he displayed little tact in reopening the case of the murdered avocat, Mustel de Boscroger. Bouillon, 
recognising the growing opposition to his authority, left Rouen on the 5 September 1564 and, 
although he remained governor of the province, real power now lay with the three resident 
lieutenants-general of Normandy. 
Philip Benedict has found little evidence to suggest that Tanneguy Le Veneur, sieur de 
Carrouges, was a Guisard client and then demonstrates how Carrouges was loyal to the throne and 
scrupulous in carrying out royal commands'55 This is only partly the picture but was probably the 
one that Carrouges would have chosen for his funeral eulogy when France was being consumed 
by the Catholic League. However, like all noblemen, Carrouges was egotistic in pursuing his own 
family interests and highly opportunist in his relations with both the crown and his other major 
patrons, the Guise. He had originally risen in Guise service but, having gained significant royal 
office, his strategy was aimed at protecting his precarious position by maintaining order in the 
152 Floquet, II, p 512; Benedict, Rouen during the Wars of Religion, p 32. The office of bailli 
was reactivated in 1576 to provide his son, the comte de Tillieres with an office. 
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volatile city and cultivating links at court. Above all, this meant stabilising the volatile religious 
situation in Rouen. Thus royal edicts which were designed to keep the religious peace also 
reinforced his own grip on power. Furthermore, he bolstered his own position of authority by 
rewarding his servants and expanding his affinity. Carrouges ensured that men from his own 
company of the ordonnance monopolised the military offices in Rouen and filled many of the 
captaincies in the surrounding bourgs. 'sa He also pursued a policy of marrying his children into 
the local elite. His daughter, Diane, was married in 1573 to Jacques de Rouville, lieutenant-general 
of the bailliage of Rouen from 1575 until 1583. Through this alliance Carrouges also kept in contact 
with the ultra-catholics. Rouville was lieutenant of the ordonnance company of the sieur de 
Chavigny, a notorious ultramontane and subscriber to d'Aumale's league of 1565.157 In 1564 
Carrouges chose Louis Le Pellerin, a catholic stalwart who had served under the duc d'Aumale in 
1562, as the ensign of his ordonnance company and he was later promoted to lieutenant (1568- 
90). ' His eldest son, Jacques Le Veneur (d. 1596), comte de Tillieres, became captain and bailli 
of Rouen on the resignation of his father in 1576.159 In October 1578 Jacques married Charlotte 
de Chabot, niece of Francois de Chabot, who was first the guidon and later the lieutenant of the 
duc d'Aumale. Links with the Guise continued and strengthened; they did not diminish in the face 
of royal service and increased royal patronage. In 1577 and 1578 Tillieres was the guidon of 
Charles duc de Mayenne and in 1583 his wife's half-sister married the duc d'Elbeuf. Finally, 
Carrouges married his remaining daughter to Paul comte de Salm, chambellan of the duc de 
Lorraine. 16° 
Carrouges' desire to maintain his links to the Guise, even though the 
crown was now his major patron, was due only partly to affection for and a historical identification 
with the Guise. These sentiments were an element of sixteenth-century noble culture but they were 
not crucial in determining strategy. By maintaining his links to the Guise, Carrouges ensured that 
he retained a number of patrons and thus a multiplicity of options and channels of communication. 
Moreover, the influence of the duo d'Alengon (duo d'Anjou from 1576) in Normandy was another 
good reason for amity with the ultra-catholics. D'Alengon, leader of the politiques, had a large 
clientele in Normandy and an 6chiquierat Alengon. He had the potential to impinge on the authority 
of the lieutenants-general. In February 1570 Catherine de Medicis had to write to reassure 
Matignon and Carrouges that the authority of d'Alenron to appoint to office only extended to his 
appanage, and that the duke only had authority: 
'56 For example, Nicholas de Pommereul was the ensign of his company of the ordonnance 
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pour commander en ce qui est de son domaine et sans toucher ä ce qui est de 
vostre autorite; et pour ce il ne faut pas que vous cragniez qu'il art voullu aucunes 
choses entreprendre en vos gouvernemens, Iesquelz tart s'en fault que je voulisse 
conseiller de diminuer ou en distraire aucune chose, que je les voudrois accroistre 
et augmenter; et vous pouvez assurer que je tiendrai toujours la main que vous 
soiez favourablement traictez non seulement en ce qui conceme I'auctoritd de vos 
charges, mais en toutes autres choses. 161 
In his relations with the crown Carrouges was interested in improving his bargaining 
position. His correspondence with the monarchy was dictated by two themes: the maintenance of 
peace in Rouen and complaints about money. It seems unlikely that these complaints reflected his 
true financial health. They do reveal the growing importance of provincial governors and 
lieutenants-general, and the need for the crown to appease their grievances in order to maintain 
stability. Brant6me was a personal friend of Carrouges and commented at some length on 
Carrouges' resentment of the favourable treatment accorded to one lieutenant-general, Jacques 
de Matignon, at the expense of. himself and Jean de Moy, in 1574: 
madame, respondit Carrouges, mais ä run vous Iuy donnez du bon foing et bonn' 
avoyne, et aux autres deux vous ne leur donnez que de la paille, et les traictez ä 
coups de fourche. '2 
Brant6me is a storyteller and not a historian and consequently it is vital to treat his works 
circumspectly. However, this narration corresponds with many of Carrouges' surviving letters. In 
April 1567 he complained to one of the secretaries of state for finance that he was receiving a 
pension totalling a mere 200 francs per month, while Matignon was in receipt of 300. In the same 
letter he went on to say that he was maintaining a household that included twenty gentlemen at 
a cost of 1000 francs per month. '63 During the third civil war Carrouges was forced to advance 
from his own pocket the pay of his company of mounted arquebusiers because royal finances were 
so stretched. '64 It was no wonder that men like Carrouges were eager to maintain their links to 
the Guise. Their influence at court and the royal fear that the loyalty of their officiers was not 
absolutely certain was more likely to induce the royal treasury to pay. The need for the crown to 
satisfy the patronage aspirations of local elites, in order to maintain stability, was the major cause 
of decentralisation. Loyalty was conditional upon reward. In Normandy this led to the establishment 
16' Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, III, p 299. 
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of three governorships in 1575, after the death of the duc de Bouillon, facilitated by the promotion 
of the three lieutenants-general. There was a further expansion of office as lieutenants-general and 
lieutenants were now created under each of the three new governors. The decentralisation of 
authority meant increased power for the new governors. However, as offices increased and the 
ability of the economy to support those offices decreased, so the traditional competitiveness of the 
nobility for honours was heightened. In the 1580s this was bound to fuel the political and religious 
crisis. 
The most dangerous effect of decentralisation was the ability of the local elites to control 
the royal tax administration. As early as 1562 local commanders had simply expropriated royal 
taxes. In the 1570s the Huguenots established an independent taxation system in the South-West. 
In 1567 Carrouges was a commissioner appointed by the crown to oversee the farming out of the 
aides of the bailliages of Rouen and Evreux. Carrouges asked Catherine de Medicis that the 
arrears of his pension be paid out of the increase in the farm. He added that he had already spent 
400 dcus and hoped to recoup his money when further transactions were concluded, assuring the 
queen mother that the profits of the tax farmers would be "fort petit". Catherine readily agreed to 
all these demands. 165 Thus there was a great potential for taking money out of the royal taxation 
system at source and bypassing official accounting procedures and, of course, this only concerned 
the money that Carrouges was prepared to 'declare'. 
Jean de Moy, sieur de La Meilleraye, enjoyed the same opportunist relations with the crown 
and the Guise, both of them patrons of his father. Jean changed sides very early on in the first civil 
war and was rewarded for his loyalty by the duc d'Aumale with a number of captaincies. By the end 
of 1563 he was lieutenant-general of Normandy and vice-admiral of France, and by the beginning 
of the third civil war in 1568 he had made the complete transformation from supporter of Conde 
to nascent leader of the most immoderate elements of the upper Norman catholic nobility. None 
of Moy's actions demonstrate5the traits of a man primarily motivated by faith; there is no evidence 
to suggest he was a protestant when he joined Conde. It is likely that his own growing ultramontane 
catholicism was born of his desire to strengthen his position in upper Normandy with appeals to 
religious solidarity. It is no coincidence that many of his potential rivals for hegemony in the pays 
de Caux were Huguenots. A symbol of Moy's nascent religious fervour was the papal authority he 
received (which must have been expensive in itself) in 1569 to build a chapel at La Meilleraye, in 
honour of the soul of his late brother. A chaplain was paid to say a mass every day on behalf of 
the deceased. ` 
, es Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, III, p 2; BN, Ms Fr, 23193, to 7, Carmuges to Catherine, 
Rouen, 12 January 1567. 
'66 Rodiere and Vallee, La maison de Moy, p 80. 
154 
Moy, like the other lieutenants-general, was jealous of his status. He fought to maintain his 
authority, trying to prevent the dismemberment of the comtd of Gisors from his jurisdiction in 
1567.167 He was particularly suspicious of the potential strength of Charles de Bacqueville-Martel, 
a major landowner in his gouvernement and a former lieutenant in the province for the duc de 
Bouillon. Bacqueville died in 1566 but was succeeded by his son Nicholas, a protestant, and also 
like his father loyal to the crown. The best way for Moy to distance himself from his rival was to 
espouse a more aggressive catholic creed. Conflict came to a head between Moy and Nicholas de 
Bacqueville-Martel over a dispute regarding the exemptions from paying the aides of the arridre-ban 
given to some of Bacqueville's gendarmes. Moy alleged that a deception had been perpetrated 
because there was no record of their service in the ordonnance company of Bacqueville. The king 
was forced to: 
mande audit sieur de la Meilleraye faire entendre aux Juges qu'ils ayent a faire 
cesser les empeschements qui setoient donnez a ceulx de lad. compagnie pour 
la taxe du ban et arriere-ban. ' 
When Charles IX summoned Bacqueville's company out of the pays de Caux the following month, 
Moy dryly commented to the king: 
Quant a celle du sieur de Bacqueville Jay entendu que vostre maiestie a ordonne 
quelle sachemine en vostre camp la ou a la verite pour beaucoup de raisons sera 
trop mieulx que par deca. 169 
There were other reasons for supporting a more vigorous anti-Huguenot stance, not least 
the opportunities to gain credit with catholic popular opinion. Moy was lobbied by the catholics of 
Dieppe and he echoed their concerns to the king: 
il sera remonstre a sad. majestie que les manans et habitans catholiques de la 
ville de dieppe font tres grande instance au sieur de la meilleraye de ne 
permectre ('exercise de la religion pretendue reformee. 10 
Moy's radicalism was thus mirrored, indeed spurred, by local catholic feeling. As bailli of Rouen, 
Carrouges was responsible for protecting an increasingly threatened religious minority. The anti- 
167 BN, Ms Fr, 23193, to 67, Moy to Charles IX, La Meilleraye, 31 January 1567; BN, Ms Fr, 
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'69 BN, Ms Fr, 15554, to 176, Moy to Charles IX, Caudebec, 4 February 1568. 
170 BN, Ms Fr, 15608, to 123, Moy to Charles IX, Dieppe, 7 April 1568. 
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Huguenot riots engendered by the peace of Longjumeau, which brought the second civil war to a 
close in April 1568, were particularly serious. The greatest threat to Moy's authority came from 
Dieppe, which was dominated by a Huguenot elite, and from the Huguenot nobility of rural upper 
Normandy. Immediately following the resumption of civil war in 1567 Moy met with the captain of 
Dieppe, Rene de Beauxoncles, sieur de Sigognes, to discuss ways of preventing another protestant 
uprising. "' Subsequent attempts by the garrison of the chateau to secure the town on 26 and 
27 October 1567 were humiliating failures. The irate townsfolk soon turned the tables and 'placed 
the garrison under siege. When order was finally restored Moy was determined to repair his 
damaged honour. Soldiers were billeted on Huguenot residences, houses were burnt and pillaged 
and a tax of 16,0001 was levied on the town. Destruction was not carried out at random by the 
soldiery but ordered directly by a vengeful Moy; among the victims was a prominent Huguenot 
conseiller at the parlement of Rouen, J6r6me Maynet. 172 
In common with his counterparts Moy was deeply involved in the problems of collecting 
royal revenue. After the peace of Longjumeau large numbers of troops had to be disbanded and 
thus paid their arrears, units that were to be retained also clamoured for their pay. May estimated 
the cost of troops in his jurisdiction (principally for the defence of Le Havre and Dieppe) to be 
12,0001per month, payable from contributions levied on the countryside. The crown was in financial 
chaos and Moy's pension had remained unpaid for five months. More seriously the pay of the 
garrison of Dieppe had been in arrears for the same length of time. 13 May asked permission to 
use revenue from loans made to the crown: 
Jay advise de faire prendre quelque somme de deniers sur les empruntz que le 
sieur de Vialar et moy faisons sur les habitans sur les habitans du bailliage de 
Caux en vertu de nostre de commission de laquelle toutefoys il ne faut en atendre 
grand effect atendu Ia Royne que tout le pays souffre a locquasion de la 
quavellerye de vostre armee. " 
Thus revenue was raised and spent by Moy, siphoned off in the localities without passing under 
the scrutiny of a royal fiscal official. The reason why Moy, and others like him, were given such 
great powers was because only they had the local resources and credit to sustain the war effort 
financially. As Moy had feared, there were few people prepared to lend money to the crown and 
"" Daval, Histoire de la Reformation A Dieppe, I, p 69. 
172 ADSM, C, 1228, Registres du Bureau des Finances de la Generalit6 de Rouen, 26 
November 1585. 
173 BN, Ms Fr, 15608, to 87, "Instruction envoyee au Roy par monseigneur de la meilleraye 
pour les affaires de son gouvemement", 24 March 1568. 
174 BN, Ms Fr, 15608, fo 143, Moy to Charles IX, Dieppe, 11 April 1568. 
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so Charles asked his lieutenant-general to forward 20,0001 of his own money to pay troops. "' 
A shrewd nobleman could raise money locally, speculate in his financial dealings with the crown 
and reap substantial rewards. By August 1568 there was little improvement in the financial situation 
and Moy pointed out that few captains were prepared to follow the king's wishes: "Je ne voy 
personne qui veuille resider ordinairement aux places et entrer en ceste despence sans y attendre 
aulcune recompense. "16 At the height of the third civil war Moy, in his capacity as vice-admiral, 
requested that he be able to raise his own extraordinary tax on satt vessels arriving in his marine 
jurisdiction. "' 
In his efforts to support the local war effort Moy was sent royal commissions to raise 
revenue and loans in conjunction with the president A mortier in the parlement, Michel de Vialar 
(d. 1576). Both worked closely together during the third civil war (1568-70). The seventeenth-century 
historian of the parlementaires, Bigot de Monville, tells us that Vialar "s'attacha aux inter@ts de la 
Maison de Guise et ext cuta plusieurs commissions contre ceux de la R. P. R. "1e It is easy to 
dismiss this non-contemporary source because many commentators regard people as Guisards 
simply because they were ultra-catholic -a false premise. In fact, Vialar was a signatory of the will 
of Claude duc de Guise in 1550 and was later a financial agent for the family in Italy in 1557.19 
Thereafter he succeeded to the office of president in the parlement of Rouen, formerly held by Jean 
de Lallement -a man long associated with the Guise. Vialar in his turn resigned the office in 1573 
to Nicholas Damours, also a constituent of the ultra-catholic faction from its very inception. Vialar's 
religious zeal is unquestionable and he was a close friend of the cardinal de Bourbon. Both Moy 
and Vialar displayed a particular antipathy towards Huguenot conseiller, J6r6me Maynet; Moy 
destroyed his property and Vialar urged the cardinal de Bourbon to ensure that he could not be 
readmitted to the parlement once peace was established in 1570. 
Vialar was therefore the perfect choice to receive the commission for the seizure and sale 
of Huguenot goods and property, outlined in the edict of Saint-Maur (September 1568). By May 
1570,40,0001 had been raised in this manner. 1B0 Moy also became involved in this dubious 
method of raising revenue and clearly both men acquired a major financial stake in the catholic 
cause. Despite continual appeals of poverty, Moy was able to invest in land in 1569 and 1570 to 
175 BN, Ms Fr, 15546 to 122, Charles IX to Moy, Paris, 29 May 1568. 
176 BN, Ms Fr, 15547, to 308, Moy to Charles IX, La Meilleraye, 24 August 1568. 
"' BN, Ms Fr, 15550, Fo 130, Moy to Charles IX, Caudebec, 15 November 1569. 
178 Frondeville, Presidents, p 221. 
179 BouiI16, I, p 584; BN, Ms Fr, 20529, for. 17-18, Vialar to Guise, Venice, 3 October 1557. 
180 BN, Ms Fr, 15551, to 256, Vialarto Charles IX, Dieppe, 1 May 1570. Vialar hoped to raise 
another 40,000/ in the same way but was furious that peace negotiations were hindering 
his activities, see BN, Ms Fr, 15551, to 258, Vialar to Catherine, Dieppe, 1 May 1570. 
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the value of 3,8001.181 A letter from Vialar to Moy on the eve of peace in August 1570 displays 
deep pessimism. Vialar spoke in favour of an end to hostilities but was anxious that peace would 
only strengten his enemies: 
Je vous advertis daultre chose si non que je vous faictz bancqueroute et lession 
[lesion] de biens et vous prie ne fonder a ladvenir aulcune esperance sur les 
deniers procedans de mesdites commissions. Vous savez quelle inimitie me 
portent deux grandes seigneurs de la court de parlement [J6r6me Maynet was 
perhaps one] qui ne cessent pour chacun jour de mapeller'galant' et dire quit me 
faut tuer dont lexecution sera facile puys que je nay receu aulcun accroisement en 
honeur et authorit6 pout avoir tant de foys expose ma vie pour le service de leurs 
Maiesties. 1B2 
During the third war of religion Moy had further alienated himself from moderate opinion 
and attracted the wrath of Huguenots. In February 1569 three Cauchois Huguenot noblemen, Jean 
de Canouville, sieur de Raffetot, and Louis and Pierre Blondel de Moissoniere, plotted to seize Le 
Havre. Moy was informed of the conspiracy, captured the chateau of Raff etot and hanged the 
defenders. The leading plotters were then condemned to death in absentia for treason. 'a3 Moy 
had clearly signalled his intentions and, when another plot was hatched against Dieppe, he acted 
ruthlessly. The ringleader, Jacques de Malderde, sieur de Cateville, was arrested together with forty 
suspect bourgeois of Dieppe. Other noblemen were soon implicated including Francois de 
Bacqueville-Martel, sieur de Lindboeuf, brother of Moy's main local rival. It is difficult to know to 
what extent these plots were the products of scares and rumours rather than actual conspiracies. 
May acted with exemplary zeal, especially because these nobles posed a threat to his authority. 
The sieur de Lindboeuf had, according to de Thou, always been good friends with May. When 
indicted by the parlement Lindboeuf turned up to the trial, unlike those accused over the Le Havre 
affair. He was implicated only indirectly in the conspiracy against Dieppe and believed he could 
count on the protection and testimony of his friend May. Instead he was condemned and 
decapitated on 5 March 1569 and his possessions forfeited to the governor of Dieppe, 
Beauxoncles. 184 The parlement was obviously taking a harsher line against rebellious noblemen. 
However, the role played by Moy's sacrifice of a friend was widely acknowledged: 
BN, Ms Fr, 15550, to 81, Moy to Charles IX, Caudebec, 26 October 1569; BN, Ms Fr, 
26414, to 153. 
182 BN, V Col, 7, to 247, Vialar to Moy, Rouen, 24 July 1570. 
183 "Discours abbreg6", p 356; Daval, Histoire de la Reformation A Dieppe, I, p 100.? 
184 Daval, Hisfoire de la Reformation A Dieppe, I, p 126. 
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L'action de la Meilleraye fut interpretee differement: bien de gens condamnerent 
sa severlte, comme outree; mais le plus grand nombre le loüa, d'avoir eu assez 
de vertu, pour sacriticier un ami particulier aux interets de la Republique. '' 
In serving the interests of the commonweal Moy served his own cause and dealt a severe blow to 
a rival family in the pays de Caux. Moy's increasingly ultramontane stance was mirrored by his 
relatives. His cousin, Jacques de May (1520-88), sieur de Riberpre, governor of Abbeville, pillaged 
Huguenots indiscriminately in the jurisdiction of Moy's gouvernement. 1 The Moy family, with the 
authority of royal office, was able to build a substantial clientele in upper Normandy. 187 They 
became one of the leading ultra-catholic noble families in Normandy and founders of the Catholic 
League in Normandy. Marriage was the means by which the Moy became linked to the ultra- 
catholic hierarchy. In 1565 Nicholas de Moy married the niece of the cardinal de Pellevd, chief 
counsellor of the cardinal de Lorraine. 's" 
Both Moy and Carrouges had long-standing links to the Guise and their success in 
achieving royal office did not put an end to the vitality of these links. They had good reason to 
cultivate the Guise in order to increase their potential influence at court. Consequently, they were 
never dependent upon the monarchy and royal patronage. In 1570 Moy simply refused to obey a 
royal command that ordered his ordonnance company out. 
Normandy 
because this would mean 
a decline In his authority. 189 Neither Moy nor Carrouges felt stable enough in their respective 
posts and sought the protection of more than one patron. The crown failed to buy complete loyalty 
despite the bestowal of offices and honours, such as the creation of three governorships in 1575. 
The crown and its officers had great difficulty in maintaining the financial value of offices and 
patronage. In March 1569 the garrisons of Tancarville, Pont de I'Arche, Chateau Gaillard, Honfleur 
and Fdcamp had received no pay for six months and no one was prepared to advance the 
necessary cash. 19° The burden of office, caused by the upkeep of troops and large clienteles, 
was exacerbated in Normandy by the open favouritism displayed by the queen mother to Jacques 
de Matignon. Carrouges' address to Catherine in 1574, recorded by Bräntome, captures this sense 
of bitterness: 
185 De Thou, V, p 566 
'86 Daval, Histoire de la Reformation A Dieppe, I, p 105. 
187 See chapter three above. 
188 BN, Cabinet d'Hozier, 252, to 3. 
189 BN, Ms Fr, 15552, fo 71, Moy to Charles IX, La Meilleraye, 23 June 1570. 
190 BN, Ms Fr 15549, to 90, marechal de Gosse to Charles IX, Rouen, 13 March 1569; to 180, 
marechal de Coss6 to Charles IX, Rouen, 27 March 1569. 
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Madame, je pense que M. de la Mayleraye et moy I'avons mieux servy; car nous 
luy avons tres bien conserve ses places, que nul n'y a ose attenter ny prendre; et 
Matignon a laissd perdre et prendre vilainement les siennes; et puis, pour les 
reprendre, il a ruyne tout le pays, et faict despendre au roy pour son armee 
combien de cent mill' escus, qui lui fairoient bien besoin ailleurs; et ast' heure, 
pensez donc madame, ä qui le roy a plus obligation, ou A luy ou ä nous. 191 
Their growing landed interest and attempts 
. 
to recruit more Normans into their military 
retinues, were indicators of the expansion of the Guise power base in Normandy in the 1560s. 
However, the ultamontane faction remained small, especially in the parlement and those with 
ultamontane sympathies, such as Jean de Moy, had their own parochial reasons for supporting the 
repression of heresy. Similarly, the populace of Paris idolised the Guise but the family had little 
influence over popular forces. 
However, the rise of popular catholic militancy was evident at the anger with which the 
peace of Saint-Germain was greeted in Paris and in provincial cities like Rouen. Dissatisfaction with 
the failure of the monarchy to protect catholicism, already evident in the early 1570s, would grow 
during the reign of Henri III asL 
scale 
of taxation and the proliferation of offices reached 
unprecedented heights. The Guise, with their great landed interest and sizeable affinity and their 
identification with the catholic cause, were ideally placed to take advantage of discontent and 
the growth of catholic radicalism which began to destabilise France in the 1570s. 
191 Brant6me, V, p 164. 
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Chapter Six 
Malcontents and Defenders of the Faith: 
The Building of a Political Power Base 
161 
The situation of the monarchy was desperate by spring 1574 as Huguenot-politique plots led by 
Henri de Navarre, Francois duc d'Alencon and Francois de Montmorency, aimed at seizing power, 
had been foiled only recently. When Charles IX died in May the heir to the throne, Henri duc 
d'Anjou, was out of the kingdom, having been elected king of Poland. In the interim the queen 
mother acted as regent. The authority of the crown was further undermined when the Huguenots 
established a republic in the South and then formed a military alliance with Henri de Montmorency- 
Damville. ' The return of Henri III from Poland did little to ameliorate the desultory performance of 
the royalist armies in the fifth civil war. The South had been practically abandoned to Damville and 
his Huguenot allies. The only reason that peace had not been concluded by the crown was that 
the demands of the Huguenot-poldique alliance were too high, notably unlimited demands for 
freedom of worship and the trial of those responsible for the Saint Bartholomew's Day Massacre. 
The Guise had very good reasons for wanting to prosecute the war more Vigo rously. Peace would 
ensure the return of the Huguenots and the Montmorency to court at the expense of the Guise who, 
despised by Catherine and, before his death, Charles IX, had regained their prominence at court 
only recently on the return of Henri III. The campaign of late summer 1575 was therefore crucial 
to the security of the Guise family and the battle of Dormans (10 September 1575) was not the 
inconsequential skirmish claimed by Pierre de L'Estoile 3 
The duke left court in early September 1575 to organise the defence of his gouvernement 
against an invading Huguenot and reiter army, numbering 4-5,000 men and led by Guillaume de 
Montmorency-Thord. ` Guise's own lands were threatened; Antoinette de Bourbon was forced to 
flee Joinville for the safety of Saint-Dizier. The penury of the crown meant that the duke had to rely 
heavily on the family resources and his local credit. He borrowed heavily and his army was 
constituted largely from his own family, including Mayenne, d'Aumale, Mercoeur and d'Elbeuf. 
Commissions were dispatched to his own clients. Charles des Boves, sieur de Rance, the former 
ensign of the marquis d'Elbeuf, raised two companies of foot. Heralds were dispatched all over 
Champagne summoning the duke's amis to the standard. The battle which defeated Montmorency- 
Thort was only a minor action but it was a credit to Guise's organisational and military abilities. The 
wound he received in the battle, earning him the sobriquet le balafrd, only served to increase his 
prestige in the popular imagination -a reputation which had grown since the Massacre of Saint Bartholomew. 
' Salmon, Society in Crisis, pp 191-3. 
2 Ibid, p 197. 
3 Pierre de L'Estoile, Journal du regne de Henri Ill, L. -R. Letevre (ed), Paris, 1943, p 84. 
On this and following, see Boullle III, pp 13-17; A. d'Aubignd, Histoire Universelle, IV, pp 
380-1, puts the Guise army at 10,000 men, although this included units raised by the crown 
and other nobles. The depredations of this army can be followed, in Claude Haton, 
Memoires, II, pp 779-800. 
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The Origins of the Catholic League 
Guise was regrouping the royal army at Melun when news reached him that peace had been 
concluded. 6 The king, facing overwhelming odds, had little choice but to meet the demands of his 
adversaries at the Peace of Monsieur, the tolerant religious provisions of which were enshrined in 
the edict of Beaulieu (6 May 1576) 6 Understandably, Guise felt aggrieved by this surrender after 
his feats the previous autumn and now had to be concerned about his status and personal safety 
at the court. Catholics everywhere were dismayed at the concessions and the adverse reaction to 
the new religious settlement was manifested by the formation of the Catholic League in Picardy. 
The peace confirmed the prince de Conde as governor of Picardy, and handed over P6ronne to 
him as a surety against the fulfilment of this and other conditions. Traditionally, the League has 
been seen as the creation of Jacques d'Humit res (d. 1579), lieutenant-general of Picardy and 
governor of Peronne, Roye and Mondidier, who succeeded in galvanising the local catholic nobility. 
Historians have seen the League as a largely parochial movement which had little impact in other 
provinces, including Normandy. ' 
The opponents of the Guise saw their 'Machiavellian' designs behind the crisis. " 
Subsequently historians have seen the sinister intentions of the family behind the League and the 
historiographical tradition of the nineteenth century stressed the danger to the patrie, since "Henri 
de Guise voulut devenir maitre en France, en se plagant au dehors dans la dependance du roi 
d'Espagne. "9 Although the Guise made no secret of their disappointment at the edict of Beaulieu, 
there is no evidence to suggest that the Catholic League was either formed or led by the family. 
Negative reactions to the peace came from diverse quarters and were strongest among those likely 
to lose their off ices as a result of the articles of pacification. Thus Philippe de Voluire (d. 1586), sieur 
de Ruffec, captain of Angouldme and one of the earliest of Henri III's mignons, was quick to adhere 
to the League. He was joined by Claude de La Chätre, captain of Bourges and until recently a 
supporter of Francois duc d'Alengon. 10 It has even been suggested that the peace of Beaulieu 
was simply a tactical move by the king to detach his younger brother from the Huguenot-po/itique 
alliance. " 
5 Bouille, III, pp 26-8. 
6 Lavisse, Histoire de France, VI, pt 1, p 171. 
Benedict, Rouen during the Wars of Religion, p 153; Dewald, The Formation of a Provincial 
Nobility, p 48 n 1. 
B E. C. Davila, Historie of the Civill Warres of France, London, 1647-8, p 445. 
9 Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe ll, 1, p 227. 
10 Constant, Les Guises, pp 81-2. 
" Chevallier, Henri lll, pp 330-4. 
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The Catholic League of 1576 (or perhaps more appropriately the League of P6ronne) had 
little in common with the populist Catholic or Holy League which became a major force in 1588. It 
was primarily a noble association and therefore similar to the leagues of the 1560s. It shared the 
same aristocratic philosophy as the Holy League formed by the Guise in 1584. Although many 
noblemen were active in both leagues, the Holy League became a much broader movement 
because it used religion to provide the ideology and win popular sympathy for a princely revolt. 
According to L'Estoile a number of towns quickly adhered to the League of Pdronne, including 
Amiens, Abbeville, Saint-Quentin and Corbie. 12 In fact, he exaggerated the rapid spread of the 
League, reinforcing the point that contemporary observers were ignorant of the League and 
historians too anxious to accept contemporary accounts without verification. Amiens, for example, 
was solicited by the leaguers but did not sign the Declaration of P6ronne. 13 
Jacques d'Humieres was the scion of a family noted for its loyalty to the monarchy. This 
is not surprising since the fortunes of the family had initially been tied to the Montmorency. 
However the influence of the Montmorency, once so pervasive in Northern France, was in decline. 
Damville remained powerful in Languedoc but his elder brother, the marechal de Montmorency, had 
seen his influence at court damaged by involvement in malcontent plots and subsequent 
imprisonment. Moreover, d'Humieres was locked in a bitter legal dispute with his brother-in-law, 
Guillaume de Montmorency-Thore. " D'Humit res probably felt that he now lacked the influential 
contacts at court he once had enjoyed. He was concerned about his authority in Picardy on 
Cond6's return and pleaded with the king to reject the peace. D'Humieres provided respectability 
and a focus for discontent but he was not in control. On May 13 1576 an assembly at P6ronne 
gathered to discuss the terms and implications of the peace and a delegation was dispatched to 
the king with a letter of recommendation from the lieutenant of Peronne, Michel d'Estourmel. 15 
After the return of this unsuccessful mission it was d'Humieres who, as the man most likely to 
receive some form of compensation, counselled acceptance of the royal will. Moreover, it is clear 
from the surviving correspondence with d'Humieres that it was d'Estourmel and another local 
nobleman, Jacques d'Applaincourt, who were held responsible for defying the king. The Peronnais 
held firm and refused to give up the keys to the town or the magazine. A group of noblemen then 
gathered at the residence of Jacques d'Applaincourt, five kilometres from the town, to sign the 
articles of association on 5 June. D'Applaincourt had drawn up the articles the day before, which 
were later signed by nearly 200 nobles, soldiers and leading inhabitants of Pdronne. D'Humibres 
12 L'Estoile, Journal du regne de Henri Ill, p 117. 
13 Inventaires des Archives Communales de la ville d'Amiens anterieures h 1790, P. Durand 
(ed), Amiens, 1894, serie BB, Deliberations de I'Echevinage; 27 June 1576,20 July 1576, 
24 July 1576,16 August 1576. 
14 De Thou, VII, p 425. 
15 For this and following, see J. Dournel, Histoire de la ville de P6ronne, Peronne, 1879, pp 
213-16. 
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signed the document but tactfully retired to his chateau at Becquincourt. On 8 June Henri wrote 
both to d'Humii res and to d'Applaincourt, demanding that royal orders be carried out and that 
d'Estourmel and d'Applaincourt leave Peronne immediately. 16 The role of the lesser nobility was 
greater than hitherto assumed. " It was they who journeyed throughout the towns of Picardy, 
urging adherence to the League; d'Applaincourt went to Abbeville and the sieur de Sainte-Marie 
to Amiens. 'B The Peronnais stood firm against royal threats and overtures and the king was soon 
forced to rescind his promise to Conde and offer him Cognac and Saint-Jean d'Angely instead as 
places of surety. By then the League had spread to Ham and Doullens. 19 
An analysis of the signatories of the League of Peronne demonstrates the links of these 
adherents with the Guise family 20 Appendix F attempts to show that these men had close kinship 
connections and that a substantial number were in the Guise affinity or were patronised by the 
Guise as a matter of policy in the succeeding years. The network of relationships tightened as 
marriages were contracted within the leaguer fraternity. The duc d'Aumale, in particular, attempted 
to cultivate and find servants among the leaguers. Jacques d'Applaincourt had been one of the 
most prominent servants of the young duc d'Aumale since at least 1575, serving as ensign in the 
duke's company of the ordonnance. By 1581 he had risen to the office of lieutenant and was 
captain and governor of the town of Guise from 1580 to 1588 21 His career had begun as a 
pannetier in the household of the cardinal de Lorraine but, like several others who signed the 
Catholic League, he had followed Conde in 1562.22 
The numerical strength of the Guise affinity in the League was the result of the adherence 
of families like the Tiercelin, the Bourbon-Rubempr6 and the Roncherolles. Adnen de Tiercelin 
(1521-93), sieur de Brasses, was a senior member of the Guise affinity. He had been involved in 
their service for many years, having participated in the campaigns of 1556-7 in Italy and in Scotland 
in 1560. He was lieutenant-general to Henri de Guise in Champagne and governor of Mouzon since 
16 Lettres de Henri lll, P. Champion (ed), Paris, 1959-, vol II, pp 444-5. 
17 De Thou, VII, 426-7, is among those who saw the League as a conspiracy led by 
d'Humieres and the Guise, but was nevertheless unable to provide any real evidence of 
collusion. 
1s E. Prarond, Histoire de la Ligue a Abbeville, 1576-1594,3 vols, Paris, vol I, p 147; 
Inventaire-Sommaire des Archives de la ville d Amiens, BB, Deliberations de I'Echevinage, 
24 July 1576. 
19 Dournel, Histoire de la ville de P6ronne, pp 216,219-21. The sieur de Sainte-Marie was 
governor of Doullens and Louis de Moy governor of Ham. 
20 The original signatories of the League can be found in BN, Ms Fr, 3329, tos 17-18; 
Prarond, Histoire de la Ligue A Abbeville, I, p 148. 
21 Vindry, p 285; M. de Sars (ed), Inventaire-Sommaire des Archives de la ville de Guise 
antErieurs A 1800, Laon, 1833, p 18. 
22 This could conceivably refer to his father or another relative, see BN, Clair, 1204, to 84; 
Correspondence de Theodore de Beze, IV, pp 266-71. 
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1562 23 Appendix F shows the considerable importance that the Tiercelin had in the leadership 
of the League -a role which would continue for the next twenty years. Jacques de Tiercelin (1549- 
78) was the younger brother of Adrien. It was during his tenure of the office of lieutenant (1572-5) 
of the company of the ducs d'Aumale that an influx of Picards changed the composition of the ducal 
retinue, ensuring that the present duke was quickly embroiled in the League because of his 
substantial Picard following? ` 
The second crucial link between the League and the Guise came through the Bourbon- 
Rubempr6 and Roncherolles families. Andres de Bourbon-Rubempr6 remained loyal to the senior 
branch of the Bourbon during the Wars of Religion, but he moved from service with Conde in 1562 
into the household of the cardinal de Bourbon, where he became the most staunchly Guisard of 
the councillors of the prelate 25 In 1572 Henri de Guise acknowledged his importance to the Guise 
family by making him governor of the comtd of Eu 26 In 1560 Rubempr6 married Anne de 
Roncherolles, a family entitled premier barons of Normandy. Rubempr6 patronised his brothers-in- 
laws. Pierre de Roncherolles succeeded him as the governor of Abbeville and sdnechal of the 
comte of Ponthieu 27 Rubemprd was also in an ideal position to find positions for this staunchly 
orthodox family in the service of the catholic branch of the Bourbons. Pierre's younger brother, 
Francois de Roncherolles (1551-89), sieur de Maineville, became infamous as a member of the 
Paris Sixteen in 1589 but he began his career as a servant of the cardinal de Bourbon and was 
then lieutenant of the company of the ordonnance of Francois de Bourbon, comte de Soissons, 
from 1578 until 1582. Maineville was also one of the most important Guise clients in Normandy. 
The Roncherolles were among the provincial elite and the strength of the League in 
Normandy was dependent on their credit in Norman political society. Where family papers and the 
correspondence remain silent, the tabellionage records demonstrate the interplay between the 
Roncherolles and other ultra-catholic families. In July 1570 the Roncherolles family gathered to 
draw lots for the inheritance of the deceased head of the family, Philippe. 28 Andre de Bourbon- 
Rubempre was present as tuteur honoraire of Pierre and Frangois de Roncherolles. Likewise their 
step-brothers were represented by ultra-catholic tutors who included Jacques de Tiercelin and 
23 Orlea, La Noblesse aux Etats-generaux de 1576 et de 1588, pp 133-5. He was also the 
governor of Reims and Doullens, although between what dates is unclear. 
24 See chapter three above. Jacques was also a significant landowner in the bailliage of 
Gisors, captain of Argentan and Domfront, see Vindry, p 285. 
25 Saulnier, Le r6le politique du Cardinal de Bourbon, p 97. 
26 Rubempr6 was also a vassal of the comte, see ADSM, E1,486/3, to 126,21 August 1579. 
27 Vindry, p 415; J. Dewald, Pont-St-Pierre 1398-1798: Lordship, Community and Capitalism 
in Early Modern France, Los Angeles and London, 1987, p 170. Rubemprd signed the 
League using his family name. Therefore it is likely that the signature of "le seneschal de 
Ponthieu" refers to Roncherolles, his successor in that office. 
28 ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1,341,20 February 1570. 
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Charles d'Espinay bishop of Dol, a future League stalwart in Brittany and friend to the pedagogue 
and poet Remy Belleau (d. 1577) who had been patronised by Rene, marquis d'Elbeuf, and was 
precepteur of the young Charles d'Elbeuf 29 The following year Pierre de Roncherolles married 
Charlotte de Moy thus uniting the two senior ultra-catholic families of upper Normandy. 0 
The Catholic League was above all an alliance of closely interelated families from the 
moyenne and petite noblesses. This was its strength and the reason why it was able to survive 
clandestinely after its proscription by the king in September 1577. It was not the instrument of 
d'Humieres or the Guise and was therefore not so vulnerable to the swings of factional politics as 
other noble associations had been. Solidarity was reinforced by the clear threat of the return of 
Conde and his followers to Picardy, monopolising local patronage and resurrecting once more the 
spectre of religious friction in the region. The adherence of so many Guise clients to the Catholic 
League testifies to growing influence of the family in Picardy, especially that of the duc d'Aumale. 
Noblemen like d'Applaincourt, who were pursuing their careers mainly through the patronage of the 
Guise, faced a stark choice at the return of Conde. The chances of gaining office in Picardy meant 
either attempting to gain the favour of the returning prince or preventing his return altogether. 
It is clear from appendix F that there was a remarkable complexity of personal relationships 
that bonded the leaguers. The ordonnance companies of Rubemprd and Roncherolles drew their 
recruits from a common network of noble families. The d'Amerval family provided men for the 
companies of other League families and for the duc d'Aumale 31 Clients and their kinsmen were 
thus in a position to act as the bonds which cemented links between their different patrons and 
assured still further the obligations of personal relationships. The Guisencourt family were petite 
noblesse from the bailliage of Gisors. Pierre de Roncherolles was the son of Suzanne de 
Guisencourt. Louis de Guisencourt was a man-at-arms of the duc d'Aumale in 1581 and performed 
services for other Guise clients. He took part in financial transactions acting as a witness for 
Charles de Roncherolles in 1585. He was either the son or brother-in-law of Perrette de 
Gaillardbois. The Gaillardbois were from the same region of Normandy and vassals of the duc 
d'Aumale, furnishing a number of men-at-arms for the duke's company ' 
It is also evident that the Guise made strenuous efforts to recruit servants from this 
sympathetic constituency and find offices for leaguers in the years following 1576. Ponthus de 
Bellefourriere, son of the governor of Corbie, thus appears as the ensign (1577-80) of the marquis 
d'Elbeuf. However, it was the duc d'Aumale who strove most to reinforce his Picard affinity. Antoine 
du Hamel, who filled the position of guidon of d'Aumale's company in 1575 and the post of ensign 
2' D. B. F., V, p 1322. 
30 BN, PO, 2539, fo 126. 
31 See chapter three above for the changes in the complexion of d'Aumale's company. 
32 ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1,348,12 March 1574; 2a"" Heritage, 2E1,1986,29 November 
1589. Georges and Francois were both men-at-arms of the duc d'Aumale (1575-81). 
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in 1581, is only one of many examples of leaguer nobles who were patronised by the duke' Not 
every signatory of the League was a Picard. Charles de Fouilleuse, at that time ensign of d'Elbeuf's 
company, had to travel to Peronne from his residence in the Vexin. The presence of Fouilleuse did 
not signal the orchestrating influence of the Guise at Peronne, but rather his response to calls for 
support from his own kinsmen and amis. Nevertheless, it is evident that since many of their senior 
servants were involved in the League the Guise cannot be represented as a disinterested party. 
The role they played in the summer of 1576 remains ambiguous because of the paucity of 
evidence, but was one of concealed sympathy. 
The close relationship between the family and the cardinal de Bourbon is crucial to an 
understanding of the strength of the League. The Bourbon still had a great deal of influence in 
Picardy and the cardinal was the senior representative of the catholic branch. He was, moreover, 
archbishop of Rouen and soon came under pressure from his diocese to prevent enforcement of 
the edict of Beaulieu. The liberal edict had also been badly received by the cchevins of Rouen, who 
asked the king for an exemption from its tolerant clauses. 34 Likewise the cathedral chapter 
petitioned the cardinal to use his influence in order to prevent the return of protestant worship. A 
delegation was dispatched to urge the cardinal to "venir en ceste ville et y estre quelque temps 
pour en expedier les hereticques et faire ce qui sera necessaire" 3' In contrast, the parlement was 
more accommodating and registered the edict quickly, but fears about the return of protestantism 
to Rouen were not assuaged and a special assembly of the parlement was convened in July 
1576.36 Among those present were fifteen senior magistrates and two maitre des requdtes, Jean- 
Jacques de Baucquemare (d. 1619) and Jacques Pdtremol (d. 1605) also a conseiller in the 
parlement of Paris. Also present were opponents of the edict: the cardinal de Bourbon, Claude de 
Sainctes (d. 1591), bishop of Evreux, and Pierre de Roncherolles who, as conseiller-ncr of the 
parlement, had the right to sit in the court. Bourbon failed to persuade the assembled judges to 
contravene the edict and interfere with the exercise of protestant worship. He was forced to act on 
his own initiative, confronting the protestant congregation during worship on 23 July 37 
Bourbon's attempt to emulate the League in defying the royal edict was made against a 
background of continued fear and uncertainty in Normandy. Before peace was signed there were 
reports that hostile soldiery had been sighted in the vicinity of Rouen 38 On 11 August Carrouges 
33 Vindry, p 156, atlas edition. 
34 ACR, A, 19,12 May 1576. 
35 ADSM, G, 2171,26 June 1576; Floquet, III, pp 160-1. 
36 ADSM, 113, Registres Secrets, 93,22 May 1576. 
37 Floquet, III, p 165; Benedict, Rouen during the Wars of Religion, p 148; ADSM, 113, 
Registres Secrets, 93,16 July 1576. 
ACR, B, 2,9 February 1576; ADSM, 1B, 93, Registres Secrets, 14 March 1576. 
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informed the grand chambre of the parlement that the king had sent him warning of a conspiracy 
against the city. The king: 
vouloit qu'iI Tust pourveu a ce que ses sujects ne se distraissent de son 
obeissance sans entrer en quelconque ligue et que de Iuy her la corde de dessus 
la teste si ils entreprennent teile Iigue 39 
Soon after elections for the Estates-General took place in October 1576 Carrouges reported more 
troop movements, although he was unsure whether these were protestants or catholics. 40 
During the tense summer of 1576 the Guise had ample opportunity to take counsel and 
discuss the crisis in which their clients were directly involved. On 6 August Charles duc de 
Mayenne was married to the comtesse de Tende at Meudon. The whole family then repaired to 
Joinville where a double marriage was celebrated in November: Charles duc d'Aumale married his 
cousin Marie de Lorraine, daughter of the marquis d'Elbeuf, and Diane de Lorraine, sister of the 
duc d'Aumale, wedded Francois de Luxembourg, comte de Roucy. 41 The first marriage was clearly 
an attempt to reinforce family solidarity. Any misgivings that d'Aumale may have had about the 
suitability of the bride were dispelled by the gift of 100,0001 provided by the duc de Guise . 
42 The 
second marriage provides another example of the Guise strategy of strengthening alliances with 
families which were territorially strong on the eastern frontiers of the kingdom and in the empire 
itself. Antoinette de Bourbon was also delighted that "son marl est fort riche et sans debte: il est 
bien loge et meuble. i43 The nuptials over, the family departed for Paris to assist at the Estates- 
General. 
Considering the depth of resentment felt in Normandy against the edict of Beaulieu, it came 
as no surprise when so many ultramontane catholics and Guise clients were elected to represent 
the seven bailliages of the province. The king had made vain attempts to ensure the election of 
sympathetic delegates. On 15 November 1576 he ordered the replacement of Emery Bigot in the 
Third Estate because: 
quelque soupcon seroit intrevenu entre aucuns de ses subject mal affectionnez 
au bien de son service iceulx voyans de nos principaulx officiers, desquelz la 
39 ADSM, 1B, Registres Secrets, 93,11 August 1576. 
40 ACR, A, 19,28 October 1576. 
41 Anselme, III, pp 491-2. 
42 Guise still owed the sum to his cousin two years later, see Bouille, Ill, p 50, n 3. 
43 BN, Ms Fr, 3338, to 38, Antoinette to the duchesse de Nemours, Joinville, 22 November 
1576. 
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tonction n'a autre esgard que a desirer et a recherer, ce qui nous est de plus 
particullier, estre employez a faire les plainctes et dolleances de son peuple" 
Marion de Martimbosc, a leading counsellor of the cardinal de Bourbon, vicar-general of the 
diocese of Rouen and chancellor of the cathedral chapter, was returned for the First Estate of the 
bailliage of Rouen 45 The Second Estate elected Antoine de Bigars (d. 1594), sieur de La Londe, 
who would become a mainstay of the League in upper Normandy. His father was a kinsman and 
guidon in the company of Villebon d'Estouteville, having defended the vieux palais against the 
Huguenot insurrection in 1562.46 Antoine had close links to the League hierarchy, marrying in 
1575 Anne de Tiercelin the daughter of Adnen sieur de Brosses, himself elected to the Estates for 
the bailllage of Amiens" Tiercelin was joined by Rubempr6, elected for the Second Estate of the 
comt6 of Ponthieu. Frangois de Roncherolles was chosen to represent the bailliage of Gisors and 
his elder brother, Pierre, sat in the provincial Estates of that year in the same capacity" The 
result in the bailliage of Caux was more contentious: 
le catholique Charles Martel sieur de Fontaines, dlu sans doute grace aux voix 
protestantes, est ecarte et m@me injurie par le gouverneur parce qu'iI parfait 
librement et rdsistoit aux contraventions qui se faisoyent en I'assemblOe contre la 
oy ancienne. 49 
The governor involved in this case, Jean de May, was sympathetic to the League, fearing that an 
emboldened protestant force in the Caux would undermine his power base. He therefore secured 
the election of Charles de Goutimesnil, the former ensign (1567-70) and lieutenant (1571) of his 
company of the ordonnance. 50 It was therefore among the upper Norman delegates that the 
League had its strongest supporters. This is not surprising given the close family ties that Picard 
leaguers enjoyed in upper Normandy. The upper Norman and Picard nobility was the dominant axis 
ACR, A, 19,10 November 1576. The royal will was ignored and Bigot pursued a hawkish 
line at Blois before his support was eventually bought by the king, see Picot, Histoire des 
Etats-GenOraux, II, p 365. 
`s Frondeville, Conseillers, p 450. He was nephew of a former bailli of the duchy of Aumale. 
For a list of delegates, see Recuell des pieces originales concernant la tenue des Etats- 
Generaux, Ill, p 3. 
Vindry, p 202. 
" BN, Carres d'Hozier, 93, to 45. 
" Farin, Histoire de la ville de Rouen, II, p 406. 
`° La Popelinihre, quoted in Orlea, La Noblesse aux Etats generaux de 1576 et de 1588, p 
92. 
60 Vindry, p 366. 
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of the League - demonstrated by the fact that when the king wished the Second Estates to vote 
him money it was Tiercelin, Bigars and Roncherolles who were prevailed upon to use their 
influence b' 
Transcriptions of the debates of the Estates-General of Blois do not survive, compounding 
our ignorance of the political fortunes of the Catholic League. However, the diary of the duc de 
Nevers provides important eyewitness information. 52By using his evidence in conjunction with the 
surviving correspondence, the historian is able to analyse the strategy and political manoeuvres of 
the League hierarchy. The most important conclusion reached is that, despite the royal attempt to 
sanction the existence of the League on 2 December 1576 and co-opt it by demanding that all 
subjects swear an oath to its articles, it remained a well organised, secretive and localised noble 
association independent of royal control. 
Henri III, assuming he had placed himself in control of the League and effectively drawn 
its fire, opened the Estates-General on 6 December 1576 " The overwhelming preponderance 
of Catholics at the Estates ensured that there was unanimous pressure for action to permit only the 
exercise of catholicism in the kingdom. Conflict in the Estates arose over the means by which this 
was to be achieved. Obviously the League and other ultramontane elements, including the duc de 
Nevers, favoured another war. However, this would entail the imposition of further burdens on the 
already financially troubled realm and the raising of new taxes, making an inquiry into the royal 
finances essential. Normandy was one of the seven provinces which voted for the renewal of 
hostilities. " It was the First and Second Estates which were the most vociferous in favour of a 
new offensive. They had most to gain from a catholic triumph and the nobility could expect military 
commissions and offices. The Third Estate had more to lose as it would have to meet the cost of 
a new campaign. When the disastrous state of the royal finances became clear in January 1577 
their scepticism turned to obduracy. They now called for fiscal retrenchment and balked at voting 
for taxes. 
Meanwhile the catholic nobility, strengthened by the local organisation of the League, 
prepared for a new campaign. As soon as the king gave his blessing provincial officers not 
previously associated with the League seized on the opportunity to dispense commissions: 
Sa majestie me dit que eile avoit envoye en plusieurs endroits, pour continuer 
('association que ['on avoit commencee en Picardie, & Monsieur de Carouge lui 
51 Picot, Histoire de Etats-Generaux, II, p 348. 
52 Printed in the Recueil des pieces originales concernant la tenue des Etats-G6neraux, vol 
III. 
53 For this and following, see Picot, Histoire des Etats-Gencraux, II, pp 322-40. 
54 Opposition to the war was strongest in the South where peace had never been established 
and there was growing war-weariness, see M. P. Holt, "Attitudes of the French Nobility at 
the Estates-General of 1576", Sixteenth Century Journal, 1987. 
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avoit mande qu'iI I'avoit falte en son Gouvernement, auquel Von lui bailloit 200 
chevaux pour [y estre employe] et 1500 hommes de pied et autant qui demeuroit 
en Pays pour la garde d'icellui. 55 
In Normandy the ultramontane nobility cooperated closely. Jean de Moy recommended to the king 
that Pierre de Roncherolles be made the maitre de camp for all League forces in Normandy 56 
The League hierarchy also worked closely together at Blois. Adrien de Tiercelin and Andre de 
Bourbon-Rubempre, acted as spokesmen for the three Estates of Picardy and reported back to 
d'Humieres on 20 December that, following meetings they had attended with the king, Henri was 
no longer an obstacle to the expansion of the Leagues' Above all their correspondence 
demonstrates that, despite the shift in the royal position, the League still remained "nostre 
association" Perceptively they did not entirely trust Henri's overtures of good faith. In order to 
maintain local control of the League and ensure that its true purpose was retained, royal officers 
in Picardy and Moy in Normandy made sure that the oath sworn to uphold the articles of the 
League recognised them as leaders in their own right, and did not reduce them to the role of mere 
royal appointees. 59 
The main hindrance to the success of the League now came from the towns who feared 
the cost, should they swear to uphold the articles of association. Altko«ý3t' o 28 December it was 
reported that Amiens "ne feront nulle difficufte de se joindre avec les associez et contribuer" 60 
Resistance was `1n Normandy. When Carrouges presented the oath of association to the 
Echevins of Rouen there was no compliance 6' The magistrates of the parlement declared that 
"ils ne pouvoient signer sans expres commandement du roy... et sur la deliberation... il fut areste que 
l'on attendroict "62 In the event the parlement was not forced to sign as a corporate body, and the 
choice was left to the conscience of the individual. Even the cathedral chapter, which had been 
strongly against the return of protestantism to Rouen, was now circumspect. On 27 December the 
cardinal de Bourbon ordered the chapter to meet and swear the oath. Instead they preferred to 
ss Recueil des pieces originales concernant la tenue des Etats-Gencraux, III, p 2. 
'6 Lettres de Henri Ill, III, pp 174-5. 
57 BN, Ms Fr, 3329, to 117, Tiercelin to d'Humii res, Blois, 20 December 1576. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Orlea, La Noblesse aux Etats-generaux de 1576 et de 1588, p 41; Harding,, Anatomy of 
a Power Elite, p 90. 
60 BN, Ms Fr, 3329, to 119, Tiercelin to d'Humieres, Blois, 28 December 1576. 
61 Benedict, Rouen during the Wars of Religion, p 153. 
62 ADSM, 1 B, Registres Secrets, 92,13 February 1577. 
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defer a decision until they had consulted their colleagues in Amiens and Beauvais. ' They found 
themselves under pressure to conform from Moy, Carrouges and Bauquemare, the premier 
president. The last of these also urged them to choose deputies to attend an assembly of the 
clergy, convened to discuss means of providing money for the war . 
6` Here was the crux of the 
problem for the First Estate. They wanted to defeat the protestants on the battlefield but, along with 
the towns, it was they who would have to bear the cost. The equivocation of the chapters of Paris, 
Chartres, Le Mans and Amiens over signing the leaguer covenant bore witness to the doubts the 
clergy now harboured. 65 
The creeping resentment against the fiscal demands of the crown meant that the noble 
leaders of the League had to co-operate even more closely to achieve their ideal of establishing 
a powerful army. They were also extremely wary of the continuous negotiations being conducted 
between the queen mother and the Huguenot leadership in the South " The continued failure of 
the Third Estate to vote money at Blois led the king to abandon plans for a new offensive and place 
his faith in negotiating a new, more acceptable, peace in early March 1577. This followed the 
conversion of the ultramontane duc de Montpensier to religious toleration and the collapse of 
support for war at the Estates, now supported by only three provinces: Picardy, Champagne and 
the Orleanais 6' 
As the political situation became more unfavourable, so the clandestine and conspiratorial 
nature of the League becomes more evident. Unified action between the League hierarchy in upper 
Normandy and Picardy was facilitated by the close kinship ties that existed. These were enhanced 
by regular and secret meetings and a constant exchange of letters, often in cipher, which betrayed 
the sensitivity of the contents and the desire to plan strategy without royal interference. Pierre de 
Roncherolles acted as an intermediary between Jean de Moy and Adrien d'Humibres, both of whom 
were important royal officiers and had a number of local responsibilities. At the end of January 
1577, when the difficulties of financing a League army were becoming apparent, a meeting was 
arranged between the two men at Neufchatel in upper Normandy. 6" What took place at the 
meeting is not known and much of the correspondence is vague on details of political strategy 
because oral communication was much safer. Another council meeting, this time at Abbeville and 
in the presence of Tiercelin and Rubemprd, is alluded to in a letter of 9 April 1577 - Moy writing 
93 ADSM, G, 2171,4 and 12 January 1577. 
64 Ibid, 24 January 1577. 
ss Ibid, 25 and 26 January 1577. 
66 Picot, Histoire des Etats-G6neraux, II, p 325. Rubemprd was part of the embassy 
dispatched to the South and was thus in a good position to keep his fellow leaguers 
informed. 
67 Picot, Histoire des Etats-Generaux, II, pp 369-71. 
68 BN, Ms Fr, 3329, to 131, Roncherolles to d'Humieres, Pont-Saint-Pierre, 26 January 1577. 
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to d'Humieres apologising for his absence 69 Roncherolles attended as his representative. Under 
discussion was the womjing failure of Amiens to provide 8,0001 for the maintenance of League 
forces. On 18 April Tiercelin referred to the same council before his impending meeting with the 
mayor of Amiens. Preparation for Tiercelin's encounter with the mayor was aided by a memoir 
drawn up for him by Francois de Roncherolles, sieur de Maineville, who had emerged as the main 
link between the League hierarchy and the court . 
70 Everyone now feared a re-negotiated peace 
and it was Maineville's task to follow developments. He wrote with great hope in cipher to 
d'HumiBres after receiving secret assurances from the king, who had: 
luy mesmes baille une particulliere et secret instruction a I'archevesque de Vienne 
[one of the royal negotiators in talks with the Huguenots] par laquelle il exprimoit 
sa derriere resolution quil ny eust de la Loire aucun presche depuis il Iuy avoit 
mande par le sr descars deja les picards et les normans... ne Iendureroient pas. " 
Clearly Henri felt himself specifically under pressure from a section of the Norman and Picard 
nobility. Maineville provided the link to the king as the emissary of these malcontents. 72 His 
information was relayed back to Picardy and Normandy and subsequently discussed in council. 
Thus Moy, Tiercelin, d'Humieres and Frangois de Gouffier (d. 1594), sieur de Crbvecoeur and 
lieutenant-general of Picardy, among others agreed to meet on 28 May to deliberate over the 
drafting of a formal letter to the king, presumably on the subject of the peace. The letter of 
convocation was again written in cipher, but more significantly the three senders also appended 
their names in cipher, suggesting the danger of their activities. A letter from Moy to d'Humieres 73 
in the same month conveys an example of the business being conducted: 
Je n'eusses tant differe a vous faire reponse a la Iettre que mavez escripte 
damyens du xiv° [May] conferer ce quavez faict a Monsieur de Carrouges qui nest 
a Rouen ayant ny avoir presance plus propre taster sur sa volonte. Que M. de 
Hugueville [Pierre de Roncherolles] auquel jay prye de prendre la peine daller vers 
6a BN, Ms Fr, 3329, to 154, Moy to d'Humieres, La Meilleraye, 9 April 1577. 
70 BN, Ms Fr, 3329, to 156, Tiercelin to d'Humieres, Amiens, 18 April 1577. 
71 BN, Ms Fr, 3329, to 164, Maineville to d'Humieres, Chenonceaux, 7 May 1577. 
12 Maineville was aided by Marion de Martimbosc, see BN, Ms Fr, 3329, to 171, Roncherolles 
to d'Humieres, Pont-Saint-Pierre, 26 May 1577. 
73 BN, Ms Fr, 3329, to 167, Moy, Tiercelin and the sieur de Sainte-Marie to d'Humieres, 14 
May 1577. Some of these leaguers had already held preliminary discussions at Blagny. 
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Iuy et masseurant quil vous fera bien amplement entendre sa negociation. Je fera 
le tous pour le service de dieu du Roy et particullierement pour notre repos. 74 
Little evidence exists to suggest that the Guise were involved in these activities beyond the 
fact that some of these men were familiars or were in direct service with the family. However, it was 
around this period that Maineville moved into Guise service. He had already made his reputation 
at Blois, where his call for non-catholic princes of the blood to be stripped of their accession rights 
earned him the hatred of Conde in particular. When the peace of Bergerac was signed in 
September 1577, proscribing all leagues and associations, Maineville was resident at the duc 
d'Aumale's chateau at Anet. He was provided with an early copy of the treaty by the duke and then 
communicated its contents to his colleagues: 
II nest pas question sinon d'aviser a ce coup si Peronne leur [the Huguenots] 
demeura et si nous logerons parmi nous nos ennemis desia [deja] tout offences 
contre nous mais surtout si nous confesserons dieu devant les hommes ou si le 
renierons, dieu nous face la grace de tenir mieux nos serments. 's 
Maineville thus appealed to religious sentiment in his call for the maintenance of the League. The 
League was founded on a principle and was not concerned with the details and specifics of a 
pragmatic religious pacification. Although there was little opposition to the new peace, which was 
less lenient to the protestants, Maineville's call had wide appeal and the League did not entirely 
disappear as the king had desired. 
One reason for Henri's willingness to keep the channels of communication open with 
Damville and the Huguenots in 1577 was his growing mistrust of the Guise. At the opening of the 
Estates-General the king made changes to the traditional order of precedence, in order to diminish 
Guise's prominence in the ceremony. 76 This was no manner in which to treat the victor of 
Dormans and it is no surprise that the duke failed to appear. " The diary of the duc de Nevers 
demonstrates that, during the royal sojourn at Blois, Guise was rarely present at the most secret 
councils of the king. Once Henri had legalised the League and placed himself at its head, Guise 
asked leave to go and begin its organisation in his gouvemement. Henri refused, fearing the 
dominance of Guise in Champagne and a consequent diminution of royal authority. 'B On 27 
74 BN, Ms Fr, 3329, to 169, Moy to d'Humibres, La Meilleraye, 24 May 1577. 
75 BN, Ms Fr, 3329, to 171, Maineville to unknown recipient, Anet, October 1577, in cipher. 
76 Bouill6, III, p 42. The duc de Montpensier was elevated in status, see below. 
77 De Thou, VII, p 448. 
78 Recueil des pieces originales concernant la tenue des Etats-Gcneraux, 111, p 32. Guise 
finally left court on 7 March 1577. 
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December 1576 the king frankly confided his suspicions to his closest advisers-79 He obviously 
felt it safer to have the duke at court where he could better observe his activities. Guise found his 
position at court increasingly untenable as even his brother-in-law, Montpensier, had joined the 
politique faction. Montpensier had much to gain from his political break from the uhra-catholics. He 
was elevated in the order of seniority at court ceremonials, having being recently triumphant in his 
battle over precedence with Guise, which had been under way since 1575.80 More serious was 
the continued hatred that the queen mother harboured for the Guise: 
la Royne courroussa contre Monsieur de Guise, qui'iI vouloit la guerre, et qu'iI y 
en avoit beaucoup qui la desiroient, et qu'iI ne la falloit faire 81 
While negotiations sponsored by Catherine continued with the Huguenots and their allies, a 
desultory campaign was fought in the South, which both sides lacked the necessary resources to 
prosecute effectively. On returning to Champagne Guise was once again forced to borrow money 
in order to pay his troops, using his own plate as a guarantee. This only compounded his 
already serious debt problem. He owed, among other obligations, 100,0001 to the duc d'Aumale 
and a further 24,0001 to his friend and mercenary captain, Christophe de Bassompierre. When 
peace was finally signed Guise made little protest, partly because the terms were favourable to the 
catholics but also because of his own financial plight. In July 1577 Antoinette de Bourbon 
complained that his rights were so extensively alienated that he "ne peut tirer un sol de son 
revenu". 84 The pragmatic attitude to the peace of Bergerac was also prevalent throughout France. 
The humiliating peace of Beaulieu had been expunged and once more protestantism north of the 
Loire remained weak and beleaguered. BS Guise's own interest now turned to international affairs. 
The Search for a Cause 1578-84. 
In July 1577 Don John seized Namur with the aim of organising a new campaign against the 
States-General. In November he sent emissaries to Guise, who was stationed on the frontier, 
79 Ibid, p 31. Nevers was himself not overtly hostile to the Guise as he too favoured a warlike 
policy. 
80 Ibid, p 60. 
81 Ibid, p 53. 
82 Bouilie, III, p 62. 
013 [bid, p 50. 
84 BN, Ms Fr, 3338, fo 86, Antoinette de Bourbon to the duchesse de Nemours, Joinville, 1 
July 1577. 
11 Benedict, Rouen during the Wars of Religion, pp 152-3. 
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asking for troops - Guise was glad to oblige. " Likewise, the States-General of the Low Countries 
appealed for outside help. D'Anjou was approached and he promised to do his best to prevent 
Guise from aiding the Spanish further. 87 By November 1577 Guise had returned to Paris, where 
he set about reinforcing his links with the city hierarchy. He arranged the huge festivities at the 
h6tel de Guise for the marriage of his servant, Louis de Hacqueville, sieur de Vicourt, to the 
daughter of Claude Marcel. The Hacqueville and Marcel families were representatives of the 
ultramontane faction of the Parisian elite. "' 
Spanish attempts to stir up factionalism in France and divert French attention from the 
revolt in the Netherlands are well documented. The duc de Guise, far from being a traitor to the 
patrie, acted in the same way as other princes - with the good of his own house in the forefront of 
his mind, and not tied the to interest of either Valois or Habsburg. The Spanish made approaches 
to Henri de Navarre, and paid pensions to noblemen in Guyenne and to the protestant mercenary 
captain, John Casimir. 89 Henri de Montmorency-Damville courted both Spain and Savoy in the 
1580s out of financial necessity. 90 Indeed the Spanish hoped to create a catholic malcontent 
alliance between Guise and Montmorency. The Spanish ambassador, Juan de Vargas Mexia, 
reported to Madrid in March 1578 that Guise would make an ideal ally since he was out of favour 
at court and heavily in debt. Following the excitement of Don John's crushing victory at Gembloux 
(January 1578), there was even talk of an invasion of England supported by Guise, discussed when 
Guise met Vargas again in April. However, these talks had no political consequences. It was 
d'Anjou's flight from the French court in February and the danger that he would raise an army to 
assist the Dutch that made an alliance with Guise even more imperative for Philip. "' 
The duke found the offers of Spanish assistance welcome because his status was under 
increasing pressure at the court. Tensions came to a head on 27 April 1578 when three of the 
86 P. O. de Törne, "Philippe II et Henri de Guise: Le debut de leurs relations", Revue 
historique, 1931, p 324; Constant, Les Guises, p 103; Bouille, III, pp 63-5. These soldiers 
may have simply deserted the French army because of arrears of pay and in any case 
their transfer relieved Guise of the problem of unpaid troops remaining in his own 
gouvernement. The Spanish were desperate for help as they had reached the financial and 
military nadir in the autumn of 1577, see G. Parker, The Dutch Revolt, London, 1985, p 
187. 
87 M. P. Holt, The duke of Anjou and the politique struggle during the Wars of Religion, 
Cambridge, 1986, p 93. 
On the magnificence of this occasion, see Bouille, III, p 65; L'Estoile, Journal du regne de 
Henri Ill, p 157. On the Marcel family, see B. Diefendorff, Paris City Councillors in the 
Sixteenth Century: the Politics of Patrimony, New Jersey, 1983, pp 95-111. 
89 Constant, Les Guises, pp 105-110. 
90 J. Davies, "Neither Politique nor Patriot? Henri de Montmorency and Philip II, 1582-1589", 
Historical Journal, 1991. 
91 Torne, "Philippe II et Henri de Guise", pp 326-9. 
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92 king's mignons were slain in a duel with a group defending the honour of the duc de Guise. 
Henri was mortified by the deaths of his favourites and the entire Guise family, accompanied by 
the duc de Lorraine, left court on 3 May in great disaccord with the king. The violence did not stop 
there and on 21 July another mignon, Saint-Megrin, was attacked and killed by thirty assailants in 
the we du Louvre. The duc de Mayenne was immediately suspected of a revenge attack for 
improper advances that Saint-Megrin had made towards the duchesse de Guise 9' 
Guise was persona non grata at the court and he did not return until March 1579. 4 
Without access to the king's ear his crEditfell and his financial affairs became pressing. The whole 
question of noble finances and indebtedness is complicated and fraught with difficulty, as Denis 
Crouzet has shown 95 Clearly political and economic fortunes were closely intertwined. As Guise 
lost favour it is likely that he found it increasingly difficult to satisfy his creditors or raise new loans. 
In August 1578 the comt6 de Nanteuil had to be sold to Gaspard de Schomberg for 120,666 ecus 
and a further two seigneuries were sold to the duc de Lorraine in November 1581 for 288 
Moreover the duc de Guise was not the only member of. the family forced to alienate land. Charles 
d'Aumale, who had reached his majority in 1579, was immediately forced to sell the barony of Bec 
Crespin to Nicholas Rome, a major creditor, because he was "presse par les creanciers que feu 
monsieur son pere luy a laisse" 97 D'Aumale's position was especially acute as he was failing to 
achieve the same status that his father had enjoyed, most significantly lacking his own 
gouvernement. This was within the king's patronage and Henri was not foolish enough to allow the 
Guise to possess too many key posts. Excepting the spectacular rise of Joyeuse and d'Epemon, 
Henri was a shrewd and subtle manipulator of royal patronage. He had already demoted the duc 
de Guise in ceremonies. In 1579 the duc d'Aumaie lost a precedence case against the duc de 
Nevers in the conseil priv6, which would have been inconceivable ten years before 98 Henri III also 
subverted the entrenched Guise position at the court by undermining the rights and jurisdiction of 
the offices they held. Henri de Guise had inherited the office of grand maitre from his father. The 
92 Bouilie, III, p 70; L'Estoile, Journal du regne de Henri Ill, p 186. Strictly speaking these men 
were neither champions of the duc de Guise nor in his retinue. He was acquainted with 
them and offered his protection after the duel. 
13 L'Estoile, Journal du regne de Henri lll, pp 190-1. 
96 Constant, Les Guises, p 108. 
95 D. Crouzet, "Recherches sur la crise de I'aristocratie en France au XVI° siecle: les dettes 
de la Maison de Nevers", Histoire, 6conomie et societ6,1982. 
96 Bouille, III, p 50. As usual if land had to be alienated it was sold to trustworthy 
acquaintances. The son of the purchaser, Georges de Schomberg, had been one of the 
pro-Guise duellists in May 1578. 
97 BN, Ms Fr, 18246, to 161. See also, Lechevalier, Notice historique sur la baronnie du Bec, 
p 12. 
98 BN, Ms Fr, 18246, fos 116-61. 
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king managed to lessen the importance of this office, and the power of the duke in the court 
hierarchy still further by increasing the status and competence of the pr6v6t6 de I'h6tel, and by 
creating the new office of grand maitre des c6r6monies. When the duc d'Elbeuf became grand 
6cuyer on the resignation of his father-in-law, Henri simply created a rival office to limit the 
patronage available to him. " Henri was not intent on an open break with the Guise but he did 
want to restrain their influence. 1°° The king seems to have a 
more 
affectionate relationship with 
the duc de Mayenne than with the duc de Guise. This was either out of genuine affection or an 
attempt to undermine family solidarity by fostering fraternal jealousy. Thus it was Mayenne who 
received major commands between 1577 and 1586 against the Huguenots in the South, and Henri 
was glad to consent to his accession to the office of admiral in 1578.10' 
The prospects of att aining honour through royal service were bleak. Guise therefore, like 
thousands of other noblemen, looked elsewhere for opportunities to further his career. Service with 
another prince would raise Guise's stature and demonstrate his power and merits to what he 
perceived as an ungrateful and poorly counselled monarch. Guise, like d'Anjou, who felt stilled by 
his role at court, saw military glory and prestige abroad as a means of raising his status in France 
and improving his bargaining position with the king. Guise also began to show greater interest in 
international affairs after the peace of Bergerac, while always keeping his political options open. 
He now, rather belatedly, turned his attention to the plight of his aunt, Mary Stuart. He was 
encouraged in his interest by her emissary, John Leslie, bishop of Ross, who had arrived on the 
continent in 1574 to secure aid for Mary and her party in Scotland. He was given the office of 
suffragan and vicar-general of the diocese of Rouen by the cardinal de Bourbon in 1579.102 Guise 
was sincerely interested in helping his cousin and her son, James VI, but he was never committed 
to projects outside France to the detriment of his status in the kingdom. Similarly, a Spanish 
pension did not not make him a puppet of Spanish policy and, in addition, it not only raised his 
financial credit but also made him more dangerous in the eyes of the monarchy, and thus improved 
his bargaining power with the king. The dynastic and historical links of the Guise meant that they 
favoured intervention in Scotland while Philip was more concerned with England. The Spanish 
monarch's relations with England were complicated, wanting to avoid war while at the same time 
preventing English intervention in the Netherlands. Similarly he was ambivalent in his motives in 
giving pensions to French noblemen. He was perfectly happy to have someone like Guise as 
another'carte frangaise', capable of diverting Valois attention away from the Low Countries but he 
99 J. Boucher, La cour de Henri l/l, Rennes, 1986, pp 59-60. 
100 The king continued to be generous. Mayenne and d'Elbeuf received 100,000/ and 100,000 
ecus respectively on their marriages. Guise received a gift of 500,000 ecus in 1582 at a 
time when the king was especially frightened about his dealings with Spain - see Boucher, 
Societe et mentalites aufour de Henri lll, I, p 283. 
101 L'Estoile, Journal du regne de Henri lll, p 187. 
102 Dictionary of National Biography, vol XI, p 975. 
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would have been horrified at the prospect of a successful Guise invasion of the British Isles, 
regardless of whether this was designed to restore catholicism. Such an attack was under 
discussion and was fully supported by Don John, who hoped to marry Mary Stuart and thereby 
acquire a kingdom, until his death in October 1578. This only served to increase Philip's jealousy 
of his half-brother, fostered by Antonio Perdz. 1Q3 
The proposals for a joint venture against England inevitably drew the duke to his extensive 
possessions in Normandy. During the summer of 1578 he paid his first visit to Eu. The town 
organised a magnificent entry for the duke and his large retinue, and during his stay he pledged 
to build a new family residence. 104 Seeing the strategic importance of Eu as a port on the 
Channel coast, the duke would strive in the coming years to improve its anchorage, enabling it to 
receive vessels of up to 300 tonneaux. 105 At the beginning of 1582 he met the bishop of Ross 
and a number of Jesuits in the town, where he granted them permission for the establishment of 
an English Jesuit college, donating £100 towards the cost. Eu served as a training centre for priests 
destined for England and acted as a magnet for English catholic exiles. 106 In order to finance 
these diverse projects Guise obtained royal permission to begin a redaction of the custom and 
privileges of the comte, enabling him to rationalise and reassert his rights and dues. 107 He further 
provided for the defence of Eu in 1583 by replacing the robin, Charles de La Chaussee, as 
governor, with Nicholas de Lannoy, sieur d'Amdraucourt, gentilhomme de sa chambre. 108 
The time that Guise spent at Eu fuelled speculation that he was behind the resistance 
mounted by the Estates of Normandy in 1578 and 1579, against royal attempts to increase the 
taille. Jean-Marie Constant has rejected any Guise involvement in the defiance of the royal will, 
manifested by the Estates of Brittany, Burgundy and Normandy. 10fl The Guise were always 
convenient targets for suspicion in time of crisis, especially for their enemies and the crown. 
Undoubtedly, the Guise did play a role in the disputes in 1578-9 but their political goals and the 
103 Constant, Les Guises, pp 108-10. Tame, "Philippe II et Henri de Guise", pp 333-4, also 
notes that Philip's attitude to the projected invasion depended heavily on Spanish success 
in the Low Countries. The pension given to Guise has been estimated at 10,000 ecus per 
quarter. 
104 Bouill6,111, p 74 n 2. Building began almost immediately but was interrupted in 1588 and 
even by 1661 only half of the chateau was complete, see P. Seydoux, La Normandie des 
chateaux et des manoirs, Paris, 1989, p 108. 
105 J. Darsel, "L'Amirautd en Normandie: I- Amirautd d'Eu-Le Trdport", Annales de Normandie, 
1969, p 269. 
106 F. Fabre, "The English College at Eu, 1582-1592", Catholic Historical Review, 1951. 
107 AN, KK, 1088, fo 170. 
106 ADSM, El, 486/1, to 35,29 October 1583. Lannoy had credit and lands in Normandy 
through his marriage to Madeleine Muterel, grand-daughter and beneficiary of Jacques, a 
conseiller in the parlement of Rouen (1544-60), see Frondeville, Conseillers, p 362. 
109 Constant, Les Guises, p 87. 
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extent of their involvement is ambiguous. Clearly, the governor of Burgundy, the duc de Mayenne, 
had much to gain from supporting the Estates of Burgundy. His open support of the province 
against the crown largely compensated for the low credit and status he had enjoyed there. 1° 
The conflict with Burgundy in May 1578 provided a warning to the king of the problems he 
was likely to face when the Norman Estates gathered in the autumn. Moreover, the Burgundians 
had dispatched emissaries to urge the Normans to join them in forcing the king to reduce taxation. 
These entreaties found a receptive audience because taxes levied without the consent of the 
Estates, undertaken in 1574 and 1576 as an emergency financial measure, threatened to become 
habitual. "' Before the opening of the Estates there was considerable unrest in lower Normandy 
against tax officials and, as a result, the king decided to send secretary of state, Pomponne de 
Bellievre, in order to placate the assembly. 12 The threat of an increased tax burden and the 
continuing infringement of provincial rights made the elections for the Estates of 1578 more than 
usually important. The election of Guise clients and servants to the assembly is clear evidence of 
Guise influence in the province. It was also an acknowledgement that these men had the protection 
of powerful malcontents, making them more effective deputies in the face of intense royal pressure. 
The convocation of the Second Estate of the bailliage of Rouen was dominated by clients of the 
duc d'Aumale. 13 The first elector present was Marc, sieur de Vaudesart, the maitre d'h6tel of 
Andre de Rubemprr. 14 Also attending was Charles de Croismare, sieur de Saint-Jean, who had 
progressed from being a man-at-arms for the baron de Clt res in 1563 to an appointment in the 
household of the duc d'Aumale. 15 The other elector was Barth6lemy de Limoges, sieur de Saint- 
Just and maitre des eaux et f6rets of the bailliage of Rouen. 16 The Limoges were long standing 
servants of the Guise, and once again provide a reminder of the importance of the remnants of the 
following of the Brez6 to the construction of the Guise affinity. Barthelemy had married Jeanne 
P6tremol in 1565, thus allying himself with one of the most senior families in Guise service. "7 
He possessed more direct links with the Guise, serving as an archer in the company of Claude duc 
10 Drouot, Mayenne et la Bourgogne, I, p 103, 
"' On this and following, see J. R. Major, Representative Government in Early Modern 
France, New Haven and London, 1980, pp 213-15. 
12 Lettres de Henri 111, IV, pp 92,97 
113 Cahiers des Etats de Normandie sous le regne de Henri lll, I, p 297. 
114 BN, Ms Fr, 21534, to 2129,16 July 1574. 
"5 Frondeville, Presidents, p 206; BN, Ms Fr, 5467, to 247. 
"6 Frondeville, Conseillers, p 620. 
117 Frondeville, Presidents, pp 177-9. 
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d'Aumale, in 1565.118 Etienne de Limoges, sieur de Prunas, an archer of the marquis d'Elbeuf 
in 1569, was noted in the muster roll as "demeurant pres d'lvry", suggesting that he was a vassal 
of the duc d'Aumale. 19 No evidence exists to suggest that these two electors were present to 
do the bidding of the duc d'Aumale. They elected Nicholas de Vipart, baron de Becthomas, younger 
brother of Claude who had been the most important Norman in the duc d'Aumale's military retinue 
in the 1560s. The Vipart were a key family in the d'Aumale affinity and Claude de Vipart, as an 
officer in the company of the duc d'Aumale, recruited from among his own clients men like 
Barthelemy de Limoges to serve as gendarmes. The role of Vipart as both patron and client is 
confirmed by the fact that when Vipart was unable to represent the bailliage of Rouen at the 
provincial Estates in 1586, it was Limoges who took his place. tZO D'Aumale was not in control of 
the election of deputies or behind the defiance of royal commands but because his affinity was so 
deeply involved he had an interest in and information about the outcome of the Estates. The 
prominence of Croismare, Vipart and Limoges in the Holy League in Normandy during the 1580s 
demonstrates that these men had a long history of opposition to the policies of Henri III and further 
suggests the high degree of political activity in which members of the Guise affinity in Normandy 
were engaged. 
When the Estates of Normandy finally met in Rouen on 17 November 1578, the 
representatives of the upper Norman bail//ages could claim strong affiliation with the ultramontane 
faction in the province. '2' Charles de Goutimesnil represented the nobility of the Caux, a function 
he had fulfilled at the Estates-General of Blois on the intercession of Jean de Moy. Francois de 
Fumechon, sieur de Guerneville, representing the nobility of the bailliage of Gisors, was a member 
of the Roncherolles affinity and had been present as a tuteurto the children of deceased Philippe 
de Roncherolles at the partage of 1570. '22 The Guise had clients elected for the Third Estate. 
Mathieu Dupont, the greffier and later receveur of Elbeuf, represented the vicomtd of Pont- 
Audemer. 123 The vicomte of Neufchatel returned Christophe Cherie, who came from a locally 
important family which performed a number of services for the duc d'Aumale. 124 
18 BN, Clair, 261, to 1729, muster roll of 50 men-at-arms and 74 archers, Chalons-sur-Saone, 
5 June 1565. 
119 BN, Ms Fr, 21529, to 1930, muster roll of 33 men-at-arms and 39 archers, Chinon, 6 
February 1569. 
120 Farin, Histoire de Rouen, II, p 410. 
121 For a list of deputies, see Cahiers des Etats de Normandie sous le regne de Henri lll, I, 
pp 310-13. 
122 ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1,341,20 July 1570. 
123 ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1 360,11 June 1580; 2E1 362,5 May 1581. 
124 Nicole Cherie was vicomte of Neufchatel in 1569 and of Aumale in 1574. Pierre, who lived 
at Aumale, acted as a guarantor in the financial transactions of Claude duc d'Aumale, see 
chapter two above. 
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Ultra-catholic candidates did exceptionally well in upper Normandy, reflecting the strength 
of catholicism in the region and reinforcing the impression that those already associated with 
political activity in opposition to royal policy were perceived as more capable of withstanding royal 
pressure. The Guise were out of favour with the king and Mayenne had already indicated his 
support for provincial institutions. Candidates from the Guise affinity or supporters of 
ultramontanism could be relied upon to resist royal pressure. Similarly, Huguenots and servants of 
the duc d'Anjou provided a rallying point for the discontented. Like the ultra-catholics they could 
in no way be accused of being "king's men". In lower Normandy protestantism remained strong and 
the duc d'Anjou possessed the duchy of Alengon and a large clientele. The Huguenot, Jacques du 
Pont-Bellanger, was elected for the Second Estate of the bailliage of Caen. t"' Jean de La Haye, 
sieur de Chantelou, representing the nobility of the bailliage of Evreux was another malcontent and 
a member of d'Anjou's household. He was raising troops in the summer of 1578 for service with 
the duke in the Low Countries. ' 
Despite the presence of Bellievre at the Estates and the special address he delivered, the 
cahier "of remonstrances presented to the king was strongly worded. Deputies were particularly 
angered by royal violations of the privileges of the province enshrined in the fourteenth-century 
Norman Charter. They demanded the reduction of taxation to the levels set under Louis XII. 127 
Henri made small concessions in his demands for money and ordered the Estates to reconvene 
in March 1579 for an extraordinary session. On this occasion the king sent the marechal de 
Montmorency as a special commissioner to accompany Bellievre. Meanwhile, Antoine Seguier, a 
maitre des requetes, was dispatched to lower Normandy to explain the royal position to local 
notables. 128 Here, urgent action was essential because opposition to tax increases was more 
violent and threatened to develop into peasant revolt. Jacques de Matignon, governor of lower 
Normandy, reported to Bellievre on 25 November 1578 about: 
les menees et praticques... qui se faisoit par nos voisins qui ont monstre le chemin 
aux autres... Ies deputez des bailliages de Caen et de Cotentin ont este ceulx qui 
ont donne coeur et persuade les autres de prendre la resolution... Je fuz adverty 
125 For preliminary information on the Pont-Bellanger, see Chenaye-Desbois, XVI, p 114; 
ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1 334,11 and 12 March 1567. 
126 By 1582 he was a chambellan ordinaire of the duke, see ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1 365, 
4 June 1582. The depredations of the 6,000 troops who marched through Normandy only 
added local discontent, see Bouquet (ed), Documents concernant 1'histoire de Neufchatel- 
en-Bray, p 25. 
127 Major, Representative Government, p 214; Cahiers des Etats de Normandie sous le regne 
de Henri 111, I, pp 6-8. The destruction caused by d'Anjou's troops was also mentioned. 
128 M. Foisil, "Harangue et rapport d'Antoine S6guier, commissaire pour le Roi en Basse- 
Normandie (1579-1580)", Annales de Normandie, 1976; Lettres de Henri lll, IV, pp 99-100. 
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quits estoient avoir beaucoup de bonnes instructions de la coste de la 
Bretagne. 12' 
In December Henri wrote to his officers in the strife torn province ordering them to apprehend all 
trouble makers. He thanked Malignon for preventing a disturbance at Coutances and wrote to him 
again concerning more serious trouble: 
Je cray que vous avez bien peu entendre ce qui est advenu a Caen d'un nombre 
de six ou sept cens paisans qui se sont presentez aux esleuz, ausquelz itz ont 
remis et rejectd desdaigneusement le mandemans qui leur avoient este envoiez 
pour I'assiette des tailles... disant qu'itz n'avoient aucun moien de 
payer ... empescher de toute votre pouvoir telles desobeissances en donnant ordre 
[a] ceuix de ma noblesse qui semblement [es favoriser, et donner ceste hardiesse 
au peupie. 130 
Henri was fearful that Normandy would provide a bad example to other provinces and he 
was determined to avert any large scale unrest. In order to ensure that royal commands were 
effectively enforced, trusted lieutenants were dispatched from the court. Matignon was promoted 
to the office of marechal and Henri replaced him as governor of lower Normandy with one of his 
mignons, Frangois d'O, the surintendant des finances. In March 1579, Nicholas de Grimouville, 
baron de Larchant, the captain of the gardes frangaises, was sent to garrison Le Havre. 13' Henri's 
concessions at the Norman Estates of March 1579 -a small reduction in the taille and a 
confirmation of the Norman Charter - failed to put a stop to all the disturbances. '32 The king 
increasingly blamed rogue elements in the Norman nobility. He was delighted and surprised to 
discover that one potential suspect, Frangois de Roncherolles, sieur de Maineville, was innocent 
in this respect. Instead, his suspicions fell on servants of his brother, particularly on Jean de La 
Haye, sieur de Chantelou, and Henri de Silly, sieur de La Roche-Guyon. Both men were involved 
in raising troops for d'Anjou's abortive campaign the Low Countries. The presence of these ill- 
disciplined troops further inflamed the anger of the peasantry, and the king saw them as a potential 
threat to the stability of the province. La Roche-Guyon was raising troops in the vicinity of Rouen 
in December 1578 and compelling them to swear an oath of loyalty to d'Anjou, an act which was 
widely interpreted as an attempt to form a new league in Normandy rather than as part of the 
129 BN, Ms Fr, 15905, fo 199, Matignon to Bellievre, 25 November 1578. 
130 Lettres de Henri 111, IV, p 140. 
131 Lettres de Henri !! l, IV, p 170. Both d'O and Larchant were Normans. 
132 Major, Representative Governement, p 214. 
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requirements for service in Flanders. '" La Roche-Guyon was a protestant and suspected of 
subterfuges in collusion with the representative for the Second Estate of Coutances in March 1579, 
Simon de Piennes, sieur de Grainville, "qui est de la nouvelle religion et recogneu avoir manyd 
beaucoup de factions en ceste partie lä"'3` Above all, the king feared the controlling hand of his 
brother who had returned to his duchy of Alengon in January 1579, after the collapse of his 
expedition to the Low Countries. Bellibvre was immediately dispatched by the king to obtain 
assurances of d'Anjou's loyalty and question his links with the troubles in Normandy. The English 
ambassador who, because of the projected marriage of d'Anjou to Elizabeth I, had a close interest 
in the aff airs of the duke, reported that: 
the Duke of Guise and Maine have no part in these popular emotions... Those of 
the best credit In Normandy resort daily to Monsieur, and the king is informed that 
they desire his protection. 135 
D'Anjou had thus acquired an ideal pretext for another revolt. That he did not seize it was due to 
the fact that much of his princely ambition had been satisfied by the generous provisions of the 
Peace of Monsieur. Above all he was intent on pursuing a kingdom for himself and he needed the 
king's blessing to marry Elizabeth. In August 1579 he departed for England but his troublesome 
Norman servants did not accompany him and rural violence failed to diminish. Henri issued orders 
for the arrest of La Haye, La Roche-Guyon and Pont-Betlanger: 
pour grandes lautes commises contre depuys la tenue desdictz Estatz, qui n'ont 
rien en communs avec le faict d'iceulx Estatz combien qu'ilz essaient de le faire 
croire auftrement affin de couvrir leurfautte particuUiere par l'auctorite d'une grande 
compagnie. '' 
La Roche-Guyon was in great danger, not only being accused of plotting to seize Rouen but also 
charged with plotting to poison the king. 137 
133 ACR, B, 4,11 December 1578. 
134 Lettres de Henri /1/, IV, pp 164-5,177. 
135 CSPF, 1578-9, p 431. D'Anjou admitted that an association was formed for the purpose 
of service in the Netherlands and he was certainly solicited by the local nobility for his 
protection. However, he complained that the disobedience of the Estates prevented him 
receiving his pension, which was assigned on the revenue of the gOneralit6 of Caen, see 
BN, Ms Fr, 15811, fos 35-7, Bellievre to Henri III, Caen, 10 March 1579. 
Lettres de Henri Ill, IV, p 268. ' 
36 
137 ACR, A, 20,22 August 1579. 
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Declared outlaws and bereft of the protection of their patron these men feared for their 
lives. Indeed, it is possible that d'Anjou disavowed their actions and abandoned them to their fate. 
La Haye and La Roche-Guyon, realising the danger they were In, fled Normandy and headed east 
to offer their services to the ducs de Lorraine and de Guise. This might seem an odd decision 
considering that La Roche-Guyon was a leading Calvinist nobleman. However, it Is no surprise to 
see strict religious divisions once again confounded and also provides some clues as to why so 
many of d'Anjou's "politique party" found it easy to join the ultramontane Holy League in 1584. The 
ability to change patrons did not mean that loyalty was so weak as to have been completely 
cynical. On close inspection the flight to Lorraine was logical, both men knowing they would receive 
refuge and a sympathetic welcome. La Roche-Guyon's younger brother, the Comte de Rochepot, 
was a favourite of Charles III, duc de Lorraine. The outlaws were soon receiving support from two 
protestant clients of the Guise, Robert Heu, sleur de Malleloy-en-Lorraine, and Pierre de Momay, 
sieur de Bruhy and brother of Duplessis-Momay. 138 Efforts by Guise, who remained persona non 
grata a& court, to attract Huguenot and politique malcontents to his service seemed to be 
succeeding. With this end in mind he had been in contact with protestant leaders, and was 
prepared to guarantee their freedom of worship. Senior Huguenot figures like Navarre, La Noue 
and Duplessis-Mornay were not inclined to trust their old adversary. 139 Similar moves to interest 
d'Anjou in an alliance of malcontents also foundered. 10 But La Haye's reason for making the 
journey to Lorraine had nothing to do with his position in the household of d'Anjou. He had his own 
links with the Guise affinity which facilitated a smooth transfer to Guise service. He was the son 
of Louise de Tiercelin and therefore the nephew of Adrien de Tiercelin. His marriage to Louise Le 
Picart made him the brother-in-law of Christophe de Bassompierre, close friend of the duc de 
Guise. "' 
This unholy alliance of malcontents, which included the Guise family and John Casimir, was 
invited by the duc de Lorraine to spend carnival at Nancy in 1580 and conspirators hoped to 
receive financial assistance from Spain. 142 The desperate need of Guise for allies demonstrates his 
search for a cause with which to augment his honour, and to show that the king could continue to 
ignore him only at his peril. Guise faced a series of dilemmas which would onlyLrelieved by the 
constitutional crisis created by d'Anjou's death in 1584. To help his aunt, to pay off his debts and Z 
maintain his status he had to regain influence at court by making his absence a source of 
distress for the crown. To do this he searched for alliances both at home and abroad. Personally 
138 Constant, p 111, remains vague on their motives and their Guise connections. 
IN Memoires et Correspondence de Duplessis-Mornay, 12 vols, Paris, 1824-5, vol I, pp 122-3. 
10 CSPF, 1578-9, p 414. 
141 ADSM, Tabelionage, 2E1,351,5 September 1575,25 September 1575. 
142 An attack on Strasbourg was mooted, although the purpose of this strategy is unclear, see 
Constant, p 112; L. Daville, Les pretensions de Charles Ill duc de Lorraine A la couronne 
de France, Paris, 1909, pp 24-31. 
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he had no qualms about talking to his former enemies, whether catholic moderates or Huguenots. 
However, he had to be vary careful about alienating his own ultramontane clients who formed the 
backbone of his following and therefore of his power. 
It was no surprise when Guise eventually returned to court on 16 March 1580. 
Undoubtedly, Henri was increasingly concerned by Guise's plotting and needed his support as 
conflict was once again imminent in the South-West. Contact between the two men had been 
helped by the presence of Louis II cardinal de Guise, in Paris. It was a triumphant return for Guise, 
who was accompanied by 1,500 horsemen. 13 He was happy to return to the centre of power 
and was immediately named as deputy to the duc d'Anjou, recently created lieutenant-general of 
the kingdom. 
Dlverging Interests: The Building of New Family Relationships 
The decline in the confessional aspect of politics after the Peace of Bergerac in 1577 diminished 
the opportunities for noble youth to forge a career in arms. 144 Indeed, well before this date Guise 
hatred and anger at individual Huguenots had been satisfied by the assassination of Coligny in 
1572. The Guise family was now represented by a new youthful generation, many of whom were 
too young to remember the paranoia and insecurities of the family in the 1560s. Complete solidarity 
in the pursuit and defence of family interest was no longer so necessary. The creation of distinct 
but related branches of the same house was inevitable as blood ties weakened and the political 
situation demanded more independent strategies. While the duc de Guise was out of favour at court 
it was even more essential for d'Elbeuf, d'Aumale and Mayenne to pursue their individual careers. 
Charles de Lorraine, duc d'Aumale, had more reason than his older cousin to be 
dissatisfied with his treatment by the king. Although he had inherited the office of grand veneurfrom 
his father, he was given no gouvernement even though he was twenty-three in 1579 and had 
reached his majority. The growth of his affinity in Picardy in the 1570s and the efforts he had made 
to patronise leaguers inevitably made the province the ideal prize of his ambition. Granting such 
a wish would have been the height of royal folly. The continuing interest of the duc d'Anjou in aiding 
the revolt in the Netherlands meant that this was more than ever a key royal office. There is some 
evidence to suggest that d'Aumale was either more pious than other members of his family or 
strove more cynically to exploit ultramontane feeling. His education at the University of Pont A 
Mousson, founded by Charles cardinal de Lorraine, certainly contributed to his rigid orthodoxy. His 
hopes of advancement must have been high on reaching his majority since his cousin and close 
143 BouiII6, III, p 82. 
'44 The decline in the confessional aspects of high politics after 1577 was first elucidated by 
J. W. Thompson earlier this century, in The Wars of Religion in France 1559-1576: The 
Huguenots, Catherine de Medici and Philip ll, Chicago, 1909. 
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friend, Philippe-Emmanuel de Lorraine, duc Mercoeur, was the brother-in-law and confidant of the 
king. "5 
In November 1579 the prince de Conde, frustrated by the failure of his peaceable efforts 
to regain effective control of the governorship of Picardy, seized La Fere. The king did little to force 
his withdrawal, sending the queen mother to negotiate his submission. '" Conde infuriated the 
local population by ravaging the countryside and attempting to seize Doullens. The prince 
complained to Henri that d'Aumale was trying to resurrect the Picard League in contravention of 
the Peace of Bergerac. "' This claim is difficult to substantiate and Henri seems to have ignored 
it. On the 15 June an army finally left Paris to reduce La Fbre after Conde had gone to the Empire 
to recruit mercenaries. The royal army was commanded by the mardchal de Matignon and 
contained the flower of Henri's court favourites: Jean-Louis de La Valette (d. 1642), later duc 
d'Epemon, and Anne de Joyeuse (d. 1587). "8 This force was joined by a significant number of 
Picard leaguers, such as Rubempre and Tiercelin. Conde's suspicions about the resurrection of the 
Catholic League seem to have been justified, and according to the Tuscan ambassador it was 
d'Aumale who led this contingent: 
II duca di Aumale ha mandati a chiamare i suoi amici, e massime delle leghe di 
Normandia e Piccardia, delle quali e capo; credesi per il piü non avra gran seguito, 
per essere la piü parte delle dette leghe di ordinanze degli uomini d'arme, le quali 
sono comandante di andare a quel campo; e quanto ai volontarii, non sono troppo 
caldi. 19 
The English ambassador confirms in his dispatches that d'Aumale was at the head of the League, 
and further speculated that he was likely to receive the governorship of Picardy in recognition of 
his exploits at La Fbre. 150 The siege went well but d'Aumale was furious when Matignon, perhaps 
as a means to prevent the leaguers making political capital out of storming La Fere, offered the 
145 Anselme, III, 793-5. D'Aumale's sister, Catherine, was the third wife of Nicholas de Lorraine 
(d. 1577), comte de Vauddmont and duc de Mercoeur, and therefore step-mother of 
Philippe-Emmanuel. Philippe-Emmanuel's younger brother, Charles, future cardinal de 
Vaudemont, had been the valet de chambre of the duc d'Aumale and his companion at 
university in 1574, see BN, Ms Fr, 22441, fo 82. 
De Thou, VIII, pp 394-5. Conde had received other places of surety in lieu of Peronne at 
the Peace of Bergerac but had not given up hope of taking Picardy. 
"' Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, VII, p 250, n 1; De Thou, VIII, p 395. 
L'Estoile, Journal du regne de Henri Ill, p 249, adds that this departure of the mignons to 
war was a cause for mockery in Paris. 
1D Negociations diplomatiques de la France avec la Toscane, G. Canestri and A. Desjardins 
(eds), 5 vols, Paris, 1859-86, vol IV, p 333. 
150 CSPF, 1579-80, pp 384,428. 
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beleaguered garrison generous terms. The enraged duke left camp without taking his leave of the 
royal commander, irate that he had been stopped from striking a blow to the pride of a rival. 15' 
D'Aumale must have realised that he had little chance of being offered the governorship 
of Picardy. Henri showed throughout the La Fire crisis that he preferred to come to an 
accommodation with Conde than allow d'Aumale to augment his reputation with the Picard nobility. 
The absence of royal favour did not engender a sharp decline In the fortunes of the d'Aumale. The 
Guise still maintained a great deal of influence over church patronage. By using this shrewdly it 
enabled them to provide for the younger brother of the duc d'Aumale, Claude II de Lorraine (1562- 
91), the chevalier d'Aumale, without dividing the inheritance of their father and financially weakening 
the ducal house. In 1572 the cardinal de Guise resigned the abbey of Bec to the chevalier 
d'Aumale, his nephew. This abbey was worth 24,0001 a year in 1576, twice the value of the 
revenue of the duchy of Aumale. '52 He was able to acquire smaller abbeys in commendam such 
as the abbey of Auchy at Aumale itself. On the death of the cardinal de Guise in 1578 he inherited 
the abbey of Trois-Fontaines in the diocese of Chälons and that of Bourges-en-Deols near 
Bourges. '5,3 The d'Aumale branch remained influential by virtue of the financial power it could 
wield, but it lacked the honour of major royal office. By building up his clientele among the 
discontented Picard nobility, d'Aumale was partially able to offset his political misfortune at court 
by strengthening his provincial power base. 
The career of Charles de Lorraine, marquis d'Elbeuf, took an entirely different direction from 
that of his cousin and brother-in-law. While d'Aumale failed to make an impression at court, the 
fortunes of the marquis improved immensely in the same period. His status and wealth were 
increased by the inheritance of the Rieux lands in Normandy. Moreover, the options he had for 
finding allies were greater than his cousin because he was related to families among the protestant 
elite, the Rieux, the Laval and the Coligny, through his mother Louise de Rieux. As he straddled 
the religious and political divide so clearly, it was no surprise that he entered the service of the duc 
d'Anjou. When the envoys of the States-General arrived at Tours on 6 September 1580 to discuss 
once more a treaty with d'Anjou, the marquis d'Elbeul was present on the duke's council. '` 
When the duke agreed to provide an army to assist the rebels, it was d'Elbeuf who was chosen as 
his lieutenant-general. '55 D'Anjou had a little military experience but d'Elbeuf, three years his junior 
15' De Thou, VIII, p 397. 
152 See chapter two above. 
'53 Lettres de Henri lll, III, p 499, IV, p 70. 
Holt, The duke of Anjou, p 134. 
Documents concernant les relations entre le duc dAnjou et les Pays-Bas, P. Muller and 
A. Diegerick (eds), 5 vols, Utrecht, 1889-99, vol IV, pp 101-2. 
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at the age of twenty-four, was a complete novice. '56 D'Elbeuf's elevation was not made on purely 
military considerations. As a prince he would command respect but more importantly as a member 
of the Guise family with protestant connections he could expect to add viability to the concept that 
this army would be a 'union sacrde'. He could gather a substantial following from among Guise 
clients, while fighting alongside the large protestant contingent would create no problems. Paul de 
Coligny, comte de Laval, who commanded a large force of Bretons, was his relative. The two 
enjoyed revenues of the Rieux lands in Normandy jointly and amicably in anticipation of a 
partage. '57 
D'Anjou ordered the army, which was coming from all over France, to assemble in June 
1581 at Chateau-Thierry, part of his appanage. The duke and the marquis were both in their 
respective territories in Normandy in the spring of 1581, agreeing to rendezvous at Evreux in May. 
D'Elbeuf was accompanied by 500 gentlemen, and although this figure includes his own company 
of the ordonnance of about 75 men, it still represents a substantial following. ' D'Anjou raised 
his own troops by handing out commissions to his household officers, recruiting was therefore 
intense in Normandy from where many of these men originated. Prominent among them was 
Guillaume de Hautemer (d. 1613), sieur de Fervacques, the governor of the duchy of Alengon, 
president du conseil and premier gentilhomme de la chambre of the duc d'Anjou. 151 Another 
Norman captain was Jacques de Rouxel (1528-1607), sieur de M6davy, and lieutenant-general of 
the duchy of Alengon. 160 Along with the large Norman and protestant contingents there were more 
surprising participants, such as Claude de Bauffremont (1546-96), baron de Senecey, captain of 
Chalon and Auxonne, and a major servant of the duc de Guise. '6' Unfortunately, nothing is 
known about the following of the marquis. Recruitment would have been handled in the same way 
as by d'Anjou, through awarding commissions to trusted clients and household officers. The 
officers of his company included notable signatories of the Catholic League, like the lieutenant, 
156 Admittedly the conseil de guerre included more experienced captains, such as the 
mardchal de Cosse, Guillaume de Hautemer, sieur de Fervacques, and Claude de La 
Chätre. 
157 On the death of Coligny in 1586, d'Elbeuf became tuteur and curateur of his son, see 
Broussillon, La maison de Lava!, IV, pp 324-6. 
11 Documents concernant les relations entre le duc d'Anjou... et les Pays-Bas, IV, pp 65,74. 
159 D. B. F, XIHI, p 1191. 
160 V. des Digueres, Etude historique et gdnealogique sur les Rouxe! de M6davy-Grancey, 
Paris, 1870, p 36. 
18' He had signalled his support of the League as representative at the Estates of Blois in 
1576 and was first the guidon and then the lieutenant (1584) of the company of the duc 
de Guise, see D. B. F., V, p 918; F. Vindry, p 295. 
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Charles de Fouilleuse, and the guidon, Ponthus de Belletourriere'02The idea that it was d'Anjou 
alone who had the ability to create a 'union sacree' uniting the French nobility has some validity. 
D'Elbeuf's retinue was not a feudal levy and he was compelled to raise considerable funds 
in order to finance the expedition. Between June 1580 and June 1583 he sold rentes at Rouen 
constituted on his lands in Normandy for a capital value of 152,8001.183 In order to meet his 
mounting obligations, the marquis was forced to sell the seigneury of Quatremares for the sum of 
80,0001 in December 1583. '64 Land sold by a magnate was usually alienated to trusted clients. 
In this case the purchaser was Jean de La Haye, sieur de Chantelou, who was now a servant of 
both d'Anjou and the Guise. La Haye was wise to have more than one patron, because it was clear 
by the date of this transaction that d'Anjou was unwell and could not be expected to live much 
longer. 
The expenses that d'Elbeuf incurred on the expedition were not compensated by glory or 
the bestowal of lucrative offices. After the euphoria over the relief of Cambrai (18 August 1581) 
evaporated, it became clear that many of d'Anjou's army had not intended to serve for long and 
the duke lacked the resources to keep the army together. D'Elbeuf left the army soon after the fall 
of Cambrai, ostensibly because of illness but, if the Tuscan ambassador is to be believed, due to 
serious disagreements with d'Anjou: 
il detto marchese ne parti molto sdeganto, e di tal sorte, che, dopo aver preso 
licenza, uscendo delta camera di Sua Aftezza jd'Anjou], disse si the tutto il mondo 
presente l'intese, e ella ancora la pot& udire: the egli aveva otto mila uomini a sua 
devozione, i quali menerebbe at servizio del re di Spagna; e che, se avesse 
saputo, quando parti dal Chatelet per andare a Cambrai, quello the aveva saputo 
dipoi, sarebbe ito a trovare it principe di Parma, dove si assicurava the el meta 
delle torze di Sua Attezza to arebbono seguito. E, oftre di lui, multi atri ne sono 
partiti con poca volonti di tomarlo a servire di un anno; di Sorte the bene gli 
servira di avere di quelli the fanno cantare i ciechi. '65 
Relations between the two men never improved thereafter and the French campaign proved to be 
a disaster after the early success of Cambrai. When d'Elbeuf offered his services again in March 
1582, d'Anjou was "content to have once made trial of him, without going that way again". "' 
162 Vindry, p 304. 
163 See chapter three above and appendix D. 
'64 ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1,367,28 October 1586. 
'65 N6gociations diplomatiques de la France avec la Toscane, IV, p 396. 
166 CSPF, 1581-2, p 583. 
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On the marquis' return to court in late 1581, the supremacy of La Valette and Joyeuse in 
the affections of the king was apparent. In September the vicomte of Joyeuse had been created 
a duchd-pairie, with the added proviso that it superseded all non-princely pairies because of 
Joyeuse's marriage to Marguerite de Vaudemont, sister of the queen. 167 La Valette had been 
made duc d'Epernon in November 1581, and the following June Joyeuse was presented with the 
office of admiral, bought by the king from Mayenne for 120,000 ecus. '" The king, although he 
esteemed Mayenne "to be of a more settled nature than his brother", was determined to allocate 
the major royal offices to men whom he could trust. 169 In order to appease the Guise, Mayenne 
was well reimbursed for surrendering the admiralty and on 29 March 1582 letters which created 
the marquisate of Ebeuf into a duche-pairie were finally published "a la requete et instance de ceux 
de la maison de Guise, deplaisants de voir les ducs de Retz, de Joyeuse et d'Epernon, prdcdder 
en honneur, grade et qualite, le marquis d'Elbeuf. "10 However, this show of favour was far 
surpassed by the gift of 100,000 ecus and the office of premier gentilhomme de /a chambre, 
bestowed upon d'Epernon at the end of February 1582. "' Guillaume de Saulx-Tavannes even 
mocked the elevation of the marquis: 
poste qu'iI n'aurait pas recherche si vite, s'iI eut attendu et se fut soucie d'etre 
grand d'etre eleve, et que, comme personne incapable et de peu de moyens, il 
n'aurait jamais obtenus, si on considdre les degres qui I'y avaient conduit et si on 
eut voulu, pour lui conferer cette dignite, que I'äge I'en eut rendu quil I'eut meritee 
par ses services. '' 
D'Elbeuf lacked high office and credit at the court but he was a prince and did have the 
landed wealth to support his new dignity. His status was greatly increased by his marriage in 
February 1583 to Marguerite de Chabot, dame de Pagny, daughter of the aged and ailing Ldonor, 
lieutenant-general of Burgundy. The dowry consisted not only of Pagny and its chateau but also 
lump sum payments totalling 12,0004 and the rights to a capital value of 8,000/ per annum in 
rentes. The contract also stipulated that Chabot would resign his office of grand ecuyerto his new 
son-in-law. 13 The marriage thus provided d'Elbeuf with the office he coveted and once again 
167 L'Estoite, Journal du regne de Henri 111, pp 273-4. 
168 Ibid, pp 281,301. 
169 Davila, Historie of the Civill Warres, p 490. 
170 L'Estoile, Journal du regne de Henri 1/1, p 297. 
171 Ibid, pp 294-5. 
172 Quoted in Maille, Recherches sur Elbeuf, p 85 
173 BN, Cabinet d'Hozier, 216, fo 101. 
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reinforced the bonds between the Guise family in Normandy and their ancestral roots in eastern 
France. "` 
The king did not try openly to alienate the Guise for he must have sanctioned the transfer 
of this office and he continued to make money gifts to the Guise, even if not on the same scale as 
to the mignons. 175 It is easy to exaggerate the financial and political difficulties of Guise in the 
early 1580s. Once in receipt of his Spanish pension he did little to fulfil his obligation to prevent the 
continuing incursions of d'Anjou into Flanders, showing that he had not become a Spanish pawn. 
He was able to purchase land. In May 1582 he bought five-sixths of the Comte of Courtenay valued 
at 160,0001, from Philippe and Jean de Rambures and Perceval de Boullainvilliers. The following 
month he purchased the seigneury of Argillieres in exchange for 3,000! worth of rentes. 16 
After the collapse of the catholic-protestant malcontent alliance in early 1580 the attention 
of the duc de Guise was directed to the British Isles. Guise felt better able to aid Mary and James 
because the situation in Scotland had become more favourable. First, Philip II was willing to aid any 
malcontent party which would divert the attention of both France and England from the 
Netherlands. '77Secondly, the grip of the protestant and anglophile earl of Morton was weakening 
and was further undermined by the return from France of Esmd Stuart, sieur d'Aubigny, created 
earl of Lennox in 1580.178 In January 1581 Guise received a commission from Mary to form an 
'association' in her name, both inside and outside Scotland. ' 79 Negotiations to effect such a 
league involved the pope and the king of Spain too. Mary remained hopeful of military intervention, 
telling Guise in September 15$2 that he could easily seize Stirling with 500 men. 1B0 Guise was 
undoubtedly more realistic and he had different aims from his fellow conspirators. As a letter from 
John Leslie in October 1580 to the general of the Jesuits demonstrates, the strategy of Guise was 
primarily concerned with events in Scotland and ensuring that the catholic party gained control of 
James VI. 1e' He was suspicious of becoming involved in Spanish plans to destabilise the 
174 The Chabot had a long association with the Guise. During the War of the Holy league, 
Chabot remained nominally loyal to Henri III and Henri IV. In reality he was simply too 
decrepit to leave the chateau of Pagny where he had retired. He was thus a marginal 
figure in Burgundian politics and was deprived of his office of lieutenant-general by Henri 
III in 1588, see D. B. F, VIII, p 133; Drouot, Mayenne et la Bourgogne, I, pp 103,157-8. 
"S Boucher, La cour de Henri 111, p 60. 
' Bouilld, III, p 312, n 1. Jean de Rambures was a Picard client of the duc d'Aumale and was 
made governor of the duchy of Guise in 1588. 
"' Daville, Pretensions de Charles 111 duc de Lorraine 6 la couronne, pp 30-54. 
1e Donaldson, Scotland: James V-Vll, pp 165-180. 
Letters, instructions et me moires de Marie Stuart, A. I. Labanoff (ed), 7 vols, London, 1845, 
Vol V, P 185. 
100 Ibid, p 301. 
18' Ibid, VII, pp 153-4. 
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English polity and therefore disrupt aid to the rebels in the Netherlands. Leading an attack on 
England would be hazardous and not in his own interests since, as Ross commented, Guise 
believed such an action was more likely to result in Mary Stuart's execution. 
Jesuit missionaries were an important part of attempts to recruit malcontents throughout 
England and Scotland between 1581 and 1583, and Guise had shown his commitment to the 
spread of the political and religious message by founding the English Jesuit college at Eu. It would 
take much more than this to help Mary Stuart. Military help from France for the Marian party in 
either England or Scotland would require the substantial support of the Norman nobility and officers 
of the admiralty. It is now clear why Henri III was so eager to relieve Mayenne of this office. Despite 
the secrecy of negotiations and preparations in Normandy, the reports of the well-informed English 
spies in the province shed some light on the activities of the Guise and their supporters. Naturally, 
the English were worried about the conspiracy and kept a close eye on the the movements of John 
Leslie, bishop of Ross, now installed in the diocese of Rouen as vicar-general and suffragan of the 
cardinal de Bourbon. '82 It was he who strove to interest the Norman nobility in Mary's cause. In 
December 1581 an English agent reported: 
It has been given me to understand that the Bishop of Ross has of late had secret 
conferences with sundry gentlemen of Normandy, such as M. 'Angevil', Pont-Saint- 
Pierre, Pierrecourte, Breaufte, Vergennes [Vereins]; meeting sometimes at Rouen 
csis7 
and sometimes at Pont-Saint-Pierre, So those gentlemen being known to be of 
troublesome dispositions and enterprisers of actions, I have thought it necessary 
to send this advertisement; the rather because this bishop continues to take hold 
of every occasion wherein he may show his factious mind. 183 
The English spy recognised that these troublesome noblemen represented the core of the ultra- 
catholic faction in Normandy built around the Moy and Roncherolles families. The first mentioned, 
Francois Le Myre, sieur d'Angerville, was Moy's personal emissary at the meetings. He was a man- 
at-arms in Moy's company in 1581, in which he was noted as living at La Meilleraye. He was one 
of the most senior members of Moy's household, since he was present at important financial 
transactions on behalf of his master. '` He was also the son-in-law of Pierre Le Doyen, sieur 
d'Autou, former maitre de logis (1570) of Moy and lieutenant of Harfleur (1581-9) under the sieur 
'82 He was an active figure in Rouen in the 1580s, see ADSM, G, 2173,23 October 1580; 
2175,21 September 1583,11 October 1583,8 May 1584. 
183 CSPF, 1581-2, p 399. 
'84 BN, Ms Fr, 21537, fo 2261, muster roll of 54 men-at-arms and 78 archers, Houdan, 28 
February 1581; ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1,348,18 and 19 February 1574. 
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de Pierrecourt. ''s Jacques de Moy (d. 1590), sieur de Pierrecourt, was the younger brother and 
lieutenant of the gouvernement of Jean de Moy as well as captain of Honfleur and Harf leur. Also 
present was his cousin, Nicholas de Moy (d. 1 589), sieur de Vereins, the guidon (1570-74) and later 
lieutenant (1574-81) of the ordonnance company of Jean de Moy. He was an important figure in 
Normandy in his own right, having acquired the office of grand maitre des eaux et forets of the 
province for 10,0001 in 1578. As the nephew of the cardinal Pellevd he had his own links to the 
ultra-catholic hierarchy. '" Adrien de Brdaut6 (d. 1597) was a veteran of the catholic army in the 
first civil war and also an ami of Jean de Moy. He had served as lieutenant of Moy's company in 
1561 and was a guarantor for the family in legal transactions in 1567 and 1572. He held a 
succession of offices in Moy's gouvernement captain of Le Havre (1573), governor of Vernon and 
Les Andelys (1574-76) and captain of Saint-Valery-en-Caux (1576). 187 Finally, the joint host of 
the conference was Moy's relative and comrade from the early days of the Catholic League in 
1576-77, Pierre de Roncherolles, baron de Pont-Saint-Pierre. 
Ross was hopeful of gaining the support of these men in the Guise affinity who were also 
veterans of the Catholic League. A successful expedition depended upon their help, especially 
since Jean de Moy was vice-admiral. The preliminary discussions with the local nobility went well 
and the duc de Guise spent large parts of 1582 and 1583 in upper Normandy. In summer 1582 it 
was reported that he was preparing ships, while the duc de Mayenne lodged with the cardinal de 
Bourbon at the archiepiscopal residence at Gaillon. Spies reported that in July all the Guise family 
were assembled in Normandy for special consultations. "Presumably this meant that they were 
counselled by their local clients. The outcome of these meetings was the decision to send Francois 
de Roncherolles, sieur de Maineville, as an envoy to James VI to urge on him a plan of joint 
action. 1B' These plans were immediately wrecked by the unstable political situation in Scotland. 
Morton and his faction regained his grip on power in August 1582 when the young king was seized 
and Lennox forced to flee. 190 Henri III could not ignore the control now exercised by the English 
and their supporters over the traditional ally of France. In October 1582 therefore a royal embassy 
departed to secure the release of James, Maineville being officially attached to this mission. '9' 
1B5 Vindry, p 377. 
186 On the May family, see chapter three above. 
187 Vindry, p93; ADSM, 6F, 11, Recueil des capitaines de Normandie; ADSM, Tabellionage, 
2E1,334,14 March 1567; 2E1,344,14 May 1572. 
'88 CSPF, 1582, p 141. 
189 Calendar of State Papers, Foreign Series, Scot/and, M. J. Thorpe et at (eds), London, 
1858-1969,1581-3, p 123. 
190 Donaldson, Scotland: James V-VII, p 178. 
19' A. Teulet (ed), Papiers d'6tat... relatifs A I'histoire de i'Ecosse au XVP siecle; tires des 
bibliotheques et des archives de France, 3 vols, Paris, 1851-60, vol 11, p 531; Lettres de 
Catherine de Medicis, VIII, pp 64,67. 
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Maineville spent the winter in Scotland using the 4,000/ he had borrowed on the Rouennais money 
market to galvanise the anti-Morton forces: 
Maineville... labours likewise to entertain the king, the nobles, and persons of credit 
to the French course, offering purses full of French crowns and also pensions to 
several persons of quality. 192 
In May 1583 he returned home, having completely failed to form a strong pro-Guise, anti- 
Morton, faction. Moreover, the Guise also faced a crisis in France, being accused of plotting to 
seize the throne. The councils held in the summer of 1582 would have had to consider the serious 
allegations levelled at the family by Nicholas Salcede. While in Flanders the duc d'Anjou became 
paranoid about an assassination attempt. These fears seemed to be founded when, in July 1582, 
some suspects were arrested and confessed under torture that thejwere Spanish agents hired to 
murder both d'Anjou and William the Silent. " one suspect, Nicholas de Salcede, hoped to save 
himself from a terrible death by inventing a grand conspiracy, organised by the Guise to seize the 
throne. He was therefore brought to Paris to face a special judicial tribunal. Some details of 
Salcbde's story are plausible because his father had briefly served the duc and cardinal de Lorraine 
and he himself had done some minor services for the Guise. '" However, much of his story was 
fantasy and most, including the king, disbelieved him. '95 Once condemned to death he recanted 
the entire confession. 
Salcede had been transported from Flanders to Paris because there were grains of truth 
in his story. In order to save himself, he embellished common knowledge of Guise movements in 
1581 and 1582 with snippets of information he had acquired while running errands for them, thus 
creating the plot to topple the Valois. His testimony was especially concerned with the adherents 
of the conspiracy in Normandy. '96 Evidently, he was confusing Guise plotting in Scotland with the 
French internal situation, either out of ignorance or guile. When he states that Brdautd and Moy 
'92 CSP, Scotland, 1581-3, p 301. 
193 Holt, The duke of Anjou, pp 175-6, is confused about some of the details. 
t94 The plot can be followed in the pamphlets collected in Cimber and Danjou, X, pp 139-69. 
Among those who believed him was Christophe de Thou, one of the magistrates to 
interrogate him, see De Thou, VII, pp 633-34. See also Sutherland, The French Secretaries 
of State in the age of Catherine de Medici, p 238. 
196 Salcbde would have been especially knowledgeable about Normandy. He had lands there 
and had been a resident before being sentenced to death by the parlement of Rouen, in 
absentia, for counterfeiting. His confiscated property was granted to the duc de Lorraine, 
see BN, PO, 2166, fo 1093, the dowager duchesse de Longueville to Charles, duc de 
Lorraine, Trie, 28 November 1582. 
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had secured towns for the plotters in the event of an attack on the crown, it is clear that this refers 
to help that was to be given to the Guise for their invasion of Scotland. '91 
Although Henri III did not take heed of this testimony, the strengthening relations between 
the Guise and their clients in Normandy meant that the king could no longer trust his own officiers. 
Henri III felt more confident than ever before because he was at last able to enjoy the fruits of 
religious peace and greater control over the flow of court patronage and office. In February 1583 
he therefore asserted his authority in Normandy, ordering the reunification of the province into a 
single governorship under his fidele, the duc de Joyeuse. " The former governors were 
compensated with a payment of 6,0001 and two lieutenants-generals were retained, Carrouges for 
the bailkages of Rouen, Evreux and Caen and Moy for those of Caux, Gisors and the Cotentin. ' 
In turn their own lieutenants retained their posts, and Carrouges was even able to ensure that his 
son would inherit his office ! 0° Such measures were designed to alleviate the dishonour of 
demotion, but the installation of a man who was neither a prince nor a Norman was an 
unprecedented move and fears about the growth of royal power seemed justified because Joyeuse 
was already admiral. The appointment of Joyeuse and attempts to introduce royal favourites upset 
the Norman political classes, as would be clearly demonstrated when the dynastic crisis swept 
France in 1584. Nevertheless, even at the beginning of Joyeuse's tenure loyal officers, such as 
Herve de Longuanay, openly protested at their demotion 201 
While the king strengthened his position in Normandy, Guise persevered with efforts to aid 
Mary Stuart. During 1582 Guise resolved to aid the earl of Lennox and the Marian party in Scotland 
but this was ended by the fall of Lennox .m This project, like all the other Guise attempts to help 
Mary, were beset by many practical difficulties and perhaps also by the lack of real political 
conviction. Guise demanded 100,000 Ecus from the Spanish before he would make any move 
against England. He had received a paltry 10,000 Ecus by September 1582 - enough, as Philip 
197 Cimber and Danjou, X, pp 159-61. However, the accusation of Matignon, now based in 
Bordeaux and not a friend of the Guise, reveals his lack of knowledge. Attempts to 
implicate La Rocheguyon, Chantelou and "ceux des estatz de Normandie" demonstrate his 
desperation. 
BN, Ms Fr, 3306, to 74. In a parallel move d'Epemon was granted the strategic captaincies 
of Metz and Boulogne. 
Harding, Anatomy of a Power Elite, p 124. Francois d'O therefore lost his post altogether, 
although he retained the captaincy of Caen. 
200 BN, Ms Fr, 3306, fos 76-7. Among the lieutenants retained were Jacques de Rouville 
(d. 1589), sieur de Grainville-la-Teinture; Jacques Le Veneur (d. 1596), comte de Tillieres; 
Herv6 de Longuanay (1510-90), was a lieutenant in lower Normandy; and finally, Jacques 
de Moy, sieur de Pierrecourt. 
201 BN, Ms Fr, 3306, to 65, Henri III to d'O, Paris, 1 February 1583. 
202 These plans lacked substance, see CSPS, 1580-6, pp 363,373,378. 
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intended, to trouble the English but inadequate and too late in the season to launch a seabome 
invasion' 
Soon after Maineville returned from Scotland in May 1583 he had an interview with Guise, 
probably at Eu 204 His report confirms that Guise had been planning to help Mary primarily by 
aiding the catholic faction in Scotland rather than with a direct invasion of England. ' However, the 
failure of Maineville's mission and the evident lack of enthusiasm among the Scottish nobility for 
his cause forced the duc de Guise to consider military intervention in England, a project originally 
favoured by Mary. Philip and the pope. Nevertheless, there were still differences between the allies. 
Guise wanted substantial Spanish aid and Philip, wanting to avoid open warfare with England, 
preferred Guise to take responsibility for the invasion 208 The problems of organising such an 
expedition that involved different interests hampered the planning and efficacy of the operation 207 
The English exiles and catholics were nervous about the designs of the Guise and desired greater 
Spanish involvement. They were supported by Mendoza, the Spanish ambassador in London, who 
also counselled more direct involvement believing that the Guise were apt to put "the question of 
religion into second place, as a mere accessory to politics". 208 Despite telling the Spanish 
otherwise, Guise preferred to concentrate his attention on Scotland. In early November the catholic 
plotters in England involved in the conspiracy were discovered and divulged the entire plan. Well 
before this Guise was once again hoping to achieve his ends by collaborating with James VI. His 
hopes of joining with James were raised when the Scottish king evaded his anglophile captors in 
June 1583. Soon after the escape, Guise wrote to James proposing a joint expedition 209 In 
November 1583 the Spanish ambassador in Paris wrote with concern to Philip II that Guise was 
once more placing the emphasis on Scotland. 210 Thereafter Guise continued to hope for help 
and support from his kinsman, the king of Scotland. 211 
Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe 11, I, p 266. In May 1583 he received a further 
20,000 dcus, see Törne, "Philippe II et Henri de Guise", p 333. 
204 CSPF, 1583, pp 358,373. 
205 For this and following, see CSPS, 1580-6, pp 479-86. 
2W (bid, pp 482-3. The Spanish ambassador in London was also concerned that attention of 
the Guise was being diverted by domestic politics. 
207 For the plans and the problems involved, see CSPS, 1580-6, pp 492-5,503-5. It was also 
noted that the Guise were liable to be distracted by domestic politics, see CSPS, 1580-6, 
pp 485-6. 
208 CSPS, 1580-6, p 492. 
209 Donaldson, Scotland: James V-VII, pp 179-80. 
210 CSPS, 1580-6, pp 502-3,509. 
211 Ibid, pp 527,589,595. 
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English agents maintained a watch on the movements of the duke during the summer. He 
spent most of July at Eu where he was surrounded by English exiles, obviously pleading for his 
help? 12 Evidence pertaining to the preparations of the invasion force is scant. D'Elbeuf was 
reportedly readying three ships at Harfleur and in August 1583 an army was assembling at 
Honfleur, Le Havre and Fecamp, commanded by Mayenne and the comte de Brissac? " Such 
an operation would have needed the co-operation of the local vice-admiral, Jean de May. Ports 
were made available to the Guise because Jacques de May was captain of Harfleur and Hanfleur. 
Fecamp was another obvious choice for embarkation because the abbey of Fdcamp had a 
preponderant influence in the port, including the right to appoint to offices. Antoine de Fiesques, 
sieur de Coqueraument, had been confirmed as captain by the abbey on the death of the cardinal 
de Guise in 1578? " Jean de May was a key figure on the Guise council now. English spies 
traced the duc de Guise, Mayenne and the cardinal de Bourbon, who were visiting May at "La 
Milleraye, where they stayed five or six days, holding council every day. "215 
It was during these meetings that the cornte de Brissac arrived from Le Havre to inform his 
fellow conspirators that the sailing had to be called off. This took place before their contacts in 
England were arrested and the delay of the invasion was probably due to lack of money and doubts 
about the objectives of the operation. Guise immediately withdrew the money he had advanced and 
the expedition had to be postponed? 's Moreover, the committment of the duke to building his new 
residence at Eu can only have served to divert his own resources and the Spanish subvention 
away from the expedition. Although, the duke was able to lay the foundations of an invasion and 
attract some support among the Norman elites, he lacked the finances to carry his plans through. 
The position of 1559-60 was reversed. This time local co-operation had been forthcoming due to 
the expansion of the Guise power base in Normandy, but without control of the royal finances the 
project was bound to founder, even with Spanish aid. The English realised they had little to fear, 
and the assessments of their spies are more sober than those of 1559-60. They understood that 
the duc de Guise did not wield the same authority at the court as had his father formerly. As the 
English ambassador reported in May 1584: 
212 CSPF, 1583-4, pp 36-7. 
213 Ibid, p 57. This force was to join with Spanish paid mercenaeries at Dunkirk, sailing to 
England to rendezvous with English catholic forces, see CSPS, 1580-6, pp 503-4,505-6. 
214 Hellot, Fecamp au temps de la Ligue, p 5. It is likely that the governor of Le Havre, 
Corbeyran de Cardillac, sieur de Sarlabous, was also sympathetic to the Guise. He served 
in Scotland in the 1550s, took part ihthe murder of Coligny and refused to implement the 
edict of Beaulieu, see Le Hardy, Histoire du Protestantisme en Normandie, p 283; De 
Thou, VI, p 398. 
215 CSPF, 1583-4, p 57. 
216 By October all preparations had been hafted, see CSPF, 1583-4, pp 57-8,185. 
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I do not doubt the duke of Guise's good will and promises to help the King of 
Scots, but see no reason to fear his performing anything, for his means are small 
and his credit smaller... those of that house come but very seldom to the court and 
when they come there is no good countenance given to them? " 
217 CSPF, 1583-4, p 493, 
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Chapter Seven 
Holy Alliance: The Guise and the Catholic People 
201 
After the failure of the planned invasion in 1583, Philip II began to lose patience with the Guise. 
He had always been suspicious of their reliance on James VI and he now resolved to flatter them 
while taking English affairs into his own hands. From 1584 he was much more concerned to 
promote conflict in France, paralysing attempts by Henri III and the Huguenots to aid Elizabeth and 
rendering Guise powerless to promote the interests in England of his cousin James VI. ' As early 
as 1582 Philip urged Guise to give French affairs priority, pointing out that since Henri III was ill and 
childless Guise would "incur great danger when the realm falls into the hands of his enemies" 2 
When the heir to the throne, d'Anjou, died on 10 June 1584, Guise was forced to abandon his 
immediate hopes of allying with James and concern himself with the threat that the new heir to the 
throne, Henri de Navarre, posed to his family. 
The Rebirth of the Catholic League and the Revolt of the Guise, 1584-8 
The Holy League was essentially an alliance of princely ambition and popular piety. Recent studies 
of the radical Sixteen in Paris have demonstrated that the Guise did not control the ultra-catholic 
forces in the capital - there was instead a coalition between the ultramontane members of the 
bourgeoisie and the discontented princes of the House of Lorraine 3A wave of popular piety and 
eschatological anxiety was discernible in northern France from the early 1580s, parallel to but 
autonomous from the dynastic crisis. ` The Guise enjoyed far greater popularity in Paris than any 
other noble family and were a focus for the aspirations of the catholic masses. Nevertheless, 
historians have over-estimated the extent to which the population of Paris understood and 
supported the aspirations of the Guise. Robert Descimon has convincingly argued that the Day of 
the Barricades on 12 May 1588, which saw the revolt of Paris and the subsequent flight of the king, 
was the result, not of the dynastic crisis or socio-economic tension, but of the defence of municipal 
liberties against the insensitive govern ment of Henri III, characterised by his introduction of large 
numbers of foreign mercenaries into the city. 5 Descimon has rightly argued that the rise of the 
League in urban areas and its subsequent history cannot be explained by divisions and struggles 
' CSPS, 1580-6, pp xli-xtvi. 
2 Ibid, 1580-6, p 402. 
E. Barnavi, Le parti de Dieu: etude sociale et politique des chefs de la Ligue parisienne, 
Louvain, 1980; J. H. M. Salmon, "The Paris Sixteen, 1584-94: The Social Analysis of a 
Revolutionary Movement", Journal of Modern History, 1972. See also M. Greengrass, "The 
Sixteen, Radical Politics in Paris during the League", History, 1984. 
` D. Crouzet, Les guerriers de Dieu, II, pp 287-342. For evidence of this in Normandy, see 
Relation de troubles excite par les Calvinistes dans la ville de Rouen, pp 50-1. See also 
J. Bossy, "Leagues and Associations in Sixteenth Century French Catholicism", Studies in 
Church History, 1986. 
R. Descimon, Qui etaient les Seize ?: mythes of realites de /a Ligue parisienne (1585- 
1594), Paris, 1983; "La Ligue A Paris (1585-94): une revision", Annales ESC, 1982. 
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between different strata of the bourgeoisie 6 He sees the League as a mosaic of different interest 
groups, often with different political and social backgrounds; the clients of the Guise represented 
only one faction in this alliance. 
The alliance of interests is also discernible in Normandy. In early 1585 the Paris Sixteen 
sent an envoy called Ameline to Normandy to open communications with sympathisers.? There 
was a clandestine League faction in the province well before the revolutionary events of 1589. 
Evidence about the composition of this group and its relationship to the Guise is meagre. Little is 
known about its activities, and a full prosopography of the League in Normandy can be compiled 
only for the period after the seizure of power by the League in Rouen in February 1589. However, 
tentative steps can be made in this direction for the period before 1589 by analysing the events 
leading up to the overthrow of Valois authority. First, the much neglected revolts of the duc d'Elbeuf 
in 1585 and 1588 provide some clues. Secondly, there was a popular movement in Normandy 
which expressed its discontent with royal fiscal and religious policy in two ways: through the 
established representative institutions and the medium of peasant revolt. 
Fearful of the growing Guise influence in Normandy Henri III had made his brother-in-law 
and mignon, the duc de Joyeuse, governor of Normandy in 1583. There was a number of factors 
in this appointment which could only have pleased Normans, if Joyeuse had acted astutely. He was 
recognised for his unflinching support of catholicism, unlike his fellow mignon and rival d'Epernon. 
Joyeuse could thus expect few complaints from the ultramontane Norman nobility, and when he 
made his entrance into Rouen on 25 March 1583 he was accompanied by the elite of the Norman 
nobility .8 His tenure of the governorship began auspiciously when the office of receveur de la ville 
was suppressed by the king, "grace ä linter vention du duc de Joyeuse". g He later managed to 
prevent the garrisoning of Rouen by royal troops in 1585, and in July 1587 it was at his behest that 
town representatives were able to plead for tax reductions directly before the Conseil du roi. 1° 
However, Joyeuse could never dissociate himself from the unpopular royal fiscal measures in which 
he was deeply implicated. Moreover, he immediately began to aggravate the local notables by 
assigning major offices to his entourage. Joyeuse was fortunate that both the governorships of Le 
Havre and Dieppe fell vacant soon after his accession. In 1584 Andre de Villars-Brancas (d. 1595), 
s The thesis that the urban League was the product of malcontents, whose access to social 
advancement had been inhibited by the growth of hereditary venal office, was first 
propounded by Henri Drouot. For an analysis of the historiographical debate, see Benedict, 
Rouen during the Wars of Religion, pp 182-3. Dijon was the object of Drouot's enquiry and 
his thesis is not corroborated by events in either Rouen or Paris, where those already in 
positions of authority led the League. 
Benedict, Rouen during the Wars of Religion, p 169. 
e ACR, A, 20,25 March 1583. 
ACR, A, 20,11 June 1583. 
10 Benedict, Rouen during the Wars of Religion, pp 171-2; ACR, A, 20,1 July 1587. 
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a Provengal nobleman and relative of Joyeuse, was made governor. " In the previous year 
command of Dieppe had been granted to another relative, Aymard de Clermont (d. 1603), sieur de 
Chatte. t2 The possession of the office of admiral and these two ports was enough to end any 
aspirations that the Guise might still have about a cross-channel invasion. This new power in 
Normandy was a serious challenge to the authority of Jean de Moy in the pays de Caux and could 
only affect the Moy family and its affinity adversely. The appointment of Claude Groulard (1551- 
1607) as premier president of the parlement of Rouen (April 1585) was a more serious blunder. 
Although a Norman, Groulard was a repentant Calvinist, a protege of Joyeuse and did not fulfil the 
age requirement for such a senior office. 13 The obvious fear was that Groulard would represent 
the interests of Joyeuse and the king rather than the corporate body he now headed. Such 
concerns seemed founded when a series of innovative fiscal measures were presented to the 
parlement for registration between 1585 and 1587.14 Consequently, a faction grew up in the 
parlement which had antipathy towards Groulard and this further swelled the number of malcontents 
in the parlement. 15 
The Norman affinity was at the heart of the League. As soon as it was clear that the duc 
d'Anjou, heir to the throne, was dying, the House of Lorraine and its most senior counsellors 
gathered at the residence of Christophe de Bassompierre in Nancy. Among those present was 
Francois de Roncherolles who, after the death of d'Anjou, signed the secret treaty of Joinville (31 
December 1584) on behalf of the cardinal de Bourbon. This treaty stipulated the extirpation of 
protestantism inside and outside France and the displacement of Henri de Navarre as heir. The 
association was supported by Spain with a subvention of 50,000 Ecus per month. 16 Although the 
aims of the League seem quite straightforward, the strategy of the Guise family is hard to define. 
The wild claims that the family were intent on seizing the throne are the products of protestant 
fh vY P%1Ltý141CSz 
propaganda and have never been substantiated. " The ' of the League became clear 
after the death of the cardinal de Bourbon, the leaguer king Charles X, in 1590. Thereafter the 
" Borely, Histoire de la vile du Havre, 11, pp 178-9. 
12 D. B. F, VIII, pp 1495-6. He was also a relative of the duke. 
13 Floquet, III, p 181-4; Frondeville, Presidents, pp 68-9. 
14 These edicts were consistently rejected, see Floquet, III, pp 230-2. 
15 The procureur general, Georges de La Porte, was a fierce opponent of Groulard. 
Antagonism between the two men continued after the defeat of the League, see 
Frondeville, Presidents, p 275. 
16 On these events, see Bouille, III, pp 125-8. 
17 The arguments are outlined in Constant, Les Guises, pp 193-200. 
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League failed to find a suitable candidate. 'a Dynastic security rather than religious fervour or 
ascending the throne was the major motive. The family wanted to regain its lost ascendancy at 
court and use this to secure its troubled dynastic status; intervention in Scotland and England was 
an obvious example of where the crusade against heresy would benefit it directly. 19 Conversely 
this would not apply to the many Calvinist servants of their cousin, the duc de Lorraine. The 
Manifesto of Peronne (30 March 1585), issued by the princes, was a clear attempt to appeal to the 
popular imagination. It called for fiscal retrenchment, highlighted the dangers the catholic faith was 
now facing and demanded the convocation of regular Estates-General. This popular appeal only 
partially masked the fact that the House of Lorraine was undertaking armed revolt in order to regain 
its position of authority in the royal councils, displacing the hated d'Epernon and Joyeuse20 
It was during the meetings at Nancy and Joinville that plans were drawn up and support 
solicited. Local leadership came from three main areas. First, there was the Guise and their 
kinsmen: the duc de Guise was given the task of securing Champagne, Mayenne Burgundy, 
Mercoeur Brittany, while d'Elbeut and D'Aumale would raise Normandy and Picardy respectively. 
The second group consisted of disgruntled noblemen who, on the death of d'Anjou, had lost their 
major patron and who were denied access to royal patronage because of the dominance of 
d'Epemon and Joyeuse at court. Veterans of d'Anjou's ill-fated campaigns in the Low Countries 
were much in evidence - Biron rebelled in Guyenne, Claude de La Chätre became colonel-in-chief 
of Guise's infantry, and the sieur de Monluc-Balagny held Cambrai for the League? ' In Normandy, 
where formerly d'Anjou had a large following, the duc d'Elbeuf could rely on the support of Jean 
de La Haye, sieur de Chantelou, and Silly de La Rocheguyon, both of whom had been implicated 
in previous Guise conspiracies. Other Norman malcontents included the disgraced former mignons 
Francois d'Espinay, sieur de Saint-Luc, and Francois d'O, governor of Caen 22 Charles II de 
18 
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Charles III duc de Lorraine had the best claim to the throneLbut he failed to press it 
effectively. Mercoeur, Mayenne and the new duc de Guise each had their own strategies 
and were divided by rivalry, see Lavisse, Histoire de France, VI, pt 1, pp 333-5. 
t9 Constant, Les Guises, p 207, asserts that Guise never desired to seize the crown and only 
wanted to secure the office of connetable, reinforcing his position at the centre of the royal 
office hierarchy. 
20 Lavisse, Histoire de France, VI, pt 1, p 244. The manifesto was entitled "Declaration des 
causes qui ont meu Monseigneur le cardinal de Bourbon et les Pairs, Princes, Seigneurs, 
villes et communautez Catholiques de ce royaume de France: de s'opposer ä ceux qui 
pour tous moyens s'efforcent de subvertir la religion catholique et I'Estat". The choice of 
Peronne, cradle of the League, was highly symbolic. 
21 Constant, Les Guises, p 122. 
22 Chevallier, Henri Ill, pp 424-7. Saint-Luc was governor of Brouage and son-in-law of 
Charles 11 de Cosse-Brissac. 
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Cossd, comte de Brissac, was another notable leaguer who co-operated with d'Elbeuf in 
Normandy ' The final bastion of League support was in the towns, alienated by economic decline 
and increased taxation, and fearful of the threat that the succession posed to catholicism. An 
alliance was forged between the Sixteen in Paris and the princes. Arms and money were 
clandestinely collected by sympathisers and dispatched to Champagne? ` 
Little of substance has been written about the princely revolt of the duc d'Elbeuf in 
Normandy. Unfortunately, as the tabellionage records in Rouen relating to the first half of 1585 do 
not survive, it is therefore difficult to ascertain information about attempts by the League to raise 
funds. There is a sole contract referred to in a later volume, pertaining to the sale of 4962/3 dcus 
of rente sold by Marin Vamier, fermier, and Jacques d'Avenel, maitre d'h6tel of the comte de 
Brissac, on behalf of the comte to Pierre Ygou, bourgeois ZS This exceptionally large transaction, 
signed on 27 March 1588, undoubtedly enabled Brissac to advance money to his captains. Brissac 
had already established his camp somewhere in lower Normandy. Meanwhile the duc d'Elbeuf, 
accompanied by 500 men-at-arms, escorted the cardinal de Bourbon from the archiepiscopal 
residence at Gaillon, where he had been rallying the support of the Norman and Picard nobility, to 
Peronne in order to issue the Manifesto - the signal to revolt D'Elbeuf left the cardinal and 
returned to Normandy but his movements are unclear. He seems to have made an attempt to seize 
the chateau of Arques near Dieppe and then returned to lower Normandy? ' Nevertheless, it is 
evident that no attempt was made by royal officiers to prevent his progress across Normandy, 
despite the publishing of the royal edict against taking up arms (28 March). 28 This is not surprising 
considering the sympathies of the Moy family and that d'Elbeuf was assured of the support of 
powerful Normans like Frangois de Roncherolles 29 It does not indicate a wave of noble support 
for the League in Normandy, reflecting instead the predatory and neutralist tendencies of 
the politically active class, unsure and uneasy about what the future would hold if unconditional 
2' Brissac had been disgraced by the disastrous expedition to the Azores in 1582, aimed at 
aiding the Portuguese against Spanish domination. He was especially annoyed that 
d'Epernon should have the office of colonel-general of the infantry which had once 
belonged to his brother. Guise stood by his old friend during his dishonour, see Brant6me, 
VI, 146-7 
24 Barnavi, Le parti de Dieu, p 62. 
25 ADSM, Tabellionage, 2a"'° Heritage, 2E1,1986,11 August 1585. A later contract mentions 
the sale of part of 500 Ecus of rente in March by d'Elbeuf to Marie de La Haye, see ADSM, 
Tabellionage, 2b" Heritage, 27 June 1600. Brissac also sold rentes to prominent 
Rouennais leaguers, Jacques de Bauquemare and his younger brother, Charles, see 
ADSM, Tabellionage, 2b'"° Heritage, 2E1,2004,11 February 1588. 
26 Bouill6, III, p 135. 
27 N6gociations diplomatiques de la France avec la Toscane, IV, p 567. 
28 C. Valois (ed), Histoire de la Ligue, oeuvre inOdife d'un contemporain, Paris, 1914, p 91. 
29 Ibid, p 88. 
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support were given to either side. If the monarchy were unable to call on the local nobility to fight 
for it, there would be little chance of containing the revolt, for the crown lacked the finances to pay 
for a large mercenary army. The activities of Jacques de Moy, sieur de Pierrecourt, one of the royal 
lieutenants in upper Normandy and a Guise sympathiser, demonstrate the paralysis of royal 
government. Ordered by the king to rendezvous with Carrouges to prevent the concentration of 
League forces, he preferred to wait at Gisors and use the crisis to bargain with the king, 
complaining that it was not possible to gather his men in time. Furthermore he demanded the pay 
for the crue of his ordonnance company and an additional bodyguard of thirty mounted 
arquebusiers. Not only did he neglect his duty in failing to arrest Brissac's lieutenant at Harf leur but 
he was also unable to prevent the gathering of League troops at La Ferte-en-Bray. When he called 
on the assistance of the town notables: 
Its m'ont faict response que de sortir hors leur ville quicter leurs femmes et enfans 
quits ne le pouvoient faire... sy [nous] ne sommes promptement secourez quits [the 
League] se feront maistres de Ia campagne 30 
D'Elbeuf established his operational base in lower Normandy because the adherence of 
d'O, governor of Caen, was already assured. In the first days of April the duke was in the vicinity 
of Argentan. 31 On Saturday 3 April he left Caen, where he had been the guest of d'O, and 
marched on Bayeux. This town was also likely to fall to the League because the offices of the 
vicomte of Bayeux were in the gift of the d'Este family, whose affairs in France were admininstered 
by a council dominated by the Guise . 
32 As Carrouges reported to the king, the governor of the 
chateau, captain Clement, came out to meet the advancing duke and then sent word to the 
inhabitants that they should open their gates, "leur disant quil estoit son [d'Elbeuf's] serviteur et que 
ne luy denyoit lentrer par le chasteau. "33 D'Elbeuf remained in Bayeux at least until 9 April, 
garrisoning the chateau with fifty men and leaving them six months pay. Captain Clement's 
adherence to the League seems to have been organised well in advance, since he now joined the 
duke's army with four companies of foot. Bayeux became an assembly point for troops arriving from 
all over Normandy, it was expected that the duke would have 6,000 men within a few days. It was 
also reported that these men were paid by expropriating local royal revenues: "II [d'Elbeuf] avail 
prins et faicte mener avecques luy deux mille esceus de la Recepte de Carentan. "34 The League 
30 BN, Ms Fr, 3395, to 52, Pierrecourt to Henri III, Gisors, 10 April 1585. 
31 BN, Ms Fr, 3395, to 34, Carrouges to Henri III, Rouen, 8 April 1585. 
32 See chapter two above. 
3° BN, Ms Fr, 3358, to 39, Carrouges to Henri III, 10 April 1585. This report was compiled 
from the eyewitness statement of an echevin of Bayeux. 
34 Ibid. 
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troops naturally used the method of levying subsistances on the local population, a regular feature 
of medieval and early modern warfare. Since the mustering of troops by the duc d'Anjou for his 
campaigns in the Low Countries, this had become a serious burden on the inhabitants of lower 
Normandy. This problem was exacerbated by the revolt of the League and made even worse by 
harvest failures. Whilst d'Elbeuf was at Bayeux "trots ou quatre Mille personnes des villages se 
plaindre a luy que l'on les contraignes de paier" - peasant disturbances which had taken place in 
1578-9 threatened to recur 35 D'Elbeuf also attempted to augment his forces by attracting royal 
officiers, not neglecting to entice them with "de belles promesses et beaulx pretexts" 36 
D'Elbeuf's forces were officered largely from his own household and from the wider Guise 
aff inity in Normandy. The deposition by Valentin de Vallee, sieur de Blanctossa, made In 1589 
provides a unique insight into the methods of raising troops for a revolt. His confession was for the 
purpose of gaining remission for murder, an annual liberty accorded under the privilege of Saint- 
Romain and administered by the cathedral chapter of Rouen" At the time of his deposition Vallee 
was a minor nobleman calling himself an ecuyer and a long-serving professional soldier who was 
in the household of Adrien des Buaz, sieur des Noyers ? His military career began in the garrison 
of Metz at the age of fifteen, and he had then served in the regiment of des Buaz for the duc 
d'Anjou in Flanders and for Brissac in the Azores. In 1585 and 1588 the regiment was recruited 
by the League. In 1585 des Buaz was persuaded by his cousin, Jean d'Hemery-Villiers, to join the 
League. Villiers himself advanced the cash in order to facilitate recruitment 3° The regiment, raised 
locally and 800 men strong, was a French mercenary unit prepared to serve anyone willing to pay. 
The des Buaz had many fiefs in lower Normandy and were originally from the region of Falaise. 
In 1585 Vallee was a sergeant in the company of the sieur des Noyers and by 1588 had risen to 
the post of ensign in one of the other companies. The regiment was large and consisted of multiple 
and separately raised companies. It was thus constituted by a system of subcontraction -a 
commission was handed from Brissac to des Buaz, he in turn commissioning contacts and clients. 
Des Buaz was a small time military contractor and veteran soldier, but his links with the League 
hierarchy meant that he was more than a mere mercenary and was therefore more trustworthy. 
Brissac had already used his services in the Azores, and his close links to uftramontanism suggest 
that his service in Flanders was under d'Elbeuf. The father of Adrien des Buaz, Nicholas (d. cl586), 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
" The deposition is to be found in ADSM, G, 2176, fos 307-11. Some of it has already been 
printed, see Floquet. Histoire du privilege de Saint-Romain, I, pp 378-80, II, pp 439-40 
38 Vallde's social status was undoubtedly lower than he claimed but shows how easy it was 
to enter the ranks of the lowest stratum of the nobility. 
39 Villiers had served under Francois de Guise in 1562, joining the League in 1585 because 
he had been replaced by d'O as captain of Caen. In 1588 he sided with the royalists In 
gratitude for a remission for murder granted to him by Henri III, see D. B. F. XVII, pp 889- 
90. 
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had been captain of Toucques; one uncle had been receveur-general in the generalit6 of Caen and 
another uncle, Rene, had been vicar-general of the cardinal de Bourbon and a leading member of 
the ultra-catholic faction in Rouen in the 1550s and 1560s. `° Moreover, Adrien had ties with other 
adherents of the League and particularly with the Longchamps family. Guy de Longchamps, 
governor of Lisieux, acted as the procureurof Adrien in a financial transaction in 1566, and in 1574 
Adrien was present at the marriage treaty of Longchamps' daughter and paid the dowry of 
2,000/. " In 1561 Nicole de Buaz, sister of Adrien, married Philippe de Montaigu (d. 1612), a former 
conseiller of the duc d'Anjou at the 6chiquier of Alencon and later a member of the League rump 
t2 parlement in 1589. Such marriage links were the very bonds of the League. 
Brissac was governor of Angers, and d'Elbeuf soon moved to join him with his Norman 
troops (in mid-May he was at Alengon). The League forces operated with impunity since the 
neutralism of the local nobility rendered royal orders impotent. Jacques Le Veneur, comte de 
Tillibres, moved no further into lower Normandy than Bemay, where he complained of his lack of 
supplies and money. ' By mid-June the League force at Angers was reported to number 3,500 
men and the duc de Joyeuse was sent down the Loire valley to combat this threat, resulting in a 
skirmish near Beaugency at which the royalists had the advantage " 
Peace was signed between the leaguers and the king at Nemours on 7 July 1585, where 
Henri swore to uphold the religious clauses of the League covenant and pay for a new war against 
the Huguenots `5 The Guise were also allocated troops paid for by the crown and given towns as 
surety, but Henri made great efforts to retain control of the crucial provinces of Picardy and 
Normandy. During the peace negotiations d'Aumale had demanded the governorships of Pdronne, 
Ham, Montdider, Corbie, Roye and Montreuil; in the event he had to be satisfied with Rue. The duc 
d'Elbeuf became the first member of his branch of the family to become a governor when he was 
appointed to the Bourbonnais, a move which advantageously kept him away from Normandy. 46 
`o See chapters three and four above. 
41 ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1.332,22 June 1566; 2E1,348,26 June 1574. 
42 Frondeville, Conseiliers, pp 443-4. 
43 BN, Ms Fr, 3408, fo 77, Tilli6res to Henri III, Bemay, 8 April 1585. 
44 Ndgociations diplomatiques de la France avec la Toscane, IV, p 580; L'Estoile, Journal du 
regne de Henri Ill, p 382. 
45 These negotiations led by the queen mother had been in progress since April and the 
strategy of the princes was not to defeat the royalists in open battle but use revolt as a 
bargaining counter in these talks. A peace accord was reached as Guise and his 
Champenois forces reached Montargis on 20 June, see Bouille, III, pp 151-7. The royal 
capitulation seems to have been due to the inevitability of Guise and d'Elbeuf joining forces 
on the Loire. 
Compare the demands made by Guise on the 2 June and what he actually received. He, 
Mayenne and Mercoeur received the best settlement, see Bouilld, III, pp 151,155-6. 
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The history of Henri III's attempts to undermine the League is familiar. First, the army sent 
against the Huguenots in Guyenne under Mayenne was ill-supplied and ended in failure. In 1587 
a new army was more lavishly equipped under Joyeuse and sent against Navarre, while the duc 
de Guise was left without resources andi the certainty of defeat against Navarre's German 
mercenary reinforcements 47 In Normandy Caen was assured when, in return for his re-entry to 
the conseil du roi and elevation as a chevalier du Saint-Esprit, Frangois d'O handed over the 
command of the town to another Languedocien client of Joyeuse, Gaspard de Pelet, sieur de La 
Vdrune'8 D'O was also made lieutenant-general in Normandy which was a direct threat to the 
authority of the existing royal officiers of this rank. Normandy was in political turmoil and, despite 
the existence of a holy war against the protestants, religious divisions are not an accurate indication 
of the complexion of the opposing factions. For example, it was difficult to pursue Calvinist troops 
when "une bonne partie d'entreulx se sont refuggiez avec Ieurs chevaulx et armes en maisons de 
leurs parens et amys catholliques" 49 The problems of peasant revolt and the depredations of the 
soldiery were compounded by the suspicions of the provincial elite. Fear of royal power in the 
shape of Joyeuse's clients galvanised royal officiers into open defiance of the crown. Jean de Moy, 
not for the first time, refused to allow his company of the ordonnance to leave his gouvemement. 50 
The most serious opposition arose over the creation of d'O as lieutenant-general. In February 1586 
Henri wrote to Tanneguy Le Veneur, sieur de Carrouges, having been warned that "vous faictes 
amas et assembler de voz amis, pour empescher et vous opposer aud. sieur d'O", and Henri had 
to promise that he would not diminish Carrouges' authority "sans recompense". 51 Catherine de 
Medicis had to inform both him and Pierrecourt that the decision to elevate d'O was not hers and 
that she would do nothing prejudicial to their honour. 1 It seems at this stage that Henri made an 
attempt to divide the Moy and the Le Veneur families, a policy he was to revive two years later. 53 
On 27 February he wrote a similar letter to Pierrecourt which was more curt than that sent to 
Carrouges and which made no mention of any recompense. ` In July 1586 Jean de Moy was 
" Chevallier, Henri Ill, pp 602-10. 
48 L'Estoile, Journal du regne de Henri 111, p 441; Chevallier, Henri 111, p 442 
49 BN, Ms Fr, 3309, fo 77, Henri III to Carrouges, Paris, 18 November 1585. 
50 BN, Ms Fr, 15571, fo 148, Moy to Henri III, Rouen, 6 December 1585. Villars had already 
refused his brother entry to Le Havre. 
51 BN, Ms Fr, 3310, fo 48, Henri III to Carrouges, Paris, 27 February, 1586. 
52 Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, IX, pp 6-7. 
53 See below. 
U BN, Ms Fr, 3310, fo 48, Henri III to Pierrecourt, Paris, 27 February 1586. 
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passed over for the command of a naval task force in favour of the governor of Dieppe, Aymard 
de Chatte. 55 Clearly Henri saw the Moy as a threat to his authority and too close to the Guise. 
At the end of 1587 Henri's plans for victory against the protestants and the destruction of 
the Guise were in ruins. Joyeuse was defeated and killed by Navarre at Coutras in October and 
Guise went on to defeat the protestant German reiter army at Vimory and Auneau; the military 
prowess of the duc de Guise had reached new heights. Just as in 1575, he had managed to 
achieve these victories largely with the help of his own forces and those of his kinsmen. Having 
concluded peace at Nemours, Guise realised that the only way he could maintain his position of 
strength was to keep his army in the field. This was an expensive proposition and would only serve 
to alienate the population of his gouvernement. Thus the duke undertook a campaign on the 
borders of Champagne against the town of Jametz, which belonged to the Calvinist duc de 
Bouillon, and thus his army was able to quarter and provision itself. This was a successful ploy and 
he was able to turn down 20,000 Ecus offered him by the king to leave the region 56 The army 
of the duc d'Aumale also remained in the field and he used the peace of Nemours to extend his 
control in Picardy. In March 1587 he seized Le Crotoy, Doullens and Pont-Remy, aided by veterans 
of 1576 like Antoine du Hamel, sieur de Belleglise and Jean de Rambures, in addition to long 
standing Guise clients like the governor of Montreuil, Francois des Essars, sieur de Maigneux. s' 
These activities also ignited a feud between d'Aumale and d'Epernon. D'Aumale made an 
unsuccessful attack on Boulogne, of which d'Epemon was governor, killing one of d'Epernon's 
servants. The mignon was even more furious when d'Aumale defeated troops that he had sent 
to reinforce Boulogne. According to L'Estoile it was the king, who believed that only subtle 
manoeuvring would defeat the League, that prevented the situation becoming critical 59 For his 
part d'Aumale complained of a plot against him engineered by d'Epernon's lieutenant, when "deux 
des siens trouve en ma maison desguisez y estoient venus en intention de me tuer ainsi quils ont 
BN, Ms Fr, 3310, fa 81, Henri III to Moy, Saint Maur des Fosses, 3 July 1586. This despite 
May being vice-admiral and having been offered the command by Joyeuse. 
56 Bouille, III, p 196. 
57 Bouille, III, p 207; Prarond, La Ligue a Abbeville, I, pp 270-6. Abbeville was not inclined to 
let in d'Aumale, despite the fact that Pierre de Roncherolles was governor. Des Essars had 
married Charlotte du Hamel-Belleglise and had been ensign of Adrien de Tiercelin (1572- 
5), see R. Rodiere, Les Gouverneurs de Montreuil de la maison de Maigneulx, 1581-1620, 
Abbeville, 1900, pp 4-5; Vindry, p 230. 
58 The assassin was the sieur de Forceville, yet another veteran of 1576, see De Thou, X, 
p 640. 
69 L'Estoile, Histoire du regne de Henri lll, pp 488,490. The strategic importance of Boulogne 
must be remembered considering the recent execution of Mary Stuart and the sailing of the 
Spanish Armada. 
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confesse par leurs propres bouches" 60 Henri's only response was to appoint the duc de Nevers, 
who had initially flirted with the League, as governor of Picardy 6 
As the duc de Guise began to prepare for the defence of the frontier in the summer of 
1587, he could not count upon the assistance of the duc d'Aumale who was occupied in Picardy. 
The king offered the paltry sum of 12,000 e cus and 10 companies of foot. However, the duke had 
maintained his army throughout the winter of 1586-7 and was now able to call on the help of his 
amis and clients 62 The nucleus already contained some relatives, such as the chevalier d'Aumale 
and Louis de Moy, comte de Chaligny 63 Also present were long-serving clients of the Guise like 
Claude de Bauffremont, sieur de Sennecy, the comte de Randan-Rochefoucauld and Anne de 
Tiercelin, sieur de Sarcus. ' The Norman contingent was led by the duc d'Elbeuf, which included 
the 150 men led by another veteran leaguer, Antoine de Bigars. D'Elbeuf also raised his own 
infantry regiment commanded by Claude de Lisle (1552-98), sieur de Marivaux, formerly 
chambellan and captain of the duc d'Anjou's bodyguard, who had served alongside d'Elbeuf in 
Flanders The resounding defeat of the reiters raised the credit of the duc de Guise to new 
heights. Guise was furious when the Germans were accorded generous terms by the king to leave 
France and were escorted to the frontier. He also believed that some reward was due to him for 
his services and, since the duc de Joyeuse was dead, the offices of admiral and governor of 
Normandy were now vacant 66 The governorship would only serve to increase the already 
extensive power wielded by the Guise in the province, while the king's power base would have 
been effectively confined to the Ile-de-France. Henri therefore made d'Epernon governor of 
Normandy and admiral of France. The feud between d'Epernon and the duc d'Aumale intensified 
and two attempts on the life of the mignon were made in the early months of 1588. r7 In January 
1588 the House of Lorraine gathered at Nancy to formulate its strategy. D'Aumale was to increase 
his efforts in Picardy, Guise to seize Sedan and Jametz, d'Elbeuf and Brissac were to raise 
Normandy against d'Epemon. It also seems that intelligence and contacts with urban sympathisers 
60 BN, V Col, 10, to 197, d'Aumale to Henri III, Aumale, 21 August 1587. 
61 Prarond, La Ligue a Abbeville, 1, p 280. 
62 On the composition of the army and the campaign, see Bouilld, III, pp 221-38. 
63 Henri de Lorraine, comte de Chaligny, was the younger brother of the duc de Mercoeur. 
In 1585 he married Claude de Moy (1572-1627), she was the only surviving child of 
Charles, baron de Moy. Her engagement to the duc d'Epernon had been called off at the 
last moment, infuriating the Moy family, see Rodidre and Vallee, La maison de May, p 61. 
64 BN, Dossiers Bleus, 634, to 29. 
65 Vindry, p 348. 
66 Constant, Les Guises, pp 163-4. 
67 Chevallier, Henri Ill, p 618; L'Estoile, Journal du regne de Henri Ill, p 545. 
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were to be strengthened " The duc d'Aumale and his lieutenant, Rambures, undertook secret 
negotiations with the pro-Guise faction in Abbeville. When d'Aumale seized a suburb of Abbeville, 
to prevent the entry of a royal garrison "et empescher que les Gascons que y voulloit mettre 
monsieur d'Epernon n'y entrassent", the governor, Roncherolles, and other leaguers prevented the 
town cannon being fired but opinion was hopelessly divided and the majority was against a 
garrison, whichever side it represented " 
Considering events in Paris and Abbeville it is likely that the same process was going on 
in Normandy. On 26 April d'Epemon left Paris to take possession of his gouvernement, entering 
Rouen on 3 May. He left with a small army in case he would have to do this by force - four 
companies of ordonnance and 22 enseignes of foot. 70 These preparations were necessary 
because the duc d'Elbeuf had been recruiting in Normandy for over a month. This time he had no 
obvious base but he had the confidence to raise his standard at his chateau of Harcourt, just south 
of Rouen. According to d'Elbeuf's lieutenant, Antoine de Bigars, their forces numbered 5-6,000 foot 
and 6-700 horse. " The infantry consisted of the regiments of captain Perdriel, Jacques Le Conte, 
baron de Nonant, and Adrien des Buaz, sieur des Noyers. Other officers in the army can be 
deduced from the presence of Guise clients raising money in Rouen at the same time as the duc 
d'Elbeuf. He sent agents into the city on 9 May 1588 to arrange for the sale of 600 Ecus of 
rente. 72 This would have provided a good opportunity for the duke to make contact with 
sympathisers in Rouen, and he was certainly in communication with the cathedral chapter at this 
time. 73 Others selling rentes in Rouen and possible officers in the rebel army included Anne de 
Tiercelin, sieur de Posse, and Philippe de Tiercelin, sieur de la Fertil-Villeneuve. " Louis de La 
Menardiere, sieur de Cuverville, was present in Rouen on the last day of April. His family furnished 
This was the case in Paris in March and April, see Bamavi, Le parti de Dieu, pp 76,119. 
The spy Poulain informed the council of the planned insurrection in Paris on 26 April, 
following which d'Epernon counselled the death of Guise. Poulain's testimony must be used 
with caution; there were contacts between the Guise and the Sixteen but the Day of the 
Barricades had little to do with this conspiracy. It was a spontaneous mass action against 
the introduction of troops into Paris, see Descimon, "La Ligue A Paris (1585-94) : une 
revision". Poulain's testimony is to be found in Cimber and Danjou, XI, p 290. 
Prarond, La Ligue a Abbeville, I, pp 311-40. 
70 L'Estoile, Journal du regne de Henri Ilf, p 548. 
71 Memoires d'Antoine de Bigars, sieur de La Londe, Societe de I'histoire de Normandie, 
Melanges, 5th ser., Rouen and Paris, 1898, p 18. The figures are almost certainly an 
exaggeration. 
'Z ADSM, Tabellionage, 26'"0 Heritage, 2E1,2005,9 May 1588. 
73 ADSM, G, 2176,9 March 1588. A present of bread and wine was voted and deputies 
dispatched to the duke ostensibly to discuss `le proces des alluvyons de la seigneurie de 
petit ville". 
74 ADSM, Tabellionage, 2" -16ritage, 2E1,2005,27 April 1588,9 May 1588. 
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several long-serving clients of the Guise. 75 Robert de La Menardie re (d. 1622), cousin of Louis, 
tried to establish the Jesuits in Caen and left his priory of Sainte-Barbe-en-Auge to the Society; he 
was a representative at the leaguer Estates in 1593. Another relative, Hugues, would die fighting 
at the battle of Ivry in 1590.76 Another problem for monarchical authority was that royal officiers 
were also compromised by the revolt. D'Epemon wrote to Herve de Longuanay, lieutenant-general, 
to prevent the gathering forces and wrote again a few days later to inform his subordinate that his 
son, Antoine de Longuanay, was one of the rebels, and indeed Antoine was also present in Rouen 
borrowing money. " Nothing was done to attack the rebel army and similar letters written by the 
king ordering the intervention of Carrouges and the Moy went unheeded. 78 Nevertheless, the elite 
of the Norman nobility did not fail to turn up to the joyeuse entree of the new governor on 3 
May. 79 Thus in the first days of May the capital of Normandy was swarming with noblemen, 
including large contingents of leaguers and the retinue of their indomitable foe, d'Epemon. 
The League was not yet the popular movement it became in early 1588; it was still 
dominated by a few activists. Revolt was confined to Guise clients and malcontent nobles, not the 
people'. The paralysis of royal government in Normandy occurred because, without the money to 
pay for a mercenary army, it relied on its provincial officiers. They often sympathised with the Guise 
and others were not inclined to chance their lives and fortunes when the risks involved were so 
great. On 12 May 1588 the population of Paris rose up in revolt in a fierce reaction to the entry of 
royal troops to the capital, a flagrant breach of the city's privileges B0 The king was forced to flee 
to Chartres, leaving Paris in the hands of the Sixteen and the duc de Guise. Both sides now made 
great attempts to win the support of towns and royal officiers in the provinces. Most importantly this 
meant Normandy, and for the royalist cause this province now took on an immense strategic 
significance. During his sojourn in Normandy, d'Epernon made efforts to ensure the loyalty of the 
former clients of Joyeuse. In February an English agent reported from Dieppe that premier 
president Groulard had been dispatched to ensure the loyalty of Villars, governor of Le Havre. The 
same agent reported that La Meilleraye and Pierrecourt "both hold for the League". " This is not 
surprising given their relationship with the Guise and, although they did not openly join d'Elbeuf, 
75 See above chapter three above. 
76 Chenaye-Desbois, X, pp 609-10; BN, Dossiers Bleus, 442, to 3. 
77 Papiers de Heroe de Longuanay, Gouverneur de la Sasse-Normandie (1575-1589), St. L6, 
1897, pp 19-20. 
78 BN, Ms Fr, 3394, to 54, Henri III to Carrouges, Paris, 28 March 1588; to 55, Henri III to 
Moy, Paris, 28 March 1588; to 63, Henri III to Pierrecourt, Paris, 20 April 1588. 
79 ACR, A, 20,3 May 1588. 
80 The argument of Descimon is followed here, although the organisation of the League and 
the vital participation of students and clerics from the left bank show that there were other 
factors involved besides the defence of the commonweal against royal 'absolutism'. 
81 CSPF, 1586-8, p 515. 
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their inactivity was a blow for the monarchy. Moreover, after the Day of the Barricades, they 
became more heavily implicated in the League because their cousins Louis de Moy, sieur de 
Gommdron and Francois de Moy, sieur de Richebourg, were Guise agents in Paris prior to the 
events of 12 May. 82 
Rouen itself remained neutral but the king could depend on the support of the premier 
president and he began to make big efforts to win over the Rouennais B3 Taxes were abolished, 
offices suppressed and the unpopular d'Epemon replaced by a prince of the blood, the duc de 
Montpensier. The city Council of Twenty Four was eventually convinced by these gestures and the 
king was invited to the city, making his entry on 13 June 1588. Philip Benedict is rather generous 
in attributing much of this to Carrouges' loyalty. Davila, who was present at court, believed that both 
father and son "dependoient en quelque fagon du duc de Guise et de Ia ligue" 84 Carrouges, as 
lieutenant-general of the bailliages of Rouen and Evreux, had done little in terms of action to stop 
the League in the previous years. The king now bought his loyalty with the offer of a brevet for the 
office of marechal when a vacancy arose. In the meantime he was accorded a pension of 3,333 
ecus. 85 He now began to argue with his son, the comte de Tillieres, bailli of Rouen, who remained 
more closely tied to the Guise. In April 1588 an English agent had already reported that: 
M. la Carewge, captain of Rouen, who serves the King, and his son, on the third 
of this month are fallen in great discord in the city, and [a] procession [has been] 
sung throughout the city upon the Guise's side, whose part M. de Carewge's son 
doth serve 86 
This split in the family is confirmed in the memoirs of premier president Groulard, who noted that: 
"le comte de Tillii res ayant espouse la belle-soeur de M. d'Elboeuf, avoit 
secrettement, encore quit n'en fait semblable, faict profession de la ligue; de sorte 
qu'ayant entendu que le roy venoit ä Rouen il se fascha fort. 87 
82 De Thou, X, p 248. 
113 For this and following, see Benedict, Rouen during the Wars of Religion, pp 174-5. 
84 Quoted in C. de Robillard de Beaurepaire (ed), Scjour de Henri ll1 ä Rouen, Societe des 
Bibliophiles Normands, Rouen, 1870, p xxiv. 
as AN, M, 458, Le Veneur, July 1588. 
66 CSPF, 1586-8, p 589. The procession probably refers to either a penitential procession or 
a thanksgiving for the victory at Auneau. 
87 Claude Groulard, Memoires, Michaud and Poujoulat, 1st ser., XI, p 554. 
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If he had originally opposed the coming of the king, his reservations were eased with a royal gift 
of 15,000 ecus. 118 Elsewhere in Normandy Jacques-Auguste de Thou was dispatched by Henri, 
when the court was still at Chartres, to gauge the mood of local notables and ensure the loyalty 
of royal officiers 89 Pierrecourt was at the court and advised de Thou on his itinerary. The royal 
emissary first went to Evreux where the bishop, Claude de Sainctes, was a leaguer. He then 
headed off to Rouen, where he gave an address to the parlement and the echevins, and then to 
Dieppe which, with its strong reformed community, was fiercely against the Guise. At Le Havre the 
governor, Villars, had already been won over by the Parisians with 30,000 ecus and de Thou 
received a cold welcome. At Lisieux, Jean de Longchamps also supported the League - his father, 
who had been the previous governor, had owed his position to the duc d'Aumale and the family 
was close to the ultramontane des Buaz. At Caen, de Thou received a warm welcome and he 
finally journeyed to La Meilleraye for discussions with the Moy family, which gave nothing away 
except its surprise at the position of Villars and suspicion of his ambition. 
The delicate discussions with Rouen paid off and the king was able to enter the city on 10 
June, staying until 21 July. Although Rouen had been lost the League could count on the neutrality 
of the Moy and the comte de Tillidres, as well as the adherence of Lisieux and Le Havre. Moreover, 
the king's sojourn in Normandy did not go unopposed. As soon as he entered Rouen the duc 
d'Elbeuf went off to Paris for talks with the duc de Guise, leaving his wife, Marguerite de Chabot, 
to oversee the conduct of his lieutenants. The army was large enough not to have to withdraw with 
the royal retinue so close, and there were a number of skirmishes with the royal garde du corps-go 
The problem of allegiance is clearly shown in the case of the deposition of Valentine de 
Vallee for remission for murder. According to this testimony his captain, Adrien de Buaz, was 
persuaded to join the League in 1585 by a relative, Jean d'Hdmery-Villiers. By 1588 Villiers was 
a royalist, he was made a maitre des requetes, was part of the fugitive court and was a leading 
figure in the king's negotiations with the Rouennais 9' In the summer of 1588, after Henri had 
made his peace with the League and agreed to abide by the terms of the edict of Union, des Buaz 
and Villiers met by chance (at least according to the testimony) at a tavern near Argentan 9 In 
the ensuing argument Vallee, while protecting his master, killed Villiers. The story had a bizarre 
ending because the duc de Mayenne and the comte de Brissac both wrote to the cathedral chapter 
of Rouen supporting opposing sides. Each used religion as the central foundation of their argument; 
"8 Beaurepaire (ed), Sejour de Henri 111 a Rouen, pp xxxiv, xxxix 
a' For this and following, see De Thou, X, pp 305-10; Mdmoires de Jacques-Auguste de 
Thou, depuis 1553 jusqu en 1601, Michaud and Poujoulat, 1st ser., X, pp 326-7. 
90 Memoires d'Antoine de Bigars, p 18. 
91 Beaurepaire (ed), Sejour de Henri 111 A Rouen, pp xxiv-v 
Villiers was killed between July and October 1588 and therefore the d'Hdmery-Villiers still 
alive in 1589, referred to in D. B. F, XVII, p 890, must be a relative. 
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Mayenne pleaded against clemency for des Buaz and Vallee, offered under the privilege of Saint- 
Romain, thus: 
Messieurs Je croy que vous n'ignorez poinct ny la facon de laquelle a este 
assassine le feu sieur de Villiers ny la condition de ceux qui ont commis ceste 
meschanettd lesquelz encores quilz feussent ses nepveuz sont toutefois recogneuz 
pour huguenots... Vostre privilege est trop sainct et sacre pour estre mis en mains 
de personnes tant indignes et si contraires a nostre religion... empeschez que ses 
huguenotz jouissent le privilege de leglise dont ils ne sont pas' 
The favourable letter written by the comte de Brissac is completely different: 
Jay tousjours recommande le sieur des Noyers [des Buaz] tres zele a nostre 
religion... II mayant assiste en plusieurs expeditions... contre les ennemys de la 
foi9` 
These letters were written in a highly stylised way in order to appeal to the deepest religious 
prejudices of the canons of the cathedral. The support of Mayenne for the condemnation was 
because Villiers' brother was one of his servants, but the argument of the duke seemed so dubious 
and ill-considered that Brissac's letter was successful. Apart from the complexities of personal 
relationships in this case it is evident that Mayenne, future leader of the League, was capable of 
trying to manipulate religious emotions, often in the crudest and most cynical manner. He was 
certainly not unique in pursuing such a strategy for his own ends. 
The Guise and Popular Revolt In Normandy 
The historian has to be careful when considering terms like 'popular support' since the relationship 
between elite and popular politics is ambiguous 95 One historian has suggested that the Day of 
the Barricades in May 1588 was another piece of the jigsaw of the master diplomacy of Philip Il 98 
93 ADSM, G, 3498,24 May 1589. The inventory of the Archives Ddpartementales wrongly 
attributes this letter to the duc d'Elbeuf and the date of the letter was 1589 and not 1588, 
see Floquet, Histoire du privilege de Saint-Romain, I, pp 378-9,11,439-40. 
94 ADSM, G, 3498, Brissac to the cathedral chapter, Argentan, 1589. 
" By popular here I mean the menu peuple and not the wider political class. 
96 D. L. Jensen, Diplomacy and dogmatism: Bernardino de Mendoza and the French Catholic 
League, Cambridge Mass., 1964, pp 131-52. In fact the popular vitality of the Catholic 
League made Guise less dependant on Spain and his effectiveness was not seriously 
damaged by the defeat of the Armada. Conversely the defeat of the Armada made it 
imperative for Philip to maintain his alliance with the Guise. 
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Certainly in early 1588 Philip II gave Henri de Guise 300,000 escudos with orders to attempt 
something to occupy France while the Armada sailed. This reasoning overestimates the control 
exercised by Spanish agents on both the Guise and the Parisian masses. The Guise were not as 
'popular in Paris during the Wars of Religion as conventional wisdom suggests, although the Guise 
had their clients and supporters 97 The Saint Bartholomew's Day Massacre and the Day of the 
Barricades were events in which the Guise participated but which they did not control. Robert 
Descimon has shown how the Sixteen were only a faction within the League and were not its 
leaders 98 Thus the Guise and their clients represented one strand of ultra-catholicism and the 
resurgence of popular piety in the 1580s could benefit the Guise but only in the sense of creating 
a climate of opinion in which they could operate; popular forces were autonomous from the control 
of elites. A shrewd politician could however exploit and capitalise on popular anger. 
The image of the due de Guise as military hero, which became a legend after his murder 
in 1588, was popularised in pamphlets and iconography .' 
This image was disseminated in the 
provinces and was neither simply based in Paris nor the work of private individuals. The town of 
Rouen had a commemorative jeton struck in honour of the duke's victory at Auneau in November 
1587. The medal had the legend "Civitas Rothomagensis" and on the reverse an eagle was 
portrayed ready to tear its prey apart with the device "Lartifice est detruict par la vertu-"10° 
Considering the events of Guise's struggle against the mignons, the symbolic nature of these words 
would have been clear to all. 
The origins of the peasant disturbances in Normandy had nothing to do with the political 
struggles of the Guise family but show the way in which such revolts could be exploited for 
sectional interest. The raising of troops by d'Anjou and the increased fiscal burdens on the 
peasantry had made life intolerable by the mid-1580s. As royal government became paralysed In 
the rest of France, so it became increasingly important to maximise the revenues of Normandy. The 
war against the Huguenots in 1586-7 saw the imposition of new levies and a variety of fiscal 
expedients; tax collectors had to resort more frequently to violence in order to fulfil their quotas. 
This burden was made worse by economic slump and harvest failure: in 1587 there was a 
subsistence crisis. 101 After the edict of Nemours in July 1585 the disbanded troops of the League 
97 The traditional view is elaborated in Jensen, Dogmatism and diplomacy, p 224, believing 
that the Spanish ambassador, Mendoza, was able to "guide the strategy of the Council of 
Sixteen, and with it much of the League, in accordance with the desires and plans of the 
king of Spain". 
Descimon, Qui dtaient les Seize ?, especially p 66. 
An example being "Sommaire Discours De Toutes Des Deffaictes Des Reistres", printed 
in Cimber and Danjou, XI, pp 266-75. 
100 BN, Clair, 1204, to 123. 
101 Benedict, Rouen during the Wars of Religion, pp 172-4. 
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became a serious menace in lower Normandy. 1°2 At a very early stage the king was aware that 
the peasantry was well organized, as he wrote to his lieutenant-general, Longuanay in October 
1586: 
ung nombre de villaiges et paroisses de Normandie, dont plusieurs sont dedans 
le destroict du gouvernement de la Basse Normandie, soubz umbre qu'ilz se 
plaignent d'estre quelques Toys travaillez du tenement de champs des gens de 
guerre, se font unys ensemble pour avoir une commune intelligence et s'entre 
secourir les ungs les autres, ä I'encontre des dictes troupes de gens de guerre... et 
s'opposer a eulx de toutes leurs forces et moiens. 103 
This peasant revolt was termed the revolt of the gautiers because it supposedly began in the village 
of Chapelle-Gauthier, about five kilometres south of Orbec. The revolt was geographically centred 
on the region around Orbec and Vimoutiers. This region is not one of productive farmland but is 
wooded and hilly bocage country characterised by dispersed settlement -a poor and backward 
region of Normandy. 104 Its position at the epicentre of revolt was due to the passage of troops 
to and from upper Normandy and the fact that as a poorer region it was less able to support the 
increased tax burden. 105 Obviously certain elections were better at avoiding taxation than others 
as can be seen in records of the bureau des finances, and money simply could not be raised to 
pay troops because of the poverty of certain districts. 106 Unpaid troops were therefore forced to 
live off the land, further exacerbating the problem. The activities of the League soldiery are 
illuminated by the testimony of Valentine de Vallee: 
Estant aux trouppes du captaine Thomas, voulant passer par Orbec, les habitantz 
feirent resistance, oü il y en eut quelques-ungs des ditz habitans, jusques au 
nombre de trois ou quatre, de tuez. 107 
In July 1588 the peasants were better organised, as the troops of the sieur des Noyers: 
102 BN, Ms Fr, 3309, fo 15, Henri III to the parlement of Rouen, Limours, 3 August 1585; to 20, 
Henri III to Car rouges, Paris, 10 August 1585. 
103 Papiers de Heroe de Longuanay, p 14. 
104 A. Fremont, Atlas et geographie de la Normandie, Paris, 1977, pp 184-5,193; Nicholls, 
"The Origins of Protestantism in Normandy", pp 23-5. 
105 There is some evidence to suggest that the generalfte of Caen was overtaxed by the 
provincial estates compared to Rouen; for the complaint of the tresorier-general of Caen 
in 1579, see BN, Ms Fr, 15905, fo 33, Novince to Bellievre, Caen, 15 March 1579. 
106 See for example ADSM, C, 1116, tos 20,56-7,137. 
107 Floquet, Histoire du privilege de Saint-Romain, II, p 439. 
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passant par un village nomme la petite haye il [Vallee] feu poursuivi par plusieurs 
paisantz estantz du nombre de quatre ou cinq mil qui voudroient deffaire led. sieur 
des Noyers et ses trouppes lequel ayant ete poursuivy prez de huit ou neut lieus 
et que tousjours le nombre desd. paisantz croissoit ne taschant a I'encercler pour 
faire un camage de lui et des siens feu contraint par leur importunite de se mectre 
en deffence dont y en eu quelques uns tuez et blessez et Wen ne peut dire le 
nombre. 108 
In March 1588 Longuanay was ordered to arrest the ringleaders of the resistance 
movement with "prompte justice et pugnacion". 109 However, political events in Paris ended any 
hope of finn government, and anarchy continued to prevail in lower Normandy, as was recognised 
by secretary of state Brulart in July: 
L'affaire le plus urgent en Normandie, c'est de rompre les troupes de M. d'Elbeuf, dont si 
le plus estoit nettoye, 'le peuple qui en a souffert infiny dommaige n'en appelleroit 
pas, o 
The revolt was eclipsed by the turbulent events of 1588 and the gautiers next appear In the texts 
in April 1589. By this time both the duc and cardinal de Guise had been murdered at Blois and the 
League had seized control of Rouen. Falaise also held firm for the League and was now directly 
threatened by the royalist army under the duc de Montpensier, who invested the town on 20 
April. "' 
The comte de Brissac resolved to relieve the town. To this end he was able to join forces 
with the gautiers. How this was achieved is not clear, especially since it was his troops who had 
been among the worst pillagers of lower Normandy, but two reasons are feasible. First, the gautiers 
were motivated partially by religion as they were supported by their own priests and clerics from 
the episcopal town of Seez, and it is important to note that the royalist army included prominent 
local Huguenots like the comte de Montgommery. "Z The second clue to the allegiance of the 
gautiers seems to lie in the fact that, having originally been a popular defensive force, they were 
now led by the lesser nobility of the region, who were sympathetic to the League. Brissac was 
desperate for reinforcements because he had only 300 cavalry at his disposal while Montpensier 
108 ADSM, G, 2176, fos 307-11. 
109 BN, Ms Fr, 3394, to 53, Henri III to Longuanay, Paris, 19 March 1588. 
10 Papiers de Herv6 de Longuanay, p 20. 
I" R. d'Estaintot, La Ligue en Normandie, Paris, 1862, p 21. 
112 For this and following, see Davila, Historie of the Civill Warnes, pp 748-9. 
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had 4,000 men. De Thou claimed that the gautiers brought him 5,000 peasants. ' 13 Brissac had 
prominent leaguers with him like Jacques de Moy, sieur de Pierrecourt, and Jean de Longchamp, 
governor of Lisieux; he could also count on a number of the local petite noblesse: the sieurs de 
Beaulieu, de Mailloc, de Tubeuf, de Roquenval and d'Eff auchour. "` It was these men who seem 
to have led the peasants into battle. Having advanced towards Falaise the League army was 
attacked and crushed in a defensive position at the village of Pierrefite. Brissac retired to Argentan 
and left the peasantry to its fate. Montpensier began a mopping-up operation, smashing the 
association and seizing Bemay, Vimoutiers and the fortified village of Chapelle-Gauthier Itself. 
Unlike the local lesser nobility, Brissac never seems to have taken part in the fight at Pierrefite. A 
number of these men were captured at Pierrefite and in subsequent skirmishes. "' It is important 
to differentiate between these local men and the League forces led by Brissac, Pierrecourt and 
Longchamps. Little is known about these lesser nobles except that they were landholders in the 
region of gautier resistance. Hamon, baron de Mailloc, remained in the League and fought to 
defend Rouen in 1592. The baron d'Echauffour was Felix Le Gris (or his descendant), guidon of 
the company of the bailli of Alengon in 1567. "s Frangois de La Vigne, baron de Tubeul, had 
been the guidon of the ordonnance of the sieur de Carrouges (1565-7) and Pierre de La Vigne was 
bailli of Mortain in 1568.1''7 The arming of the peasantry was not uncommon. It had happened 
in 1562, and in 1585 the provincial Estates complained that in the vicomte of Caen: 
Loys du Touchet, sieur de Beneauville,... combien qu'iI Wait auctorite ny 
commission de ce faire, contraint les gens du pays d'achapter et avoir armes, 
faisant faire monstre de six sepmaines en six sepmaines, combien qu'iI ne soft 
necessaire: et soubs couleur, ledit du Touchet fait encourir au pauvre peuple de 
grands fraiz, peines et travaux. 1e 
113 De Thou, X, p 601. 
114 Floquet, III, p 241. 
15 Palma Cayet, Chronologie Novenaire, Michaud and Poujoulat, 1st ser., XII, p 126; L. 
Boivin-Champeaux, Bernay et La Ligue, Bemay, 1889, pp 13-20. 
"s Vindry, p 375; BN, PO, 1413, fo 6. Felix may well have formerly been a protestant since 
the captain of the company in which he had served. Jacques de Renty, was a former 
lieutenant of the company of the king of Navarre. Felix was also the nephew of Jacques 
du Merle, lieutenant of the comte de Tillibres from 1581 to 1587. 
Vindry, p 501; BN, PO, 2994, to 5; BN, Dossiers Bleus, 668, to 1. Francois married 
Jacqueline Le Moyne, making him a relative of prominent ultra-catholic Martin du Bosc, 
who had married lsabeau Le Moyne in 1571. 
1e Cahiers des Etats de Normandie sous le regne de Henri Ill, 11 p 131. 
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This report confirms the involvement of Guise clients in the peasant resistance movement. Louis 
II de Touchet, sieur de Bdneauville, was the nephew of Nicholas d'Osmont, a Guise household 
servant in the 1550s. In 1580 Louis married married Marie de L'Estendart, granddaughter of Adrien 
d'Humieres. Witnesses to the marriage contract included senior adherents of the Catholic League. 
Jean V, baron de Vieuxpont, at that time an archer in the company of the marquis d'Elbeut, was 
present. He was accompanied by Anne du Sart, former lieutenant of Philippe de Roncherolles and 
relative of Robert du Sart, man-at-arms of the duc d'Aumale (1565-9) and the marquis d'Elbeuf 
(1573). 19 There seems to have been a desire to defend the locality against further incursions of 
troops and the small force of Brissac was not as much of a threat as the armed strength of the duc 
de Montpensier. This defensive mentality was reinforced by a genuine desire to uphold catholicism. 
The motives of another Bautier leader are more easy to distinguish. Jacques Le Conte, baron de 
Nonant, had previously been an officer in the army of the duc d'Elbeuf. His mother, uncles and 
aunts were all protestants and, after the death of his father in 1581, his mother erected a chapel 
in the barony. Huguenots came to worship from all over the bailliage of Alengon which only caused 
disturbances and conflict, no chapel having stood there before, and soon the: 
gendarmes du roi ou du duc d'Alengon [d'Anjouj vinrent bien ä Nonant pour retablir 
I'ordre, mais leur r6le semble d'dtre borne ä lever imp6ts et ä pratiquer les 
requisitions. 120 
Losses caused by the protestants and the soldiery amounted to 10,0001 The adherence of the 
baron to the League can be seen only in the light of the despair at the breakdown of order and the 
reign of anarchy - religion seems to have been a contributory rather than a decisive factor. 
According to de Thou, the resistance of the gautiers had been broken forever by the duc 
de Montpensier. '2' However, when the duc de Mayenne arrived in the region during the following 
month there were still peasants under arms eager to join him. '22 By 1590 the captain of Essay, 
Jean Malard, sieur de La Motte, was leading a peasant force known as the Lipans who operated 
in the region of Domfront, Belleme and Seez. '23 The gautiers posed no military threat to royalist 
19 Courtaux, Histoire genealogique de la maison de Touchet, pp 45-9. 
120 C. Verel, Le marquisat de Nonant, Alengon, 1908, p 46, see also "Une paroisse rural du 
duche d'Alengon: Saint-Germain de Clairfeuille", Bulletin de la socidte, historique et 
archEologique de I'Orne, 1893, pp 297-8. 
121 De Thou, X, p 603. 
122 BN, Ms Fr, 23296, to 22. 
123 M. Odolant-Desnos, Memoires historiques sur la ville d'Alengon et sur ses seigneurs. 2 
vols, Alengon, 1787, vol II, p 353. Other groups were known as Francs-Museaux and 
Chateaux-Veils, see Salmon, Society in Crisis, p 279. 
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dominance in lower Normandy but their presence made collecting taxes difficult. In 1594 "la recette 
'2` des tailles de I'Election de Bemay n'a pu se faire A cause de la revolte des gaultiers". 
In urban areas increased religious fervour was certainly a major factor in the success of 
the League. '25 It is also clear that on the one hand there was spontaneous action by the masses, 
exemplified by the Day of the Barricades, and on the other hand there was a group of highly 
organised and committed leaguers among the urban elites throughout France before 1589. Work 
done by Barnavi and Descimon on Paris has gone some way to explaining relationships between 
i the Guise, the activists and the masses. As early as 1585 the Sixteen in Paris sent an envoy to 
Normandy'26 There is no available evidence to show who were the activists in the province. 
Yet it is possible to build up a list of the clandestine supporters of the League, by investigating 
those involved in the coup of February 1589 and those who espoused leaguer sentiments and were 
opponents of royal policy at the provincial Estates and at the Estates-General of Blois in 1588.127 
According to a memorandum from Carrouges to the king in April 1585, large sections of 
the town were suspected of being pro-League. The Council of Twenty Four remained loyal but the 
parlement, the clergy and the city's Spanish community were untrustworthy. 128 The accuracy of 
this report was confirmed when in July the edict of Nemours, proscribing protestantism, was 
greeted with joy by the populace and rapidly registered by the parlement. '29 However, the 
parlement was not prepared to register measures designed to pay for the war against the 
Huguenots and repeatedly blocked fiscal innovations presented to them by the king. In August 1587 
the king wrote in the strongest terms to Carrouges after: 
le premier president et conseillers fizet et pericard ayant me venir trouver pour me 
rendre raison dun arrest qui a donne par mad. court sur le faict de la 
reappreciacion... ne pouvant me contenterdes remonstrances quilz mont envoyees 
sur larrest que jay demierement donne en ce faict avis quil soft son plain et entier 
effect, sans avoir aulcun esgard a icelles, daultant quelles ne tendent a autre but 
124 C. de Robillard de Beaurepaire (ed), Inventaire-Sommaire des Archives-Ddpartementales 
de la Seine-lnfOrieure, anterieurs A 1790, ser. C and D, Paris, 1864, vol I, p 197. 
125 Benedict, Rouen during the Wars of Religion, pp 190-208; Crouzet, Les Guerriers de Dieu, 
II, pp 361-450. 
126 Benedict, Rouen during The Wars of Religion, p 167. 
127 Because of the lack of evidence Benedict concludes that little of certainty can be 
established about the League before 1589, see Rouen during the Wars of Religion, p 168. 
128 BN, Ms Fr, 3358, fo 42, discussed in Benedict, Rouen during The Wars of Religion, p 171. 
129 Floquet, III, p 230. 
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de monstrer quilz sont jaloux de la conservacion de leurs authorite aux despens 
et diminution de la mienne. 130 
As the most senior magistrate in the parlement the premier president, Groulard, could have 
expected to be in this deputation. His fellow emissaries were opponents to royal policies within the 
parlement. Conseillers Jacques Fizet and Guillaume Pencard sat in the rump League parlement 
at Rouen after 1589. Indeed Pericard was a leading member of the League hierarchy. His 
commitment to the church was unquestionable since he was abbot of Saint-Taurin and grand 
chantre of the cathedral of Rouen. He was one of those who counselled the cardinal de Bourbon 
to join the League. 13' The relationship between the Pr ricard and the Guise was close and has 
been discussed at length above. Jean Pericard, elder brother of Guillaume, was the secretary of 
the duc de Guise and deeply involved in the affairs of the League. In January 1588 he was present 
in Rouen, at precisely the same time as the duc d'Elbeuf was organising a revolt in the 
province. '32The League in Normandy was therefore closely associated with the Guise affinity. 
Opposition to royal policies and the voicing of discontent can also be followed in 
representative assemblies. The cahiers de doleances of the provincial Estates became increasingly 
vociferous and at the Estates-General of Blois the king was surrounded by malcontents. The 
Norman Estates complained about the burdens of taxation, the excessive sales of venal office and 
the spiralling costs of justice. '33 Appendix G outlines those Guise clients and leaguers present 
at the Estates between 1584 and 1588. Families long associated with Guise service, such as the 
Vieuxpont, the Limoges, the Vipart and the Bigars, are prominent. Others had a long tradition of 
support for ultamontanism, like the Secard and the Goutimesnil. A third group had once been In 
the household of the duc d'Anjou, such as Jacques du Bosc (d. 1614), sieur de Coquereaumont, 
and Francois de Cormeilles, sieur de Tendos. '3' These men took a leading role in the Estates; 
for example in 1585 Antoine de Bigars was elected to present the cahierde doldances to the king. 
Its first article offered congratulations on issuing the edict of Nemours and for ensuring the unity 
of the faith, but also urged him "garder, entretenir et inviolablement observer" its clauses. 135 
130 BN, Ms Fr, 3394, to 65, Henri III to Carrouges, August 1587. 
'3' Saulnier, Le role politique du cardinal de Bourbon, p 97. 
132 ADSM, Tabellionage, 2b"'° Heritage, 2E1,2003,4 January 1588. 
133 Benedict, Rouen during the Wars of Religion, pp 162-3. 
134 Jacques du Bosc had been a gentilhomme ordinaire of the duc d'Anjou In 1578 and again 
in 1581. As the the husband of Anne Jubert he was the beneficiary Jean Juberl. formerly 
grand vicaire of the abbey of Bec for the cardinal de Guise, see Frondeville, Conseillers, 
p 27; ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1,356,2 June 1578; 2E1 364,25 October 1581. Francois 
de Cormeilles was gentilhomme ordinaire of the duke in 1578 and captain of Fontaine-le- 
Bourg in 1586, see ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1,357,12 July 1578; 2E1,367,10 October 
1586. 
'35 Cahiers des Etats de Normandie sous le regne de Henri lll, II, pp 108,303. 
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By 1588 criticism of the regime (although not directly aimed at the king) had become quite 
open. When the duc d'Epemon came to Rouen to take up his governorship, the usually honorific 
and formulaic address to the governor by the cathedral chapter was turned into an extraordinary 
attack on the duke by the penitencierof the cathedral, Jean Dadre. Dadrd's main concern was that 
the promise made in 1585 to combat heresy was being undermined by "politiques" and 
"machiavellistes". In the war against heresy Dadre placed the onus on d'Epemon: 
"C'est ä vous d'y remedier, si voulez faire I'office d'un bon Gouverneur. Vous en 
avez la puissance, pour avoir I'oreillle, la faveur, le credit, le coeur et I'auctorite du 
Roy en main. II ne reste que la bonne volonte, de laquelle vous ferez paroistre les 
effects quand vous voudreez. " 
lt was the complaint of the League and the Guise that the king had failed to do this. The edict of 
Union (July 1588) and the Estates-General of Blois were supposed to ensure that protestantism 
was crushed and that Henri of Navarre was excluded from the throne. There was intense 
competition at the elections for the Estates-General. In Picardy the duo d'Aumale exercised a 
preponderant influence over the elections and his client, Adrien de Tiercelin, was returned for the 
baillfage of Amiens. 137 The League also dominated elections in Normandy and the list of electors 
for the bailliage of Rouen still exists. ' Of the twelve noblemen who appeared for the election 
at least two were in the Guise affinity. Martin du Bosc, sieur d'Emendreville, was a veteran of the 
catholic army in Normandy in 1562. '39 Barthelemy de Limoges was a client of the duo d'Aumale 
and the Vipart family, who stood in for Nicholas de Vipart at the provincial Estates of 1586. It Is 
therefore no surprise that Nicholas de Vipart, baron de Becthomas, was elected to represent the 
bailliage at Blois. There were other electors who favoured a pro-Guise candidate. Jean de 
Gaillardbois came from a family who provided a number of men-at-arms for the duo d'Aumale, and 
likewise Claude de Heris, sieur du Fay, another elector, since Adrien de Hens had been an archer 
of the marquis d'Elbeuf in 1579. '40 
The representatives from Normandy were dominated by League leaders and Guise 
clients. "' The cardinal de Bourbon exerted a great deal of influence and was himself elected for 
136 Remonstrance Faicte A Monsieur d'Espernon, Entrant En l'Eglise Cathedrale de Rouen, 
le 3 de may 1588, Rouen, 1588, pp 5-7. 
137 Orlea, La Noblesse aux Etats generaux de 1576 et de 1588, pp 98-9. 
138 ACR, A, 20,27 duly 1588. 
'39 See chapter five above. 
140 See appendix E. Francois de Gaillardbois was a man-at-arms from 1575 until 1581 and 
Georges was an archer during the same period. 
"" Recuell des pieces originales concernant la tenue des Etats Generaux, IV, p 3. 
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the First Estate of Rouen, and another prominent clerical leaguer, Claude de Sainctes, was 
returned at Evreux. Among the lesser clergy, two men, Jean de Vieuxpont (d. 1612), abbot of Saint- 
Jean de Falaise, and Etienne de Vion, curd d'Auzebosc, had appeared recently at the provincial 
Estates. Vieuxpont was a cousin of the barons de Vieuxpont, major clients of the Guise, and his 
brother, Gabriel, was the ensign of the comte de Brissac. 142 
Although Caen was generally an area of royalism, a future League captain of Bayeux, Jean 
f d'Escajeul (1520-93), sieur de La Bretonnii re, was elected. He had fought for the catholics in 
Normandy in 1562 and had been lieutenant of the ordonnance company of Philippe de 
Roncherolles (1567-9). In the bailliage of Caux the comte de Brissac was preferred to the local 
candidate, Jean de Moy, who, according to a contemporary, "ayant fait choses qui estoient au 
mecontentement de tout le monde aux dites estates. ""3 The Cotentin was represented by 
Charles Martel, sieur de I'Honneur de Montpingon, nephew of Adrien, a future leader of the rump 
League parlement of Rouen. '" His cousin, Frangois, was to become an important League 
captain. In the bailliage of Gisors Charles de Roncherolles, sieur de Heuqueville, completed the 
list of League successes. The only exception was in the bailliage of Alengon where the royalist 
bailli, Jacques de Renty, used illegal methods to overcome his opponent, Gabriel de Vieuxpont, 
sieur de ChaillouE. 145 The League was strong among members of the Third Estate, although the 
evidence available is insufficient. Certainly Guillaume Colombel, a conseiller-echevin of Rouen. 
elected for the Third Estate of the bailliage of Rouen, was a League sympathiser. '' 
On 23 December 1588 Henri duc de Guise was murdered at Blois on the orders of the 
king, and his brother the cardinal was killed the next day. To the Catholic League, Henri III had 
been an unpopular king who increased taxes, sold offices as never before and was misguided by 
evil counsellors, but he now revealed himself as a tyrant; municipal revolutions followed In Paris, 
Amiens, Reims, Dijon, Orleans and Marseille. In Rouen there was great anger but Carrouges 
quickly acted to stifle unrest, stationing troops at strategic points throughout the city. "' Solicited 
142 ADSM, Tabellionage, 2"" Heritage, 2E1,2007,27 August 1588. This branch of the 
Vieuxpont had become recently very wealthy through the inheritance of Madeleine 
d'Annebaut. 
13 Bouquet (ed), Documents concernant I'histoire de Neufchatel-en-Bray, p 62. Brissac also 
had greater status than Moy and was elected as the president of the Second Estate at 
Blois. 
"` Frondeville, Conseillers, p 481. The father of Adrien was Olivier, lieutenant of Charles I de 
Cosse, marechal de Brissac. 
, as Recueil des pieces originales concernant la tenue des Etats-G6neraux, IV, p 45; Orlea, La 
Noblesse aux Etats generaux de 1576 et de 1588, p 98. 
146 He was present at the provincial Estates held by the League in 1589 as well as the League 
Estates-General at Melun in January 1590, see Farin, Histoire de la ville Rouen. II, p 411. 
He was related to the League pariementaire, Guillaume de Paixdecoeur. 
147 For this and following see Benedict, Rouen during the Wars of Religion, pp 177-81. 
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by both sides Rouen remained neutral, the governor making every effort to maintain stability: 
religious processions were banned. Carrouges thus followed the same path as in 1588, trying to 
maintain control of the city while at the same time using his position as governor to bargain with 
the parties. There were again splits in the civic hierarchy. Jacques Le Veneur, the bailli, leaned 
towards the League and the fiercely royalist Groulard felt the Le Veneur were less concerned about 
w: s 
the possibility of unrest than he was. 1' It seems likely that both Carrouges andi on were solicited 
by the two sides while maintaining a precarious neutrality. Indeed, it was the rumour that the father 
was negotiating with the royalists that became the signal for the well organised League coup in 
Rouen. On 5 February 1589 Carrouges was isolated with his men in the abbey of Saint-Ouen and 
forced to yield to the League. In the preceding twenty-five years Carrouges had proved above all 
else to be a political survivor, and he now attempted to become the head of the League. On 7 
February a council of twelve was established to direct the affairs of the town and three days later 
Carrouges swore an oath to work with the League in Paris and ensure the adherence of local 
administrative bodies. 1' However, Carrouges was seen as a vacillating moderate; after popular 
agitation he was imprisoned and then expelled. '50 His family had lost its power base and neither 
he nor his son played a role in the ensuing conflict. 
The council of twelve was divided evenly among the church, the judiciary and the town 
bourgeoisie. They came from the elite of the city and so the advent of the League was no social 
revolution, and their commitment to catholicism was beyond reproach. 15' They were also activists 
in the ultramontane cause. Pierre S6card, cure of Saint-Maclou, and his brother, Claude, canon of 
the cathedral were among the church representatives. The involvement of this family in the ultra- 
catholic cause can be traced back to the 1560s. '12 Their relative, Pierre, sieur de Saint-Amoult, 
was a servant of Jean de Moy and a League captain. '53 Another representative of the church, 
Jean Dadre, had already proved his zeal in admonishing the duc d'Epemon. Among representatives 
for the magistrature were Jean and Jacques de Bauquemare, both of them bitter enemies of the 
premier prt silent, Groulard, who was forced to flee the city. They were also major creditors of the 
Guise. '54 Among the bourgeois representatives there was at least one Guise servant. In 1586 
148 Floquet, III, p 283-4. 
19 H. A. LLoyd, The Rouen Campaign, 1590-1592: Politics, Warfare and the Early Modern 
State, Oxford, 1973, pp 127-8. 
150 Floquet, III, pp 292-3. 
'S' Benedict, Rouen during the Wars of Religion, pp 180-2. 
152 See chapter four above. 
153 See chapter three above and G. Valdory, Discours du siege de la ville de Rouen au mois 
de Novembre mil cinq cens quatre vingt ooze, E. Gosselin (ed), Rouen, 1871, p 7. Valdory 
was a familiar of the duc d'Elbeuf, acting as his lawyer in the parlement and giving counsel. 
154 See chapter three above. 
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Charles de Bornes acted as procureur in a legal transaction for the cardinal de Guise, abbot of 
Fdcamp. 151 
In the early months of 1589 the parlement divided into two, the royalists convening at Caen. 
The only major statistical difference between the two groups lies in the variation of their ages. The 
eldest members supported the League, infuriated by the increased sales of office which had 
devalued the prestige and financial value of their own offices. ' Many of those in the League 
parlement were also clients of leaguer magnates. There was a number of different groupings in the 
rump parlement which explains the clashes of personalities and the factionalism within the 
pailement, even after moderates had been purged or left willingly. Guillaume Pdricard was a client 
of the Guise but constantly clashed with the conseiller, Michel de Monchy, nephew of the cardinal 
de Pellevd. In 1592 Pdricard, despite the support of Mayenne, failed to be nominated as a 
president. The two magistrates were both part of the extremist faction of the League but they fought 
over possession of the archdeaconry of Rouen. 157 There were other factions in the parlement. 
The cardinal de Bourbon could rely on his vicar-general, Marion de Martimbosc, a conseiller in the 
parlement, to hold firm for the League. 168 The Bauquemare could count on the support of their 
kinsmen who remained in Rouen. The conseiller, Charles Le Febvre d'Escalles (d. 1613), was 
married to Marguerite Bauquemare and his father was a creditor of the Guise. 1S9 The procureur- 
g6n6ral, Georges de La Porte, who like so many other leaguer parlemenatires was an enemy of 
Groulard, was the older brother of an official of the comtesse of Gisors, Anne d'Este, former 
duchesse de Guise. 16° Other leaguer magistrates had closer links to the Guise. The grandfather 
of Louis Garin, a conseiller since 1582, had been bailli of Elbeuf and the family continued to be 
patronised by the Guise. One brother of Louis became a monk at the abbey of Bec and the other 
two were men-at-arms in the company of the duc d'Elbeuf. '61 Obviously the ties of kinship were 
important in the decision on which side to take and the examples are numerous. For example, 
Louis Garin was the son-in-law of the conseiller, Guillaume de Paixdecoeur who played an 
important role in the defence of Rouen in 1592 as captain of the bourgeois militia. '6 Moreover, 
other robins, such as the conseiller, Philippe de Mordaigu, were related to the leaguer noblesse 
d'6pe e. 
'55 ADSM, Tabellionage, 2b' Meubles, 25 July 1586. 
'56 Benedict, Rouen during the Wars of Religion, pp 183-5. 
157 Frondeville, Conseillers, pp 485,501; Lloyd, The Rouen campaign, p 133. 
158 Ibid, p 450. 
1S9 See chapter three above. 
160 Frondeville, Presidents, p 277. This office had been held by the La Porte family since 1552. 
'61 Frondeville, Conseillers, p 357. 
162 Frondeville, Conseillers, p 341; Valdory, Discours du siege de Rouen, p 6. 
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In late February the duc de Mayenne arrived in Rouen and on 4 March at a general 
assembly of the town a Conseil de ! 'Union was formally established. This was constituted by adding 
prominent robin and noblesse d'epee representatives to the standing council of twelve. '6' The 
addition of Guillaume Pericard, a Guise client, was an obvious move by Mayenne to improve his 
own authority. Pericard's elder brother, formerly the secretary of the duc de Guise, was now one 
of the four secretaries of state of the League. Mayenne also promoted two other Guise clients to 
the council: Nicholas de Moy, sieur de Vereins and Antoine de Bigars, sieur de La Londe. Vereins 
had his authority reinforced when he was given the office of grand maitre des eaux et fordts of 
Normandy for the League. '64 The other noble de robe courte to sit on the Conseil, Antoine de 
Bigars, was a key figure in the Guise affinity, precipitating his arrest and temporary detention by 
the king, after the murder of the Guise at Blois. 165 Bigars became one of the most important 
League captains in Normandy. His brother, Guillaume, sieur d'Oissel, was ensign of the duc 
d'Aumale and he expanded his own clientele through manipulation of military patronage. '66 Finally 
the two most important officiers in upper Normandy, Jacques de Moy and Andre de Villars-Brancas 
had the droit de seance on the Conseil. Thus Guise clients were rewarded with a predominant role 
in the running of League affairs in Normandy. 
The Apogee and Decline of the Holy League, 1589-94 
The major problem faced by the League in Normandy was not the lack of adherents but the 
absence of a recognised leader of sufficient status. In 1589 the Norman affinity of the Guise turned 
out in substantial numbers but, in order to galvanise this support and to make sure that it 
was not ephemeral, the presence of a prince of the House of Lorraine was crucial - his court acting 
as a focus for the aspirations and the desire of the nobility to serve and be rewarded. Unfortunately, 
the prime candidate for the governorship, the duc d'Elbeuf, was arrested at Blois and held to 
ransom, not gaining his liberty until 1593.16' Without an obvious princely candidate, like d'Aumale 
in Picardy, positions of authority were always likely to be the object of factional squabbling. 
Moreover, serious weaknesses were soon apparent in the ranks of the moyenne noblesse. The 
Moy and Roncherolles families had been the mainstay of the Guise affinity in Normandy for many 
163 Benedict, Rouen during the Wars of Religion, p 188. 
164 ADSM, C, 1231,4 March 1589. He had previously occupied the post from 1578 to 1582 
and his younger brother Francois, sieur de Richebourg, was lieutenant-general of the 
League artillery, BN, PO, 2078, to 102. 
165 Memoires d'Antoine de Bigars, p 19. 
166 He became captain of 100 men-at-arms. His ensign was Francois de Mascarel. younger 
brother of Antoine, League commander of Neufchatel, see ADSM, 1 B, Registres Secrets, 
103,20 November 1592. 
167 Maille, Recherches sur Elbeuf, I, p 88. 
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years. However, Pierre de Roncherolles was governor of Abbeville and Francois de Roncherolles 
sat on the Conseil General de ! 'Union in Paris and was lieutenant-general of the Ile-de-France. '" 
The Moy family was devastated by untimely deaths: Nicholas, sleur de Vereins, died in 1589: 
Jacques, sieur de Pierrecourt, in late 1590 and Jean, sieur de La Meilleraye, in the late summer 
of 1591. 
The Moy family filled the power vacuum in the early days, before their mortality crisis. When 
j Mayenne established the Conseil de ! 'Union it was noticeable that he was accompanied by 
Jacques, sieur de Pierrecourt, and Henri de Lorraine, comte de Chaligny, heir by his wife to the 
elder line of the Moy. 11 Jean de Moy fulfilled the functions vacated by Carrouges in the city, 
presiding over the Conseil de PUnion on 25,27 and 29 May 1589 and presenting Mayenne's 
demands for money. 10 However, Moy's tenure in office was at a time of disaster: the League was 
defeated three times in Normandy and lost ground to the royalists. The defeat of the gautiers was 
followed by the victories of Henri de Navarre at Arques (21 September 1589) and Ivry (14 March 
1590). These reverses were compounded by royalists plots to seize Rouen"' In fact the major 
problem with Moy seems to have been his age (he was sixty-two in 1590). Michel de Monchy later 
recalled that he often had to preside over the Conseil, "duquel estoit chef le sieur de la mailleraye 
mais ny pouvoit le plus souvent vacquer a cause de son indisposition". '' After the defeat at Ivry, 
a siege of Rouen became increasingly likely and so Mayenne dispatched his trusted Burgundian 
lieutenant, Jean de Saulx-Tavannes, to command there. This proved to be disastrous because 
Tavannes was an outsider and viewed suspiciously by all Normans, "disans quil est estranger et 
3 As the fortunes of the Moy family waned so those of the quil ne respecte assez la noblesse". 
governor of Le Havre, Villars, waxed, since he had no rival in the pays de Caux. In 1591 he 
quarrelled sharply with Tavannes and threatened to change sides unless his rival was removed. 
Realising the position of authority Villars now had and the general dislike of Tavannes, Mayenne 
acceded to this demand, and thus in July 1591 the League had its first effective governor of 
Normandy. 
168 For a list of those on the Conseil, see Palma Cayet, Chronologie Novenaire, Michaud and 
Poujoulat, ist ser., XII p 101. 
'69 ACR, A, 20,4 March 1589. 
10 ACR, A, 20,25 May, 27 May, 29 May, 1589. 
171 Benedict, Rouen during the Wars of Religion, p 210; Floquet, III, pp 346-60. 
'n ADSM, 1B, Registres Secrets, 103, fo 196. Moy was in command of Rouen in April 1591, 
in the absence of Villars. By May he was ill and he died between June and September 
1591 and was buried at Rouen, see ADSM, 1B, Registres Secrets, 100,4 and 16 April 
1591; Rodiere and Vallee, La maison de Moy, p 80. 
173 ACR, A, 20,23 April 1591. For the conflicts in Rouen, see Lloyd, The Rouen campaign. 
pp 132-7. 
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The strength of the infant League was derived not from its leadership but from its appeal 
to urban communities and also from the strength and size of the Guise affinity in Normandy. The 
extent of the Guise power base in Normandy ensured the Catholic League would have a number 
of strongholds - places which were unable to withstand a serious siege but from which the 
surrounding plat pays could be controlled. The lands of the Guise provided bases at Lillebonne, 
Eu, Aumale and Harcourt, commanded by trustworthy servants. Guillaume de L'Isle, gentilhomme 
ordinaire de la chambre of the duc d'Elbeuf, was captain of the chateau of Harcourt in 1588. "' 
Jacques Blondel, procureur fiscal of the comte of Lillebonne, was also the captain of that chAteau. 
In February 1589 Jean de Moy asked Blondel to maintain Lillebonne for the League but he did not 
appeal to religious sentiment or to the authority of the Conseil de I'Union; instead he spoke against 
the "ennemys de Ia patrye et de Monsieur le duc d'Elbeuf". 75 D'Elbeuf's affairs in Normandy 
were handled by a council headed by Charles de Sarcilly, sieur d'Emes, intendant and maitre 
d'h6tel of the duke. He exercised his powers in March 1590 by replacing Blondel as captain of 
Lillebonne with Mathurin de Montpellier. 16 Fecamp was also assured since the abbey, of which 
the cardinal de Guise had been abbot, had the right to appoint to the captaincy of the town. ' 17 
Elsewhere Guise clients declared for the League, such as Jean de Longchamp at Lisieux. The sleur 
de Pierrecourt was captain of Honfleur and Philippe d'Ercambourg was lieutenant of the Comte de 
Brissac at Harfleur. "a 
Other clients were rewarded with the patronage available to Mayenne. Charles de 
Fouilleuse, lieutenant of the ordonnance company of the duc d'Elbeuf, was provided with the office 
of bailli of the town of Gisors by Mayenne. "9 His younger brother Philippe, another veteran of 
the League in 1576, was part of the garrison of Pontoise. 180 Nicholas de Moy became governor 
of the bailliage of Gisors, an office formerly held by his cousin Jacques de Moy - revealing how 
power was becoming devolved and perhaps giving an indication of why Fouilleuse defected to 
Navarre. 1e' Other clients gained even higher office; by 1592 Antoine de Bigars was lieutenant- 
'74 ADSM, 6F, 11, Recueil des capftaines de Normandie, 12 September 1588. 
175 ADSM, E1,462; Moy to Blondel, 23 February 1589. 
176 ADSM, E1,462,28 March 1590. 
177 Hellot, Fdcamp au temps de la Ligue, p 5. 
' ADSM, 6F, 11, Recueil des capitaines de Normandie, 18 May 1588. Charles d'Ercambourg 
was a man-at-arms of Jean de Moy from 1574 to 1581, see appendix E. 
179 ADSM, 1 B, Registres Secrets, 94,15 June 1589; BN, Dossiers Bleus, 278, to 68. 
130 H. Le Charpentier, La Ligue A Pontoise et dans le Vexin Francais, Pontoise, 1878, pp 71-2; 
BN, Dossiers Bleus, 278, to 5. 
18' ADSM, 1B, Registres Secrets, 94,1 July 1589. 
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general of the bailliages of Rouen, Evreux and Gisors and Jean V, baron de Vieuxpont, was 
governor of Dreux, Houdan, Montfort-L'Aumaury and Hurepoix. '82 
The League could also rely on many of the malcontents who had formerly supported the 
duc d'Anjou. Jean de La Haye, sieur de Chanteloup, became a captain of its field army in 
Normandy. Antoine de Mascarel, sieur de Hermauville, former chambellan ordinaire of d'Anjou was 
governor of Neufchatel, and his younger brother, Frangois, was ensign of Antoine de Bigars and 
captain of Fontaine-le-Bourg. " 
In lower Normandy, where the Guise landholding interest and clientele were small, the 
former adherents of the duc d'Anjou were Important to the League. Pierre de Rouxel (1562-1618), 
sieur de Mddavy, was the son of a major servant of the duke. He was governor of Argentan and 
Vemeuil, and bailli of Alengon. '" Elsewhere in lower Normandy support was weak because of 
the strength of protestantism and the lack of Guise influence. Yet Jean d'Escajeul, a veteran uhra- 
catholic, was able to seize Bayeux and hold out until January 1590. '" In the Cotentin a 
successful campaign was waged by Francois de La Morvissiere, sieur de Vicques, until his death 
in August 1590, supported by Frangois de Pdricard, bishop of Avranches, who held out against the 
siege of the duc de Montpensier in his episcopal town until February 1591. '06 
The success of the royalists in Normandy under Montpensier and Henri de Navarre himself 
in 1589 and 1590 put the League under intense pressure. As positions became indefensible or a 
royalist victory seemed inevitable so defections occurred, and thus Charles de Fouilleuse was 
captain of Gisors for the royalists by March 1590.187 There are a number of reason why the 
League did not collapse after so many setbacks. These included aid from the duke of Parma and 
the weaknesses of the royalist cause after the assassination of Henri III (August 1589) when many 
catholic nobles refused to recognise as king the protestant, Navarre. A number of local minor 
commanders also showed a remarkable degree of loyalty to the League and to the Guise. Jean 
de Longchamps was forced to yield Lisieux to Navarre in December 1589 and was confined and 
'82 Vindry, p 73; Memoires d'Antoine de Bigars, p 25. 
183 ADSM, 1B, Registres Secrets, 103,20 November 1592; ADSM, 6F, 11, Recueil des 
capitaines de Normandie, 6 February 1591; Bouquet (ed), Documents concernant la 
Neufchatel-en-Bray, p 65. 
Digueres, Etude... sur to Rouxel de Mddavy-Grancey, p 57. His father-in-law, the sieur de 
Fervaques, loved by d'Anjou and hated by Henri III, was lieutenant-general for the League 
in Burgundy. 
Wood, The Nobility of the Election of Bayeux, p 92. 
186 Pericard was aided by Charles, Antoine and Frangois d'Orglandes all distant relations of 
Jean d'Orglandes, who had managed the affairs of the duc de Lorraine in Normandy in the 
late fifteenth century, see Chenaye-Desbois, XV, p 206. 
187 See above - his brothers remained with the League: Philippe died at the siege of Pontoise 
and Louis fought at Ivry. 
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given a month to decide which side he should join. He refused service with Navarre and joined the 
garrison of Rouen. '" 
Explaining the bonds that the held the League together is difficult. Religion was certainty 
important, but many noblemen proved to be, at the final victory of Henri de Navarre, both 
opportunist and equivocal concerning matters of faith. The bonds of loyalty and kinship had been 
formed and strengthened by marriage and common service within the Guise affinity in the 
preceding decades. During the crisis of the civil war comradeship and kinship were even more 
important to the survival of a noble house. In the late 1580s and early 1590s there were numerous 
marriages which attempted to use kinship to reinforce the bonds that already united adherents of 
the League and some of the most important marriages between Guise clients took place during this 
period. 
In March 1588, at the height of the political crisis, a marriage contract was drawn up on 
behalf of Philippe de Montaigu, future consei/lerin the League parlement and brother-in-law of the 
leaguer captain Adrien des Buaz, for the marriage of his daughter, Barbe, to Fulcran de 
Houetteville. 1B° The contract brought together League sympathisers in the parlement with Guise 
clients. Fulcran was guided by the counsel of his amis and parens, which included men in the 
process of revolt against the crown: 
Gabriel de Vieupont sieur de chailloue cappitaine de cinquante hommes darmes 
soubz la charge de Monseigneur le conte de brissac... Messire henry des 
boves... guidon de la compagnie monseigneur le duc d'Elbeuf et haulte et puissante 
dame charlotte de givry veufve de feu haut et puissant seigneur charles des 
boves... lieutenant pour sa maiestie au vexin trangais et cappitaine de cinquante 
hommes darmes soubz la charge de mond. seigneur duc delbeuf. 190 
This is not an isolated example of a leaguer robin and leaguer epee family inter-marrying. In April 
1588 the marriage treaty of Marie du Fay, daughter of the conseiller in the parlement Jean du Fay 
(d. 1562), and Andre de Fautereau, baron de Cretot, was drawn up. 1°' The Fautereau were 
vassals of the duc de Guise and a leaguer family: Francois, younger brother of Andre, was a 
'88 R. B. Wemham (ed), List and Analysis of State Papers, Foreign Series, Elizabeth 1, 
London, 1964-, vol I, p 266. 
'89 ADSM, Tabellionage, 2+"'° Heritage, 2E1,2007,27 August 1588. The dowry was 10,0001- 
a sizeable sum. 
1°0 Ibid. 
191 ADSM, Tabellionage, 2"" Heritage, 2E1,2005,21 May 1588. For this and following, see 
Frondeville, Presidents, p 399. The dowry was a mere 1,1001 but Marie had been married 
once before. 
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representative at the League Estates-General at Paris in 1593. 'M Kinship links reinforced 
political connections. The elder brother of Marie, Jean du Fay (d. 1615), was ensign of the company 
of Jacques de Moy and husband of Madeleine de Jubert - one of whose uncles was the former 
grand vicaire of the cardinal de Guise and another was a major creditor of the duc d'Elbeuf. 12' 
Finally the youngest daughter, Anne du Fay, was married to Robert Deschamps (d. 1592), sieur du 
Reel, a conseiller-echevin who remained in Rouen during the League. 
The most important marriage to take place between members of the Guise affinity (or more 
precisely between servants of the duc d'Elbeuf) was that of Gabriel de Vieuxpont, sieur de 
Chailloud, and Catherine des Boves, daughter of Charles, sieur de Contenan. This marriage almost 
certainly took place in the 1580s or early 1590s. Gabriel was an integral part of the retinue of the 
comte de Brissac in 1588. His younger brother, Auffay, was an archer of the marquis d'Elbeuf in 
1579 and his distant cousin, Jean V, baron de Vieuxpont, was ensign of the duc d'Elbeuf in 
1587. '4 The des Boves were even more important clients of d'Elbeuf. Charles, sieur de 
Contenan, had been tuteurof Rend, marquis d'Elbeuf, and ensign, later lieutenant, of the d'Elbeuf 
ordonnance company (1555-78). 195 His eldest son, Henri, continued the tradition, and was the 
guidon of the duc d'Elbeuf in 1588. '96 The Vieuxpont were also the focus of other marriages 
within the League community. For example, in 1586 Christine de Vieuxpont married Gedeon de 
Monchy, a League captain. 197 
The historiography of the League has always tended to stress the internal contradictions 
between radical bourgeois elements and self-serving aristocrats, and between particularism and 
the need for a centralised war effort, and finally the failure to find a suitable alternative to Henri de 
Navarre. Certainly the unhappy tenure of Tavannes in Rouen was a microcosm of the first two of 
these problems. Yet by the end of 1592 the League seemed to have recovered from the defeats 
of 1589-90, especially after the successful defence of Rouen which left the royalists exhausted. The 
aid offered by the duke of Parma was important for the survival of the League but without the 
continuing efforts and sacrifices on a local level there would have been no League. This 
necessitates a discussion of the strengths of the movement at a local level. 
The defence of Rouen between November 1591 and April 1592 by the new governor, 
Villars, was successful because he was able to work with the authorities in the city to prepare for 
'92 D'Estaintot, La Ligue en Normandie, p 275. 
193 ADSM, Tabellionage, 2b"'° Heritage, 2E1,2009,7 december 1588. On the Jubert, see 
chapter three above. 
'94 The Vieuxpont are discussed in chapters three and five above. 
'95 The des Boves are discussed in chapters two and three above. 
196 ADSM, Tabellionage, 2a'"° Heritage, 2E1,2007,27 August 1588. 
197 Chenaye-Desbois, XIX, p 730. 
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its defence. '" Military operations meant that the power of the governor grew in relation to the 
Conseil de PUnion and Villars came to dominate the League as governor and admiral of Normandy 
after the siege. '9' However, the rise of Villars was due to his ability to build up a sizeable affinity 
in Normandy, beginning as League governor of Le Havre and the pays de Caux. Like Tavannes 
he was an outsider, but unlike his rival he chose to employ and patronise the local nobility rather 
than to antagonise them. Thus Normans like Hamon, baron de Mailloc, feature in his 
household? °° In the summer of 1591 when Mayenne visited Rouen, Villars was stationed outside 
the city with 15 ships and 1,500 men, threatening to defect if Tavannes was not removed. 20 ' In 
the Caux Villars had proved himself a good commander and therefore became a natural focus for 
the local nobility. As an outsider and a professional soldier he was prepared to disregard 
particularist interests. Thus as early as June 1589 he was complaining of the carelessness of the 
garrison at Lillebonne: "vous faictes si peu destat de vous employer a la garde des passages de 
la riviere" [Seine], and he unceremoniously told the captain: "je vous asseure que au moindre 
inconvenience qui adviendra Je le feray tomber sur vos testes. "202 Immediately after the disaster 
at Ivry he sent his lieutenant Charles de Goutimesnil, sieur de Boisroze, to garrison the chateau. 
This not only assured the chateau but also provided Villars with patronage, since Boisroze would 
now claim the wages and privileges pertaining to that office. The Goutimesnil were neighbours and 
clients usually associated with the Moy, but as the Moy family was suffering a mortality crisis Villars 
was perfectly placed to fill the power vacuum. 
In Rouen itself, Villars did not wield absolute authority. Antoine de Bigars had been captain 
of the fort Saint-Catherine since September 1589 and Mayenne made him lieutenant to Villars 203 
Jacques de Bauquemare was captain of the vieux palais. There were about 6,000 men in the town 
who included, beside the bourgeois militia, 5-600 light cavalry, 200 mounted arquebusiers and 
1,200 French foot; a predominantly indigenous force supplemented by 300 landsknechts204 
Analysis of the relative importance and composition of different followings that made up the 
defenders of Rouen is possible with reference to Guillaume Valdory's Discours du siege de la ville 
de Rouen. The garrison fell into four major groupings. First, the most striking feature about the 
'98 For Villars' efforts to galvanise the defenders and the siege itself, see Lloyd, The Rouen 
Campaign, pp 139-163. 
'99 Benedict, Rouen during the Wars of Religion, p 215. By 1593 the Conseil was redundant 
and its leader Michel de Monchy in exile. 
200 Valdory, Discours du siege de Rouen, p 12. 
201 Benedict, Rouen during the Wars of Religion, p 216. 
202 ADSM, El, 462, Villars to the inhabitants of Lillebonne, 19 June 1589. 
M Memoires d'Antoine de Bigars, p 23 
204 Lloyd, The Rouen Campaign, p 141. 
205 A list of noblemen is to be found on pp 2-12. 
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defenders of Rouen was the presence of so many families associated with the Moy affinity, despite 
the fact that the last surviving adult member of the family had died well before the city was 
besieged. These men were largely from the Cauchois petite noblesse and, as Villars was already 
governor of Le Havre and the pays de Caux, it seems likely that he was able to attract the loyalty 
of large sections of the May aff inity, especially since, as in the case of the Goutimesnil, he had 
patronage to dispense. These former Moy clients included Pierre Secard, sieur de Saint-Arnoult. 
man-at-arms of Jean de Moy in 1581 and a member of his household; Etienne de Rouil, sieur de 
La Rouilliere, man-at-amis (1581); Jacques du Tot, man-at-arms (1574-81); Pierre Calmesnil, man- 
at-arms (1570); Charles Sevestre, archer (1574) and man-at-arms (1581); Jacques d'Argence, 
man-at-arms (1581); Jean du Corde, man-at-arms of d'Elbeuf (1579) and May (1581); and finally 
Louis de Braques, sieur de Biennais, a man-at-arms of the sieur de Pierrecourt in 1569. In addition 
two members of the Goutimesnil family, the sieur de Coutances and the baron de Courcy, governor 
of Caudebec, appear in Valdory's list - each family associated with the May and appearing regularly 
in the musters of their companies of the ordonnance. 
The second group of noblemen was composed of major servants of the Guise. Charles de 
Sarcilly, sieur d'Emes, was head of the council of the duc d'Elbeul in Normandy and Henri des 
Boves was ensign of the duke's company. There was also the sieur de La Chambre, "ancien 
serviteur et domestique de Mons. le duc d'Elleboeuf" Z07 Also present at the siege were clients 
of the duc d'Aumale from the pays de Caux: Robert de Baillieul (1539-1601), sleur de Blangues. 
and his younger brother Nicholas, sleur de Drumare. 208 Their distant relative, Jean de Bailleul, 
was a veteran of d'Aumale's army in 1562, and on their mother's side the Hervieu family had 
provided a number of servants for the Guise 20' It seems probable that the sieur d'Anserville, 
listed as a maitre d'hötel in the household of the duc d'Aumale in 1575, was from the Bailleul family 
and was possibly Robert himself 210 
The third grouping of noblemen consisted of magistrates not usually associated with military 
service. In fact robins often had experience of military affairs. Thus Jacques de Bauquemare was 
captain of the vieux palais and Guillaume de Paixdecoeur, a conseiller in the parlement, was 
206 For a list of muster rolls consulted and a discussion of the Moy affinity see appendix E and 
chapter three above. It should be pointed out that Valdory often only gives the family name, 
making identification of individuals difficult. This list is certainly an underestimate of true 
numbers. 
207 Valdory, Discours du siege de Rouen, p 26. Claude and Philibert de La Chambre were 
gendarmes in the company of the duc d'Aumale in 1565, see appendix E. 
208 Valdory, Discours du siege de Rouen, pp 34-6. 
209 Louis de Hervieu was man-at-arms of d'Aumale (1565) and d'Elbeuf (1569-79), and Pierre 
de Hervieu was a man-at-arms of d'Elbeuf in 1579, see appendix E. 
210 BN, Ms Fr, 22441, to 82. The seigneury of Anserville is the old form of Angerville-la-Bailleul 
and the family were vassals of the barony of Bec Crespin held by d'Aumale from 1562 until 
1579. 
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captain of the city bourgeois militia. In defending Rouen he was joined by other magistrates like 
Georges de La Porte, the procureur-general, and Jean Le Doux, the president of the presidial of 
Evreux. Jean was the nephew of Guillaume Le Doux, brother-in-law of the leaguer bishop of 
Evreux, Claude de Sainctes? " 
The fourth identifiable group consisted of important League captains and the refugiez, such 
as Longchamp, the governor of Lisieux, and Martin d'Espinay (d. 1609), sieur de Bolsgudroult, 
governor of Louviers, as well as field captains who commanded their own units. The followers of 
the duc d'Elbeuf had their own commands: Antoine de Bigars was captain of fifty men-at-arms, 
Jacques Le Conte of twenty-six light horse, Jean de La Haye of fifty lances and his son Philippe 
of 100 light horse - all were present inside Rouen. 
The Guise and Moy affinities therefore played an important role In the defence of Rouen. 
In 1562 the city of Rouen had fallen swiftly because the Huguenots lacked the full support of the 
protestant nobility of upper Normandy. Quite simply, in 1591 the leaguer nobility turned up in 
sufficient numbers with their retinues to save their provincial capital, after it seemed that the League 
in Normandy, riddled with internal divisions, was close to collapse. Certainly the English forces 
aiding Navarre were supremely confident about the prospects of a quick victory? '2 The continuing 
strength of the League in upper Normandy was partly due to the fear of a heretic as king. The fact 
that the League did not collapse in upper Normandy in the face of successful royalist campaigns, 
was also due to the strength of particularist feeling and the necessity of defending the patrie against 
outsiders -a factor previously ignored by historians. The League in urban areas was often a 
reaction against the encroachment of royal power upon local privileges. Localities everywhere 
dreaded the presence of foreign troops, and the Rouennais feared that Tavannes was going to 
introduce a foreign garrison. 213 Indeed, disillusion with the League was increased by its use of 
Spanish troops 214 The army of Navarre consisted of large contingents of German. English and 
Gascon protestants, and the defence of Rouen was therefore a defence of catholicism and the 
patrie against foreigners. This particularist feeling and Norman separatism are accurately captured 
by the contemporary memoirs of an ultra-catholic Rouennais cleric who talks of "la Normandie" and 
the "pays de France" thus: 
Je laisse maintenant ä penser lequel c'est de France ou de la Normandie lequel 
est redevable et le plus tenu I'un ä I'autre. Et toutefois, de ce peuple de France, 
il ne pent sortir une gracieuse parole de sa bouche, qui dise bien des Normands. 
21 Frondeville, Conseillers, p 649. 
212 Wernham (ed), List and Analysis of State Papers, Foreign Series, Elizabeth 1, III, p 214. 
213 ADSM, 1B, Registres Secrets, 100,19 March 1591. 
214 Prarond, La Ligue ä Abbeville, III, p 96. 
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ni de Normandie. Si est-ce qu'elle est assez grande pour estre maride a un roi; si 
eile estoit reduite en royaume; eile croistroit encore. 15 
Thus particularism, usually seen as a hindrance to the effectiveness of the leaguer military effort, 
was a very strong factor in the survival of the League despite many setbacks, and contributed to 
stalling the advance of Henri de Navarre. 
Submission, Defeat and the End of the 
Guise Affinity In Normandy ? 
Rouen was relieved by the duke of Parma on 21 April 1592. Although conditions had become 
intolerable in the city and Villars had only just held out, it was a major victory for the League 
especially since the disaffected army of Henri de Navarre had suffered terrible privation . 
2'6 The 
new duc de Guise, Charles, and his kinsmen, Mayenne and d'Aumale, basked in the appreciation 
of the Rouennais ?" 
This however proved to be the high point of League fortunes and it was soon faced with 
a crisis when the inconclusive Estates-General of 1593 failed to find a suitable candidate for the 
throne. In the background was economic disaster and mistrust of growing Spanish Influence, 
reinforced by Philip li's attempts at the Estates to overturn the Salic Law and secure the succession 
of his daughter to the throne. Navarre was able to capitalise on this malaise and war-weariness by 
ceasing the military campaign, attempting to win the support of moderates by abjuring Calvinism 
(July 1593) and making a virtue of conciliation and negotiation. 
It has long been recognised that the victory of Navarre was achieved by buying on 
individual League commanders, with both cash and the confirmation of the offices they held. The 
devastation of the seigneurial economy and the huge debts that captains had run up in order to pay 
troops meant that, by 1593, only the king could meet the burdensome financial obligations 
accumulated by the League captains. The extent of devastation can be quantified21° In 1577 the 
ferme of the barony of Manehouville, part of the duchy of Longueville, was worth 1,000/ per annum. 
In 1594, the lease of the farm for nine years was for only 8501 p. a. In 1586 the seigneuries of Ry 
and Vascoeuil had a revenue of 1,100/ but in 1597 were valued at only 6501. The barony of 
2'5 Relation des troubles excites par les calvinistes dans la ville de Rouen, p 43. 
216 Benedict, Rouen during the Wars of Religion, p 221. 
217 LLoyd, The Rouen Campaign, p 183. Misgivings about the Spanish were great and Parma 
camped outside the city. 
218 For the economic crisis, see Benedict, Rouen during the Wars of Religion, p 226. Upper 
Normandy suffered heavily for the first time in the Wars of Religion, see "Documents 
Historiques: pillages de gens de guerre (1589-93)", Bulletin do la sociOt6 de I'histoire do 
Normandie, 1909, pp 242-6. 
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Longeuil, farmed out for 3,519! in 1586, had fallen to 3,180! in 1599, six years after the end of 
hostilities 219 In 1592 Francois de Fontaine-Martel claimed to have incurred 30,000 dcus of 
damage to his land. m 
By the summer of 1592 Villars had reinforced his position in Normandy when Mayenne 
made him governor and admiral. Fears about Villars' hegemony were not unfounded since he was 
able overrule the Conseil de l'Union. However, control of his subordinates eluded him for, as the 
L- 
plight of the League worsened, they wanted to strengthen their own positions and put themselves 
in a better bargaining position with the king. If Villars were to reach a secret accommodation with 
Navarre, minor nobles could be left with nothing but debts and devastated lands. Thus in November 
1592, Villars' lieutenant, Charles de Goutimesnil, sieur de Boisrozd, seized Fecamp for himself 22' 
The two men then began to fight a private war for control of the pays de Caux. When Villars signed 
a truce with the royalists in Dieppe the local League commanders ignored it, intent on building up 
their own spheres of influence . 
222 In December 1592 the disintegration of the League forces into 
petty baronial armies was such that the parlement had to write to its captains to: 
"Ies inciter de se voyr et avoyr correspondence les ungs avec les autres, quite 
toutes partialites et divisions qui peuvent estre entre eulx et se joindre de mesme 
vollonte et affection avec led. seigneur de villars 2" 
When Bernay came under attack in May 1593 no leaguer captain could be Induced to move from 
his own base in order to mount a relief operation 22` Whilst Villars was in Paris with Mayenne, 
the League captain of Neufchätel, Frangois de Fontaine-Martel, broke the truce with Dieppe and 
fighting recommenced. There is no doubting the original zeal of this man and his family. In 1588 
his cousin, Charles Martel, went to the Estates-General of Blois. Two of his younger brothers died 
fighting for the League, he himself was captured at the battle of Ivry and his uncle, Artus, who 
219 These figures are collated from the assorted papers of the House of Longueville, in AN, 
Q' 1374, Comptes des baux et fermages du duch6 de Longueville (1573-1615). See also 
AN, Q' 1371,1375 and ADSM, 1 ER, 1954, Compte... de la terre de Mannouville pour neuf 
anndes. 
224 ADSM, J, 437,17 June 1592. 
221 He was not a turncoat and remained a leaguer because the election for the Estates- 
General took place there and the Conseil de l'Union considered him a leaguer, see Hellot, 
F6camp au temps de la Ligue, p 37. 
222 D'Estainot, La Ligue en Normandie, pp 303-5. 
ADSM, 1 B, Registres Secrets, 103,22 December 1592. The parlement was also concerned 
about the pillaging and robberies committed by these troops. 
224 ADSM, 113, Registres Secrets, 103,8 May, 12 May 1593. 
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would prove a useful ally against Villars, sat in the rump parlement In Rouen 226 Villars was 
furious with the disobedience of his subordinate, especially since Martel had the support of radicals 
in the parlement. 226 Yet, Martel's show of force was not the action of a radical who was intent on 
defeating heretics, but more an effort to extend his own influence. Martel had bought the 
governorship of Neufchatel in August 1592 for 8,0001 and was determined to get a good return for 
his investment by increasing the area under his authority. 7 In May 1593 he seized the chateau 
of Bacqueville, which belonged to his distant protestant cousins and in February 1594 he attacked 
the manor of a fellow League captain at Argueil. 228 Thus when he finally came to an 
accommodation with Henri IV in October 1594 he retained the governorship of Neufchatel and was 
paid 16,000 Ecus. Even for handing over such a minor place as Vernon the sieur de Rouxel- 
M6davy was accorded, besides a pension, the offices of bailliof Alengon, lieutenant-general of the 
bailliage of Evreux and the governorship of Verneuil, while his father retained the governorship of 
Argentan. The most serious problem for Mddavy was the pressing need to pay his troops and 
followers. He received 12,000 Ecus to pay the garrison of Vernon, in addition to provision for the 
payment of his company of gendarmes and other troops directly from the aides of the election of 
Verneuil 22`' The price that had to be paid to Villars was consequently colossal and it must have 
been of some relief to Henri when he died in 1595.2w 
Nevertheless, loyalties were not always so easily undermined. Antoine de Bigars, sieur de 
La Londe, left documents on his death that were collated by his son in 1626, with the help of 
eyewitnesses who had served under Bigars during the League. This was at a time when the 
League was viewed as pernicious and families preferred to forget or fabricate the role that they had 
played. Although the memoirs at times exaggerate the role of Bigars In a stylised manner, they 
glorify and do not try to hide the hero's military prowess in the service of the League, perhaps 
because they were for private consumption. The narrative dwells on the fact that Bigars felt it 
dishonourable to sell himself to Henri IV and only submitted when he was totally isolated. He 
believed: 
Villars qui estoit grandement plein d'ambition, et avoit recogneu que le seigneur 
de la londe n'avoit faict la guerre que pour la zele de sa religion et qu'au contraire 
225 Frondeville, Conseillers, pp 481-2. Fontaine-Martel was a vassal of the duc d'Elbeuf, see 
ADSM, El, 445,12 March 1604, 
226 Especially Michel de Monchy who was expelled in June 1593 by Villars, see ADSM, 1 B. 
Registres Secrets, 103, fos 103-4; Benedict, Rouen during the Wars of Religion, p 213. 
227 Bouquet (ed), Documents concernant l'histoire de Neufchatel-en-Bray, p 89. 
228 lbid, p 97. 
229 For these terms see, ADSM, C, 1237, fos 65-8. 
230 For the benefits accruing to Villars, see Benedict, Rouen during the Wars of Religion, p 
228. 
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qu'iI y avoit dependu une partie de son bien et que tous les autres ne falsolent la 
guerre que pour leur utility et profict " 
La Londe had thus rejected the overtures of Henri since: 'Je ne traicterez Jamals avec mon Roy 
I'espee a la main" and "qu'il manqueroit jamais de foy a M. de Mayenne of a sa religion". He felt 
loyalty to the Guise and preferred to wait for news of Mayenne's disposition 'de Westre point 
acusds de trahison". In the meantime Villars made his peace and secured the city for the crown. 
Bigars left Rouen but was contacted by the king and pressed by his relatives at the court. Asked 
to provide troops for service against the Spanish in Flanders he relented and received a 
commission to raise a company of 100 men-at-arms and 24 companies of foot. 232 
After the death of Villars the governor of Normandy, Montpensier, became the undisputed 
major focus for patronage in Normandy. His status as a prince and a landowner In the province 
helped this process' The disintegration of the League forces in Normandy in 1593 and 1594 
into competing bands of warlords was indicative of the increasingly diffuse nature of loyalty and the 
devolution of power. Seemingly the Guise affinity was thus shattered along with the League - the 
ultra-catholic faction was now in disarray, weakened by the growing cynicism towards religious 
extremism. The ideological justification for Guise resistance to the monarchy had now been taken 
away and the family could no longer satisfy the aspirations of its clients as the League began to 
collapse. In fact, this sudden decline of the Guise is as much a myth as the smooth transition to 
"stability", "autocracy" and "absolutism" introduced by Henri IV? '` The new king was an extremely 
shrewd politician since he had learnt to be conservative. He realised during his campaigns that he 
could not defeat discontented magnates in battle but would have to bargain with them and keep 
a balance between factions. His predecessor had been much more of an Innovator and reformer 
but change generated conflict by impinging on particularist interests. Henri IV was a warrior-king, 
in contrast to his predecessor whose inability to fight for his crown and whose fanatical personal 
piety were alien to noble culture. Henri IV's relations with the ducs d'Aumale and d'Elbeuf go some 
way to explaining his triumph and also the fate of Guise power in Normandy. 
23' Memoires d'Antoine de Bigars, p 34. 
232 Ibid, p 38. 
The Montpensier had been granted the revenues of, and the right to appoint to offices In 
the royal comtd of Mortain and the vicomte of Auge. 
23 These words are taken from Salmon, Society in Crisis, p 321. A tentative attempt to divorce 
the reality of Henri IV from the myth has been made In M. Greengrass, France in the Age 
of Henri IV: The Struggle for Stability, London, 1984. The myths that surround Henri IV still 
hold wide currency, see R. Bonney, Society and Government in France under Richelieu 
and Mazarin, 1624-61, London, 1988, p 158, "the exclusion of the great nobility from 
government had been the work of Henri IV". 
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Charles de Lorraine, duc d'Aumale, was the most unrepentant leaguer in his family. Ever 
since 1576 he had built his reputation as head of the League in Picardy and cultivated his affinity 
accordingly but the zenith of his authority came after 1589 when he was governor of the province 
for the League. He spared no expense in pursuit of this important office. As early as April 1588 it 
was reported that he was running out of money and that all his lands were mortgaged Whilst 
he campaigned in Picardy his wife, Marie, looked after the finances as "sa procuratrice specialle 
de faire et negocier les faictz et affaires de leur maison". 236 This included the provision of all 
offices, the establishment of the fermes and the sale of land. At first small parcels of land were sold 
to placate creditors ?" In April 1590 Marie borrowed 2,000 Ecus In Rouen. 238 By 1594 the 
financial situation was acute and parts of the seigneury of Boves near Amiens had to be sold 7'0 
For the duke war meant a serious loss of revenue from his estates, compounded when he sacked 
Aumale itself as a punishment for submitting too easily to the royalists 240 His younger brother 
found that the revenue from his ecclesiastical benefices was eroded away and when he was killed 
in action in 1591 the abbey of Bec, which was in the hands of the royalists, was given by Henri IV 
to one of his supporters? " The losses incurred through warfare could be offset by the patronage 
available to a League governor. Ecclesiastical benefices were extremely important and between 
June and November 1589 d'Aumale appointed to five abbeys and one priory? 'Z Clients such as 
Charles de La Chaussee, a member of the council for the defence of Vimeu and Ponthieu. received 
land confiscated from protestants in the region Z'3 
The strains of war affected d'Aumale's affinity. In 1591 Pierre de Roncherolles, governor 
of Abbeville, was accused by the townsfolk of collaborating with his turncoat nephew, Charles de 
Bourbon-Rubempre. Although Roncherolles was proved innocent after an enquiry, the duke felt 
235 CSPF, 1586-8, p 601. 
236 ADSM, Tabellionage, 2b'"° Heritage, 2E1,2003,13 November 1587. 
23' ADSM, Tabeiiionage, 2«"° Heritage, 2E1,2003,16 November 1587. The tief of Guehauville 
was sold to Christophe Cherie, whose family was closely associated with Guise service, 
for 1,100 Ecus. 
ADSM, Tabellionage, 2'r' Writage, 2E1,2013,3 April 1590. 
239 A. Janvier, Boves et ses seigneurs: Etude historique sur la commune de Boves, p 172. 
240 Semichon, Histoire de la ville dAumale, I, p 308. 
241 Poree, Histoire de I'abbaye du Bec, II, p 355. 
242 BN, Ms Fr, 3977, to 353, "Beneff ices donnez par le duc de Mayenne despuis le mays de 
juin 1589 jusques au moys de novembre audict an". 
243 BN, Ms Fr, 3979, to 135, "Extraict d'un article contenu aux deliberations faictes par M. le 
duc d'Aumale... tenue ä Amyens pour pourveoir aux affaires de lad. province ... Faict 
ä 
Amyens, le second jour de novembre... 1590". 
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obliged to remove him in order to placate the town 2" There was a high mortality rate among 
senior clients of the duke and veterans of the League of 1576. In the space of few days in 1589 
Frangois de Roncherolles was killed and in a separate engagement three members of the Tiercelin 
family died 2`s By January 1594 d'Aumale still had In the field men like Antoine du Hamel, sleur 
de Belleglise, but it was now noticeable that he was commanding Spanish troops 2"° Abbeville 
and Amiens refused to countenance the introduction of foreign troops and when Paris succumbed 
to Henri IV the Picard towns decided to treat with the king, making d'Aumale's position untenable. 
When his Picard power base collapsed he fled to the Spanish Netherlands, entering Spanish 
service and dying in Brussels in 1631. 
D'Aumale's exile has been ignored by historians but it provides a good example of how 
Henri IV was able to impose his authority. While the rest of the Guise were handsomely rewarded, 
d'Aumale was made an example. There was no via media between accomodation and defiance. 
Charles duc de Guise reached an agreement with the king in November 1594 and Mayenne agreed 
on a cessation of hostilities on the 22 September 1595. Both received generous terms and Guise 
was granted the governorship of Provence, a province in which he had a landed interest. This was 
not only a victory against the incumbent and family enemy, d'Epemon, but also provided a useful 
base for the pursuit of Guise dynastic interests in Italy. D'Aumale was offered generous terms by 
the king but he still refused to submit and was therefore declared guilty of lese majestd and 
condemned to death in absentia. D'Aumale soon realised his error and spent the rest of Henri's 
reign trying to get himself rehabilitated. He and his wife wrote many letters to the king and 
Montmorency-Damville, the connetab/e247 
Henri IV realised the value of this example to potential malcontents but this does not 
demonstrate that the Bourbons had 'absolutist' tendencies. First, in 1595 the parlement of Paris 
refused to register the royal command calling for the execution of d'Aumale 2" By 1602 the king 
could still not enforce the condemnation, since the courdespairsfailed to meet: 'I'un se disant son 
allid et ami; les autres alleguaient quelques querelles qui dtaient passees entre eux; d'autres 
mettaient en avant leur indisposition" 249 In fact, Henri showed fortitude in withstanding the 
pressure he was under to grant a pardon. It was the financial crisis of the d'Aumale that ruined the 
244 Prarond, La Ligue A Abbeville, II, pp 345,378-86. Roncherolles was paid 3,680 dcus in 
compensation by the town but he only resigned when the money was paid in May 1593. 
245 De Thou, X, p 640. 
246 Wernham (ed), List and Analysis of State Papers, Foreign Series, Elizabeth 1, V. p 414. 
247 For example, BN, Ms Fr, 2945, fo 77, d'Aumale to Henri IV, 1596; BN, Ms Fr. 3574, to 84, 
d'Aumale to Damville, Brussels, 15 September 1598; BN, Ms Fr, 3832, to 83, duchesse 
d'Aumale to Damville, n. d.; BN, Ms Fr, 4766, fo 240, d'Aumale to Henri IV, n. d. 
248 Pierre de L'Estoile, Journal pour le regne de Henri IV, L. -R. Lefevre (ed), 2 vols. Paris, 
1948,1958, vol I, pp 461-2. 
249 L'Estoile, Journal pour le regne de Henri IV, 11, p 71. 
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family rather than the king's displeasure. In February 1594 Sully paid a visit to the duchesse 
d'Aumale, remarking upon the dilapidated state of the once magnificent chateau of Anet0 The 
seigneury of Boves was seized in 1606 on behalf of creditors. ' In 1609 the barony of Ivry was 
also handed over to the administration of creditors, adjudging it to Marie de Luxembourg, widow 
of the duc de Mercoeur who had leant heavily to d'Aumale. Financial disaster was compounded 
by the failure to produce a male heir. 2512 In order to accomplish the destruction of d'Aumale Henri 
only had to bide his time and undermine the family by quartering troops on its lands? ' 
Nevertheless it should not be presumed that the destruction of the d'Aumale was inevitable. 
The duke simply exchanged one master for another, becoming a pensioner of the Spanish king, 
attending the court of the archdukes in Brussels and leading troops at Amiens against Henri IV in 
1597 and at Nieuwpoort against the Dutch in 160025` He remained in contact with his friend and 
relative the duc de Mercoeur, who wrote a letter to d'Aumale in 1599 expressing the defiant attitude 
of the House of Lorraine. Mercoeur alluded to the descent of their family from Charlemagne such 
that: 
personne ne doibt plus doubter ce que vous et les vostres pourrez bien en qualitO 
de ses successeurs remonter sur la mesme throsne... 
and reconfirmed his commitment to catholicism, demonstrating that his submission to Henri was 
temporary, and regretting that he had been forced: 
me departir pour quelque temps de lapparence de mes pretentions sur la Bretagne 
plustot force par le bon sens des envieux de nostre maison que par la justice de 
leurs armes... je me resolus de remettre a une saison plus oportune de reprendre 
de ce qui m'appartient. 255 
250 Sully, Les Oeconomies Royales, D. Buisseret and B. Barbiche (eds), Paris, 1970-, vol I, 
pp 405-6. 
Janvier, Boves et ses seigneurs, p 172. 
252 The elder of his two daughters married Henri de Savoie, duc de Nemours and the 
younger wedded Ambrosio Spinola, see Anselme, III, p 492. 
25' According to the duchesse d'Aumale the damage at Ivry was 8,000 dcus, see BN, Ms Fr, 
10239, to 54, duchesse d'Aumale to Damville, n. d. 
254 In 1608 he was governor of Binche and Mariemont, see H. Lonchay et al (eds), 
Correspondance de la cour d'Espagne sur les affaires des Pays-Bas au XVIP siecle, 6 
vols, Brussels, 1923-37, vol I, p 298. 
255 BN, Dupuy, 88, to 340, Mercoeur to d'Aumale, La Roquette, 14 July 1599. 
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In fact Mercoeur died in 1602, thus removing another thorn from Henri's side. Nonetheless 
the danger from the Guise family had already diminished because the family could never be united 
as it once had been. In Normandy the decline of the d'Aumale inevitably had a more serious Impact 
than elsewhere. This was partially offset by the ability of Charles, duc d'Elbeuf, to establish his 
branch of the family on an equal footing with that of his cousins. In 1593 he escaped the captivity 
in which he had been held since the murder of Henri de Guise at Blois. D'Elbeuf was made 
governor of Poitiers but he did not take part in any offensive actions and remained on good terms 
with the royalist governor of Poitou, coming to an agreement with him for the division of the 
taii/e. 256 Negotiators from the town were sent with the consent of the duke to parley with Henri 
IV, and in June 1594 Poitiers submitted, d'Elbeuf becoming the first member of his family to yield. 
He was well rewarded; remaining as governor of Poitiers and, according to Davila, receiving a 
pension of 30,0001 p. a257 The d'Elbeuf continued to be well treated by the Bourbons. The duke 
was confirmed in the office of grand ccuyer and, since d'Aumale had preferred exile, he was 
granted the forfeited office of grand veneur and he also obtained the governorship of the 
Bourbonnais. In 1619 his son married the illegitimate daughter of Henri IV and was made governor 
of Picardy, demonstrating the confidence placed in the family. D'Elbeuf's close links to the 
protestant hierarchy were undoubtedly of great benefit in his rehabilitation. 
Joseph Bergin has already shown that historians ignore the continuing power and Influence 
of the Guise in the early seventeenth century at their peril259 In Normandy the decline of the 
branch of d'Aumale was a severe blow but it was in stark contrast to the resilience of their d'Elbeuf 
cousins. In 1605 the duc d'Elbeuf inherited the entire comt6 of Harcourt on the death of his 
nephew, Guy de Coligny, comte de Laval ° When the dynastic wars of the 1590s came to an 
end, d'Elbeuf no longer had the need for a large military retinue and in any case Henri IV was 
forced to reduce standing companies because of the penury of the crown ' The reconstruction 
of the shattered Norman economy needed local expertise and a standing council to oversee 
administrative, financial and judicial decisions. This council in Normandy was headed by the duke's 
wife, Marguerite de Chabot, who became the first member of the family to reside continuously at 
Elbeuf She was aided in her task by Charles de Sarcilly, sieur d'Emes, maitre d'h6tel and 
256 A. Thibaudeau, Histoire de Poitou, 3 vols, Niort, 1839-40, vol III, p 121. 
257 Ibid. 
258 Anselme, III, p 493. 
259 Bergin, "The Decline and Fall of the House of Guise as an Ecclesiastical Dynasty". 
The comte had been divided between the two families in 1584 and since 1588 d'Elbeut had 
administered the lands since 1588 as tuteur of Guy, comte de Laval, see Broussillon, La 
maison de Laval, V, p 324; ADSM, El, 482,1584. 
26' Greengrass, France in the Age of Henri IV, pp 182-3. 
262 Maille, Recherches sur Elbeuf, II, p 53. 
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intendant of the duke. His prominence as a counsellor reveakthe links between families that can 
continue over generations - he was the son of Jean de Sarcilly and Catherine, batarde de Lorraine, 
who were married before the Wars of Religion began .m The younger sister of Charles was lille 
d'honneur and dame d atours to the queen, Louise de Lorraine. As the political situation In France 
became less confrontational so the need for the affinity as a symbol of military power and prestige 
temporarily declined. Affinities now consisted of smaller military retinues and centred upon the 
management of the family fortune and the household, as they had before 1562. After the disruption 
of war, in which documents detailing rights and privileges had been destroyed or their enforcement 
neglected, seigneurial power had once again to be asserted. Marie ordered her agents to pursue 
all reliefs owed on noble fiefs "A toute diligence sans intermission"` Eustache Trevache, the 
Huguenot fermierof Lillebonne, was subject to legal proceedings for having the temerity to flee the 
Catholic League without having paid the agreed total for the lease, and all his property was 
confiscated, including a grainhouse he owned at Bolbec. 265 Accords were reached with the 
fermiers about reducing the sums they had to pay since the war had lowered the expected level 
of revenue. Eloi Perdrix, the fernier of Elbeuf received 9001 of compensation because of the 
"abbeuses desd. terres quil ya estd pilld et robbe par les gens de guerre le nombre de vingt deux 
chevaux qui sont estimez valoir plus de cinq cents escus". 266 In 1596 the piece of land called 
the prairie d'Estelan produced nothing because the "sieur de boisrozd estant en garnison du 
chasteau de Lillebonne a toujours jouy de lad. prairie pour I'usage de ses chevaulx sans avoir 
page" 26' The reclaiming and enforcement of rights meant building up and maintaining a judicial 
clientele in the parlement of Rouen and lesser courts. The duke was soon embroiled in scores of 
cases. If a vassal did something as simple as to refuse to hand in an aveu for his lands, detailing 
the dues and obligations he owed, a lengthy court case would ensue 2" 
This reconstruction would have needed a large clientele -a process aided by the duke's 
position as a provincial governor, and his position as grand veneur and grand 6cuyer, which 
augmented his status and increased the patronage he could dispense. In 1605 he died and was 
buried at La Saussaye near Elbeuf, a ceremony which placed him beside his ancestor, Jean de 
Lorraine, comte d'Harcourt, buried there in 1472. D'Elbeuf thus realised and reinforced the 
relationship between the House of Lorraine and Normandy. Despite the defeat of the Catholic 
League d'Elbeuf represented the continuation of the House of Lorraine as Norman magnates. 
m The composition and activities of the duke's council are discussed in chapter three above. 
26' AN, T, 199/22, to 87. 
265 ADC, E, 353,13 November 1585; AN, T, 199/22 to 87. 
266 AN, T, 199/24, Compte, 7 October 1597. 
26' ADSM, El, 446, Compte de Lillebonne pour 1596. 
2" ADSM, E1,445,12 March 1604. The defaulters in this case were former leaguer captains, 
Antoine de Canouville and Frangois de Fontaine-Martel. 
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By neglecting the Guise landed interest and affinity in Normandy, historians have misunderstood 
many things about the family and overlooked one of the most important elements of sixteenth- 
century Norman society. For example, the influence of the Guise affinity cannot be omitted from 
the exploration of the reasons for the failure of protestantism in Normandy. This study questions 
the conclusions of those historians who have sought to minimise the role of the nobility in both the 
initial success and growth of protestantism and the resurgence of catholicism. ' The relationship 
between elite politics and popular forces was complex and interdependent, and has been little 
studied by historians. As early as 1562 the duc d'Aumale was capable of forming a catholic peasant 
defence association. Similarly the passing of the comtes of Brionne, Harcourt and Eu from the 
hands of Calvinist lords to the Guise family between 1567 and 1570 was a crucial blow to the 
strength of Calvinism in upper Normandy and for its failure to consolidate; Calvinist tenants, 
churches and pastors would not only lack future protection but persecution would become more 
likely? Similarly those Calvinist lords, like the duc de Longueville, who could have provided 
leadership to the faithful, preferred to remain on the side of their kinsmen the Guise. The protestant 
masses in Rouen were bound to become an isolated and powerless minority unless they could find 
the protection of a locally powerful lord. The Calvinist governor, Bouillon, was another hope, but 
he vacillated too often. Although he made his lands in the East into protestant havens, he lacked 
the credit in Normandy to be effective and was too dependent on the Guise at court to use his 
governorship effectively. The protestants in the 1560s, unlike the Catholic League In the 1580s, 
lacked the leadership that could make effective use of popular passions. 
This study has attempted to demythologise the Guise family. The Guise were not a 
monolithic entity; indeed it is clear that members of the family had different personalities and 
beliefs. The unity of the family did not arise from a uniform and rigid obsession with the defence 
of catholicism or total dedication to a religious cause. Individual members of the family had more 
complex views of religion, witness the cardinal de Lorraine's ecumenism in 1561 and attempts by 
the family to form factional alliances with Conde in 1564, Navarre in 1578 and Calvinist malcontents 
in 1580. Charles d'Elbeuf was not bothered by the employment of Calvinist servants or the 
borrowing of money from the elite of the Rouennais protestant community. Attitudes to religion were 
both sincere and opportunist but always depended on circumstances; there was never a constant 
fixed perspective towards faith and the Guise were not religious dogmatists. Conversely, since 
family interest and the defence of catholicism became analogous in the minds of the Guise, religion 
was always viewed with the family interest in mind. These examples of apparent Guise hypocrisy 
towards the catholic faith are all related to the furtherance of family interest. This is why Longueville 
On the nobility and protestantism, see Benedict, Rouen during the Wars of Religion, p 242; 
D. Nicholls, "The Origins of Protestantism in Normandy". Certainly the repressive royal 
edicts of 1567-8 and the massacres of 1572 were disasters for the protestant community. 
Denis Crouzet in Les guerriers de Dieu, eschews an analysis of the interaction between 
elite and popular politics in favour of the study of the popular imagination, mentalitds and 
the clash between opposing systems of belief. 
2 This point is also made in G. Hurpin (ed), L'Intendance do Rouen en 1698, p 175. 
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and Bouillon could trust the Guise, since kinship was above religion. Yet because the Guise were 
the symbols of catholicism and because they fashioned an image of themselves as defenders of 
the faith, the furtherance of the family by any means was also the advancement of the catholic 
religion. 
It has long been established that the cardinal de Lorraine was a much more complex 
character than contemporary propaganda had portrayed him. His commitment to ecumenism In 
1561 may have been political but he was not the only member of the Guise family to have 
been exposed to more tolerant religious currents, in which hope of conciliar reform and 
reconciliation flourished. Anne d'Este was certainly educated in this Erastian atmosphere. It is 
noticeable that both she and the cardinal became more inflexible after the death of her husband 
in 1563. This event is crucial in understanding Guise strategy thereafter since this was a terrible 
blow and the frustrating attempts to obtain justice only exacerbated the bitterness. This hatred was 
not aimed at all protestants in general but specifically at the Chatillon and their catholic allies the 
Montmorency; naturally an attack on protestantism was also a blow to the Chatillon. Even in this 
more religiously hostile atmosphere the Guise could employ the poet Remy Belleau at Joinville as 
tutor to Charles future marquis d'Elbeuf. A few months previously Belleau had been a protestant, 
writing in defence of Conde after the conjuration of Amboise. Belleau provided a humanist 
education and it did not matter that he was "assez indifferent pour la cause catholique" 3 In 
contrast to the marquis d'Elbeuf, his cousin Charles de Lorraine, the future duc d'Aumale, was 
educated at a Jesuit-run college established in the post-Tridentine era. Generalisations about the 
family should be attempted with caution. D'Elbeuf, with protestant kinsmen and servants, proved 
himself to be more tolerant in his religious attitudes and d'Aumaie more ultramontane. They both 
fought alongside each other in the Catholic League but this unity came not from a shared militant 
faith but a common belief in the pursuit of family and dynastic interest. Likewise, their kinsman 
Charles III duc de Lorraine supported his cousins financially and politically during their struggles. 
He did not see any contradiction between his support for them and his own toleration of 
protestantism; his chief minister, the comte de Salm was a Calvinist. Charles' support of the 
Catholic League was purely one of dynastic ambition rather than of pious scruples ` 
The centrality of the family in political calculations, and the role played by Antoinette de 
Bourbon at its apex, cannot be underestimated. After the death of her husband in 1550 she spent 
the rest of her life at Joinville, leading a religiously orthodox lifestyle and shunning the court. She 
devoted herself totally to the running of family affairs, concerning herself with family finances and 
estate management. The upbringing of her grandchildren was undertaken at Joinville under her 
auspices with the help of her daughters and daughters-in-law. In this atmosphere the bonding of 
the kin group began away from the court, fostering the close relationships that characterised the 
Guise family. Historians of politics and institutions in sixteenth-century France have usually 
3 A. Echkhardt, Remy Belleau: sa vie - sa Bergerie, Budapest, 1917, pp 53-9,71. 
DaviII6, Pretensions de Charles III duc de Lorraine A la couronne do France, p 3. 
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concentrated on individuals. In doing this they have failed to grasp the principles of political culture. 
Political strategy was above all based on the family and within the kin grouping women had a 
crucial role to play in politics and family strategy. Thus the fortunes of the d'Elbeuf branch, which 
flourished in the early seventeenth century, could not have been possible without Charles duc 
d'Elbeuf at court and his wife, Marguerite de Chabot, playing an equally important role in reviving 
the family estates in Normandy. 
This study has attempted to view the monarchy from the perspective of one family in 
contrast to the traditional preoccupation with seeing the nobility only in terms of the state and the 
monarchy. The Guise served the monarchy to further their own family and both king and family had 
prospered from the alliance of interests before 1559. However, during the Wars of Religion the 
Guise - in contrast to the reigns of Henri II and Francois II - did not rank among the intimates of 
the king. Charles IX and Henri III were heavily influenced by their mother and had their own 
favourites and, as their reigns progressed, they came to fear Guise power. This fear came because 
of the realisation that the Guise, through their dynastic eminence, wished to be the most prominent 
of royal counsellors. In this way dynastic ambition and religion became so intertwined they cannot 
be separated. The appeals made by the family to the catholic imagination and its ability to capitalise 
on popular feeling gave the family its power base. 
The defence of catholicism was not part of a one-dimensional religious struggle. It was both 
a defence of the faith and a factional badge around which support could rally. The Guise were on 
the one hand capable of employing Huguenot servants and helping Huguenot kinsmen and on the 
other hand portraying themselves as the only saviours of catholicism. Thus the Guise family were 
able to project a public image aimed at the catholic people which exactly fitted the perceptions of 
the masses, who in the economic turbulence and religious anxieties 1580s awaited a godly and 
martial saviour to deliver them. The duc de Guise was able to portray himself as the defender of 
the faith even if his actions were always in the dynastic interest - there was a deliberate formation 
and expression of identity 5 In the final analysis the dynastic interest became synonymous with 
the religious cause. The ultramontane ideology, however much at odds it was with the actual 
activities of the moderate duc d'Elbeuf, could not be abandoned since popular support had by the 
1580s, in alliance with the extensive Guise affinity, become the foundation of dynastic power. 
It was popular forces and not Spanish money which brought the Guise to the pinnacle of 
their success in 1588, especially since Philip It's credit was badly damaged by the destruction of 
the Armada. Since the Guise were virtuous symbols of catholicism, untainted by the failures and 
mistakes of the monarchy, they were bound to be the the ideal focus for popular discontent. There 
was a gap between elite and popular mentalities. On the one hand the Guise were concerned with 
their dynastic interests and on the other hand the masses were driven by other forces, whether in 
defence of communal liberties or religious anxiety. The Catholic League was clearly an alliance of 
diff erent interests but the problem remains of how the Guise were able to exploit popular passions. 
5 Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning from More to Shakespeare, p 1. 
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First, the Guise were a symbol -a focus for the discontents of the masses and one way 
of legitimising popular protest. Secondly, because after 1563 the Guise remained relatively out of 
favour at court, they were thus forced to augment their power base in the provinces and make 
alliances with provincial malcontents. They did this in precisely those regions were the League was 
to have most impact - Normandy, Picardy and Champagne. For example, In Picardy the duc 
d'Aumale realised the potential for restructuring his affinity after 1576 around the newly formed 
Catholic League. 
The existence of a large affinity was not tantamount to the control of a province. Thus In 
Picardy d'Aumale was not able to take any significant town by force. However, when the municipal 
revolutions swept Picardy in 1589 he was in a perfect position to capitalise on the disintegration 
of monarchical authority. The Guise affinity in Paris was numerically small but it gave the family a 
link with and information about popular feeling in Paris. Thus affinities were the crucial bridge 
between elite and popular politics. In 1589 the gautiers joined the League to make common cause 
because of the relationship between Guise clients and the noble leaders of the peasants. In 
Normandy, popular support for the Catholic League was effectively galvanised into a major political 
force by the existence of the large Guise affinity in the province. 
The strength of an affinity came not from a hierarchical structure and control from the 
centre. The foundation of an affinity was not control but consensus, counsel and devolvement of 
power. The provincial council, as much as the lord's household, was a forum In which clients and 
servants could participate in the running of the lord's affairs and the formulation of family strategy: 
taking decisions and enjoying the financial and honorific benefits of service. Strategy formed In 
council had the benefits of drawing upon a wide body of information and advice and of achieving 
consensus within the lord's following. If a revolt was to be raised the support of clients had to be 
forthcoming. Affinities were not therefore bent to the will of a single magnate but were dynamic 
structures in which the decisions and strategies of clients were vitally important. Ideology, In the 
form of religion, was a means of galvanising an affinity and expanding the size of a following with 
an appeal to faiths The maintenance of a large affinity was crucial to the power of a magnate. 
However, to maintain support during the Wars of Religion the Guise not only had to provide 
benefits for and extend protection to their clientele they also had to ensure that they were seen to 
be defending the faith of their clients. By using religion to augment their following they were also 
bound to maintain that support by continuing to symbolise the catholic cause. In this manner the 
opportunity for factional manoeuvering, by forming factions across the religious divide, although 
often attempted by the family, was limited and usually ineffectual. The Guise were both 
strengthened and imprisoned by their appeal to populism. 
This study has focused upon one family in a single province during a limited period of time. 
Above all it has demonstrated the need for more studies of the composition and dynamics of 
affinities in late medieval and early modern France. Further study will illuminate not only the 
6 Thus Conde was able hugely to expand his following in the 1560s. 
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. 
strategies of the magnates and their international family interests, but will also reveal the 
importance of the lesser nobility and other social groups within political society. Politics was not the 
preserve of a few magnates, and historians must begin to explore the connection between elite and 
popular politics and the interaction between the court faction and provincial power structures. 
Affinities are crucial to the understanding of early modem political society. This thesis has 
attempted to outline the parameters for future study and indicate the areas which future research 
needs to explore. 
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Appendix A: Income of the ducs d'Aumale under Claude de Lorraine (1526.73) and his son 
Charles (1556-1631). 
Seigneury and date of Value in livres per annum 
acquisition/sale and date 
Normandy 
duchy of Aumale (1550) 9,800 (1583)' 
barony of Mauny (1550s) 4-5,000 (1580s)2 
comtd of Maulevrier (1547) 1,000 (1568)' 
Anet and Ivry (1566-1612) 20,000 (1614)4 
barony of Bec Crespin (1562-79) 2,075 (1604)5 
Longpaon/Geole (1565) 900 (1564)6 
Other lands 
comt6 of Saint-Vallier (1566) n/k 
seigneury of Boves (1550) n/k 
Offices and Pensions 
captain 50 lances 1,800 (1551)' 
100 lances 2,800 (1572)8 
50 lances 2,200 (1573)9 
captain chevaux-legers 3,600 (1551)10 
royal pension 16,000 (1564)" 
12,000(under Henri 111)12 
grand veneur 4,400 (1563)" 
3,750 (1581)" 
governor of Burgundy n/k 
BN, PO, 1750, to 235,24 March 1583, bail A ferme of the duchy of Aumale for six years 
commencing 1 January 1584. 
2 Extrapolated from the figure given for the 1670s, in G. A. Prevost (ed), Notes du premier 
president Pellot sur la Normandie (1670-83), Rouen and Paris, 1915, p 160. 
3 ADSM, J, 138, Documents concemant le comtd de Maulevrier, 1469-1779,29 April 1567. 
` Maudit, Histoire d'Ivry-la-Bataille, p 282-3. 
5 Dewald, Formation of a Provincial Nobility, p 208. 
S ADSM, Tabellionage, 2E1,326,19 February 1564. The price of these lands was 23,0001. 
BN, PO, 1749, to 78,25 April 1551. 
8 BN, PO, 1749, to 93,6 October, 1572. 
9 BN, PO, 1750, fo 175,15 October 1573. 
10 BN, PO, 1749, fo 80,28 October 1551. 
" BN, PO, 1750, to 157,29 February 1564. 
12 J. Boucher, Societe et mentalites autour de Henri /I/, 3 vols, Lille, 1981, vol I. p 283. 
13 BN, PO, 1750, to 158,25 May 1564. 
14 BN, PO, 1750, fo 228,31 December 1581. 
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Appendix B: Income of the d'Elbeuf Family under Rene de Lorraine (1536-66), marquis 
d'Elbeuf and his son Charles (1556-1605), duc d'Elbeuf 
Seigneury and date of Value in livres per annum and 
acquisition/sale date 
Normandy 
duchy of Elbeuf (1550) 13,000(1595)' 
comtd of Lillebonne(1570) 3,339(1540)2 
7,300(1581)3 
comt6 of Brionne (1567) 2,884(1540)` 
comte of Harcourt (1567/1586) 4,218(1540)5 
Other Lands 
barony of Ancenis (1554-99) 24,000 (1599)6 
barony of Pagny (1583) n/k 
Offices and Pensions 
captain 50 lances 2,200 (1573)' 
60 lances 2,800 (1579)8 
capitain-general des galeres 5,540 (1564)9 
grand 6cuyer n/k 
governor of Bourbonnais 
(1586-8) n/k 
pension from cardinal de 
Lorraine 2,000 (1561)10 
' AN, T, 199/24, last december 1595. Elbeuf was only created a duch6-pairie in 1581. 
2 ADC, E, 3,10 October 1540. 
3 ADSM, Tabellionage, 1°` meubles, 24 February 1586. 
ADC, E, 3,10 October 1540. 
5 ADC, E, 3,10 October 1540. 
6 Maillard, Histoire dAncenis, p 589. 
BN, PO, 1750, to 191,15 October 1573. 
BN, PO, 1750, to 192,27 February 1579. 
9 AN, K, 92B, to 29,30 October 1564. 
10 BN, PO, 1749, to 130,22 April 1561. 
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Appendix C: Buyers of rentes from the ducs d'Aumale, according to the Rouennals Notarial 
Archives 
Buyer Amount Date of ADSM Tabellion- 
llvres Purchase age, 2E1 
Gilles Gasquerel, bourgeois: 700 11.10.50 304 
Jean de Saldaigne: ' 250 17.10 50 304 
Robert de La Masure? 400 06.11.50 304 
Gilles Gasquerel: 300 04.09.51 305 
Jean Le Febvre d'Escallesý 210 07.09.56 313 
Simon Baudouin, bourgeois: 100 07.09.56 313 
Chapter of Rouen Cathedral: 360 30.09.56 313/314 
Jesse de Bauquemare: 20 06.10.56 323 
Nicholas Rome: ` 200 25.11.58 318 
George Langlois, bourgeois: 600 19.02.64 329 
Jesse de Bauquemare: 360 10.01.65 334 
Jacques Declainville: 400 10.01.65 334 
Jean Le Febvre d'Escalles: 420 10.01.65 334 
Nicholas Rome: 400 16.07.65 330 
Catherine Le Gras: 100 17.11.65 331 
Vincent Puchot: 400 28.11.65 331 
Children/wife Vincent Puchot: 1000 17.09.66 332 
Marie de La Haye: 5 600 14.09.70 341 
Guillaume Auber 6 600 14.09.70 341 
Marc-Antoine Bigot: ' 300 14.09.70 341 
Jean Bethencourt, docteur. 200 14.09.70 341 
Charles Puchot: 8 300 25.09.79 359 
Charles Puchot: 200 1583 2. H6r. -02.03.84 
Procuration: 6000 03.04.90 2. H6r. -03.04.90 
'A Huguenot merchant, see Brunelle, The New World Merchants of Rouen, p 150 
2A conseiller in the parlement of Rouen (1520-56), see Frondeville, Conseillers, p 197. 
A conseiller in the parlement (1544-71) and husband of Anne Bauquemare, see 
Frondeville, Conseillers, p 360. 
Conseiller du ville and secretaire du roi, see Frondeville, Presidents, p 422. 
Me of Vincent Puchot. 
s Son of a conseiller in the parlement and an adherent of the Catholic League, see 
Frondeville, Conseillers, p 276. 
Captain of the bourgeois militia in Rouen for the Catholic League, see Frondeville, 
Presidents, p 246. 
e Son of Vincent Puchot. 
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Appendix D: Buyers of rentes from the duc d'Elbeuf, according to the Rouennals Notariat 
Archives 
Buyer Amount Date of ADSM Tabellion- 
Ilvres Purchase age, 2E1 
Marguerite Rome: 600 11.06.80 360 
Catherine Le Gayant: 600 13.06.80 360 
Jacques de Bauquemare: 360 12.08.80 361 
Barbe Le Mercier: 600 05.05.81 363 
Alonce Quintadoines: 900 05.05.81 363 
Jacques Jubert: 1200 5.5/27.12.81 363/4 
Pierre Le Courier: ' 1600 05.05.81 363 
Anne Le Mercier. 200 05.05.81 367 
Marie de La Haye: 1200 12/15.07.81 363/7 
Pierre du Quesne? 300 08.12.81 364 
Jean Hall' 600 08.12.81 364 
Nicholas Cabreuil, bourgeois: 300 27.05.82 365 
Pierre Roque: ` 300 13.02.82 2. Hdr. -05.05.1600 
Baptiste Le Chandelier :5 300 14.02.82 365 
Frangois de Civille: 6 120 29.05.82 365 
Andre Bonissent: 7 150 29.05.82 365 
Marie de Bauquemare: 500 19.05.82 365 
Robert Le Roux: 300 23.01.83 2. H6r. -17.08.85 
Antoine Premierasni ° 400 16.04.83 2. Hdr. -16.04.1600 
Anne du Moucel: 950 29.05.83 2. Hdr. -13.05.1600 
Jean de Vey: 300 17.06.83 2. Her. -06.05.1600 
Claude Le Gendre, bourgeois: 2000 27.06.83 2. Hdr. -12.05.1600 
Marie de La Haye: 1500 27.03.85 2. Hdr. -27.06.160010 
'A conseiller in the parlement (1579-93) and a royalist during the Catholic League, see 
Frondeville, Conseillers, p 561. 
ZA conseiller in the parlement (1572-1603) and a royalist during the period of the League, 
see Frondeville, Conseillers, p 503. 
Tresorier-general en Normandie and wealthy merchant closely linked to the Puchot, see 
Brunelle, The New World Merchants of Rouen, p 77. 
A conseiller in the parlement (1576-83) and husband of Marie Le Chandelier, see 
Frondeville, Conseillers, p 533. 
5A conseiller in the parlement and (1556-92), see Frondeville, Conseillers, p 418. 
eA Huguenot, see Frondeville, Conseillers, p 396. 
A conseillerin the parlement (1586-1620) and royalist during the League, see Frondeville, 
Conseillers, p 598. 
BA conseiller in the parlement (1554-83) and son of a servant of the Guise (chapter two 
above), see Frondeville, Conseillers, p 298. 
Procureur and receveur for the chevalier d'Aumale, abbot of Bec, see Brunelle, The New 
World Merchants of Rouen, p 67. 
1° The figure is made up of two transactions, the second was dated 7 July 1586. 
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Appendix D continued 
Jacques Fizet: " 150 30.06.86 2. Hdr. -17.06.1600 
Marie Gombautt: 300 07.07.86 2. Hdr. -03.05.1600 
Robert Hanivel: 300 08.07.86 2. Hdr. -05.02.1608 Christophe Eude: 300 23.07.86 2. Hdr. -10.05.1600 
Jean de Rouen, bourgeois: 250 09.05.88 2. Hdr. -09.05.88 
Berthelemy HaII6: 1200 09.05.88 2. Hdr. -09.09.88 
Jean Deudemare, bourgeois: 660 25.09.88 2. H6r. -09.05.1600 GuiUaume Auber: 500 1580s 2. Hdr. -03.05.1600 
Antoine Premierasni 45 06.09.89 2. Hdr. -19.04.1608 
"A conseiller in the parlement (1568-96) and supporter of the League, see Frondeville. 
Conseiliers, p 437. 
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Appendix E: Muster Rolls Consulted 
Captain Date Place M-at-A Archers BN, Ms 
Charles de Moy, 06.01.59 Pontaudemer 37 56 Fr25800 
sieur de La Meilleraye 
Jacques de May, 22.04.69 Beningne-sur- 29 43 Fr 21529 
sieur de Pierrecourt Seine 
Jean de Moy, 12.01.70 Auffay-sur- 30 40 
sieur de La Meilleraye Scie 
12.01.74 Auffay-sur- 30 34 " 
28.02.81 Houdan 54 78 Fr 21537 
Adrien, sieur de 01.05.68 Grainville- 47 41 Clair 264 
Breaute la-Teinture 
Philippe de 20.11.67 Pontoise 20 29 Clair 264 
Roncherolles 
Pierre de 01.09.85 Abbeville 30 45 MR&M 
Roncherolles 
Jean de Cleres 1564 unknown 23 33 Fr 5467 
to 247 
Claude duc 05.06.65 Chalons-sur 50 74 Clair 261 
d'Aumale Saline 
06.10.72 Dreux 51 75 Fr 21533 
Charles duc 14.10.75 Beaune-en- 21 28 Fr 21535 
d'Aumale Brie 
28.08.81 Saint Quentin 42 89 Fr 21538 
Rend marquis 01.06.65 Montereau 40 60 Clair 261 
d'Elbeuf 
06.02.69 Chinon 33 39 Fr 21529 
Charles duc 1573 Mery-sur-Seine 21 34 Na Fr 80 
d'Elbeuf 
26.02.79 Pontoise 35 42 Clair 267 
Leonor d'Orleans, 24.07.60 Caen 29 49 Fr 21525 
duc de Longueville 
04.11.66 Caen 40 60 Fr 21527 
29.05.69 Berry 60 70 Fr 21 S30 
11.03.76 Cosne-sur-Seine 51 76 Clair 276 
Tanneguy Le Veneur, 05.06.65 Lisieux 30 45 Clair 261 
sieur de Carrouges 
26.04.72 Lisieux 30 45 Clair 271 
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29.02.76 Brezolles 
(Bourbonnais) 
02.08.81 Noyon 
Printed in Rodiere and La Vallee, La Maison de Moy, pp 256-69. 
29 42 
57 86 
(b Fir 8532 
Clair 278 
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Appendix F: The Guise and the League of Pdronne 
Signatory Kinship Links and Guise Connections 
d'Acheu: Paul d'Acheu m. Gabrielle d'Estourmel. 
Pierre d'Ameray: man-at-arms of the duc d'Aumale (1572-5). 
Pierre d'Amerval: archer of the duc d'Aumale (1581), brother Godefroy was 
lieutenant for the League in Montreuil in the 1590s. another 
brother, Simon, m. Adrienne de Lameth. Geoffrey d'Amerval was 
the ensign of Andre de Bourbon-Rubemprd (1574-8) and 
lieutenant of Pierre de Roncherolles (1585). Charles d'Amerval was 
archer (1575) and later man-at-arms (1581) of the duc d'Aumaie. 
Jean d'Amerval was archer of the duc d'Aumale (1565). Anus 
d'Amerval was prior of Fecamp. 
Jacques d'Applaincourt: ensign (1572-5) and lieutenant (1581) of the duc d'Aumale. 
governor of the duchy of Guise (1580-8). 
Ponthus de guidon of the marquis d'Elbeuf (1577-9) and governor of Corbie. 
Bellefourriere: 
Jean de Belleval: man-at-arms of the marquis d'Elbeuf (1565). Francois de Belleval 
was ensign of Andre de Bourbon-Rubempre and his son Jacques 
a gentilhomme servant of the cardinal de Bourbon. 
A. de Biencourt: Florimond de Biencourt was in the company of Claude I de 
Guise, governor of the duchy of Aumale and councillor of 
Francois de Guise (1552-62). His son Jacques m. Renee de 
Fumechon who was close to the Roncherolles and his daughter 
was attached to the household of Mary Stuart. 
Jean de Biencourt: ecuyerof the duc d'Aumale (1581). 
A. de Blottefiere: husband of Marguerite Picquet (see below). 
Andres de Bourbon- councillor of the cardinal de Bourbon, governor of Abbeville, 
Rubempre: senechal of the comte of Ponthieu and governor of the comtd of 
Eu (1572-9). 
Michel d'Estourmel: nephew of the cardinal de Pellevd and lieutenant for the 
Catholic League in Picardy from the 1580s. 
A. d'Estourmel: brother of Michel. 
Louis d'Estourmel: brother of Michel. 
Jean d'Estourmel: cousin of Michel. 
Charles de Fouilleuse: sieur de Flavacourt, guidon (1573-5) and later ensign (1576.9) of 
the marquis d'Elbeuf. 
Captain Flavacourt: younger brother of the above. 
J. de Forceville: Charles was a man-at-arms of d'Humieres and m. Marguerite du 
Hamel. Adrien was ensign of Jean de Rambures. 
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Antoine du Hamel: ensign (1575) and guidon (1581) of the duc d'Aumale. Barbe du 
Hamel m. Paul de Belleval. 
Adrien de Lameth: m. Anne d'Estourmel. 
Nicholas Le Prevost: daughter m. Jean Picquet. 
Noel Le Roy: archer of the marquis d'Elbeuf (1565-9). Franrols Le Roy was 
Ocuyer of the duc d'Aumale and Andre was leaguer lieutenant of 
Abbeville under Pierre de Roncherolles in the 1590s. 
de Ligny: probably Jean de Rambures, younger brother of Philippe. Married 
the dame de Ligny in 1571, niece of Andre de Bourbon- 
Rubempre. Leaguer lieutenant in Picardy from the 1580s and 
governor of the duchy of Guise (1588). 
Jean de Marcheville: archer of the duc d'Aumale (1572). 
Jacques de Milly: man-at-arms of the marquis d'Elbeuf (1565-9). 
Antoine de Monchy: son Geddon m. Christine de Vieuxpont, sister of the ensign of the 
marquis d'Elbeuf. 
Sidrac de Monchy: son of Antoine. 
Robert de Monchy: colonel of foot for the League from the 1580s and younger 
brother Michel, conseillerin the parlement of Rouen and leader of 
the League in Normandy. 
Jean de Mons: related to the Picquet. 
Louis de May: m. Claire d'Amerval, governor of Ham (1577-84) and a relative of 
Jean de May, sieur de La Meilleraye. 
Adrien Picquet: vassal of the comte d'Eu and assisted at the grands fours of the 
comte. His son Gedeon was lieutenant of Adrien de Tiercelin and 
captain of Aumale. 
Jean Picquet: father of Adrien. 
Charles Picquet: relative of the above. 
Le seneschal de Ponthieu: perhaps Pierre de Roncherolles who succeeded Rubempre as 
senechal and as governor of Abbeville. 
Philippe de Rambures: see de Ligny. 
Rouvroy: Either Rene de Rouvroy, archer of the duc d'Aumaie (1581). or 
Andre, a man-at-arms of the marquis d'Elbeuf (1579), or Jean, 
archer of the marquis d'Eibeuf (1579). 
Saint-Blimond: Francois, guidon of Rubemprd, see also Saveuse. 
Regnault de 
Saint-Martin: man-at-arms of the duc d'Aumale (1581). 
Josse de Saveuse: m. a) Marguerite des Essars and b) Suzanne d'Acheu. Sister 
Francoise m. Andre de Saint-Blimond. 
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Francois de Saveuse: brother of Josse. 
Adrien de Tiercelin: major client of the Guise whose younger brother was lieutenant 
of tvtc ow o C( ' A-vtn& 4e, .i 
The essential basis for this biographical information can be found in Anselme. Chenaye- 
Desbois and Vindry. Also useful were the works on the Picard nobility, particularly R. do 
Belleval, Nobiliare de Ponthieu at de Vimeu, 2 vols, Amiens, 1861 and Los hots at les 
seigneurs du Ponthieu et du Vimeu, Paris, 1870; L: E. de La Gorgue-Rosny, Rocherches 
genealogiques surles comtes de Ponthieu, de Boulogne, do Guines, 4 vols, Boulogne-sur- 
Mer, 1874. For a full list of the muster rolls consulted see appendix E. 
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Appendix G: Guise Clients and League Adherents 
at the Provincial Estates, 1584-8' 
Year Name Estate Bai 
1584: Claude Secard, cure of Saint-Maclou Ist Rouen 
Guillaume Vipart, sieur de Silly 2nd Rouen 
1585: Gilles de Goutimesnil 2nd Caux 
Antoine de Bigars, sieur de La Londe 2nd Rouen 
1586: Jean de Vieuxpont, abbot of Saint-Jean de Falaise 1st Alengon 
Etienne Vion, cure of Auzebosc Ist Caux 
Barthelemy de Limoges 2nd Rouen 
1587: Francois de Cormeilles, sieur de Tendos 2nd Rouen 
Antoine de Canouville, sieur de Raff etot 2nd Caux 
1588: Jacques du Bosc, sieur de Coqueraumont 2nd Rouen 
Francois de La Morvissiere, sieur de Vicques 2nd Cotentin' 
The records for every bailliage do not exist; only those for Rouen are complete, see Farin. 
Histoire de la ville de Rouen, 11, pp 407-11; Cahier des Etats de Normandie sous le regne 
de Henri Ill, vol II. 
264 
Bibliography 
265 
Manuscript Sources 
Archives Nationales, Paris 
Serie K 928, KK 1088, 
Serie M 458 
Serie Q' 1371,1374,1375 
Serie T 199/22,199/24 
Bibllothbque Nationale, Paris 
Cabinet d'Hozier; 97,216,252 
Carres d'Hozier; 93 
Cinq Cents Colberts; 7,10,24,53,54 
Collection Clairambault; 261,264,267,271,276,278,341,342,344,346,347,348,351,353,726, 
1087,1204 
Collection Dupuy; 88 
Dossiers Bleus; 426,442,634,661,668,674, 
Manuscrits francais; 2945,3118,3121,3188,3237,3306,3309,3310,3329.3338,3358.3394, 
3395,3408,3574,3832,3977,3979,4638,4640,4766,5467,8182,10239,15546,15547,15548, 
15549,15550,15551,15552,15554,15571,15608,15811,15876,15905,18246,20176,20429, 
20467,20468,20470,20513,20515,20517,20519,20529,20532,20533,20534,20536,20538, 
20541,20542,20543,20544,20545,20548,20549,20551,20553,20554,20646,20649,21525, 
21527,21529,21530,21533,21534,21535,21536,21537,21538,22441,23193,23296,24429, 
25800,25802,25808,25809,26291,26414,32369 
Nouvelles acquisitions francaises; 8630,8632,8633,21165,23576 
Pieces originales; 485,496,781,1413,1749,1750,2165,2078,2166,2539,2842,2958,2994. 
3029 
Archives Departementales de Calvados 
Serie E 3,237,238,339,353 
2E; 882 
Archives Departementales de is Seine-Maritime 
Serie B 
1B-, 547 
1B, Registres Secrets; 91,92,93,94,100,103 
Serie C 1116,1228,1231,1239,8182 
Serie E 
1 ER; 1954 
266 
E1; 445,446,462,482,486 
2E1, Tabellionage: 
Registres sur parchemin; 304,305,313,314,316,318,319,320,321,323,326.327 bis, 329,331, 
332,334,335,339,341,344,348,350,351,352,356,357,359,360,361,362,363,364,365, 
367. 
22"' Heritage; 1986,2003,2004,2005,2007,2009,2013,2015,02.03.84,17.08.85,09.05.88. 
09.09.88,03.04.90,16.04.1600,03.05.1600,06.05.1600,09.05.1600,10.05.1600,12.05.1600, 
13.05.1600,17.06.1600,27.06.1600,27.07.1600,05.02.1608,19.04.1608. 
1" meubles; 24.02.86, 
26m meubles; 25.07.86, 
Serie F 
6F; 4,11 
Serie G 
Deliberations Capitulaires; 2162,2164,2171,2173,2175,2176 
3498 
Chambre du Clerg6; 5668,5670 
Serie J 
138 
7J, Chartrier de la famille Martel, 2,3,8,43 
Fonds Danquin carton 16. 
Archives Communales de Rouen 
Serie A Deliberations de la ville; 17,18,19,20 
Serie B Journaux des Deliberations; 2,4 
Bibliothbque Municipale de Rouen 
Collection Leber, 5176 
Y, 102 
Printed Sources 
Anselme, Le P. -Histoire genealogique et chronologique de la maison royal de France. des 
pairs, grand officiers de la couronne & et de la maison du roy, 9 vols. Paris, 
1726-33. 
Asseline, D. -Les Antiquitez et Chroniques do la villa do Dieppe, 2 vats, Dieppe, 
1874. 
267 
Aubignd, Agrippa d' -Histoire Universelle, A. de Ruble (ed), 9 vols, Paris, 1886-97. 
Belleau, Remy -Larmes sur le trespas de Monseigneur Rend de Lorraine, et do Madame 
Louyse Marquis & Marquise d'Elbeuf. Ensemble le tombeau do 
Monseigneur Francois de Lorraine Duc de Guyse, n. p., 1566. 
Bouquet, F. (ed) -Documents concernant l'histoire de Neufchatel-en-Bray, Rouen, 1884. 
Brdard C. -Les Archives de la ville de Hon flour, notes historiques et analyses de 
documents, Paris, 1885. 
Bourgeville, -Les Recherches et Antiquitez de to province de Neustrie a present duchO 
Charles de, de Normandie, Caen, 1588. 
sieur de Bras. 
Boyvin, Francois de, -Memoires, Michaud and Poujoulat, ist ser., X. 
baron du Villars 
Brantbme, Pierre de -Oeuvres, L. Lalanne (ed), 11, vols, Paris, 1864-82. 
Bourdeille, sieur de 
Calendar of State Papers, Foreign Series, of the reign of Elizabeth t, J Stevenson at at (eds). 
London, 1863-1950. 
Calendar of State Papers, Foreign Series, Scotland, M. J. Thorpe et at (eds), 1858-1969. 
Calendar of State Papers, Foreign Series, Spain, G. A. Bergenroth et al (eds), London, 1862-99. 
Calendar of State Papers, Foreign Series, Venice, R. Brown et at (eds), London, 1867-97. 
Casteinau, Michel de -Memoires, Collection Universelle des mOmoires particuliers relatds A 
l'histoire de France, XLI. 
-Memoires, Michaud and Poujoulat, Ist ser., IX. 
Catalogue des actes de Henri ll, Paris, 1979-. 
Catalogue analytique des chartes, documents historiques composant les archives du college 
heraldrique, 2 vols, Paris, 1866. 
Chenaye-Desbois, -Dictionnaire de la Noblesse, 19 vo{s, Paris, 1863-76. 
F. de La and Badier 
Cimber L. and -Archives curieuses de I'histoire de France, 1st ser., 15 vols. 1834-7. 
Danjou, F. (eds) 
Collection Universelle des memoires particuliers relatifs A l'histoire de France, 67 vols, London, 
1785-91. 
Correspondence de Theodore de Beze, H. Meylan et al (eds), Geneva, 1960-- 
Davila, E. C. -Historie of the Civill Warres of France, London, 1647-8. 
De Thou, -Memoires, depuis 1553 jusqu en 1601, Michaud and Poujoulat, l st ser., 
J. -A. X. 
-Histoire Universelle de 1543 jusqu en 1607,16 vols, London, 1734. 
Dickinson, G. (ed) -"Two Missions of Jacques de la Brosse', Scottish Historical Society, 3rd 
ser., vol XXXVI, Edinburgh, 1942. 
268 
"Documents Historiques: pillages des gens de guerre (1589-93)", Bulletin de la socidtd de 1 histoire 
de Normandie, 1909. 
Durand, P. (ed) -Inventaire-Sommaire des Archives de la ville d' Amiens antdrieures a 
1790, serie BB, Deliberations de I'Echevinage, Amiens, 1894. 
Groulard, Claude -Memoires, Michaud and Poujoulat, Ist ser., XI. 
Haton, Claude -Memoires 1568-82, F. Bourquelot (ed), 2 vols, Paris, 1857. 
Heron, A. (ed) -Deux Chroniques de Rouen, Rouen and Paris, 1900. 
"Histoire contenant les vains effort des Huguenots assidgens le prieurd de Sainct-Philibert en 
Normandie", Cimber and Danjou, VI. 
Histoire ecclesiastique des eglises rdformces au royaume de France, G. Baum amd E. Caunitz 
(eds), 3 vols, Nieuwkoop, 1974. 
Histoire generale de Paris, Registre des deliberations du bureau de la vile de Paris, Bonnardot at 
al (eds), Paris, 1883-. 
Hurpin, G. (ed) -L'Intendance de Rouen en 1698, Paris, 1984. 
Journal de ce qui est passe en France durant t'annee 1562, M. Francois (ed), Paris, 1950. 
Journal dun bourgeois de Paris, L. Lalanne (ed), Paris, 1854. 
Lacource and Duval -Recueil de pieces originales et authentiques aoncernant la tenue des 
Etats-Gen neraux, 9 vols, Paris, 1789. 
La Planche, Louis -Histoire de l'Estat de France tant de la republique que de la religion sous 
Regnier, sieur de le regne de Francois ll, 1576. 
-La Legende de Charles, Cardinal de Lorraine of de ses ftdres de la 
maison de Guise, descrite par Frangois de l Isle, Reims, 1576. 
La Popeliniere, -L'Amiral de France, Paris, 1584. 
Lancelot de Voisin, -L'Histoire de France... depuis I 'an 1550 iusques a ces temps, 2 vols. sleur 
de n. p., 1581. 
L'Estoile, Pierre de -Journal du regne de Henri Ill, L. -R. Lefevre (ed), Paris, 1943. 
-Journal pour le regne de Henri IV, L. -R. Lefevre (ed), 2 vols. Paris, 
1948,1958. 
Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic, of the reign of Henry Vlll, J. S. Brewer et al (eds), 21 
vols, London, 1864-1932. 
"Lettre de M. le mareschal de montmorency A M. le duc de Montpensier, prince du sang au sutet 
de la querelle avec le cardinal de Lorraine", Cimber and Danjou, VI. 
Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, H. de La Fernere and Baguenauft de Puchesse (eds). 9 vols. 
Paris, 1880-99. 
Lettres de Henri ill, P. Champion (ed), Paris, 1959-. 
"Lettres du Roy au gouvemeur de Bourgogne, par lesquelies il charge ceux de Guise du meurtre 
commis en la personne de monsieur I'amiral et de la sedition advenue A Paris ei mande qu'd vent 
que I'edict de paciication soil entretenu", Cimber and Danjou, VII. 
Lettres, instructions et mEmoires de Marie Stuart, A. I. Labanoff (ed), 7 vols, London, 1845. 
269 
Lonchay, H. -Correspondance de la cour 
d'Espagne sur les affaires des Pays-Bas au 
et at (eds) XVIP siecle, 6 vols. Brussels, 1923-37. 
Memoires d Antoine de Bigars, sieur de la Londe, Societe de 1'histoire de Normandie, Melanges, 
5th ser., Rouen and Paris, 1898. 
Memoires du prince de Conde, Michaud and Poujoulat, VI. 
Memoires et Correspondence de Duplessis-Momay, 12 vols, Paris, 1824-5. 
Memoires joumaux de Frangois de Lorraine duc dAumale of de Guise, 1547A 1563, Michaud and 
Poujoulat, VI. 
Michaud, J. F. and -Nouvelle collection des memoires sur I'histoire de France, Pads, 1836- 
Poujoulat, J. -J. -F. 54. 
(eds) 
N6gociations diplomatiques de la France avec la Toscane, G. Canestri and A. Desjardins (eds). 
5 vols, Paris, 1859-86. 
Palma Cayet, P. V. -Chronologie Novenaire, Michaud and Poujoulat, 1st ser., XII. 
Papiers de Herve de Longuanay, Gouverneur de la Basse-Normandie (1575-1589), St. L6,1897. 
Paris, L. (ed) -Ndgociations, lettres et pieces diverses relatives au regne de Francois 11, 
Paris, 1841. 
Prevost, G. A. (ed) -Notes du premier president Pellot stir la Normandie (1670-83), Rouen and 
Paris, 1915. 
Relation de troubles excites par les calvinistes dans la vllle de Rouen depuis I 'an 1537 jusqu en 
Pan 1582, publication of La Revue de Rouen et de la Normandie. Rouen, 1837. 
Remonstrance Faicte A Monsieur d'Espernon, Entrant En I'Eglise Cathedrale de Rouen, le 3 may 
1588, Rouen, 1588. 
Robillard de -lnventaire-Sommaire des Archives Departementales de la Seine- 
Beaurepaire, Interieure, anterieurs ä 1790, ser. C and D, Paris, 1864. 
C. de (ed) -Sejour de Henri Ill a Rouen, Socieste des Bibliophiles Normands, Rouen. 
1870. 
-Cahiers des Etats de Normandie sous le regne do Henri III, 2 vols. 1887- 
.8 
-Cahiers des Etats de Normandie sous le regne de Charles IX, Rouen. 
1891. 
Ruble, A. de (ed) -Commentaires et lettres de Blaise de Monluc Mardchal de France. 5 
vols, Paris, 1864-72. 
Sars, M. de -Inventaire-Sommaire des Archives de la ville de Guise antdrieurs A 
1800, Laon, 1833. 
Saulx-Tavannes, -Memoires, Michaud and Poujoulat, Ist ser., VIII. 
Gaspard de 
Serres, J. de -Recueil des choses memorables avenues en France sous les refines de 
Henri 11, Francois 11, Charles IX, Henri Ill, Henri IV, contenant intinies 
merveilles de nostre sidcle, n. p., 1599. 
270 
"Sommaire Discours De Toutes Des Defiaictes Des Reistres", Cimber and Danjou, Xi. 
Sully, Maximilien de -Les Oeconomies Royales, D. Buisseret and B. Barbiche (eds). Paris, 
Bethune, duc de 1970-. 
Teulet, A. (ed) -Papiers d'6tat... relatifs A1 histoire de I'Ecosse au XVf ; tires des 
bibliotheques et des archives de France, 3 vols, Paris, 1851-60. 
-Relations politiques de la France avec et de I'Espagne avec I'Ecosse au 
XVP siecle, 5 vols, Paris, 1862. 
Travers, E. (ed) -R6le du ban et de l'arri6re-ban du bailliage de Caen en 1552. Rouen and 
Paris, 1901. 
Valdory, G. -Discours du siege de la eitle de Rouen au mois de Novembre mil cinq 
cents quatre vingt onze, E. Gosselin (ed), Rouen, 1871. 
Valois, C. de (ed) -MOmoires de la Ligue. oeuvre inedite dun contemporain, Paris, 1914. 
Vieilleville, Francois -Memoires, Michaud and Poujoulat, 1st ser., IX. 
de Sc6peaux, sieur de -Mdmoires, Collection Universelle des mdmoires particuliers relaüts A 
I'histoire de France, XXXII. 
Vindry, F. - Dictionnaire de I'Etat major au siezieme siecle, Paris, 1901. 
Wemham, R. B. -List and Analysis of State Papers, Foreign Series, Elizabeth 1, London, 
1964-. 
Wood, M. (ed) -Foreign Correspondence with Marie de Lorraine, Queen of Scotland, 
1548-57, Scottish Historical Society, 3rd ser., vol VII. Edinburgh, 1925. 
Secondary Sources 
Amphoux, H. -Essai sur t histoire du protestantisme au Havre et dans ses environs, Le 
Havre, 1894. 
Bamavi, E. -Le parti de Dieu: etude sociale et politique des chefs de la Ligue 
parisienne, 1585-1594, Louvain, 1980. 
Baumgartner, F. -"Henry II's Italian Bishops: A study of the use and abuse of the 
Concordat of Bologna", Sixteenth Century Journal, 1980. 
-Henry 11, King of France 1547-1559, Durham and London. 1988. 
Benedict, P. -Rouen during the Wars of Religion, Cambridge, 1980. 
Beik, W. -Absolutism and Society in Seventeenth-Century France: State Power and 
Provincial Aristocracy in Languedoc, Cambridge. 1985. 
Belleval, R. de -Nobiliare de Ponthieu at de Vimeu, 2 vols, Amiens, 1861. 
-Les fiefs et les seigneuries du Ponthieu at du Vimeu. Paris, 1870. 
Bergin, J. -"The Decline and Fall of the House of Guise as an Ecclesiastical 
Dynasty", Historical Journal, 1982. 
Boivin-Champeaux, L. -Bernay et la Ligue, Bernay, 1889. 
Bonnenfant, G. -Histoire generate du diocese d'Evreux, 2 vots, Paris, 1933. 
271 
Bonney, R. -Society and Government in France under Richelieu and Mazarin, 1624. 
1661, London, 1988. 
Borely, A. -Histoire de la ville du Havre et de son ancien gouvernement, 3 vols, Le 
Havre, 1880-1. 
Bossy, J. -Leagues and Associations in Sixteenth Century French Catholicism, 
Studies in Church History, 1986. 
Bost, C. -M. -Les seigneurs de Lillebonne, Luneray. 1987. 
Boucher, J. -Societe et mentalites autour de Henri Ill, 3 vois, Lille, 1981. 
-La cour de Henri III, Rennes, 1986. 
Bouille du Chariol, -Histoire des ducs de Guise, 4 voll, Paris, 1849-50. 
R. de 
Briggs, R. -Early Modern France, Oxford, 1977. 
Broussillon, B. de -La maison de Laval, 1020-1605: Etude historique acconpagnd du 
cartulaire de Laval et de Vitre, 5 vols, Paris, 1895-1903. 
Brunelle, G. K. -The New World Merchants of Rouen, 1559-1630, Ann Arbor, 1991. 
Buvignier, C. -Jametz et ses seigneurs, Verdun, 1861. 
Caillieres, J. de -Histoire du mareschal de Matignon, Paris, 1666. 
Carpenter, C. --The Beauchamp affinity: a study of bastard feudalism at work', 
English Historical Review, 1980. 
Chestret de Hanneffe, -Histoire de la maison de La Mar ky compris les Cleves de la seconde 
J. de race, Liege, 1898. 
Chevallier, P. -Henri 111: roi shakespearien, Paris, 1985. 
Constant, J. -M. -Les Guises, Paris, 1984. 
Contamine, P. -Guerre, etat et societe A la fin du mayen age, Paris, 1972. 
Cosse, Simon de, -Histoire des ducs de Brissac, Paris, 1952. 
duc de Brissac 
Courtaux, T. and -Histoire genealogique de la rnaison de Touchet, Paris, 1911. 
Touchet, marquis de 
Crouzet, D. - Recherches sur la crise de I'aristocratie en France au XVI: les defies de 
to maison de Nevers", Histoire, dconomie et socidtO, 1982. 
-Les guerriers de Dieu: La violence au temps des troubles de religion 
(vers 1525 - vers 1610), 2 vols, Paris, 1990. 
Croze, J. de -Les Guises, les Valois, et Philippe l!, 2 vots, Paris, 1866. 
Darsel, J. "L'Amiraute en Normandie: I- AmirautO d'Eu Le-Treport', Annates de 
Normandie, 1969. 
Daval, G. and J. -Histoire de la Reformation A Dieppe, 1557-1657,2 vols. Rouen . 1878. 
272 
Davies, J. -"Family Service and Family Strategies: The Household of Henri, duc de 
Montmorency, ca. 1590-1610", BL, tic 4 *-t. 4 rc. f- Fvr.. { a-, mal mice- S 
-"Neither Politique nor Patriot ? Henri de Montmorency and Philip II", 'Js 
Historical Journal, 1991. 
Daville, L. -Les pretensions de Charles 111 duc de Lorraine A la couronne de France, 
Paris, 1909. 
Descimon, R. -"La Ligue A Paris (1585-94): une revision', Annales ESC, 1982. 
-Qui e taient les Seize ?: mythes et realfites de la Ligue parisienne (1585- 
1594), Paris, 1983. 
Des Digueres, V. -Etude historique et genealogique sur les Rouxel de MOdavy-Grancey, 
Paris, 1870. 
Des Forts, P. -Le Chateau de Villebon, Eure-et-Loire: Etude historique et archeologique, 
Paris, 1914. 
Deville, A. -Histoire du chateau et des sires de Tancarville, Rouen, 1834. 
Dewald, J. -The Formation of a Provincial Nobility: The Magistrates of the Parlement 
of Rouen, 1499-1610, Princeton, 1980. 
-Pont-St-Pierre 1398-1798: Lordship, Community and Capitalism in Early 
Modern France, Los Angeles and London, 1987. 
Dielendorf, B. -Paris City Councillors in the Sixteenth Century: The Politics of 
Patrimony, New Jersey, 1983. 
-Beneath the Cross: Catholics and Huguenots in Sixteenth-Century Paris, 
Oxford, 1991. 
Donaldson, G. -Scotland: James V-VII, Edinburgh, 1978. 
Doumel, J. -Hisfoire de la vile de Pöronne, Peronne, 1679. 
Drouot, H. -Mayenne et la Bourgogne: Etude sur la Ligue, 1587-1596,2 vols, paris, 
1937. 
Eckhardt, A. -Remy Belleau: sa vie - sa Bergerie, Budapest, 1917. 
Eisenstadt, S. N "Patron-Client Relationships as a Model of Structuring Social 
and Roniger, L. Exchange", Comparative Studies in Society and History, 1980. 
Erlanger, P. -Henri 111, Paris, 1948. 
Estaintot, R. d' -La Ligue en Normandie, Paris, 1862. 
"Recherches sur les Hautes-Justices F6odales existent en 1789 dans les 
limites du departement de is Seine-Infdrieure", Academie des Sciences, 
Arts et Belles Lettres de Caen, 1892. 
Estancelin, L. -Histoire des comes d'Eu, Paris and Dieppe, 1828. 
Evans, W. H. -M6zeray et la conception de I'histoire de France au XVIP, Paris, 1930. 
Evennett, H. 0. - The Cardinal of Lorraine and the Council of Trent, Cambridge, 1930. 
Fabre, F. "The English College at Eu, 1582-1592", Catholic Historical Review, 
1951. 
Farin, F. -Histoire de la vile de Rouen, 6 vols, Rouen, 1738. 
273 
Filhot, R. -Le premier president Christophe de Thou et !a reformation de 
coutumes, Paris, 1937. 
Floquet, A. -Histoire du Parlement de Normandie, 7 vols, Rouen, 1840-2. 
-Histoire du privilege de Saint-Romain, 2 vols, Rouen, 1833. 
Foisil, M. "Harangue et rapport d'Antoine Seguier, commissaire pour le roi on 
Basse-Normandie (1579-1580), Annales de Normandie, 1976. 
Forestie, E. -Un capitaine gascon au XVr: Corbeyran de 
Cardaitlac-Sarlabous. Paris, 
1897. 
Forneron, H. -Les duos de Guise et leur 6poque, 2 vols, Paris, 1877. 
Frondeville, H. de -Les presidents du Parlement de Normandie (1499-1790). Rouen and 
Paris, 1953. 
-Les conseillers du Parlement de Normandie au siezieme siede (1499. 
1594), Rouen and Paris, 1960. 
-Les conseillers du Parlement de Normandie sous Henri IV et sous Louis 
Xlll (1594-1640), Rouen and Paris, 1964. 
Fremont, A. -Atlas et geographie de la Normandie, Paris, 1977. 
Gorgue-Rosny, -Recherches gdnelogiques sur les Comtds de Ponthieu. de Boulogne, de 
L. -E. de La Guines et Pays circonvoisins, 4 vols, Boulogne-sur-mer, 1874. 
Graham, V. and -The Royal Tour of France by Charles IX and Catherine de' Medici: 
McAllister Johnson, W. Festivals and Entries 1564-6, Toronto, 1979. 
(eds) 
Greenblatt, S. -Renaissance Self-Fashioning from More to Shakespeare, Chicago, 1980. 
Greengrass, M. -France in the Age of Henri IV: The Struggle for Stability, London, 1984. 
-"The Sixteen, Radical Politics in Paris during the League", History, 
1984. 
-"Noble Affinities in Early Modem France: The Case of Henri I de 
Montmorency, Constable of France", European History Quarterly, 1986. 
Grittiths, G. "Saint Bartholomew Reappraised", Journal of Modem History, 1976. 
Harding, R. -Anatomy of a Power Elite: The Provincial Governors of Early, Modern 
France, New Haven and London, 1978. 
Hauser, H. -Les sources de I'histoire de France: Le XVP siecle (1494-1610), 4 vols. 
Paris, 1912. 
Hellot, A. -Essai sur les Martels de Basqueville et de Basqueville-en-Caux, Rouen, 
1879. 
-Fecamp au temps de la Ligue: la legende de Boisrozd, Yvetot, 1897. 
-Essai sur les baillis de Caux de 1204,4 1789. Paris, 1895. 
Holt, M. P. -The duke of Anjou and the politique struggle during the Wars of 
Religion, Cambridge, 1986. 
-Attitudes of the French Nobility at the Estates-General of 1576', 
Sixteenth Century Journal, 1987. 
Ives, E. W. -Faction in Tudor England, London. 1979. 
274 
Janvier, A. -Boves et ses seigneurs: Etude historique sur to commune de Boves, 
Amiens, 1877. 
Jensen, D. L. -Diplomacy and dogmatism: Bernardino Mendoza and the French 
Catholic League, Cambridge Mass., 1964. 
Jouanna, A. -Le devoir de revolte: la noblesse frangaise et la gestation de YEtat 
moderne (1559-1661), Paris, 1989. 
Jouen, L. -Jumidges, Rouen, 1926. 
Kettering, S. -Patrons, Brokers and Clients in Seventeenth-Century France, Oxford, 
1986. 
-"Friendship and Clientage in Early Modem France, French History, 
1992. 
Laheudrie, , E. -Recherches sur 
le Bessin: histoire du Bessin des origines a la Revolution, 
2 vols, Caen and Bayeux, 1930. 
Lamet, M. -S. -"Reformation, War and Society 
in Caen, Lower Normandy, 1558- 
1610", unpub. PhD thesis, Univ. Massachusetts, 1980. 
La Morandiere, G. de -Histoire de la maison dEstouteville, Paris, 1903. 
Landurant, A. -Montgommery /e regicide, Paris, 1988. 
La Ronciere, C. de -Histoire de la marine francaise. 6 vols, Paris, 1899-1932. 
La Roque, G. -A. de -Histoire genealogique de la maison d'Harcourt, 4 vols, n. p., 1662. 
Lavisse, E. -Histoire de France, V1, pt 1, La Rdforme et la Ligue, by J. H. Marißjot. 
Paris, 1904. 
Le Canu, A. -Histoire du diocese de Coutances et Avranches, 2 vols, Coutances, 
1877-8. 
Le Charpentier, H. -La Ligue A Pontoise et dans /e Vexin Francais, Pontoise. 1878. 
Lechevalier, A. -Notice historique sur les barons et to baronnie du Bec. Paris, 1898. 
Le Hardy, G. -Histoire du Protestantisme en Normandie depuis son origine rysquei la 
publication de I'ddit de Nantes, Caen, 1869. 
Lemarchand, G. -"Le Tempore) et les revenues de I'abbaye de F6camp pendant to XVII' et 
le XVIII° siecles", Annales de Normandie, 1965. 
Lewis, P. S. -"Decayed and Non-Feudalism in Later Medieval France', SuIetin of the 
Institute of Historical Research, 1964. 
Lloyd, H. A. -The Rouen Campaign, 1590-1592: Politics, War and the Early Modem 
State, Oxford, 1973. 
Maillard, E. -Histoire dAncenis et de ses barons, Nantes, 1881. 
Maille, P. -Recherches sur Elbeuf. " Esquisses ou silhouettes de ses seigneurs de la 
maison de Lorraine, 3 vols, Elbeuf, 1859-63. 
Maimbourg, L. -Histoire de la Ligue, Paris, 1684. 
275 
Major, J. R. -Representative Government in Early Modem France, New Haven and 
London, 1980. 
-"Noble Income, Inflation and the Wars of Religion in France', American 
Historical Review, 1981. 
Marchand, C. -Charles 1 de Cosse, comte de Brissac et mardcha! de France, 1507- 
1563: Etude sur la fin des guerres d'Italie et sur la premiere guerre de 
religion, Paris, 1889. 
Martin, G. -Histoire et genealogie de la maison d'Harcourt, St. Etienne. 1971. 
Maudit, F. -J. -Histoire d'Ivry-la-Bataille et de I'abbaye de N6tre Dame d'lvry, Evreux, 
1899. 
McFarlane, K. B. -The Nobility of Later Medieval England, Oxford, 1973. 
-England in the Fifteenth Century, London, 1981. 
Mettam, R. -Power and Faction in Louis X/V's France, London, 1988. 
Morel, E. -Houdencourt: seigneurie et paroisse, 2 vols, Compiegne, 1878-82. 
Moulierac-Lamoureux, -Le bon roi Rene, ou les hasards du destin, (1409-1480), Avignon, 
R. L. 1980. 
Muller, P. and -Documents concernant les relations entre le duc dAnjou et ! es Pays- 
Diegerick, A. (eds) -Bas, 5 vols, Utrecht, 1889-99. 
Neuschel, K. -Word of Honor: Interpreting Noble Culture in Sixteenth-Century France. 
Ithaca and London, 1989. 
Nicholls, D. -"The Origins of Protestantism in Normandy: A Social Study", unpub. 
PhD thesis, Univ. Birmingham, 1977. 
"Inertia and Reform in the Pre-Tridentine French Church: The Response 
to Protestantism in the Diocese of Rouen, 1520-62". Journal of 
Ecclesiastical History, 1981. 
Nugent, D. -Ecumenism in the Age of the Reformation: The Colloquy of Poissy, 
Cambridge Mass., 1974. 
Odolant-Desnos, P. -Memoires historiques sur la vile d'A/encon et sur ses seigneurs, 2 vols. 
Alencon, 1787. 
Oman, C. -The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, London, 1937. 
Orlea, M. -La Noblesse aux Etats generaux de 1576 et de 1588: etude politique el 
sociale, Paris, 1980. 
Parker, G. -The Dutch Revolt, London, 1985. 
Pastor, L. von The History of the Popes from the close of the Middle Ages, 40 vols. 
London, 1891-. 
Pimodan, G. de -La mere de Guises: Antoinette de Bourbon 1494-1583. Paris, 1889. 
Picot, G. -Histoire des Etats-Generaux considdrds au point de vue de tear In1 nce 
sur le gouvernement de France de 1355 d 1614,4 vols. Paris, 1872. 
Poree, A. A. Histoire de l'abbaye de Bec, 2 vols, Evreux, 1901. 
276 
Potin de La Mairie, N. -Recherches historiques, archdologiques et biographiques sur les 
possessions des Sires Normands de Gournay, Le Bray Normand et La 
Bray Picard, 2 vols, Goumay, 1852. 
Potter, D. "The duc de Guise and the fall of Calais, 1557-1558, English Historical 
Review, 1983. 
"A Treason Trial in Sixteenth Century France: the Fall of Marshal du 
Biez", English Historical Review, 1990. 
-"The Luxembourg Inheritance: The House of Bourbon and its Lands In 
Northern France during the Sixteenth Century', French History, 1992. 
Prarond, E. -La Ligue A Abbeville, 1576-1594,3 vols, Paris, 1873. 
Prentout, H. "Les Etats Provinciaux de Normandie', Memoires de I Academe 
Nationale des Arts et Belles-Lettres de Caen, 3 voll, Caen, 1925-7. 
Rawcliffe, C. -The Staffords, Earls of Stafford and Dukes of Buckingham, 1394-1621. 
Cambridge, 1978. 
Rodiere, R. -Les Gouverneurs de Montreuil de la maison de Maigneulx (1581-1620), 
Abbeville, 1900. 
Rodiere, R. -La maison de Moy, Le Mans, 1928. 
and Vallee, E. 
Romier, L. -Les origines politiques des guerres de religion, 2 vols, Paris, 1913. 
-Le royaume de Catherine de Medicis: la France A la veille des guerres de 
religion, 2 vols, Paris, 1922. 
-La Conjuration d Amboise, Paris, 1923. 
-Catholics et Huguenots ä la cour de Charles IX, Paris, 1924. 
Saint-Denis, H. M. -Notices historiques sur les communes des environs d'E/beuf, 8 vols. 
Elbeuf, 1885-90. 
Salmon, J. H. M. -"The Paris Sixteen, 1584-94: The Social Analysis of a Revolutionary 
Movement, Journal of Modern History, 1972. 
-Society in Crisis: France in the Sixteenth Century, New York, 1975. 
Saulnier, E. -Le role politique du Cardinal de Bourbon (Charles X) 1523-1590, Paris, 
1912. 
Sauvage, M. R. N. -"Les Troubles de 1562", Etudes Lexoviennes, 1915. 
Semichon, E. -Histoire de la ville d'Aumale, 2 vols, Paris, 1862. 
Seydoux, P. -La Normandie des chateaux et des manoirs. Paris, 1989. 
Shannon, S. C. -The Political Activity of Francois de Lorraine, duc de Guise (1559- 
1563): From Military Hero to Catholic Leader, unpub. PhD thesis, Univ. 
Boston, 1988. 
Sutherland, N. M. -The French Secretaries of State in the Age of Catherine de medic 
London, 1962. 
-The Massacre of Saint Bartholomew and the European Conflict. 1559.7 
Londm, i, Ia73. 
-Princes, Politics and Religion, London, 1984. 
277 
Thibaudeau, A. -Histoire de Poitou, 3 vols, Niort, 1839-40. 
Thompson, J. W. -The Wars of Religion in France: The Huguenots, Catherine de Medici and 
Philip Il, Chicago, 1909. 
Tbme, P. O. de -Philippe II et Henri de Guise: Le debut de leurs relations", Revue 
historique, 1931. 
"Une paroisse rural du duchd d'Alengon: Saint-Germain de Claireteuille", Bulletin de la socidtd, 
historique at archdologique do lOme, 1893. 
Vaissibre, P. de -Recits du 'temps des troubles, XVr siöcle. Une Familie: las 
d'Alcgre, Paris, 1914. 
Valois, N. -Le conseil du roi au XIV, XV et XVP siecles. Nouvelles recherches 
suivies d'arrets et de procds-verbaux du consei, Paris, 1888. 
-"Les Etats de Pontoise (Rout 1561)', Revue hisforique de 1'6glise de 
France, 1943. 
Verel, C. -Le Marquisat de Nonant, Alencon, 1908. 
Wood, J. -The Nobility of the Election of Bayeux, 1463-1660: Continuity through 
Change, Princeton, 1980. 
278 BIEL 
LONDON 
UNIV 
